Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Acts

Section 246 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act VIII of 1859. Referring to Acts VIII and XIV of 1859
Act XIV of 1859, Act IX of 1871, Act XV of 1877 and Act IX of 1908. Section 3 of Act XIV of 1859
Limitation Act in force was Act XIV of 1859. Section 16 Clause (3) of that Act
Section 6 of Act XV 1877 and (3) that Section 12 of the Limitation Act
Section 29 of the Limitation Act IX of 08. What effect Section 29
Section 59 of that Act and not Article 12 of the Limitation Act
Section 59 Act II of 1864 elapsed on the 31 Dec. 1908.
provisions of the General Act of Limitation
Clause 11 of Section 16 of Act XIV of 1859
clause 3 of Section 16 of Act XIV of 1859
Section 15 Clause 2 of the Limitation Act
provisions of the Limitation Act of 1859,
Section 59 of the Revenue Recovery Act.
Sections 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act
Section 59 of Madras Act II of 1864
SECTION 12 LIMITATION ACT
SECTION 18 LIMITATION ACT
SECTION 14 LIMITATION ACT
SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
Section 246 of Act VIII of 1859
Section 59 of Act II of 1864.
Indian Forest Act V of 1882,
SECTION 6 INTEREST ACT
Forest Act V 1882.

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Suit to Set Aside Sale for Arrears of Revenue (Limitation Issue)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a suit to set aside a sale held for arrears of Government revenue on the ground of alleged fraud. The suit was dismissed by the Lower Courts on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Section 59 of Madras Act II of 1864 prescribes a period of six months for such suits. Under the chronology given in the opinion, the six-month period provided by Section 59 would have elapsed on 31 December 1908. The courts were closed for the Christmas holidays on that day and re-opened on 4 January 1909. On 1 January 1909 a new Limitation Act (Limitation Act IX of 1908, coming into force) became effective; it contains Section 15 Clause 2 which provides that, when notice has been given in accordance with statutory requirements, the period of such notice shall be excluded in computing limitation.

The plaintiffs (appellants before the appellate court) claimed the benefit of Section 15 Clause 2 of the new Limitation Act such that their suit would not be barred. The respondents (defendants below) contended that the general provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to suits governed by a special local Act that prescribes a period of limitation (here Section 59 of Act II of 1864), and relied on Section 29 of the Limitation Act and a Full Bench decision (Abu Bucker Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India (1911) I.L.R. 34 M. 505). The appellate court considered these contentions and the relevant precedents and concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to rely on the new Limitation Act provisions; accordingly the court held that the suit was not barred by limitation, reversed the decrees of the lower courts and remanded the suit for disposal on the merits.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Section 15 Clause 2 of the Limitation Act (Limitation Act IX of 1908), which excludes the period of statutory notice in computing limitation, is applicable to a suit governed by Section 59 of Madras Act II of 1864 (the six-month period for suits to set aside sales for arrears of revenue).
Whether the general provisions of the Limitation Act (notably Sections 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act) are inapplicable to suits for which a special or local Act prescribes a period of limitation — and, relatedly, whether earlier Full Bench and Division Bench authorities control the present question.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

The general provisions of the Limitation Act (Sections 4 to 25) — including Section 15 Clause 2 — are not applicable to suits for which a special, local Act prescribes a period of limitation.
Section 29 of the Limitation Act (corresponding to Section 6 of Act XV of 1877) disallows the Limitation Act from affecting or altering any period of limitation specially prescribed by a special or local law; reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision in Abu Bucker Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India (1911) I.L.R. 34 M. 505 as authority for non-applicability of the general provisions in such contexts.

