Kulwant Sahay, J.:— This appeal has been referred to a Special Bench for a consideration of the question whether the suit was barred by the two years' rule of limitation under Schedule III, Article 3 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. As the question arises in Second Appeal the whole appeal is before this Bench.
The facts are shortly these: Two brothers, Daryao and Sumran were the owners of a holding. They died leaving several sons and grandsons. In 1918, the defendant 1st party, who was the landlord of the holding, instituted a suit for arrears of rent. In this suit, Chhabu, one of the sons of Daryao, and Jagan and Matuki, the two sons of Sumran, were impleaded as defendants. Another son of Daryao, named Bansi, who was adult and appears to have been the karta of the family, was not impleaded in the suit, nor were the sons of the other sons of Daryao and the sons of Kokai, the third son of Sumran, impleaded. The landlord obtained a decree in his suit and in execution thereof sold the holding and purchased it himself. The present suit was instituted by the grandsons of Daryao and Sumran and by Bansi, who were not made parties in the rent suit, for a declaration that their interest in the holding was not affected by the execution sale, and for recovery of possession thereof. The trial Court decreed the suit for possession of a 7-annas 8-pies share in the holding. On appeal the learned District Judge has upheld the decree of the Munsif with a slight modification to the effect that the share to which the plaintiffs were entitled was 8-annas 8-pies and not 7-annas 8-pies. The defendant 1st party had taken the plea of limitation, and this was one of the issues in the suit. The learned Munsif had held that as the suit was instituted within twelve years from the date of delivery of possession it was not barred by limitation.
The two years' period of limitation under Article 3 of Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not appear to have been urged by the defendant before the Munsif. When the matter came before the District Judge, it appears that it was urged before him that the period of limitation was one year under Article 12 of the Indian Limitation Act and not twelve years under Article 142. The learned District Judge held that Article 12 did not apply, but that Article 142 applied. After disposing of this argument of the defendant no. 1, the learned District Judge observed as follows:
“I have considered, although the point has not been raised in argument before me, whether the suit does not fall under Article 3 of Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act.”
He referred to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Abhoy Churn Mookerjee v. Shaikh Titu and held that, as the landlord in dispossessing the plaintiffs was acting not in his capacity as landlord but as the representative of the co-tenants whom he had sued, the special period of limitation under Article 3 of Schedule III did not apply.
In this appeal by the defendant landlord the only point argued is that the special period of limitation under Article 3 of Schedule III did apply. The question appears to be concluded by a long series of authority.
So far back as the year 1897, it was held by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Abhoy Churn Mookerjee v. Shaikh Titu, referred to by the learned District Judge, that the special period of limitation did not apply to a, suit where the landlord had dispossessed the raiyat as purchaser of the holding in execution of a decree for rent. O'Kinealy and Hill, JJ. put it on the ground that the landlord claimed to be in possession as representative of the persons whose right, title and interest he had purchased. He was, therefore, only there by virtue of his purchase and that, therefore, the suit was not one which fell within the Bengal Tenancy Act, which applies only to a case where a tenant has been dispossessed by his landlord. The question was again raised in the year 1901 in Brojo Kishore Mahapatra v. Saraswati Dassi in which Maclean, C.J and Banerjee, J. followed the decision in Abhoy Churn Mookerjee v. Shaikh Titu. Banerjee, J., in dealing with the question, pointed out that the contention that the Article of the Bengal Tenancy Act did apply was “opposed to the limitation imposed upon the provisions of the Act by the preamble to it, which says that 1 the Act is intended to amend and consolidate certain enactments relating to the law of landlord and tenant.” He further observed as follows:—
