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  • Indian Arbitration Act and the provisions
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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 6 December 1917 the defendants, trading as Joylal and Co., executed a sold note addressed to the plaintiff, Gopiram Bhotica, for 150,000 yards of Hessian cloth (delivery scheduled January–March 1918). Clause 12 of the sold note provided that "Any dispute whatsoever arising on or out of this contract shall be referred to arbitration under the rules of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce ... and such decision shall be accepted as final and binding on both parties to the contract."

In January–April 1918 the plaintiff repeatedly requested and/or refused delivery orders and denied liability in correspondence after the defendants presented payments and difference bills (including a difference bill for Rs. 13,625). On 18 November 1918 the defendants applied to the Registrar, Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, requesting constitution of a tribunal. On 18 December 1918 the plaintiff filed suit seeking (a) a declaration that the defendants were not entitled to proceed with arbitration (arguing they acted only as brokers), and (b) an injunction restraining the defendants from proceeding with arbitration pending the suit.

The trial Judge, Chaudhuri, J., initially granted and subsequently made absolute a rule restraining the defendants from further proceeding with the arbitration pending the suit, on grounds including allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and that the matter involved difficult questions of law and custom rendering it a matter for the Court rather than the Chamber.

The defendants appealed. On appeal Sanderson, C.J. reviewed the grounds advanced below and the competing submissions and ultimately allowed the appeal, setting aside the interlocutory injunction with costs. Mookerjee, J., and Fletcher, J., agreed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the arbitration clause applied to the defendants (Joylal and Co.) who had signed the sold note as "Brokers" — i.e., whether they were "parties to the contract" within the meaning of the arbitration clause.
  2. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction restraining arbitration proceedings instituted under the arbitration clause.
  3. If the Court has jurisdiction, whether it should exercise its discretion to grant an interlocutory injunction in the present circumstances (including whether the suit was instituted primarily to prevent arbitration and whether the matters in dispute were appropriate for arbitration).
  4. Whether a local custom (alleged in Calcutta that brokers become responsible to buyers and sellers and may receive or pay damages) should be read into the contract and treated as converting brokers into "parties" for the arbitration clause.
  5. Whether arbitration would be rendered futile (or arbitrators functus officio) by the institution of the suit, or whether an award could be executed against the plaintiff before he could obtain relief from a court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff) — Gopiram Bhotica

  • The arbitration clause applied only to disputes between "parties to the contract" — defined, he argued, as the buyer and the seller — and did not cover defendants who signed merely as brokers.
  • Even accepting the alleged Calcutta custom, the brokers did not thereby become parties to the contract "for all purposes" or to the extent of falling within the arbitration clause.
  • The question whether the defendants were parties to the contract should be decided by the Court and not by the arbitral tribunal.
  • It would be unreasonable to import the alleged custom into the contract in a manner that would make brokers parties to the contract within the meaning of the arbitration clause.
  • The institution of the suit made the arbitrators appointed (or to be appointed) functus officio and rendered arbitration proceedings futile.
  • The plaintiff argued that in India, unlike under English practice, an award might be executed against him as soon as it was filed, before he could obtain court relief — implying the need for interlocutory relief to prevent irreparable prejudice.

Respondents (Defendants) — Joylal and Co.