Appellants' Arguments

The plaintiffs were entitled to have limitation computed under the new Limitation Act as it came into force (1 January 1909) before the suit stood barred; therefore Section 15 Clause 2 should be applied and the suit is within time.
The Full Bench decision in Abu Bucker Sahib (1911) should not govern the present case; it was argued to be in conflict with other decisions of the Court (Venkata v. Chengadu and Seshamma v. Sankara) and those earlier decisions were not considered or overruled in Abu Bucker.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Abu Bucker Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India (1911) I.L.R. 34 M. 505	Held (Full Bench) that Section 12 of Act XV of 1877 was not applicable to an appeal under the Forest Act; relied on to argue that general Limitation Act provisions may be inapplicable to special/local Acts.	The court examined the reasoning of Abu Bucker (chiefly based on Section 6 of Act XV of 1877 and other grounds) but held it did not overrule earlier decisions (Venkata v. Chengadu and Iswara v. Karuppan) and would not preclude construing Section 59 of Act II of 1864 as subject to the general Limitation Act where the construction of the special Act warrants it.
Venkata v. Chengadu (1888) I.L.R. 12 M. 168	Discussed applicability of general Limitation Act provisions; two judges held Section 18 of the Limitation Act was applicable to a suit under Section 59 of Act II of 1864.	Cited as authority supporting the view that general provisions of the Limitation Act can apply to suits falling under Section 59, and the court treated the decision as not overruled by Abu Bucker.
Seshamma v. Sankara (1888) I.L.R. 12 M. 1	Applied Section 14 of the Limitation Act to a suit under the Madras Boundary Act XXVIII of 1860; indicated that, except as to the period fixed, other general provisions can apply to special/local Acts.	Relied upon to support the proposition that, save as to the period prescribed, other general provisions of the Limitation Act may apply to cases falling under special or local laws.
Veerammah v. Abbiah (1893) I.L.R. 18 M. 99	Considered construction of the Registration Act and expressed views on the applicability of Section 6 of the Limitation Act (that it rendered general provisions inapplicable to special/local Acts in certain readings).	The opinion notes Shephard J.'s observations in this case but treats them as part of an earlier line of authority; the present court did not adopt the view that all general provisions are excluded merely by Section 29 (corresponding to Section 6).
Haji Ismail Sait v. Trustees of the Harbour, Madras (1900) I.L.R. 23 M. 389	Accepted Veerammah v. Abbiah as authority that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to cases under the Forest Act; also considered the principle of Section 5 on general grounds.	Cited as showing a line of decisions where some general Limitation Act provisions were held applicable to matters under special Acts.
Mussamat Poolbas Koonwar v. Lalla Jogesher Sahay (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 7	Privy Council held that Clause 11 of Section 16 of Act XIV of 1859 (postponement of starting point of limitation in cases of disability) applied to suits under Section 246 of the Civil Procedure Code; illustrates that general limitation provisions may modify special procedural limitations.	Relied on to show that earlier Privy Council decisions treated the general Limitation Act as capable of modifying the operation (starting point) of a special statute; used to support the construction that Section 59 should be subject to general Limitation Act provisions.
Muhamad Bahadoorkhan v. The Collector of Bareilly (1874) L.R. 1 I.A. 167	Earlier Privy Council decision concerning forfeited property; held the claim was barred by the one-year limitation then applicable and that the statute was to be construed as a special enactment not admitting annexation of saving for disability.	Cited as a prior decision distinguished by the Privy Council in Mussamat Poolbas Koonwar; used to explain limits of importing general Limitation Act provisions into very special statutory schemes.
Huro Soonduree Choudhrain v. Anandanath Roy Chowdhry (1865) 3 W.R.C.R. p. 8	Referred to by the Privy Council as evidence of established practice in Indian courts respecting the interaction of procedural and limitation provisions.	Used in the court's exposition of the Privy Council's reasoning in Mussamat Poolbas Koonwar to show historical practice.
Iswara Pattar v. Karuppan (1893) 3 M.L.J.	Applied Section 18 of the Limitation Act to a suit under Section 59 of the Revenue Recovery Act; cited to show instances where general provisions were used with Section 59 cases.	Cited by the court as authority reinforcing the view that certain general Limitation Act provisions have been applied to suits under Section 59.
Iswara v. Karuppan (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 7	Mentioned in the opinion as an earlier decision said to have laid down the law in relation to Section 59 suits (appears in the court's treatment of earlier authorities).	Referred to alongside Venkata v. Chengadu as part of the body of earlier decisions which the court considered not to have been overruled by Abu Bucker and which support applying general Limitation Act provisions to Section 59 suits where appropriate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's central analytical path can be summarized in the following steps, each drawn strictly from the opinion's text:

