ORDER OF REFERENCE TO A FULL BENCH
The question for determination in this case is whether the compensation for improvements is to be paid for at the rates stipulated for in the demises of 1876 or in accordance with the provisions of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act. In the Full Bench ruling reported in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kantian, it was held that in the case of a contract made prior to 1st January 1886, the rate of compensation is governed by the terms of the contract. In a subsequent case repoted in Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter. Benson and Krishnaswami Ayyar, JJ., expressed an opinion (obiter) that if a contract as to the rate of compensation is unfavourable to the tenant even though it has been entered into before 1st January 1886, he is entitled to claim compensation under Sect. 5 of the Act at the rates prescribed in Sects. 9-18, and remarked that this opinion was not opposed to the Full Bench ruling in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan as the question therein answered was whether the making of the improvements after 1886 disentitled the tenants to the rates fixed by the contract before that date. This, we think, hardly expresses the matter correctly. Although the question in dispute in the suit was as to the rate payable for improvements made after 1886, the question referred to the Full Bench was couched in general terms as follows:
“In the case of a contract made prior to 1st January 1886, is the rate of compensation which a tenant is entitled to receive governed by the terms of the contract or by the provisions of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Acts of 1887 and 1900?”, and the answer given was that in the case of a contract made prior to 1st January 1886, the rate of compensation is governed by the terms of the contract. This being so, we do not think that the facts of the case can warrant us in reading into the answer a modificaton that is not there, for the decision of the Full Bench is merely an answer to the question prounded and is not, unless expressly so stated, to be considered as a decision which must be construed as governed by the facts of the case in which the reference is prounded, when no reference is made to those facts in the question referred to the Full Bench. The same view of the law was followed by another Divisional Bench (Benson and Sundara Aiyar, JJ.) in Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan and it was held that Sect. 19 of the Act referred only to contracts which took away or limited the right of a tenant both to make improvements and to claim compensation for them, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and not to contracts which merely regulated the amount of compensation that they could claim. In Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman, two other learned Judges of this Court (Sadasiva Aiyar and Tyabji, JJ.) thinking that the decisions in Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter and in Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan, were not in accordance with the Full Bench ruling in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan and that the distinction drawn between the right of a tenant to make improvements and to claim compensation for them and his right to claim under an agreement which does not expressly refer to his power to nuke improvements was somewhat hypercritical, referred the following questions to a Full Bench.
(1) “Whether a contract which is made prior to the 1st January 1886 and which regulates the rates of compensation claimable by the tenant for improvements or provides for methods of fixing the amount of compensation due to him (such rates or methods not being in accordance with the provisions in Sects. 5 and 6 of the said Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act) but which does not expressly refer to the tenant's right to make improvements, is not binding on him if such a contract is less favourable to him than Sects. 5 and 6 of the Act, and whether the tenant is entitled to repudiate the contract and to claim compensation according to the provisions of the Act, and whether Sect. 19 of the Act affects such contracts.”
(2) “Whether Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter and Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan have correctly interpreted the Full Bench decision in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan.”
The reply of the Full Bench to the first question was that the contract mentioned therein was not binding on the tenant if it is less favourable to him than Sects. 5 and 6 of the Act. In reply to the second question, the Court was of opinion that having regard to the question which the Court had to consider in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan there was no inconsistency between the judgments in that case and the judgments in Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter and in Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan and remarked in conclusion “we are not prepared to say that the last two cases were not rightly decideu.” It will thus appear that the prior ruling in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kunnan, was not disssented from, and as regards I.L.R, 34 Mad., 61 and I.L.R, 36 Mad., 410 it was held that they were not wrongly decided. In Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter the case was decided quite apart from the opinion expressed obiter which the learned referring Judges in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman, considered to be in conflict with the ruling in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan and in Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan the contract under consideration was of a peculiar nature and did not merely regulate the rates of compensation. It would appear therefore that both the Full Bench rulings, i.e, in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan and in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman, are stiil in force and are binding on us. The question for decision in the case before us now is