  • There existed a well-known Calcutta custom in transactions in gunny, Hessian and similar goods by which brokers are held responsible to both buyers and sellers for performance and may receive or pay damages; under that custom brokers effectively become parties for contract incidents.
  • Whether brokers are parties to the contract depended on the express terms of the contract and the incidents to be read into it by reason of the custom — a matter for the arbitration tribunal to decide.
  • The question whether the defendants disclosed the names of their principals when presenting the sold note was a factual issue for the arbitral tribunal.
  • The Court had no jurisdiction to restrain arbitration proceedings by injunction because such proceedings did not, in their submission, constitute interference with any legal right of the plaintiff; alternatively, even if the Court had jurisdiction, there were no sufficient grounds to exercise it in this case.
  • Any alleged procedural difference between Indian arbitration practice and English practice did not justify a novel practice of granting interlocutory injunctions to restrain arbitrations.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sardarmull Jessraj v. Agar Chand Mahata & Co. (judgment of Rankin, J.) The judgment emphasises that procedural differences between the Indian Arbitration Act and English rules do not justify creating a novel practice of granting interlocutory injunctions to interfere with arbitration; the matter is procedural rather than substantive and should not alone lead to interlocutory relief. The court relied on this reasoning to reject the plaintiff's contention that the possibility of immediate execution of an award in India (as distinct from English practice) justified granting an interlocutory injunction; Sanderson, C.J. treated the precedent as supplying the answer on that point and as support for refusing to develop a new interlocutory practice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Sanderson, C.J. conducted a focused analysis grounded on discretion, procedural suitability of arbitration, and the limits of interlocutory relief. The court proceeded as follows:

  1. Scope and character of the suit: The Court observed that the suit appeared to have been instituted primarily to prevent arbitration proceedings. The trial judge had rested his injunction on grounds including allegations of fraud and complex questions of law and custom, but on appeal the plaintiff's counsel did not support those specific grounds.
  2. Question of status of the brokers: The Court noted the central factual and contractual dispute — whether the defendants, who signed as brokers, were "parties to the contract" for the purposes of the arbitration clause. The Court recognized an evidentiary dispute (for example, whether the defendants disclosed their principals when presenting the sold note) that it was not in a position to resolve on interlocutory appeal and which properly lay for determination by the tribunal adjudicating the dispute.
  3. Custom and its import into the contract: The Court acknowledged the defendants' allegation of a Calcutta custom that renders brokers responsible to both buyers and sellers and that the custom could import incidents into the contract. The Court treated the ascertainment of such a custom and its contractual effect as matters for the arbitration tribunal.
  4. Jurisdiction to grant injunction: The Court stated it was unnecessary to decide definitively whether it had jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining arbitration. Importantly, even assuming jurisdiction existed, the Court concluded that it should not exercise that discretion in the present case.
  5. Procedural considerations and precedent: Addressing the plaintiff's argument that an award could be executed in India before the plaintiff could seek to restrain its execution (distinguishing the case from English practice), Sanderson, C.J. relied on Rankin, J.'s reasoning in Sardarmull Jessraj v. Agar Chand Mahata & Co. The court adopted the view that differences of procedure between Indian and English arbitration practice did not warrant initiating a new interlocutory practice of routinely granting injunctions to interfere with arbitration.
  6. Discretion and suitability of arbitration: Given that the suit could not determine all matters in dispute (for example, the precise amount due to defendants), and because the matters were not shown to be inappropriate for arbitration, the court concluded that an interlocutory injunction was not justified. The judgment below rested on grounds not supported by the plaintiff on appeal, further undermining the basis for continuing the injunction.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal was allowed and the interlocutory injunction previously granted restraining the defendants from proceeding with arbitration was set aside with costs both in this Court and in the Court below.

Implications:

  • The arbitration proceedings before the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce may proceed; the tribunal is to adjudicate the factual and contractual issues (including whether the defendants are parties to the contract, and whether any local custom should be read into the contract).
  • The Court declined to establish a novel interlocutory practice to restrain arbitration on the basis of procedural differences between Indian and English arbitration practice; the opinion relies on existing precedent to resist such an expansion of interlocutory relief.
  • Direct effect: the plaintiff's attempt to restrain arbitration by interlocutory injunction failed and the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs; the decision does not purport to set a new legal precedent beyond applying and following earlier authority on the limits of interlocutory interference with arbitration.

Decision reported: Appeal allowed. Judges Sanderson, C.J., Mookerjee, J., and Fletcher, J. (unanimous as to result).