“I would, however, observe that if the Article applies, as I think it does, only to suits as between landlord and tenant, it would not be right to hold that it is applicable to a suit where the dispossession is by the defendant acting, not as landlord, but, expressly, in a different capacity, namely, that of auction-purchaser of the right, title and interest of a tenant at a sale held in execution of a rent decree obtained by him as a co-sharer landlord”. The question was again raised in the year 1906 in Mahomed Khalil v. Hirendra Nath Bhattacharya where a fractional landlord had purchased a holding in execution of a decree for rent obtained by another co-sharer landlord, and as such auction-purchaser dispossessed the plaintiff raiyat, and it was held that the dispossession by the fractional landlord was not as landlord but as a purchaser and, therefore, the special limitation under Article 3 of Schedule III did not apply, and reliance was placed upon the rulings in the cases of Abhoy Churn Mookerjee v. Shaikh Titu and Brojo Kishore Mahapatra v. Saraswati Dassi. In 1913 in Kamaldhari Thakur v. Rameshur Singh Bahadur the same question was again raised, and D. Chatterjee and N.R Chatterjea, JJ. gave two reasons for holding that the two years' rule of limitation did not apply. The first reason was that the landlord had obtained possession not as a landlord but purchaser at a sale held in execution of a decree, and reliance was placed upon the three cases above referred to. The second reason given was that the dispossession effected by the act of delivery of possession by the Court is not dispossession by the landlord within the meaning of Article 3 of Schedule III of the Act, and the Judges observed that the landlord as purchaser, no doubt, moves the Court to deliver possession but he gets possession through the intervention of the Court. The delivery of possession by which the dispossession is effected is an act of the Court and when the landlord gets into possession by a process of the Court, it is not an act of dispossession by the landlord within the meaning of the Article, which contemplates a dispossession by the landlord by taking the law into his own hands or otherwise than in due course of law.
Therefore, from 1897 to 1913 there was a consensus of decisions to the effect that Article 3 of Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act did not apply to the case of a dispossession by a landlord acting as an auction-purchaser.
In 1914, a different view was taken by Fletcher and Richardson, JJ. in Pitambar Mahapatra v. Bhagabat Lal and it was held that Article 3 of Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act applies even where the landlord purchasing at a rent sale in the name of another person takes forcible possession of the holding and ousts the raiyat. Reference in this case was made to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Aminuddin Munshi v. Ultufunnissa Bibi. The facts of this case were, however, as follows: The original tenant was one Ramizeddi who died leaving a widow, five daughters and two sons. A rent suit was brought against the two sons only, leaving out the widow and the daughters. A decree was obtained, and in execution thereof the holding was sold and purchased by a third person (not by the landlord). The auction-purchaser dispossessed the widow and the daughters who instituted a suit for possession. The Munsif decreed the suit; but the Subordinate Judge dismissed it on the ground that it was barred by two years' limitation. The matter came in appeal to the Calcutta High Court and was heard by Brett, J., sitting singly. He held that Article 3 had no application as the dispossession was by the purchaser who was a third party and not the landlord. There was a Letters Patent Appeal against the decision of Brett, J., and it came on for hearing before Rampini, C.J and Doss, J. Their Lordships in Letters Patent Appeal held that the landlord and the auction-purchaser must be held to be acting in collusion in the act of dispossessing the plaintiffs and that it was not the auction-purchaser who alone had dispossessed the plaintiffs, and, therefore, the rule of limitation of two years applied. With very great respect to the learned Judges I am unable to follow the reasoning. The dispossession there was by a third person who happened to be the purchaser in execution of a rent decree, and it cannot be said that the purchaser in dispossessing the raiyats was acting in collusion with the landlord and that the dispossession was really the act of the landlord. This case was dissented from in the case of Kamaldhari Thakur v. Rameshur Singh Bahaduri; but it was followed by Fletcher and Richardson, JJ. in the case of Pitambar Mahapatra v. Bhagabat Lal. In Ram Kinkar Tewari v. Sthiti Ram Panja Mookerjee and Walmsley, JJ. held that it was well settled that where a landlord in execution of a decree for arrears of rent puts the holding to sale, purchases it himself, and obtains delivery through Court, such dispossession of the tenant is not dispossession within the meaning of Article 3, and reliance was placed upon the decision in Kamaldhari Thakur v. Rameshur Singh Bahadur. The question again came for consideration before Teunon and Sheepshanks, JJ. in Durgapada Panja v. Bhusan Chandra Ghosh and reliance was again placed on the decision in Kamaldhari Thakur v. Rameshur Singh Bahadur; and it was held that the two years' rule of limitation did not apply to the dispossession by the landlord as auction-purchaser. This decision was given in the month of May, 1916, and in July following the question again arose in Fani Bhusan Sarkar v. Pulin Chandra Mondul. This case was decided by Fletcher and Teunon, JJ. and the case of Aminuddin Munshi v. Ulfutunnissa Bibi was again followed and it was held that Article 3 of Schedule III did apply to the dispossession by the landlord as auction-purchaser, and the same view was taken by Fletcher, J. sitting with Newbould, J. in Satish Chandra Basu v. Nittya Gopal Halder.
