Fazl Ali, J.:— This is an appeal from a decree passed by the Subordinate Judge of Gaya in a suit brought by the plaintiff to recover a sum of Rs. 26,795-11-8 from defendants 1 to 3. Defendants 1 and 2 are full brothers and defendant 3 is the son of defendant 1. These three defendants were admittedly members of a joint family of which defendant 1 was the manager or karta till 1932 (1339 F). The case of the plaintiff is that defendant 1 as karta of the family borrowed (1) Rs. 4,869 on 5th December 1929, (2) Rs. 7,200 on 22nd March 1931, (3) Rs. 10.034-7-0 on 27th September 1931, and executed a promissory note in favour of the plaintiff for the particular sum borrowed on each occasion. The trial Court decreed the suit against all three defendants holding that the hand-notes were genuine and that defendant 1 had borrowed the sums mentioned in them for family necessity. This appeal has been preferred by defendants 2 and 3 (defendant 1 not appealing) and the only questions which are raised by them are (1) that the plaintiff's action being based upon promissory notes, no decree should have been passed against defendants 2 and 3 who had not signed them, and (2) that the finding of the trial Court as to the existence of legal necessity for the loans taken by defendant 1 was not correct. In arguing the first point the learned advocate for the appellant greatly relied on 46 IA 33 : 46 Cal 663.1 In that case a question arose whether a person whose name did not appear on certain hundis (which are negotiable instruments) could be made liable under them on the ground that the person who had drawn the hundis was his agent. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee answered the question in the negative and observed as follows:
It is not sufficient that the principal's name should be ‘in some way’ disclosed; it must be disclosed in such a way that on any fair interpretation of the instrument his name is the real name of the person liable upon the bills. Their Lordships' attention was directed to Sections 26, 27 and 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, and the terms of these sections were contrasted with the corresponding provisions of the English Statute. It is unnecessary in this connexion to decide whether their effect is identical. It is sufficient to say that these sections contain nothing inconsistent with the principles already enunciated, and nothing to support the contention, which is contrary to all established rales, that in an action on a bill of exchange or promissory note against a person whose name properly appears as party to the instrument, it is open either by way of claim or defence to show that the signatory was in reality acting for an undisclosed principal.
2. In view of these observations it has been held in a number of recent cases that the karta of a joint Hindu family cannot by executing a promissory note in his own name bind the other members of the family, no other names appearing on the document as those of persons to be charged: see, 52 Cal 802;2 41 CLJ 535;3 21 MLJ 526;4 15 PLT 1005 and 16 PLT 117.6 The Allahabad High Court has, however, taken a different view in 44 All 3937 and held that there is no inherent reason why the managing member of a joint Hindu family cannot in that capacity execute in his sole name a promissory note which should be binding on the family as a whole and the property owned by it. The learned Judges who decided that case have explained the decision of the Privy Council by pointing out that the position of the head of the joint Hindu family is not the same as that of an ordinary business agent and that a joint Hindu family, being a legal person according to Hindu law lawfully represented by and acting through the managing member or head thereof, is included ordinarily in term ‘a person’. A similar view had been expressed by two eminent Judges of the Madras High Court in 23 Mad 5978 and both these decisions have been followed by the Lahore High Court in AIR 1933 Lah 4949 and by a Single Judge of this Court in 14 PLT 623.10 It may also be stated that before the decision of the Judicial Committee in Janki Das v. Maharaja Sir Kishan Prasad the High Court of Calcutta had also held in several cases that the karta of a joint Hindu family could bind the other members of the family by signing a promissory note for family purposes: see, 7 CWN 72511 and 11 CWN 139.12
3. Now the view expressed in these cases has this advantage that it enables the Court to grant the same relief in a suit based on a promissory note as in a suit for debt and therefore makes it unnecessary for it to decide whether the suit belongs to one category or the other. The distinction between these two classes of suits is too well recognized to be overlooked, but so far as this country is concerned, the line of distinction becomes highly artificial in many cases, firstly because except in a few mercantile towns a promissory note is not popularly regarded as a negotiable instrument; and, secondly, because the distinction depends largely on the view one takes of the pleadings, and the pleadings in the mofussil Courts are generally defective and badly drafted. Besides, so far as the Hindu law goes, it does not recognize any distinction between the liability of the joint family when the debt is contracted by its karta under a promissory note and its liability when the debt is contracted otherwise. Under that law all that is necessary to make every member of the family liable is that the debt should have been contracted for legal necessity or for the benefit of the family. Where therefore the benefit is proved, the Court will not be justified in refusing to grant the appropriate relief to the creditor, unless it is compelled to do so by something to be found in the Negotiable Instruments Act or the principles under, lying it.