    Joylal And Co. v. Gopiram Bhotica

    Sanderson, C.J:— This is an appeal from the judgment of my learned brother Chaudhuri, J., by which he made absolute a Rule calling upon the defendants, Joylal and Co., to show cause why an injunction should not be granted restraining them, until the final disposal of the suit or further order of the Court, from further proceeding with the arbitration proceedings in respect of contract No. 13,700, dated 6th December 1917. It appears that on the abovementioned date the defendants had entered into a contract with the plaintiff. It was in the form of a sold note and was addressed to the plaintiff Gopiram Bhotica and was as follows:

    “We have this day sold by your order and on your account to our principals 150,000 yards Hessian cloth”

    2. Of a description and quality therein stated. It was signed by the defendants as “Brokers,” Delivery was to be January to March 1918, 50,000 yards monthly. The contract contained a Clause, 12, which ran as follows:

    “Any dispute whatsoever arising on or out of this contract shall be referred to arbitration under the rules of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce applicable for the time being for decision, and such decision, shall be accepted as final and binding on both parties to the contract.”

    3. In January 1918, the plaintiff asked for a delivery order for 50,000 yards. This request was not complied with and on 31st January 1918, Messrs Khaitan and Co., on behalf of the defendants, tendered Rs. 8,750 as the value of the goods deliverable under the said contract. The goods not having been delivered, on 12th February 1918 the defendants sent a difference bill for Rs. 13,625 and demanded payment of that sum. On 20th February 1918, the plaintiff wrote the following letter:

    “I am surprised to receive your letter of the 12th instant delivered me late by post, enclosing your difference bill No. 15571, dated 6th current, for Rs. 13,625 and in reply beg to point out to you that due date price charged therein is not correct. Please amend the due date price as settled with you on the due date at Rs. 37 per 100 yards, and send me back at your earliest convenience far payment and oblige. Your bill is returned herewith.”

    4. On 25th February 1918, the defendants asked the plaintiff for delivery order for further 50,000 yards cloth. After several letters the plaintiff wrote the letter dated 6th March 1918. It is as follows:

    “I am in receipt of your letter of 2nd instant, delivered me late by the post office and in reply I challenge your right of purchasing the goods against me after due date. I regret I cannot entertain your claim.”

    5. A difference bill was sent and the plaintiff replied on 16th March 1918 as follows:

    “I have no other alternative but to refer you to my letter of 6th current. I deny my liability in the matter.”

    6. A similar demand for delivery order was made in respect of the March consignment, and upon a difference bill being submitted by the defendants, the plaintiff on 11th April 1918 denied his liability. On 18th November 1918 the defendants wrote to the Registrar, Tribunal of Arbitration, the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, submitting their statement and requesting the constitution of a Tribunal of Arbitration upon the matters in dispute between the defendants and the plaintiff. On 18th December 1918 the plaint in the suit was filed: in it the plaintiff asked:

    “(a) For a declaration that the defendant firm is not entitled to proceed with the said arbitration or claim any damages under the said contract in which he acted merely as broker: (b) for an injunction to restrain the defendant firm from proceeding with the said arbitration pending before the tribunal of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.”

    7. On the same day an application was made by the plaintiff for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants from proceeding with the arbitration. The learned Judge on that day granted a rule which, as already stated, was made absolute on 4th June 1919. The learned Judge's decision was based upon certain grounds which were as follows:

    “I think however having regard to the character of the suit and the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation made and also as it involves difficult questions of law and custom, it is a fit case for this Court and incompetent for the Chamber, and the arbitration should be stayed.”

