Mullick, J.:— This second appeal arises out of a suit upon a mortgage executed on 16th of June 1906 in the district of Manbhum. At that time the Tenancy Act applicable to the district was Act 10 of 1859. That Act was repealed by the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 6 of 1908, so far as concerns the District of Manbhum on 22nd December, 1909. The present suit was brought on 15th June, 1916. In it the plaintiff prayed for the enforcement of the mortgage charge by sale. The Munsif, as well as the District Judge on appeal, dismissed the suit holding that under Section 47 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, no decree or order could be passed by any Court for the sale of the right of a raiyat in his holding. The plaintiff accordingly prefers the present second appeal. It is admitted that it is no longer possible, by reason of the six years' rule of limitation, to give the plaintiff a money decree for the debt and if he cannot get a decree for the sale of the holding, then the suit must be dismissed. The learned vakil for the appellant endeavoured to make a point that it had not been clearly held that the interest in question was that of a raiyat, but it is quite clear from the judgment of the lower appellate Court there is a conclusive finding of fact upon this point. The only question that remains is one of law, viz., whether Section 47 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, operates against the plaintiff.
2. On behalf of the appellant it is argued that the section cannot have retrospective effect, that the right to sell the property accrued at a time when the Act was not in force and being a vested right it is not affected by the subsequent enactment. Reliance is placed in support of this contention on the case of Mrs. Vesta Gliffon Sebastian v. Kuloda Prosad Deogharin(1). In that case there was a transfer by sale of a raiyati holding in the district of Manbhum on 19th August, 1909, that is to say, about four months before the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act came into operation. The petitioner in the case was a claimant under Section 211 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act and contended that the sale had passed a good title to her and that she was entitled to maintain the claim. Their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court, giving effect to the general principle that the promulgation of an amending Act could not without any express terms take away from a party any rights which might be vested in him under a prior Act held that Section 46 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, which invalidates transfers of raiyati holdings except transfers made before the 1st January 1903, was not retrospective. The learned vakil for the appellant urges that by parity of reasoning S. 47 also should be so construed. Indeed in sub-Cl. (c) of that section there is an express saving in respect of decrees obtained before 1st January 1903, but the legislature has omitted to make any such provision in respect of rights which accrued between that date and 22nd December, 1909. Whether the omission was accidental or intentional it is not our province to inquire. The only question to be determined is whether or not, under the principles applicable to the interpretation of statutes, S. 47 is to be given retrospective effect.
3. The learned counsel for the respondent relying upon the case of Lakshmi Bibi Kujrani v. Atal Behari Haldar(2), contends that S. 47 is an absolute bar upon the Court. That case undoubtedly is very similar to the present case and decides that where a preliminary decree upon a mortgage executed before the passing of the Act has been obtained, a final decree for sale cannot be obtained by reason of the bar imposed by the statute. With very great respect it seems to me that their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court overlooked the principles which were applied by that Court in Mrs. Sebastian's case. The statute now under consideration is not one relating to procedure hut infringes upon the rights of the subject and must therefore be strictly construed in aid of the subject. A like view was taken by their Lordships of the Bombay High Court in Kalian Moti v. Pathubhai Faljibhai(3) and Nagar Pragji Jivabhai Bavaji(4). In both cases a mortgage was executed before the Bombay Act 6 of 1888 came into force. Under that Act the decree passed upon the mortgage could not be enforced by sale without previously obtaining the sanction of the Government of Bombay. It was held that this restriction did not bind the Court so as to operate retrospectively. The general rule with regard to the operation of amending Acts retrospectively has been very clearly laid down by Jenkins, C.J, in a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Gopeshwar Pal v. Jiban Chandra(5). It is true that the Court in that case was concerned to decide a point of limitation, but their Lordships generally agreed to the proposition that in the absence of something putting the matter beyond doubt a Court should decline to put on an Act a construction that would deprive any person of a right of action vested in him at the time of passing the Act The learned counsel on behalf of the respondent has endeavoured to restrict the operation of this rule by saying that the rule will apply where by reason of the amending Statute the right of suit is absolutely barred, but that where, after the passing of the amending Statute a reasonable interval is given for the exercise of the vested right, then the amending Act will operate.
4. Their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court in the Full Bench decision above referred to, while holding that the amending Act could not apply in the first class of cases, declined to express any opinion as to the second class. That decision however dealt with a matter of limitation, which is essentially one of procedure. In the case before us the right in question is not one accorded by any rule of procedure but is a substantive right given to the mortgagee by the general law of property. S. 47, Act 6 of 1908 does not concern itself in any way with the procedure applicable to the execution of decrees.
5. In this view the principle applied in Mrs. Sebastian's case should, in my opinion, be applied, and therefore the plaintiff is entitled to proceed to enforce his mortgage charge. The result is that the appeal is decreed with costs.
6. Jwala Prasad, J.:— I agree.
V.S/R.K
7. Appeal decreed.