1. This is a reference made to the Court under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act, concerning the professional conduct of Surjya Narayan Singh, a Mukhtar practising at Beguserai in the District of Monghyr. Proceedings were instituted against the Mukhtar under the said section in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer of Beguserai in November last. The charge against him was that he had obtained money from parties in criminal cases on the plea of bribing the presiding officer of the Courts before whom the cases were tried. Three instances were alleged in which he had so obtained money and a fourth in which he had attempted to do so. Daring the conduct of the enquiry much evidence was admitted which was merely hearsay and which ought to have been excluded altogether from consideration by the Deputy Magistrate. He further relied upon information obtained by him personally from what he described as reliable sources, to the effect that the Mukhtar had the reputation of making money by deceiving the parties by representing that he could influence the Courts before which their cases were tried by bribery. In the event, although he appears to have thought that the evidence would not have been sufficient to support a conviction in a criminal Court nevertheless he considered that a less stringent standard of proof should be applied in proceedings under the Legal Practitioners Act even in cases where the offence charged amounted to a crime, and found the charges proved. Both the District Magistrate and the Sessions Judge through whom the report was forwarded and who have stated their opinions thereon in accordance with Section 14 of the Act, appear to have found considerable difficulty in accepting the Sub-Divisional Officer's view as to the standard of proof required in such cases. The District Magistrate seams to consider that, whilst no particular case can be said to have been so fully proved against the Mukhtar as to justify his criminal prosecution, the cumulative effect of the evidence in the different cases and of the evidence of reputation forges a chain of reasoning which makes it certain that the Mukhatar had been in the habit of taking money from his clients on the plea of its being required to bribe the Courts. The learned Sessions Judge observes:
“The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on a certainty arising out of the cumulative effect of the evidence in the different cases and of the evidence of reputation. My difficulty is, that I do not find the evidence of reputation on the record and there are certain deficiencies (noticed by the Sub-Divisional Officer himself) in the depositions of Har Gauri and Ajodhya. I can sea no sufficient reason for doubting the accuracy of the Sub-Divisional Officer's findings. But the strength of the case against the Mukhatar, as presented in the record, is not proportionate to the amount of paper used. It is considered that a moral certainty of the Mukhtar's guilt is sufficient reinforcement for the evidence on record, then I would venture to endorse the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate.”
2. It is quite clear, from what has just been stated, that neither the Sub-Divisional Officer nor the Sessions Judge was satisfied that the evidence on the record would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction against the accused had he been prosecuted before a criminal Court. It is also clear that the District Magistrate was under the impression, upon the evidence adduced, that in none of the particular instances in which accused was alleged to have taken money for the purpose of bribing the Court, was there sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction but that the cumulative effect of the evidence made it certain that the Mukhtar had been in the habit of taking money from his clients for such a purpose. The Court is entirely unable to understand why a different standard of proof of guilt should be required in a case like the present from that which is necessary in any other legal proceedings.
3. The proof which is required in order to convict on an criminal charge, is that which leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court that the offence has been committed. To adopt a different standard of proof in cases arising under the Legal Practitioners Act would in our opinion, be an entirely novel departure and unjustifiable on any known principle of law. To remove a person from his profession, for what amounts to a criminal offence, upon evidence which would not support a conviction on a criminal charge, cannot possibly be justified.
4. Of the four cases in which the accused is alleged to have committed an offence, in one, that of Bijo Pasban v. Narsingh, it is sufficient to say that there is no evidence whatever in support of the charge. With regard to one of the others, Jalo Singh v. Ajodhya Singh, the evidence is that of a witness who contradicts himself in some of the most material parts of his evidence and not only is his evidence uncorroborated but is unsupported by another witness called to support him. In the third case, that of Khubi Singh v. Hafiz Abu Jafar, in which the charge is attempt be obtain money, the only evidence is that of a person described as a Tahsildar of Hafiz Abu Zafer, the accused in that case, from whom the Mukhtar is alleged to have attempted to obtain a sum of Rs. 200 to bribe the Honorary Magistrate. Prom the cross examination of that witness it is quite clear that his occupation was that of a tout and it would be extremely dangerous to rely upon his uncorroborated word as proof of such a charge. The only case which has caused us any doubt is that of Mt Tunia Dhanukain v. Har Gauri Singh. Har Gauri was accused in that case of stealing a cow belonging to Mt. Tunia Dhanukain. He alleged that he asked the Mukhtar who was appearing against him why he had taken up the case against him when he had appeared on his behalf in an earlier case, to which the Mukhtar replied that if he was prepared to spend money to bribe the Deputy Magistrate, he would get off and asked for Rs. 200 for that purpose. Har Gauri alleged that he gave him Rs. 50 and promised to give him another Rs. 100 later on. He subsequently asked his pleader whether the Deputy Magistrate was in the habit of taking bribes and, being soundly taken to task for asking such a question by his pleader he refused to pay the Mukhtar anything more. He does not appear, however to have attempted to get back what he had already paid. This witness according to his own evidence, was quite willing to be a party to bribery and further, was admittedly a liar and a perjurer, having stated in a previous case that he had been acquitted and not convicted in a still earlier case. Except for the fact that it is proved by the pleader himself that Har Gauri did ask him whether the Deputy Magistrate took bribes, this witness's evidence is entirely uncorroborated. In our opinion, it would be extremely dangerous to rely upon the uncorroborated testimony of a witness of this class in support of a charge of such a grave nature. It is true that in cases of this sort reliable evidence is not always easily obtainable. People, who are in the habit of committing offences of this nature do not, as a rule, publish them abroad and the evidence obtainable is generally from those, who are themselves particeps criminis. This does not necessarily mean that their evidence is untrue, but in such cases the Court should be slow to accept their uncorroborated testimony and should be satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt as to its truth. Having carefully considered the whole of the evidence in this case, eliminating that which was clearly inadmissible and which obviously influenced the mind of the Sub-Divisional Officer, we have come to the conclusion that, although the evidence creates a very grave suspicion as to the conduct of the Mukhtar, it fails to satisfy us beyond all reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
5. We wish to add that, in holding enquiries of this nature, the presiding officer should take care not to allow the introduction of irrelevant matter, or to admit evidence which ought to be rejected. Such a course can serve no good purpose and is against the best interests of justice. The order suspending the Mukhtar is discharged.
V.S/R.K
6. Order accordingly.