    8. On the hearing of this appeal, the learned counsel for the plaintiff said that he did not support the grounds of the judgment, but he relied upon certain points upon which he argued he could support the judgment. The first was that the arbitration clause was confined to disputes arising between “parties to the contract,” which, he contended, means the buyer and the seller and that the defendants, who signed the contract merely as brokers, were not parties to the contract of purchase and sale within the meaning of the clause. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the defendants that there is in Calcutta a well-known custom by which brokers in contracts in gunny, Hessian and other manufactured jute goods are held responsible by both buyers and sellers for the performance of the said contracts and that the brokers themselves either receive the damages or pay the same. The learned counsel for the plaintiff did not dispute the alleged custom, but he contended that the brokers did not by reason thereof become parties to the contract for all purposes or to such an extent that they could be said to be parties to the contract within the meaning of the arbitration clause. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the question whether the defendants were parties to the contract should be decided by the Court. On the other hand, the defendants contended that this was a question which depended upon the express terms of the contract and the terms which would have to be read into it by reason of the custom, and that it was a question which should be left to the Arbitration Tribunal for decision. There was a dispute on a question of fact between the parties as to whether the defendants at the time of presenting the sold note to the plaintiff disclosed the name of their principals, Messrs Amarchand Madhoji and Co. Upon that question I am not in a position to express any opinion at present: it is a question which will have to be decided by the tribunal which adjudicates upon the dispute. It was further contended on behalf of the plaintiff that if the result of incorporating the alleged custom into the terms of the contract was to make the brokers “a party to the contract” within the meaning of the arbitration clause, it was unreasonable. Another contention on behalf of the plaintiff was that by reason of the institution of the suit, the arbitrators appointed or to be appointed by the Chamber of Commerce were or would be functus officio and that the arbitration proceeding would be futile; and lastly it was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the Court should exercise its discretion and dismiss the appeal on the ground that the injunction would be the means of avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings.

    9. The defendants contended that the alleged custom was not unreasonable, and that in any event it was for the Tribunal of Arbitration to ascertain the custom and to decide what incidents are thereby imported into the contract. It was further urged on behalf of the defendants that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the arbitration proceedings by injunction, as such proceedings do not constitute an interference with any legal right of the plaintiff; that the alleged grounds, namely, that the defendants were not a “party to the contract” and that the arbitration proceedings consequently would be futile, were not sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction, and that even if the Court had jurisdiction to grant an injunction, there was no ground in this case for the exercise of such jurisdiction. It was then urged on behalf of the plaintiff that the arbitration proceedings might not be futile because in this country the award, if made against the plaintiff, could be executed as soon as it was filed and before the plaintiff could move the Court to restrain execution, and that this distinguished the case from the English cases based on the English Arbitration Act. I think the judgment of Rankin, J., in Sardarmull Jessraj v. Agar Chand Mahata & Co. (1) supplies the answer on this point. The learned Judge says:

    “I think it is a matter of procedure and not of substance that the party complaining in such a case would have to apply to the Court to have the document taken off the file. I do not think that I ought to start granting interlocutory injunctions upon novel considerations, and attempt to commence a new system as regards interfering with arbitrators in such matters by reason of this difference in practice between the Indian Arbitration Act and the provisions of the English rules”

    10. I do not think that it is necessary in this case for us to decide the question whether the Court has jurisdiction to grant an injunction: for, in my judgment assuming that the Court has jurisdiction, we ought not now to exercise that jurisdiction. The judgment of the learned Judge having been based on grounds, which the learned counsel for the plaintiff did not support, it is entirely in the discretion of this Court, to grant or refuse an injunction; and in the circumstances of this case in my judgment an interlocutory injunction should not be granted. The suit in this case was obviously instituted for the purpose of preventing the arbitration proceedings: it is not a suit in which all the questions which are in dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants could be decided, e.g, the amount, if any, which is due to the defendants in respect of the contract could not be ascertained in the suit: and. I am not able at the present stage of the proceedings to say that the matters in dispute between the parties are such as should not be submitted to and decided by the Arbitration Tribunal. For these reasons in my judgment the appeal should be allowed and the interlocutory injunction should be set aside with costs both in this Court and in the Court below.

    Mookerjee, J.:— I agree.

    Fletcher, J.:— I agree.

    V.B/R.K

    11. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Joylal And Co. v. Gopiram Bhotica
    (Dec 2, 1919)