Identification of the controlling statutes and timeline: Section 59 of Madras Act II of 1864 prescribes six months for suits to set aside sales for arrears of revenue. The six-month period would have expired on 31 December 1908. The new Limitation Act (Limitation Act IX of 1908) came into force on 1 January 1909 and contains Section 15 Clause 2 which excludes the period of a statutory notice in computing limitation.
Framing of the legal question: whether Section 15 Clause 2 of the new Limitation Act is applicable to suits governed by Section 59 of Act II of 1864 (the parties conceded that the length of the period is that prescribed by Section 59 and not Article 12 of the new Limitation Act).
Consideration of respondents' reliance on Section 29 of the Limitation Act (corresponding to Section 6 of Act XV of 1877) and the Full Bench decision in Abu Bucker Sahib v. Secretary of State for India: respondents argued that general provisions (Sections 4–25) should not apply where a special period is provided by a local Act.
Examination of Abu Bucker Sahib: the court reviews the Full Bench's reasoning (the Chief Justice's three grounds and the other judges' focus on Section 6 of Act XV of 1877). The court notes that Abu Bucker did not consider or dissent from earlier decisions (Venkata v. Chengadu and Iswara v. Karuppan) and that Abu Bucker is therefore not necessarily controlling to the extent of overruling those prior authorities.
Review of earlier authorities and statutory context: the court analyses Privy Council authority (Mussamat Poolbas Koonwar v. Lalla Jogesher Sahay) and other decisions (Venkata v. Chengadu, Seshamma v. Sankara, Iswara Pattar v. Karuppan) which indicate that the applicability of general Limitation Act provisions to suits under special/local Acts depends on the proper construction of the special Act — i.e., whether the special Act was intended to be a complete and exclusive code on limitation for the matters it covers.
Statutory construction applied to Section 59 of Act II of 1864: the court observes that Act II of 1864 was enacted when the Limitation Act XIV of 1859 was in force and that clause 3 of Section 16 of Act XIV of 1859 indicates that when a shorter period is specially prescribed by another law that shorter period shall be applied "notwithstanding this Act." Reading these provisions together, the court concludes that the Madras Legislature intended only to shorten the one-year period (then given by the Limitation Act) to six months but did not intend thereby to exclude the other general provisions of the Limitation Act (for example provisions affecting the starting point of limitation or excluding certain periods in computation).
Reconciliation of Section 29 (Limitation Act IX of 1908) with the construction of Section 59: the court states that Section 29 does not affect the construction to be placed upon Section 59 for the purposes of this case and that it is unnecessary to decide in this opinion the full effect Section 29 might have upon a special Act provision that manifestly excludes the general provisions. On the construction reached, Section 59 is subject to the general Limitation Act provisions for the time being in force.
Conclusion of analysis applied to facts: because the new Limitation Act came into force before the suit was absolutely barred by the six-month period, and because Section 59 is to be read as subject to the general Limitation Act provisions, the plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of Section 15 Clause 2. Consequently, the suit is not barred by limitation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate court held that the suit is not barred by limitation. The court reversed the decrees of the Courts below and remanded the suit to the Court of First Instance for disposal on the merits. The costs in the present and lower appellate court proceedings were ordered to abide the result.

Immediate Consequences for the Parties

The plaintiffs' suit to set aside the sale for arrears of revenue will proceed to be heard on the merits in the Court of First Instance (remand ordered).
The orders of dismissal by the lower courts on limitation grounds are set aside.
Costs of the appellate and lower appellate proceedings were not finally apportioned but were directed to abide the outcome on the merits.

Broader Legal Implication as Stated in the Opinion

The court concluded, on construction of the statutes and having regard to earlier authorities, that Section 59 of Madras Act II of 1864 (which prescribes a six-month period) should be read as subject to the general provisions of the Limitation Act for the time being in force — i.e., certain general Limitation Act provisions (such as those affecting the starting point of limitation or excluding periods of notice from computation) can apply to suits governed by Section 59 unless the special Act unmistakably shows an intent to exclude them.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to material and statements contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond that text.

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Srinivasa Aiyangar And Ors. v. The Secretary Of State For India In Council Represented By The Collector Of Tanjore And Ors.

