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  • section 104 and Order XLIII, rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • provisions of Order XLI, rule 23, and from section 107,
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 108 extends the provisions of the Code
  • Order LVIII, rule 4 of the Judicature Act
  • section 153 of the Estates Land Act.
  • section 92 of the Amending Act XII
  • section 622 [new section 115, clause
  • Section 107, clause(1) (section 582
  • section 561, Civil Procedure Code.
  • clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 115,
  • clauses (a) and (b) of section 115
  • Order XLI, rule 32 (section 577
  • Order XLI, rule 33,
  • Order XLI, rule 28
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 104 and Order XLIII, rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • provisions of Order XLI, rule 23, and from section 107,
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 108 extends the provisions of the Code
  • Order LVIII, rule 4 of the Judicature Act
  • section 153 of the Estates Land Act.
  • section 92 of the Amending Act XII
  • section 622 [new section 115, clause
  • Section 107, clause(1) (section 582
  • section 561, Civil Procedure Code.
  • clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 115,
  • clauses (a) and (b) of section 115
  • Order XLI, rule 32 (section 577
  • Order XLI, rule 33,
  • Order XLI, rule 28
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Full Bench Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These petitions arose from three ejectment suits brought by a landholder in the District Munsif's Court at Tanuku. The defendants contested the Munsif's jurisdiction, asserting the suits should have been instituted before the Collector under section 153 of the Estates Land Act. The District Munsif returned the plaints for presentation to the proper Court. On appeal the Subordinate Judge reversed the Munsif's decision and ordered the Munsif to take back the plaint, restore the suit to his file and dispose of it according to law. The defendants applied to the High Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside the Subordinate Judge's order on the ground that the Munsif's view on jurisdiction was correct and the Subordinate Judge was wrong.

Two Judges (Sankaran Nair and Sadasiva Ayyar) found a conflict of judicial opinion concerning whether the Subordinate Judge's order amounted to an exercise of jurisdiction not vested in him or an illegal exercise of jurisdiction and referred two questions to a Full Bench:

  1. What is the scope of the words "acted illegally" in section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code; does the High Court have power to interfere where a question of law is wrongly decided by a revisional court?
  2. Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under section 115 to interfere where an Appellate Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, erroneously decides that the Court of First Instance was or was not competent (i.e., had or had not jurisdiction) to entertain a suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the exact scope of the meaning of "acted illegally" in section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, and whether the High Court may interfere in cases where a question of law is wrongly decided by the Court under revision.
  2. Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under section 115 to interfere when an Appellate Court erroneously decides that the Court of First Instance had or had not jurisdiction to entertain a suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants / Applicants (those who applied under section 115)

  • Contended that the District Munsif's view on jurisdiction was correct and that the Subordinate Judge's contrary order should be set aside under section 115.
  • Raised the contention that a subordinate Appellate Court acts without jurisdiction within the meaning of section 115 when, under an error of law, it decides that the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction and directs the latter to retake the case on its file and dispose of it according to law.

Respondent / Appellate side (as presented in argument)