whether the rate of compensation which the tenans are entitled to receive is to be governed by the contracts of 1876 or by the provisions of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Art. According to the decision in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan the tenants are entitled only to the rate of compensation contained in the contract. The question might however be put in the form of the first question referred to the Full Bench in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman and according to the opinion expressed in that case the answer must be that the contract is not binding on the tenant, if it is less favourable to him than Sects 5 and 6 of the Act and consequently the tenants would be entitled to the higher rates provided in the Act. These two answers in the present case are directly conflicting, and as both the rulings are binding on us, the latter one not having in any way dissented from the former, we are in doubt as to which ruling to follow and think that the question should be again referred to a Full Bench. No doubt in Abdula Rowthan v. Raja Vasudeva Ravivarma, one of the referring Judges in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman, Sadasiva Aiyar and Najier, JJ., interpreted the ruling on their reference as holding that the decision in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan should not be construed as negativing the tenant's right to claim compensation according to the Act if the terms of the agreement are less favourable to him but we are unable to trace such a ruling in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman, where it is only stated that I.L.R 34 Marl. 61 and I.L.R 36 Mad. 410 were not inconsistent with I.L.R 32 Mad. 1, and were rightly decided. As we have pointed out, I.L.R 34. Mad. 61 was decided on quite a different point and I.L.R 36 Mad. 410 related to a contract of a somewhat peculiar nature unlike the usual contract regulatig the rate of compensation. As regards the provisions of Sect. 19 of the Act and the opinion held in Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter and in Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan(5), that the section only refers to contracts limiting the right to make improvements and to claim compensation and not to contracts merely regulating the rate of compensation payable, we would like to identify ourselves with the remarks made by the referring judges in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman, and would also add a further observation which seems to have escaped notice in the cases referred to above. Sect. 19 of the Act prescribes that contracts of a certain class made after 1st January 1886 shall be inoperative, but it is not apparent that the provisions of the section affect in any way contracts made before that date. Any contracts made before that date whether of the class referred to in Sect. 19 or of any other nature, must be considered and their validity determined according to law apart from any consideration of Sect. 19, which does not purport to be restrospective in effect. In the case therefore of a contract regulating the rate of compensation payable and entered into before 1st January 1886, the question for determination does not seem to us to be, whether it is a contract of the nature contemplated in Sect 19, but whether it is a contract which is valid and binding according to law, and more especially the law as contained in Sect. 28 and other provisions of the Contract Act. If prior contracts of the nature specified in Sect. 19 are rendered invalid by reason of the passing of the Tenants' Improvements Act or are invalid in law for any other reason, Sect, 19 would appear to be superfluous, for contracts after 1st January 1886 would be invalid for the same reason and there is no reason for declaring their invalidity by a special provision of the legislature.
We therefore again refer the following questions for determination by a Full Bench as they are questions which are constantly cropping up and in many cases as in the present one, large sums of money are involved.
1. When a contract his been entered into between a Malabar tenant and his landlord before 1st January 1886, according to which compensation is payable at certain rates therein specified, is such contract valid and binding on them, whether the rates are more or less favourable to either party than the rates prescribed by the Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act?
2 When the question of the rate of compensation comes up for determination at a date after the introduction of the Act, can either party to a contract entered into before 1st January 1886 elect to have the rates fixed according to the Act in preference to the rates mentioned in the contract?
[This Second Appeal came on for hearing on this day pursuant to the above Order of Reference, befor the Full Bench as constituted above]
Mr. C. V. Anantakrishna Aiyar (Mr. P. V. Parameswara Aiyar with him) for the Appellants:—The Malabar Compensation for Tenant's Improvements Act is really retrospective. Act I of 1900, which amended the Act of 1876 and thereby secured to the tenants the market-value of the improvements, cannot be intended to refer only to improvements to be made in future. The rates mentioned in the Act ha\e been applied even to pending suits; see I.L.R, 13 Mad., 502. Sect. 19 of the Act of 1900 does not govern Sect. 5 of the Act. The non-mention of Sect. 19 in Sect. 6 while the other Sects, viz., 8 to 18 are mentioned, is significant. Sect. 5 abrogates contract as well as custom. See Sect. 4 of the repealed Act. If contract can prevail against the provisions, of the Act, then logic would require that custom also can prevail. That would be to make the provisions of the Act wholly nugatory. The absence of any saving clause in the Act shows that the legislature did not intend to protect any contracts whatsoever.
It is the privilege of the tenant always to choose whether he will abide by the contract or by the Act. See (1899) 1 Q. B. 465, (1899) 2 Q.B 618 and (1911) A.C 246, all cases under the English Agricultural Holdings Act (1883). See also I.L.R, 20 Mad., 435.