1. This is a suit to set aside a sale held for arrears of revenue on the ground of fraud. The suit has been dismissed by the Lower Courts on the ground that it has been barred by limitation. Section 59 of Madras Act II of 1864 provides a period of 6 months for such a suit from the date on which the cause of action arose. There are several ways in which the plaintiffs attempt to get rid of the bar. We consider it sufficient to deal with one of their contentions as we have come to the conclusion that it must succeed and that the suit must be held to be not barred. Section 15 Clause 2 of the Limitation Act enacts that "in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit of which notice has been given in accordance with the requirements of any enactment for the time being in force, the period of such notice shall be excluded." This clause did not exist in the previous Statute, Act XV of 1877. The six months provided by Section 59 Act II of 1864 elapsed on the 31 Dec. 1908. The Court was closed on that day for the Christmas holidays and reopened on the 4th January 09. On the 1st January 09 the present Limitation Act came into force, that is before the suit was barred. The plaintiffs are therefore entitled to have the question of limitation decided in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute. They claim the benefit of Section 15 Clause 2. If this claim be well-founded the suit will be within time. The question argued is whether the provision in question is applicable to suits governed by Section 59 of Act II of 1864 it being conceded that the period of limitation for the suit is that provided by Section 59 of that Act and not Article 12 of the Limitation Act which has provided a period of one year for a suit to set aside a sale for arrears of Government revenue. The respondents' contention is that Section 15 Clause (2) and other general provisions enacted in Sections 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to suits for which a special period of limitation has been provided by a local or special Act, and reliance is placed on Section 29 which lays down that nothing in the limitation Act "shall affect or alter any period of limitation specially presented for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law now or hereafter in force in British India" and on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Abu Bucker Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India (1911) I.L.R. 34 M. 505. The appellants on the other hand contend that that case which decided that section 12 of act xv of 1877, allowing a deduction of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the Judgment and decree of the Lower Court in computing the period of limitation for an appeal in a case decided under the Indian Forest Act V of 1882, should not govern this case and that it is in conflict with another Full Bench decision of this Court in Venkata v. Chengadu (1888) I.R.R. 12 M. 168 and the decision of a Division Bench in Seshamma v. Sankara (1888) I.L.R. 12 M. 1 which were not overruled by or noticed in that judgment. In Abu Backer Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India (1911) I.L.R. 34 M. 505 the question whether Section 12 of the Limitation Act was applicable arose with respect to an appeal presented against the decree of the District Court on an appeal against an order of the Forest officer under the Forest Act V 1882. The Full Bench composed of three learned Judges held that it was not. The learned Chief Justice based his Judgment on three grounds : (1) that the provisions of the Poorest Act showing that the power to extend the period of limitation in cases coming within that Act was vested in the Governor-General in Council must be taken to indicate that general provisions of the limitation act having the effect in certain cases of extending the period of limitation should not be applicable; (2) that the application of these general provisions would have the effect of affecting the period of limitation prescribed by the Forest Act within the meaning of Section 6 of Act XV 1877 and (3) that Section 12 of the Limitation Act could not be applied to cases where the law did not render it necessary for an appellant to produce a copy of the decree and judgment of the Lower Court for the valid presentation of an appeal. Wallis and Miller JJ. the other members of the