  • Argued that when an Appellate Court reverses the decision on a question of jurisdiction it necessarily has the implied power to direct the first Court to do what follows on reversal; the appellate power to remand and direct the first Court follows from the general powers of an Appellate Court.
  • Relied on precedents (as described in the opinions) asserting that not every error of law justifies interference by the High Court under section 115; some cases held that appellate remands or reversals did not amount to illegality or a failure of jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kristamma Naidu v. Chapa Naidu Full Bench decision on the meaning/scope of section 115; majority view that the third part authorizes interference when a lower Court's decision is "perverse". Referred to as a binding Full Bench decision on the wider question; cited for the proposition that a perverse decision may amount to "acting illegally".
Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh (Privy Council) Held that not every error of law would justify High Court interference under section 115; the Privy Council considered an error on res judicata and limited interference. Considered as a limiting authority; judges discuss its scope and whether it bars interference where an error of law affects jurisdiction.
Manisha Eradi v. Siyali Koya Majority held that a Small Cause Court Judge who assumed jurisdiction owing to an error of law acted without jurisdiction within the first part of the section; some judges treated third part as applicable in cases of error of law or material irregularity. Used to illustrate differing judicial approaches to whether errors of law affecting jurisdiction come under the first or third part of section 115.
Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Bahsh Singh (variant spelling) See the Privy Council citation above (same authority in repeated references). Repeatedly discussed and distinguished on the ground that it did not appear to address errors of law affecting jurisdiction explicitly.
Badami Kuar v. Dinu Rai Majority view that questions to which section 115 applies were questions of jurisdiction only. Referred to in discussing whether section 115 should be confined to questions of jurisdiction and in relation to the scope of interference.
Jugobundhu Pattuck v. Jadu Ghose Alkushi Held that a subordinate appellate Court dismissing a suit for want of jurisdiction under an error in law acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Referred in support of the view that appellate confirmation of a wrong jurisdictional conclusion may amount to illegality.
Mathura Nath Sarkar v. Umesh Chandra Sarkar Decision (cited) where the High Court could not interfere; based on Amir Hassan Khan authority; conceded point that the District Judge acted within jurisdiction though an error of law was alleged. Discussed as a case with facts similar to the present but distinguished because it relied on Amir Hassan Khan; its applicability to errors of law as to jurisdiction was questioned.
Meenatchi Achi v. Ananthanarayana Ayyar Case like the present; Court overruled the objection that it could not interfere under the section (but did so without reasons in the text). Invoked to show precedent where High Court intervened although the reasoning was not detailed in that report.
Zarmiran (Zamiran) v. Fateh Ali Held that an appellate Court acted illegally in affirming a decree dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction owing to an error of law. Used to support the proposition that appellate affirmation of a wrong jurisdictional dismissal can be set aside in revision.
Chindan v. Kunhiraman Miller, J. held there was no illegality or irregularity in an Appellate Court remanding a suit where the lower Court had returned the plaint for presentation to another Court. Referred to as authority where remand by an Appellate Court was not treated as illegal.
Vishvanath Govind Deshmane v. Rambhat Held the High Court had power to interfere under revision where the appellate Court agreed with the first Court that it had no jurisdiction. Invoked to show instances where High Courts exercised revisional power to correct jurisdictional errors.
Khatija Bi v. Babu Sahib Held that where a first Court failed to exercise jurisdiction owing to an error of law and the Appellate Court confirmed that view, the Appellate Court must also be held to have failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. Referenced as a supporting instance though not examined at length in that judgment.
Venkatasubbiah v. Seshachellum Held that a District Munsif's order refusing amendment of a plaint cannot be revised under section 115. Listed among recent cases delineating limits on revisional interference.
Ramgopal Jhoonjhoonwalla v. Joharmall Khemka Held that an erroneous decision as to limitation was not revisable under section 115 (as cited). Cited to show categories of errors deemed not revisable.
Ramjas Agarwalla v. India General Navigation and Railway Company, Ld. Refusal to frame and try a requisite issue was held revisable (as cited). Invoked to illustrate that some interlocutory refusals are amenable to revision.
Venkata Subramaniam v. Kanchi Raju Abdur Rahim, J., refused to interfere in revision where the lower Court misconstrued section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Used as another example of limited revisional intervention in cases of erroneous law.
The Queen v. Madhub Chunder Giri Mohun and Goomanee Described for explanation of appellate functions in criminal matters; used to illustrate function of Courts of Appeal. Referred as comparative authority for appellate functions and re-hearing principles.
Kirani Ahmedula v. Subabhat Relates to functions of the Appellate Court in matters where discretionary power is vested in a Court. Referred in support of appellate powers to exercise discretion akin to original Courts.
Sakharam Mahadev Danage v. Hari Krishna Danage Illustrates that an Appellate Court may take cognizance of facts occurring after the first Court's decision. Used to underline the appellate court's broader cognizance of the cause.
Ram Pershad Ojha v. Bhurosa Koonwar Same principle as above (appellate cognizance of subsequent facts). Referred similarly to show appellate scope.
Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal, Bhashyam Ayyangar (J.) Explained that when an appeal is preferred the suit is continued in the Court of Appeal and re-heard in whole or in part; the Court of Appeal is seized of the whole suit in many cases. Quoted to support the proposition that an appeal continues the suit in the Appellate Court and underpins the view that an Appellate Court may deal with the cause generally.
Elston v. Rose Mentioned in the context of discussion on the Privy Council decision and the scope for interference by High Courts. Cited alongside other authorities when addressing the meaning of "acting illegally."
Mohunt Bhagwan Ramanuj Das v. Khetter Moni Dassi (Decree-Holder) High Courts sometimes held gross and palpable errors leading to grave and manifest injustice may justify interference. Referenced to show judicial tendency to allow interference where manifest injustice arises.
Kali Charan Sirdar v. Sarat Chunder Chowdhry; Duraisami Reddi v. Muthial Reddi; Subramaniya v. Munusawmi Listed as cases not reconcilable with the view that any error rectifiable on second appeal is proper ground for interference. Used to demonstrate conflicting lines of authority and the limits of revisional intervention.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench confined itself to the second referred question (whether the High Court may interfere under section 115 when an Appellate Court erroneously decides that the Court of First Instance had or had not jurisdiction). Different judges provided distinct lines of reasoning:

Wallis, J. — Key analytical points
  • Refused to travel beyond the present case and treated the majority decision in Kristamma Naidu v. Chapa Naidu as binding for the more general question.
  • Distinguished Amir Hassan Khan and the Full Bench in that they did not deal with errors of law affecting jurisdiction; concluded section 115 empowers the High Court to keep subordinate courts within jurisdictional bounds and to prevent refusals to exercise jurisdiction.
  • Reviewed authorities (Manisha Eradi, Badami Kuar, Jugobundhu Pattuck, Mathura Nath) and concluded those decisions do not bar interference where errors of law affect jurisdiction.
  • Accepted that a Court of First Instance which wrongly assumes jurisdiction due to an error of law acts without jurisdiction and extended that reasoning to an Appellate Court that remits a case to a lower Court without jurisdiction: in such circumstances the Appellate Court acts without jurisdiction within section 115.
  • Answered the second question in the affirmative (i.e., High Court can interfere) but did not decide the propriety of interference in the present petitions.
Sundara Ayyar, J. — Key analytical points
  • Set out the factual matrix of the Tanuku suits and the procedural steps leading to the Full Bench reference.
  • Considered authorities (Chindan; Mathura Nath Sirkar; Zamiran/Zarmiran; Badami Kuar; Jugobundhu Pattuck; Vishvanath Govind Deshmane; Khatija Bi; Meenatchi Achi) and analyzed whether these proceeded on the ground that the Appellate Court acted illegally or failed/exercised jurisdiction not vested in it.
  • Emphasised statutory provisions (Order XLI rules, section 107, section 108, Order XLIII rules) demonstrating that an appeal is a continuation of proceedings and that the Appellate Court has plenary or extensive powers akin to a Court of first instance in many respects.
  • Argued the Appellate Court, when it reverses an order returning a plaint for want of jurisdiction, must be taken to be seized of the cause and may direct the first Court to proceed; therefore the Appellate Court in remanding took cognizance of the cause because it relied on an error of law affecting jurisdiction.
  • Concluded that the High Court can rectify an erroneous decision of the Appellate Court under the first part of section 115 (i.e., that the Appellate Court exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law in directing the Munsif to try the suit).
Sadasiva Ayyar, J. — Key analytical points
  • Expressed doubt about decisions that interpreted "acted illegally" to include mere erroneous decisions on law or that allowed invocation of clauses (a) and (b) of section 115 in respect of other courts' jurisdictional decisions.
  • Analyzed the literal structure of section 115 (old section 622) and concluded it permits interference only on three grounds: (a) exercised jurisdiction not vested in it; (b) failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it; (c) acted illegally or with material irregularity.
  • Distinguished the jurisdiction of the court whose order is sought to be revised from the separate question whether that court was correct about another court's jurisdiction. Held clauses (a) and (b) apply only to the jurisdiction of the court whose order is under revision, not to its decision about some other court's jurisdiction.
  • Considered Privy Council authority in Amir Hassan Khan and the Full Bench in Kristamma Naidu binding; concluded those authorities restrict revisional interference and that an erroneous decision of law (including on another Court's jurisdiction) does not necessarily amount to illegality or material irregularity amenable to revision.
  • Would not extend section 115 to permit revision of an Appellate Court's erroneous decision about the jurisdiction of the first Court where interlocutory remedy and later second appeal mechanisms exist.

In sum, the reasoning shows a divided Full Bench: two judges (Wallis and Sundara Ayyar) considered that section 115 permits High Court interference where an appellate decision based on an error of law confers jurisdiction improperly (either under the third part or the first part of the section), whereas Sadasiva Ayyar J. adhered to a restrictive view (relying on Amir Hassan Khan and Kristamma Naidu) that mere erroneous decisions of law about another court's jurisdiction do not ordinarily amount to "acting illegally" or to the kinds of jurisdictional defects contemplated by clauses (a) and (b) of section 115.

Holding and Implications

The Full Bench produced divergent judicial opinions on the referred questions. The positions set out in the opinion excerpt are:

  • Wallis, J.: Answered the second question in the affirmative — the High Court is empowered under section 115 to interfere where an Appellate Court, by error of law, directs a Court of First Instance to proceed in a matter over which the latter has no jurisdiction (i.e., the Appellate Court can be said to have acted without jurisdiction).
  • Sundara Ayyar, J.: Also answered the second question in the affirmative — concluded the Appellate Court is seized of the cause on appeal and that the High Court can rectify an erroneous decision of the Appellate Court under the first part of section 115.
  • Sadasiva Ayyar, J.: Reached a contrary conclusion — held that clauses (a) and (b) of section 115 apply only to the jurisdiction of the court whose order is under revision and that an erroneous appellate decision about the jurisdiction of a first Court does not fall under those clauses; followed Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh and Kristamma Naidu for a narrower scope and treated "acted illegally" (on first question) as meaning a wilfully perverse decision rather than a mere erroneous decision of law.