So far as the decisions of this Court are concerned, the latest ruling in I.L.R, 38 Mad., 589 (F.B) enunciates the correct position. I.L.R, 21 Mad., 149 was a case of contract after the Act and I.L.R, 33 Mad., 218 related to the question of custom. I.L.R, 32 Mad., I (F. B.) is clearly distinguishable. It assumed that the contract was valid and decided only that the contract being valid, the same rates mentioned therein would apply whether the improvements were effected before or after the Act. I.L.R, 34 Mad, 61 and I.L.R, 36 Mad., 410 are clearly in my favour and explain the true scope and import of the decision in I.L.R, 32 Mad., 1. That the explanation given therein is correct is also clear from I L.R 38 Mad., 589 (F.B). It is clear therefore that Sect. 19 does not refer to a contract fixing rates alone. It is only if the tenant's right to improvements is limited or taken away whether with or without a limitation as to the rates that Sect. 19 applies. See also (1913) M.W.N, 52, 29 M.L.J, 316, and 28 I. C. 679.
Mr. C. Madhavan Nair for the Respondents:—Sect. 19 in the Act of 1900, is simply a re-enactment of Sect. 7 of the old Act. Sect. 7 was the subject of judicial consideration in I.L.R 33 Mad., 218. The legislature has in Sect. 19 simply given effect to the construction put by their Lordships in I.L.R, 33 Mad., 218 on the old Sect. 7 as clearly saving contracts prescribing rates. The earlier Full Bench ruling in I.L.R, 32 Mad., 1 is the only correct exposition of the law on the point and the decisions in I.L.R, 34 Mad., 61, I.L.R, 36 Mad., 410 and I.L.R, 38 Mad., 589 (F. B.) are all wrong and are clearly opposed to the provisions of Sect. 19 which only abrogates contracts made after the Act.
OPINION
The decision of the Full Bench of four Judges in 1891 in Kerala Varmah Valia Raja v. Ondan Ramunni proceeded upon the footing that the intention of the legislature was that contracts made before the date mentioned should stand unaffected by the Act, in other words that Sects. 5 and 6 (corresponding to Sects. 4 and 5 of the earlier Act) did not apply to cases governed by such contracts. This was expressly decided in Viru Mammad v. Krishnan. As this contention was not in accordance with the intention of the legislature it would hardly have refrained from putting the matter right when repealing and re-enacting the act with modifications in 1899. In 1908 it was again held by a Full Bench in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan, that Sect. 19 (formerly 7) did not affect the validity of contracts made prior to the 1st of January 1886 whether the improvements were made before or after the coming into force of the Act of 1887. In 1900 Benson and Krishnaswami Aiyar, JJ., in Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter whilst disposing of the case on another ground, suggested that, while prior contracts dealing with right to make improvements and claim compensation for them were saved under the Act, this was not the case with prior contracts dealing only with the rates at which compensation was to be paid. This view was adopted in Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan in 1911 by Benson and Sundara Aiyar, JJ., who refused to give effect to a contract made prior to January 1886 which did not restrict the tenant's right to make improvements but only the rates payable for such improvements. In 1913 Sadasiva Aiyar and Tyabji JJ., referred to a Full Bench the questions whether such contracts were enforceable, and whether the two last mentioned decisions were consistent with the Full Bench decision in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kuhi Kantian The Full Bench answered without assigning reasons that such contracts were not enforceable if less favourable to the tenant than Sects. 5 and 6 of the Act and that the decisions in Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter, and in Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan were not inconsistent with the Full Bench ruling in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan. The question has again been referred to a Full Bench by Spencer and Phillips, JJ., on the ground that the Full Bench decision in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman is inconsistent with the earlier Full Bench decision im Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan and that they are in doubt which to follow and has now come before a Bench of five Judges.
After hearing the whole question re-argued we agree with the referring-Judges in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman and in the present case that the view advanced in I.L.R 34 Mad. 61 and adopted in I. L. R. 36 Mad. 410 and accepted by the Full Bench in Kochu Rabia v. Abburahman cannot be supported. Sect. 19 (formerly 7) which deals in terms with future contracts cannot in our opinion he construed as dealing only with contracts which take away or limit the right of a tenant to make improvements and also limit his right to claim compensation for them under the Act, but applies equally to contracts which take away or limit either of these rights. It is we think clear that the legislature intended to prohibit all future contracts taking away or limiting either or both of these rights It is well settled that the word “and” may be read as “or” where it is necessary to do so in order to carry out the obvious intention of the legislature (Maxwell on Statutes 331, 3rd Edition). The existence of a proviso excluding from the operation of the section a particular class of contracts dealing with the compensation payable under the Act, and the insertion of the word “to” before “claim” when the original Sect. 7 was re-enacted as Sect, 19 also support this view. If, as we hold, contracts, affecting only the right to claim compensation come within the section, the suggested distinction fails, and we are bound, following the uniform course of decisions in this Court, to answer the first question referred to us in the affirmative and the second in the negative.
S. S.