Court proceeded purely on the language of Section 6 of Act XV of 1877 which in their opinion was plain and unambiguous and held that the application of the general sections of the Act would have the effect of affecting the period of limitation prescribed by special or local Acts and was therefore disallowed by Section 6. Those learned Judges did not refer to the earlier decisions of this Court in Venkata v. Chengadu (1888) I.L.R. 12 M. 168 and Veerammah v. Abbiah (1893) I.L.R. 18 M. 99. According to those decisions the question whether the general provisions of the limitation act should be applied to cases where a special period of limitation is provided by a special or local Act, would depend on whether the provisions of such Act should be regarded as enacting a complete body of provisions with regard to the limitation of suits coming within the purview of the Act. In other words the question would be whether the special or Local Act should be construed as excluding the applicability of the general provisions of the limitation act, each case would have to be decided on the construction of the particular Statute which provides a special period of limitation. The learned Chief Justice's Judgment also makes no reference to Venkata v. Chengadu (1900) I.L.R. 23 M. 389. He refers to the observations of Shephard J. in Veerammah v. Abbiah (1893) I.L.R. 18 M. 99 as supporting the view that Section 6 would make the provisions of the limitation act inapplicable to any suit coming within a local or special act. Shephard J. in that case based his judgment in part at least on the construction he placed on the provisions of the Registration Act, which in his opinion excluded the applicability of any of the sections of the limitation act although he also expressed the opinion that the language of Section 6 of the Limitation Act rendered the general provisions of the Act inapplicable to the cases coming under special or local Acts. In Haji Ismail Sait v. Trustees of the Harbour, Madras (1900) I.L.R. 23 M. 389 he accepted Veeramma v. Abbiah (1893) I.L.R. 18 M. 99 as authority for the propositions that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to cases under the Forest Act, (see page 397) although he was also prepared to apply the principle of Section 5 on general grounds. In Venkata Chenqadu (1888) I.L.R. 12 M. 168 four learned Judges took part. Two of them Muthuswamy Aiyar and Kernan JJ. held that Section 18 of the Limitation Act was applicable to a suit falling under Section 59 of Act II of 1864. It was, however, not necessary to decide the question as the application of the section would not save the suit from limitation. Parker and Wilkinson JJ. cannot in our opinion be taken to have expressed any opinion on the point, although Mr. Rangachariar contends that they intended to do so. In a later case Iswara Pattar v. Karuppan (1893) 3 M.L.J. Collins C.J. and Davies J. applied Section 18 to a suit under Section 59 of the Revenue Recovery Act. In Seshamma v. Sankara (1888) I.L.R. 12 M P. 1 Collins C.J. and Muthuswamy Aiyar J. applied Section 14 of the Limitation Act to a suit under the Madras Boundary Act XXVIII of 1860. They observed. "The true construction of Section 6 then is that save as to the period of Limitation the other provisions of the General Act of Limitation are applicable to cases falling under special or local Law." We do not consider it necessary for the purpose of this case to consider whether Section 29 of the present Statute corresponding to Section 6 of Act XV of 1877 may not render the general sections of the limitation act inapplicable to special or local Acts generally. We think that Abu Bucker Sahib v. Secretary of State for India (1911) I.L.R. 34 M. 505 cannot be regarded as overruling the decisions in Venkata v Chengadu (1888) I.L.R. 12 M. 168 and Iswara v. Karuppan (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 7 which laid down the law with regard to suits coming under Section 59 of Act II of 1864. They were not considered or dissented from in that case. We are of opinion that if on a construction of Act II of 1864 the conclusion can be arrived at that the period of 6 months was intended to be subject to the general provisions of the limitation act, Abu Bucker Sahib v. Secretary of State for India (1911) I.L.R. 34 M. 505 would not preclude us from giving effect to that conclusion.