Core Ruling (as reflected in the opinions): Divided — the judges were not unanimous: two judges held that the High Court may interfere (affirmative) in respect of an appellate error conferring jurisdiction improperly; one judge held that it may not (negative).

Implications:

  • There is no single unanimous Full Bench holding in the provided text that establishes a new, unified rule; the opinion records conflicting judicial conclusions on the precise scope of section 115 and the meaning of "acted illegally."
  • Direct consequence for these petitions (i.e., whether the Subordinate Judge's order should be set aside) is not conclusively resolved in the provided excerpt — the judges gave separate reasoned opinions rather than a single collective order in the portion supplied.
  • Because opinions differ, the excerpt shows no clear, binding expansion or contraction of precedent beyond what individual judges articulated: some judges would allow revisional interference where an appellate misdirection confers jurisdiction improperly; others would confine revisional interference to cases of wilful perversity or to jurisdictional defects of the court whose order is under revision.
  • No new universally binding precedent (i.e., a unanimous Full Bench ruling) is apparent from the material provided; the matter remains contested among the judges whose reasons are summarized above.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the statements and holdings contained in the provided opinion excerpt and does not infer the final disposition of the petitions beyond the positions expressly taken by the judges whose reasons are recorded.

    Vuppuluri Atchayya v. Kanchumarti Venkata Seetharamachandra Rao

    Wallis, J.:— The second question referred to us covers the present case, and I do not think it advisable to travel outside of it especially as the more general question has been considered by a Full Bench of five Judges in Kristamma Naidu v. Chapa Naidu and the decision of the majority appears to me to be binding upon the Court as at present constituted. As regards the second question, I am of opinion that the case is not covered by the decisions of the Privy Council and the Full Bench in Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Sing and Kristamma Naidu v. Chapa Naidu neither of which deals, with errors of law affecting jurisdiction. I think that the High Court is empowered under section 115 to keep Courts subordinate to it within the bounds of their jurisdiction and to see that they do not refuse to exercise in functions discharged in England by means of the writs of prohibition and mandamus. No question of jurisdiction arose in, Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh or as it seems to me, was considered by their Lordships. That decision was considered by a Full Bench of five Judges in Manisha Eradi v. Siyali Koya, where it was held by the majority that, a Small Cause Court Judge who assumed jurisdiction owing to an error of law as applied to the facts found by him acted without jurisdiction within the first part of the section. Muttuswami Ayyar, J., with whom Parker, J., concurred, preferred to treat the third part of the section as applicable and held that it applied in cases where the lower Court assumed or declined jurisdiction in consequence of some error of law or of some material irregularity in its proceedings and in no others. In the later Full Bench case Kristamma Naidu v. Chapa Naidu, Muttuswami Ayyar, J., was of opinion that this was too narrow a construction and agreed with the majority that the third part of the section authorized interference when the decision of the lower Court was perverse. In this case too Shepherd, J., appears to have considered that all erroneous decisions as to jurisdiction would be covered by the earlier provisions of the section, but if this be not so, there is nothing, to show that he would have regarded the third as inapplicable. In Badami Kuar v. Dinu Rai, the majority of the Full Bench were of opinion that the questions' to which the present section 115 applies were questions of jurisdiction only. In Jugobundhu Pattuck v. Jadu Ghose Alkushi, the subordinate appellate Court in dismissing a suit for want of jurisdiction under an error in law was held to have acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The decision in Mathura Nath Sarkar v. Umesh Chandra Sarkar, the facts in which are on all fours with the present case that the High Court could not interfere was based on the authority of Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Bahsh Singh which was I have already, said does not appear to me to apply to errors in law as to jurisdiction.

    In Meenatchi Achi v. Ananthanarayana Ayyar which was also a case like the present, the Court overruled the objection that it could not interfere under the section but without giving reasons. In Zarmiran v. Fateh Ali, it was held that the lower Appellate Court acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction in affirming the decree of the Court of First Instance dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction owing to an error of law. I am prepared to follow the decisions in support of the view already cited to hold in the case referred to us the High Court is empowered to interfere under the third part of the section. Cases of jurisdiction of course can only come under this part of the section if they do not come under the first or second parts and the contention has been raised before us that a subordinate Appellate Court acts without jurisdiction within the meaning of the section in deciding under an error of law that the Court, of First Instance has jurisdiction and directing the latter to retake the case on its file and dispose of it according to law. This contention is opposed to Mathura Nath Sarkar v. Umesh Chandra Sarkar, but the point was not argued there as it was conceded that this part of the section was inapplicable. There could be no doubt that a Court of First Instance which wrongly assumes jurisdiction owing to an error of law acts without jurisdiction. Similarly it may, I think, be said, that an Appellate Court has not jurisdiction to remit for trial to a lower Court cases over which the latter has no jurisdiction I and that if it does so under an error of law it acts without jurisdiction within the meaning of the section. In either view I answer the second question in the affirmative. I have not considered the propriety of interfering in the present case.