4. Under the law of negotiable instruments, as has been explained by the Judicial Committee in Sadasukh Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Prasad it seems necessary that the name of the person to be charged should be disclosed in the document in such a way that the responsibility is made plain and can be instantly recognized as the document passes from hand to hand. Now, the joint Hindu family is an institution peculiar to this country and the law gives its karta the power to contract loans for the benefit of the family according to his own discretion and without any express authority from the other members of the family. Therefore when the karta borrows money for the family purpose he is not acting as an agent for an undisclosed principal or principals but may well be regarded as the principal. At any rate when he acts as a karta, he acts in a capacity which is so well known that there can be no misapprehension as to the identity of the person or persons whom he purports to bind by his act. On the whole therefore I am inclined to think that the rule laid down in Sadasukh Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Prasad is not applicable to a Hindu family and I am to some extent fortified in my view by the later pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in 15 PLT 99.13 In that case a suit had been brought on the basis of two promissory notes executed by the manager of a joint Hindu family against the surviving members of that family after the death of the manager who had executed the promissory notes. The Judicial Committee in dealing with the case observed: (1) that it would be within the authority of the karta of the joint family to borrow money in his own name if it be necessary for the proper conduct of the joint family business that money should be borrowed from time to time on promissory notes, and (2) the fact of the promissory note being signed by the karta is equally consistent with the borrowing by him for his own individual purpose or borrowing for the purpose of the joint family business.
5. The matter, however, need not be pursued any further because I agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that on the pleadings of the parties the present suit should be treated as a suit for recovery of debt. This is clear on reading paras. 3 and of the plaint where after stating the amounts which were borrowed by defendant 1 on different occasions it is stated that the three handnotes were executed “in proof of his taking the aforesaid loans”. Again in para. 6 of the plaint the defendants are sought to be made liable on the ground that “they were benefited by the loans” and in para. 8 it is clearly stated that the cause of action accrued on the dates on which the loans were taken and the handnotes sned upon were executed.
6. It is true that in para. 9 of the plaint the plaintiff asked for a decree “on account of the three handnotes sued upon”, but the plaint must be read as a whole and if read as a whole, it supports the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge that the suit was in essence a suit for debt and therefore all the members of the family would be liable to repay the debt if they were contracted for legitimate family necessity. The next question to be considered is whether the debts were in fact contracted for family necessity. (After discussing the evidence his Lordship came to the conclusion that defendant 1 contracted the loans in question not for his own use bub for the benefit of the family and that both defendants 2 and 3 were benefited by the loans, and the judgment proceeded.) There is only one other point which remains to be dealt with. In cases where a loan is contracted by the managing member of a joint family a question often arises at the time of the execution of the decree as to the extent of the liability of the other members of the family for the debt. This question has arisen in this particular case also as will appear from the connected miscellaneous appeal before us and it seems therefore to be necessary that the decree of the Court should be prepared in such a way as to make the position clear. In 12 PLT 707,14 two learned Judges of this Court have quoted with approval the following passage from Mulla's Hindu Law as correctly summarizing the law on the subject:
In the case of debts contracted by a manager, in pursuance of his implied authority in the ordinary course of the family business, there is a distinction between the liability of a manager and the liability of his coparceners. The manager is liable not only to the extent of his share in the joint family property, bat, being a party to the contract, he is liable personally, that is to say, his separate property is also liable. But as regards the other oo-parceners, they are liable only to the extent of their interest in the family property, unless, in the case of adult oo-parceners, the contract sued upon, though par-porting to have been entered into by the manager alone is in reality one to which they are actual contracting parties, or one to which they can be treated as being contracting parties by reason of their conduct, or one which they have subsequently ratified.
7. Now in this particular case so far as defendants 1 and 3 are concerned, the position is perfectly simple. The former as the executant of the handnotes is personally liable for the debts contracted under all of them and defendant 3 who is a minor is liable for these debts only to the extent of his interest in the joint family property. As to defendant 2, 1 am of opinion that he is personally liable for the loan contracted under the handnote dated 27th September 1931. I have already stated that the mortgage bond (Ex. 3) dated 19th September 1932 which was executed by him as well as by defendant 1 refers in clear terms to the promissory note in question and I may quote the exact words used in the bond which are as follows:
We paid rent with interest on the default of instalment for 1928 to the said ijaradar by taking a loan from Babu Sidheshwar Prasad Narain Singh etc. etc., under a handnote for Rs. 10,034-7-0.
8. I think that this statement, the correctness of which there is no reason to doubt, brings the case of defendant 1 within the exception referred to in the passage quoted above and amounts to a ratification of the loan. Defendant 2 is therefore personally liable so far as the debt contracted under the handnote of 27th September 1931 is concerned but he is liable only to the extent of his share in the joint family property in respect of the debts contracted under the other two handnotes. I would therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs and direct that in the decree which is to be prepared in this Court the amount due under the three handnotes should be calculated separately and it should be made clear that defendant 1 is personally liable for the debts due under all the three handnotes that defendant 2 is personally liable only in respect of the debt contracted under the third handnote and that defendant 3 is not personally liable under any of the debts but is liable only to the extent of his Interest in the joint family property.
Madan, J.:— I fully agree.
S.C/D.S
9. Appeal dismissed.