2. Act II of 1864 was enacted when the general Limitation Act in force was Act XIV of 1859. Section 16 Clause (3) of that Act provides that "when by any law now or hereafter to be in force a shorter period of limitation than that prescribed by this Act is specially prescribed, such shorter period shall be applied notwithstanding this Act." The starting point of limitation and the period of limitation are clearly distinguished as distinct factors in the various Statutes of limitation, Act XIV of 1859, Act IX of 1871, Act XV of 1877 and Act IX of 1908. Section 3 of Act XIV of 1859 provided a limitation of one year to set aside sales for arrears of Government revenue from the date of the confirmation of the sale. The period was liable to be shortened by any special statute. In Mussamat Poolbas Koonwar v. Lalla Jogesher Sahay (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 7 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that Clause 11 of Section 16 of Act XIV of 1859 postponing the starting point of limitation in cases of disability on account of minority was applicable to suits provided for by Section 246 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act VIII of 1859. Referring to Acts VIII and XIV of 1859 their Lordships observed, "the object of the first was to enact a General Code of Procedure for the Courts of Civil Judicature not established by Royal Charter. The object of the second was to establish a general law of limitation in supercession both of the Regulations which had governed those Courts and of the English states which had regulated the practice of the Courts established by Royal Charter. Looking to the 5th Sub-section of the 1st Section (providing a period of one year for suits to alter or set aside summary decisions and orders of Civil Courts) "and to the 3rd and 11th Sections" (providing a limitation of one year for suits to set aside sales under decrees or for arrears of Government Revenue, and a limitation of 12 years to suits for the recovery of immoveable property) "of Act XIV of 1859, their Lordships have no doubt that the intention of the Legislature was that the period of limitation resulting from the 24tjth Section of Act VIII should in the case of a minor be modified by the operation of the 11th Section of Act XIV, and that this construction has obtained in the Courts of India appears from the case from Huro Soonduree Choudhrain v. Anandanath Roy Chowdhry (1865) 3 W.R.C.R. p. 8." The above passage shows that their Lordships based their decision on the construction of Section 246 of Act VIII of 1859 whether it excluded or not the provisions of the Limitation Act of 1859, their Lordships distinguished an earlier decision of theirs in Muhamad Bahadoorkhan v. The Collector of Bareilly (1874) L.R. 1 I.A. 167. There certain property belonging to A was taken possesion of by B. Some years later B. was convicted and executed as a rebel and all his property in his possesion was confiscated including the property of A. The sons of A sued for the recovery of the lands of which they had been dispossessed by the rebel. The suit was brought more than a year after the younger plaintiff came of age and more than a year after the passing of Act XIV of 1859 which allowed only one year to sue and did not save the rights of persons under disability. Their Lordships held that the claim was barred by limitation. They observed "The words are perfectly plain-no suit brought by any party in respect of forfeited property shall be entertained unless it be instituted within the period of a year from the date of seizure. It is true that this limitation is introduced by way of proviso, but their Lordships think that, looking at the various parts of the Act and gathering the purpose and intention of the Legislature from the whole, this was a substantive enactment and that, although it appears under the form of a proviso it was a limitation intended by the Legislature to apply to all suits brought by any persons in respect of forfeited property." With respect to the argument that a saving with regard to parties under disability must be taken to be by equitable construction implied in this case and that the clause in Act XIV of 1859 relating to disabilities might be imported into the Act, their Lordships held that it could not be done. They observed,-"This Act is of a special kind and does not admit of those enactments being annexed to it." This seems to show that their Lordships' Judgment was based on the construction of the special Act in question. Referring to this decision their Lordships observed in Mussamat Pool Bas Koonwar v. Lala Jogeshwar Sahay (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 7. "It arose upon a very special statute and upon that ground the Judgment rests." Then they refer to the passage cited above, and point out "and they proceeded to observe that the application of the statute (if it did apply) would not assist the appellants who would not even in that case have brought their suit in proper time. It is clear that their Lordships were disposed to regard the pronouncement in the earlier case as a dictum not necessary for the decision of the case. The learned Government Pleader argues that the decision in Mussamat Pool Bas Koonwar v. Lala Jogeshwar Sahay (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 7 proceeded on the ground that the two Statutes, acts viii and xiv of 1859, were passed in the same year-a fact to which their Lordships no doubt refer (see p. 24) but we cannot agree that any stress was intended to be laid upon the circumstances. The basis of the decision as we understand it, was that the provisions of the general Code of procedure should be regarded as subject to those of the general Code of limitation. We do not think any distinction can be drawn with respect to the applicability of the general provisions of the Code of limitation between suits for which a special period of limitation is prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code and those for which a special period is presented by some other Statute. Both the decisions of the Privy Council proceeded upon the construction placed upon the particular statute in question in each case. We must take it that the Legislature in Madras was not unaware of the provisions of act xiv of 1859 when it enacted Section 59 of Act II of 1864. In our opinion it did not intend to do anything more than shorten the period of one year given by the Limitation Act to suits to set aside sale for arrears of revenue and having regard to the language of clause 3 of Section 16 of Act XIV of 1859 we must conclude that the Legislature intended that the period prescribed in Section 59 of Act II of 1864 should be subject to the general provisions of the limitation act for the time being in force which might have the effect of postponing the starting point of limitation or of excluding any time in the computation of the period of limitation. The question of the construction to be placed on Section 59 cannot be affected by Section 29 of the Limitation Act IX of 08. What effect Section 29 would have upon the provision in the special Act which could not be construed as subjecting any special period of limitation prescribed therein to any provisions of the limitation act it is unnecessary 'to consider in this case. We feel strengthened in this conclusion by the decisions of this Court already referred to above relating to the limitation for suits coming within Section 59 of Act II of 1864. We hold therefore that the suit in the present case is not barred by limitation and reversing the decrees of the Courts below remand the suit for disposal on the merits to the Court of First Instance. The costs in this and in the Lower Appellate Court will abide the result.

Srinivasa Aiyangar A... v. The Secretary Of Sta...