    Sundara Ayyar, J.:— These petitions arose out of three suit instituted by a landholder to eject the tenant in each, case in the District Munsif's Court of Tanuku. The defendants objected to the jurisdiction of the Munsifs' Court and contended that the suits should have been instituted before the Collector. The question of the proper Court empowered to try the suits depended on the construction of section 153 of the Estates Land Act. The District Munsif held that he had no power to entertain the suits and returned the plaints for presentation to the proper Court. An appeal was presented against his order the Subordinate Judge who beard the appeal put a different interpretation on section 153 of the Estates Land Act and was of opinion that the plaints were rightly presented to the District Munsif's Court. He passed the following order:—“The lower Court's order is therefore set aside with a direction to the District Munsif to take back the plaint, restore the suit to its file and dispose of the same according to law.” The defendant applied to this Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside the Subordinate Judge's order on the ground that the Munsif's view on the question of jurisdiction was right and that the Subordinate Judge was wrong. The petitions came on for bearing before Sankaran Nair and Sadasiva Ayyar, JJ. The learned Judges holding that there was a conflict of judicial opinion on the question whether the Subordinate Judge could be held, in passing his order, to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him or to have acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction, and that there was a great diversity in the opinions of the Judges as to the right interpretation to be put on the words “acted illegally” in section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, referred the following questions for the decision of a Full Bench:—

    (1) What is the exact scope of the meaning, of the words acted illegally in section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code? Has the High Court power to interfere in any class of cases (and, if so, which class) where a question of law is wrongly decided by the Court whose decision is attacked in revision?

    (2) Has the High Court jurisdiction, to interfere under section 115 when an Appellate Court erroneously decides in the exercise of its admitted jurisdiction as an Appellate. Court, that the Court of First Instance was or was not competent (i.e,), had of had not jurisdiction to entertain a suit?”

    The second question alone arose for decision in the petitions before the learned Judges who made the reference. The first question is very wide in its scope. It is doubtful whether it is possible, or desirable, if possible, to attempt an exhaustive definition of the expression “acting illegal” in the exercise of jurisdiction.” The question was considered by a Full Bench of five Judges of this Court in Kristamma Naidu v. Chapa Naidu. Their, opinions were not unanimous we considered it desirable in the circumstances to give our answer only to the second question referred for our opinion in this case and to abstain from dealing with the wider point raised in the first question.

