Kidwai, J.:— On the 14th October, 1935, Ishuri Lodh executed a bond for Rs. 600 in favour of Bulla Lodh in consideration of the money due under a promissory note. The bond provided for repayment by instalments of Rs. 60 per annum and provided that in case of default of any one instalment, the creditor would be entitled to obtain the whole of the balance at once. There was no stipulation for the payment of any interest.

The first two instalments were paid but there was default in the payment of the third instalment which fell due on the 14th October, 1938. On the 21st December, 1941 however, a sum of Rs. 18 was paid in respect of the bond. This payment. Was endorsed upon the back of the bond and the endorsement bore the thumb impression of Ishuri.

On the 14th September, 1944. Hulla instituted the suit out of which this application arises in the Court of Small Causes at Lucknow for recovery of a sum of Rs. 813 due under the bond together with interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum after a deduction of Rs. 138 acknowledged to have been paid. The plaint sought to exclude the period between 1st January, 1938 and the 1st January, 1947 in calculating the period of limitation on the ground that the defendant was an agriculturist within the meaning of Act X of 1937 (U.P Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act). Ishuri denied payment of Rs. 18 and pleaded that, even if this payment was proved, it did not extend limitation under section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act since it was not made within the period of three years prescribed by Article 75 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act. The liability to pay interest was denied and it was claimed that the amount shown in the bond as payable should be reduced because the original loan was only for Rs. 364 and the rest of Rs. 600 was interest. It was thus claimed that, at the most, only Rs. 286 could be allowed.

Upon the defendant taking the last-mentioned plea, the plaintiff made a declaration, said to be under section 4 the United Provinces Debt Redemption Act, that he would not execute the decree against the land, agricultural produce or person of the defendant.

The learned Judge, Small Cause Court, found that the payment of Rs. 18 on the 21st December, 1941, was proved and that it was duly endorsed at the back of the bond over the thumb-impression of the debtor. He also found that the bond did not stipulate for any interest and so no interest was payable. He accepted the declaration under section 4 and consequently did not deem it necessary to reopen the transaction in any case. He further held that section 20 of the Limitation Act did not apply to a case under Article 75 and that consequently the suit was barred by time.

The creditor has applied in revision under section 25 Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and it is contended on his behalf that section 20 of the Limitation Act does apply to the present case. That is the principal point which has to be considered.

In the present case the bond provided for payment by instalments and it was further stipulated that in case there was default in payment of any one instalment, the creditor could at once recover the entire balance due. It is not disputed that Article 75 of Schedule I of the Indian Limitation Act applies to a case such as the present one and that time began to run from the date of the default, i.e 14th October, 1938—vide Ram Kumar v. Baqridi. The period of limitation has, therefore, to be calculated from that date.

As the law stood no suit could, however, be brought at the time when the instalment fell due and for sometime afterwards by reason of Act X of 1937, and consequently section 5 of that Act provides that, in calculating this period of three years, the period during which Act X remained in force should be excluded. Thus limitation in this case expired on the lapse of three years from the 1st January, 1941, since Act X of 1937 exhausted itself on the 31st December, 1940.

It was contended by the learned advocate for the opposite-party that, in view of the decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court Shankar Lal v. Rana Lal Singh, the period which was excluded should not be taken into account for the purpose of section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act. The facts of that case are entirely different. That case related to section 52 of the United Provinces Court of Wards Act. In the case of an estate being taken under the Court of Wards, limitation does not cease to run and if the creditor fails to make a claim or to institute a suit within the period of limitation prescribed by law, his suit must fail, that is to say, the period prescribed by Schedule I of the Limitation Act remains unaffected by proceedings under the Court of Wards Act being commenced. Thus if the creditor allows the period prescribed to lapse, any subsequent action in the manner laid down under section 20 of the Limitation Act would not extend time and that is what happened in the Full Bench case. It was, however, argued that by reason of section 52 of the Court of Wards Act the period during which proceedings for taking an estate under the Court of Wards, remained pending should be excluded and that, therefore, the prescribed period had not expired when the acknowledgment was made under section 20. This contention was repelled by the Full Bench and their Lordships state in their decision:

“The question before us is a different one, namely, the effect of an acknowledgement made in a period which is excluded after the prescribed period has expired.”