It will thus appear that from 1897 to 1913 the Calcutta High Court had always taken the view that the two years' limitation did not apply when the dispossession was by the landlord as an auction purchaser. A contrary view was taken for the first time in 1914 by Fletcher and Richardson, JJ. but the former view was again adopted in 1916 in which year, however, in two cases [Fani Bhusan Sarkar v. Pulin Chandra, Mondul and Satish Chandra Basu v. Nittya Gopal Haldar] which came before Fletcher and Teunon, JJ. and Fletcher and Newbould, JJ. the opposite view was again taken. The preponderance of the decisions is, however, in favour of the view that Article 3 of Schedule III has no application.
In a recent decision of the Calcutta High Court in Satish Chandra Bandopadhya v. Hashemali Kazi the holding was purchased by the landlord in execution of a decree and symbolical possession of the land was delivered to him by Court. The actual ouster, however, took place on a later date; and it was held that the ouster was by the landlord and, therefore, the two years' rule of limitation applied. Rankin, C.J, in the course of his judgment, observed as follows: “It is, therefore, not a case of ouster by the machinery of a Court of law and although I agree with Page, J., in the opinion that the meaning of dispossession is satisfied when the defendant landlord comes in against the will of the occupying tenant even by the machinery of a Court of law, the present case does not actually require us to decide that question.”
The question, therefore, was not expressly decided although the observations made in the course of the judgment go to support the contention that the two years' rule of limitation would apply even when the dispossession was by the landlord as purchaser.
I now turn to the decisions of the Patna High Court. In Jaimangalbati Misrain v. Jharu Lal Das Mozamdar the dispossession was by the landlord on the allegation that the land was her kamat land and the contention raised was that she had effected the dispossession of the raiyat not as a raiyat but as a person who had no right to the land; and Chamier, C.J observed. “I am not prepared to place such, a narrow construction on Article 3. It appears to me that if it is shown that the plaintiff raiyat is in fact a tenant of the defendant who dispossessed him, in respect of the land claimed in the suit, then Article 3 applies to the suit.” It was contended before his Lordship that the two years' rule of limitation did not apply on the principle laid down in Kamaldhari Thakur v. Rameshur Singh Bahadur; and in dealing with the contention his Lordship observed as follows: “It has been held in several cases in the Calcutta High Court that where a landlord buys a raiyat's holding and as purchaser of the raiyati interest dispossesses that or another raiyat, Article 3 does not apply to a suit by the dispossessed raiyat to recover his holding [See Kamaldhari Thakur v. Rameshur Singh and cases there cited] and some of the language used in the judgments in these cases supports the contention of the respondents in the case now before us. But the actual decisions in those cases do not cover the present case and I am not prepared to extend those decisions to the present case.” Mullick, J., who delivered a separate judgment, observed as follows: “With regard to that class of cases which have sought to exclude from the operation of Schedule III ousters by a landlord acting under the authority of a Civil Court decree and in the capacity of an auction-purchaser, the principle on which they may be distinguished is that the facts in each of those cases show that the tenancy was at an end and that, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant at the time of the ouster.” Their Lordships, therefore, did not dissent from the view that the two years' rule of limitation did not apply if the dispossession was effected by the landlord as an auction-purchaser. Chamier, C.J and Mullick, J. followed their own decision in Gowher Ali… v. Enayat Ali….. The question was directly raised in Mahadeo Rai v. Pargash Rai and Kamaldhari Thakur v. Rameshur Singh Bahadur was followed; and I adhere to the view which I expressed in this case.