    So, far as the second question is concerned, Miller, J., in a similar case—Chindan v. Kunhiraman—held that there was no illegality or irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction by an Appellate Court in setting aside an order returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court and remanding the suit to the Court of the First Instance for adjudication according to law. It was apparently not urged before the learned Judge that there was, an exercise of jurisdiction not vested in the Appellate Court: at any rate he pronounced no opinion on that question. In Mathura Nath Sirkar v. Umesh Chandra Sirkar, Maclean, C.J, and Gurudass Banerjee, J., held the same view as Miller, J., and on the same grounds. Maclean, C.J, observed: “It is conceded also by the appellant's pleader that the learned District Judge in doing what he did was clearly acting within his jurisdiction, and the point urged is this, that if he did anything, he committed an error in law alone.” Banerjee, J., also considered only the question whether there was an illegal exercise of jurisdiction. He said: “It may seem anomalous that where a Court acts without jurisdiction, it may be set right under section 622 but, when it directs another Court to do so, its order is not open to revision under that section. But the anomaly, so far as cases like the present are concerned, has been removed by section 646(b), which shows that the remedy in such a case, supposing the petitioner's contention to be right that the case was triable by the Court of Small Causes, lies in the course prescribed by that section, and not in an application under section 622.” This observation would not apply where the question of jurisdiction does not arise on account of a doubt as to whether a case is of small cause nature or not. Section 646(b) or the corresponding section in the present Procedure Code would have no application, for instance to the present case. In Zamiran v. Fateh Ali, it was held that where an appellate Court disagreeing with the opinion of the Court of First Instance, that it had no power to try the suit, directs it to do so, the High Court could interfere under its revisional powers but the ground of interference was that the Court acted illegally in holding that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction. On the same ground of illegal exercise of jurisdiction the Allahabad High Court interfered in Badami Kuar v. Dina Rai, where both the lower Courts held that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to try the suit and also the Calcutta High Court in Jugobundhu Pattuck v. Jadu Ghose Alkushi. In Vishvanath Govind Deshmane v. Rambhat, where the Court of Appeal agreed with the first Court that the latter had no jurisdiction, the Bombay High Court held that the High Court had power to interfere under section 622 (Act XIV of 1882). The reason given was in the words of the Court; “The Subordinate Judge has refused to exercise jurisdiction which, if he is wrong, is by law vested in him, and we can examine his order to see if he is right in his refusal.” It is not explained whether the District Court in holding that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it (District Court) or acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction. ‘In Khatija Bi v. Babu Sahib, which was decided by Benson, J., and myself we held that where the first Court, owing 60 an error of law, failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it and the Appellate Court taking the same view of the law confirmed the order, the Appellate Court must, also be held to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it. But the point was not examined at length in the judgment. In Meenatchi Achi v. Ananthanarayana Ayyar, it was held that, if an Appellate Court fails to set aside an order of a Munsif who acted with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction the High Court had power under section 622 to set aside the Appellate Court's order but it was not explained whether the Reason was that the Appellate Court must be held in confirming the first Court's order, to have committed the same material irregularity as the first Court or that the Appellate Court must be taken to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction Vested in it by not setting aside the first Court's order. So far it will be observed that all the cases in which the High Courts interfered to set aside an order of an Appellate Court relating to the question of the jurisdiction of the first Court, have not proceeded on the ground that the Appellate Court exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it or failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it. Apparently the attempt to induce the High Court to interfere was based in the arguments at the Bar in those cases on the ground that there was an illegal exercise of jurisdiction by the Appellate Court. I cannot therefore but be diffident in arriving at the conclusion to which my reasoning has led me that in such cases the High Court has power to interfere under the first part of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (section 622 of the repealed Code), that is, on the ground that the Appellate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it or failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it. With all deference I cannot but think that insufficient attention has been paid in the consideration of the High Court's powers under section 115 to the true nature of the functions performed by an Appellate Court. It is not denied that if a Court by an error of law in deciding whether it had jurisdiction, exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it or failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it the High Court has power to interfere under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and that its right of interference cannot be objected to on the ground that the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether it has jurisdiction over the cause or not and that an erroneous decision on the question is a mere error of law which the High Court cannot rectify according to the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh. See Manisha Eradi v. Siyali Koya and Elston v. Rose. What is contended is that though an error of the Court regarding its own jurisdiction can be rectified the mistake of an Appellate Court concerning the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance cannot be set right under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is argued that the Appellate Court in an appeal, from an adjudication of the first Court concerning its jurisdiction merely decides whether that adjudication is right or wrong, that the matter before it is nothing more nor less than the order of the first Court regarding its jurisdiction and that the Appellate Court pronouncing its own decision on the question exercises no jurisdiction over the cause itself which was before the first Court and that therefore the first part of section 115 would be inapplicable. I am of opinion that this is an entirely wrong view of the matter. Order XLI, rule 32 (section 577 of the old Code), enacts that “the judgment (of the Appellate Court) may be for confirming, varying or reversing the decree from, which the appeal is preferred.” Section 107, clause(1) (section 582 of the old Code), provides “subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an Appellate. Court shall have power—(a) to determine a case finally; (b) to remand a case; (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial; (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken.” Clause (2) says “subject as aforesaid, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original-jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein.” Section 108 extends the provisions of the Code relating to appeals to appeals (a) “from appellate decrees, and (b) from orders made under this Code or under any special or local law in which a different procedure is not provided”. Order XLIII, rule 2, makes the rules of Order XLI applicable to appeals from orders. It is quite clear that the Civil Procedure Code has accepted and carried out the well-established principle that an appeal is the continuation of the proceedings in the Original Court, that those proceedings are removed to the Court of Appeal and that the proceedings in the Appellate Court, are in the nature of a re-hearing. In the case, of second appeals no doubt the High Court does not possess plenary powers of dealing with the case and it cannot be said in such cases that the cause is re-heard in full but this does not affect the; general principles regulating the functions of an Appellate Court or the powers and duties of a Court of First Appeal. See The Queen v. Madhub Chunder Giri Mohun and Goomanee where the functions of a Court of Appeal in criminal cases are explained. Kirani Ahmedula v. Subabhat relates to the functions of the Appellate. Court in cases where a discretionary power is vested in a Court. An Appellate Court, is entitled to take cognisance of facts which occurred subsequent to the decision of the first Court. See Sakharam Mahadev Danage v. Hari Krishna Danage and Ram Pershad Ojha v. Bhurosa Koonwar. No doubt there are express provisions restricting the powers even of a Court of First Appeal such as in the matter of the right to admit additional evidence, but such restrictive provisions are mere rules of procedure similar to provisions relating to procedure in the Court of First Instance. In Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal, Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., observes at page 95: “When an appeal is preferred from a decree of Court of First Instance, the suit is continued in the Court of Appeal and re-heard either in whole or in part, according as the whole suit is litigated again in the Court of Appeal or only a part of it. The final decree in the appeal will thus be the final decree in the suit whether that be one confirming, varying or reversing the decree of the Court of. First Instance. Later on he says: “When an appeal