Thus in that case all that was laid down was that the effect of section 52 was not such as to give retrospective effect to the law of limitation so as to extend the period of limitation as prescribed in section 20. That is not the position in the present case.

In Maqbool Ahmad v. Pratap Narain Singh their Lordships of the Judicial Committee were called upon to consider the effect of sections 4 and 14 of the Indian Limitation Act on the question of extension of time. Their Lordships say at page 86:

“The second period is the period of the long vacation. In regard to that matter, the appellants seem to their Lordships to be in a position which is in the nature of a dilemma. It is to be noted that there is a marked distinction in form between section 4 and section 14. The language employed in section 4 indicates that it has nothing to do with computing the prescribed period. What the section provides is that where the period prescribed expires on a day when the court is closed, notwithstanding that fact, the application may be made on the day that the court reopens; so that there is nothing in the section which alters the length of the prescribed period whereas in section 14 and other sections of a similar nature in the Act, the direction begins with the words: ‘In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any application,’ certain periods shall be excluded. It therefore seems to their Lordships that, where there is ground for excluding certain periods under section 14 in order to ascertain what is the date of the expiration of the prescribed period, the days excluded from operating by way of limitation have to be added to what is primarily the prescribed period: that is to say, if the prescribed period is three years, and twenty days ought to be excluded in order to determine when the prescribed period expires, twenty clays have to be added to the three years and the date of the expiration of the prescribed period is thus ascertained.”

Thus it appears from this decision which was subsequently followed in Puran Chand v. Abdullah that the period prescribed lapses not on the expiry of the definite number of years prescribed by Schedule. I but on the expiry of that number of years together with the period of time which is excluded from the calculation. In that case their Lordships held that the prescribed period being three years, and twenty days having to be excluded under section 14, the prescribed period expired after the lapse of three years and twenty days. On this calculation the prescribed period expired in this case on the expiry of three years from the 1st January, 1941. Thus the payment made on the 21st December, 1941, was within the prescribed period and came within the scope of section 20 of the Limitation Act.

Another contention was that section 20 of the Limitation Act does not apply at all to cases governed by Article 75. In support of this contention reliance was placed upon Gaya Din v. Khiali Ram. In that decision no doubt a general proposition to the effect contended for was laid down but there is absolutely no discussion of the question which did not really arise and a different view has been taken by a Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Rup Narain v. Tirbent Sahai. In that case it was laid down that payment made towards the debt and evidenced by writing on the back of the bond was sufficient to extent time under section 20 of the Limitation Act. In that case also the bond was an instalment bond to which Article 75, applied. The whole matter has been discussed by the learned Judges composing the Bench and it is not necessary for me to repeat the reasoning of the learned Judges which I respectfully follow.

In the present case, although the bond was an instalment bond, the whole money had already become due before the payment was made on the 21st December, 1941. Thus at the time when the payment was made, the plaintiff could have sued for the entire balance. In these circumstances the payment made extends limitation under section 20 of the Limitation Act.

The result is that this application must, be allowed and the decree of the learned Judge, Small Cause Court, must be set aside.

There still remains the question, however, as to the amount which is actually due and as to whether the transaction could be re opened in view of the fact that it was based upon a promissory note for a smaller amount. These questions have not been decided by the learned Judge in the lower court because he was of the opinion that the declaration filed under section 4 of the Debt Redemption Act was sufficient. That declaration, however, cannot be taken into account at all because section 4 of the Debt Redemption Act prescribes that the declaration must be made in the case of a suit filed after the coming into force of that Act in the plaint. In the present case the declaration was not made in the plaint and it cannot be considered at all. The court was, therefore, bound to proceed to determine the amount due by applying the provisions of the United Provinces Debt Redemption Act without taking into consideration the declaration made. Since it has not done so, it will now restore the suit to its old number and proceed to decide the points left undecided by it in the light of the above observations.

In the circumstances the parties will bear their own costs.

Application allowed.