It follows, therefore, that the weight of authority is clearly in favour of the view that Article 3 of Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not apply if the dispossession is by the landlord as an auction-purchaser of the holding.
It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the plea of special limitation of two years was not raised by the defendant either in his written statement or during the trial of the suit in the trial Court or in his arguments before the District Judge and the learned District Judge had for the first time in the course of his judgment referred to the question whether the suit was barred by two years' limitation, and that it was not open to the appellant in the present appeal to raise this question, as the special rule of limitation must be specifically pleaded; and reliance has been placed upon Kedar Nath Mondal v. Mohesh Chandra Khan and Bhadai Sahu v. Manowar Ali. It is true that the special limitation of two years under Article 3 of Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act was not pleaded by the defendant in his written statement, nor was the question raised before the Munsif during the trial. A general plea of limitation, however, was taken in the written statement and an issue was framed. In Kedar Nath Mondal v. Mohesh Chandra Khan the decision turned on the special facts of that case. In that case the defendants had set up the case that the plaintiffs had never, been in possession, and it was observed that having set up such a case they could not possibly with any chance of success set up an absolutely contradictory case that although the plaintiffs had never been in possession they were dispossessed by the defendants acting as landlord. It was further observed that in as much as that case had not been especially pleaded and the facts not being apparent on the face of the record, the Judge had no jurisdiction to go into the matter and inquire whether on certain facts that he had found the suit was barred; and the learned Judges held that the Court below could not by arriving at certain conclusions of fact deprive the plaintiffs of the right to have the issue properly tried, namely, to have an issue framed and evidence adduced in support of the plaintiffs' case and also to have the defendants' evidence in support of their case. In view of these facts the learned Judges were of opinion that the plaintiffs must have been taken by surprise. In Bhadai Sahu v. Manowar Ali, in dealing with the question of limitation, the learned Judges observed that the plea of limitation in the form it was taken before their Lordships was never taken in the Court of the Munsif or in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, and they said: “Now our rule is that if a point of law requires a finding of fact for its determination we cannot allow it to be entertained in second appeal in this Court.” The two decisions, therefore, relied upon by the learned Advocate for the respondents proceeded on the principle that if the decision on the question of limitation depended upon findings of fact which had not been arrived at or in respect of which opportunity was not given to the parties to adduce evidence, such a question will not be allowed to be raised for the first time in appeal. In the present case, however, the plea of limitation was taken and the facts necessary to come to a decision on the point whether the special rule of limitation prescribed by Article 3 of Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act applied were gone into, and there was no question of any prejudice to any party. Moreover, under section 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act the Court is bound to dismiss the suit if it be a suit specified in Schedule III and is not instituted within the time prescribed in that Schedule, although limitation has not been pleaded. In such class of cases, therefore, it is not necessary that the plea of special limitation under Article 3 of Schedule III should be specifically taken in the written statement, and it was open to the appellant in this appeal to raise the question. I would, therefore, disallow the objection of the respondents on this point.
The result, therefore, is that it must be held that the suit was not barred by limitation and, as the other findings of the District Judge have not been challenged before us, the decree of the District Judge must be affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.
Courtney Terrell, C.J:— I agree.
James, J.:— I agree.
Appeal dismissed.