is preferred, the Court of Appeal is really seized of the whole suit though the relief given by it will be limited to the portion of the decree appealed against or objected to under section 561, Civil Procedure Code.” The same principle is adopted with regard to the functions of the Court of Appeal in England. Order LVIII, rule 4 of the Judicature Act lays down that the Court of Appeal has the same power of drawing inferences, etc., as the High Court 36 and 37 Victoria, Chapter 66, Section 75, enacts that for all purposes incidental to hearing and determination of any appeal within its jurisdiction and the management, execution and enforcement of any judgment or order made on such appeal and for the purposes of any other authority expressly given to the Court of Appeal it shall have all the powers, authority and jurisdiction vested in the High Court of Chancery. Order XLI, rule 33, enacts that the Appellate Court should pass the order which the first Court should have passed and has full power to pass such other order as may be necessary to do justice between the parties before it. Walter Clark, the learned author of the article on Appeal and Error in the Cyclopaedia of American Law and Procedure, Volume II, observes at page 516 that: in its original and technical sense “An appeal was a proceeding, introduced into equity practice from the Civil law, by which the whole cause was removed from a lower to an Appellate Court, and there tried de novo upon evidence newly introduced, being subjected to a new and final determination as if it had not been tried before, and without any reference to the conclusion of the inferior Court. The object of the common law writs of error was to review and correct any error of law committed in the proceedings. The learned author points out that the appeal established by statute in most of the States of the United States has some of the characteristics both of the equitable remedy of an appeal and of the writ of error. In India a first appeal is similar to the equitable remedy of an appeal in England. The Appellate Court indeed has not got to and cannot re-hear the suit de novo upon fresh evidence and without any reference to the conclusion of the inferior Court. The extent of its powers to fully described in the Civil Procedure Code. The provisions in the Code that I have already referred to, conclusively show that its functions and powers are similar to those of the first Court. When, therefore, a suit has been disposed of by the first Court and an appeal is preferred, the Court of Appeal is seized of the cause and has the powers and duties of the first Court. It must of course, be remembered that all appeals are not appeals in which the whole cause in the first Court is brought before the Appellate Court. While the cause still remains in the Court of First Instance particular proceedings before it may be brought before the Appellate Court. Such matters are set out in section 104 and Order XLIII, rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code. For instance, if there is an appeal against an order appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver the suit in which the question arises remains in the hands of the first Court and only the proceedings relating to the appointment of the receiver are removed to the Appellate Court and the powers possessed by the Appellate Court, similar as they are to those of the first Court, would relate only to the proceedings removed to it. If the consequence of an order passed by the first Court is to bring the proceedings there to a close then the appeal to the Appellate Court has the effect of bringing up the whole cause before it. Where a suit has been dismissed by the first Court on a preliminary point and an appeal is lodged against the dismissal, the suit itself is before the Court of appeal. That this is the effect according, to the contemplation of the legislature is clear from the provisions of Order XLI, rule 23, and from section 107, already referred to. The former provision gives the Appellate Court, where the decision of the first Court on a preliminary point is reversed, power if it thinks fit to remand the case while the latter provision invests it with plenary powers to deal with the appeal in any other manner if it thinks fit to do so. It may determine the case finally, frame issues and refer them for; trial and take additional evidence or require such evidence to be taken, in the exercise of its ample discretion and clause (2) of section 107 invests it with all the powers of the first Court. A remand is to be made only if the Appellate Court thinks fit to do so according to Order XLI, rule 23. Notwithstanding therefore that the decision of the first Court was confined to the adjudication of a preliminary point and the appeal is against that adjudication, the Appellate Court is seized of the whole cause. When the Court of First Instance holding that, it had no jurisdiction to try a suit, returns the plaint for presentation to another Court its order terminates the proceedings in the suit before it. The order is tantamount to a dismissal of the suit for all practical purposes; the object of returning the plaint is merely to enable the plaintiff to present the same instrument in another Court and avoid the payment of fresh Court fees a concession made to him on the around that he has already, paid court fees for the complete adjudication of the cause. If there were no provision in the Code for the return of the plaint, and the Court dismissed the suit on the ground, of want of jurisdiction the appeal against the dismissal would be dealt., with under Order XLI, rule 23. In consequence of the concession, made in plaintiff's favour allowing the return of the plaint to him it was found necessary to provide specially for an appeal against the order. But all this does not alter the substantial character of the order returning a plaint on the ground of absence of jurisdiction in the first Court or of the appeal against such order. The suit being at an end so far as the first Court in concerned and nothing being left, there the appeal has the effect of removing the whole cause to the Appellate Court. If the Appellate Court decides that the first Court has jurisdiction to try the suit then it directs the latter Court to proceed with the trial of the suit. This it is able to do only because, it has cognizance of the suit itself. Having regard to section 108 making the provisions relating, to appeals from decrees applicable to appeals from orders and to the fact that under section 107 it has the power both to determine a cause finally and to remand a case it is by no means clear to me that when the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that an order of the first Court returning a plaint is wrong it cannot determine the case finally itself. But, however that may be, I have no doubt that the Appellate Court is seized of the cause whatever may be the mode prescribed for its disposal of the cause. There is no provision in the Code laying down what the Appellate Court should do when it reverses any particular order of the first Court against which an appeal lies. What is its duty in such a case? It appears to me the answer must depend on what duty will lie upon it as a Court having cognizance of the cause when the particular order of the first Court has been reversed. If the order of the first Court put an end to the proceedings before that Court then I think that section 107 gives the Appellate Court plenary pawers in dealing with the appeal. If the order is of as interlocutory character and the cause itself is still in the hands of the first Court the Appellate Court will have power to pass such orders as would naturally follow from the reversal of the order appealed against. Order XLI, rule 28 provides that an Appellate Court remanding a suit to the first Court may direct what issue or issues may be tried in the case remanded. This Shows that it has power to deal with the cause generally and that its authority is not confined to the decision of the correctness or otherwise-of-the adjudication on the preliminary point. In this case the Subordinate Judge after reversing the decision of the Munsif on the question, of jurisdiction directed him to try the suit on the merits. How could he do so without taking cognizance of the suit, itself. It was argued for the respondent that the authority in reverse the decision on the question of jurisdiction must be taken to give power, impliedly to direct the first Court to do what follows on the reversal. But would not the legislature have made specific provision giving the Appellate Court any further powers if the appeal itself was intended in the contemplation of the legislature to do no more than to enable the Appellate Court to deal with the particular question decided by the Munsif? In my opinion the legislature considered it unnecessary to make any provision of the kind because of the general powers of an Appellate Court which are embodied in section 107 of the Code. The Subordinate Judge therefore in passing the order of remand took cognizance of the cause. He did so on account of an error in the decision of the question of law on which, the jurisdiction of the first Court, and his own jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case depended.—This view would obviate the anomaly pointed out by Banerjee, J., in Mathura Nath Sarkar v. Umesh Chandra Sarkar. Section 115 was clearly intended to enable, the High Court to exercise its powers of revision, where any question of jurisdiction either, of the first Court or the Appellate Court was concerned; and if we hear in mind the nature of he powers and functions of a Court of Appeal there would be no difficulty in giving effect to the object of the section. I am therefore of opinion that the High Court has power to rectify the erroneous decision of the Appellate Court under the first part of section 115, i.e, on the ground that the Appellate Court in this case exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it in holding that the Munsif ought to have tried the suit of the merits and in directing him to do so.

    In the view I have taken of the case it is unnecessary for me to consider whether the Appellate Court can be said to have acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction in directing, the first Court to take cognizance of the suit and to adjudicate on the merits. Great and almost irreconcilable diversity of opinion has prevailed with respect to the interpretation to be put on the word ‘illegally.’ The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh, decided that it was not every error of law which would justify the High Court in interfering under section 115. But their Lordships did not proceed to state whether any and what error of law would amount to “acting illegally in the exercise of jurisdiction.” The error, which the High Court rectified in the case before their Lordships related to the finding of the lower Court on a question of res judicata. A wrong decision on such a question would lead to a fresh, adjudication between the parties but need not necessarily result in a failure of justice. Whether their Lordships meant no more than that an error which need not lead to a failure of justice would not be a good ground for interference, it is difficult to say. The High Courts have sometimes laid down, that gross and palpable errors leading to grave and manifest injustice may justify interference consistently with the decision of the Privy Council. See Mohunt Bhagwan Ramanuj Das…Claimant, v. Khetter Moni Dassi…Decree-Holder;, J., indeed went further and (held the opinion that any error which could be rectified in Second Appeal would also be a proper ground for interference under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. See Badami Kuar v. Dinu Rai. This is not reconcilable, with the decision of the Privy Council see Kali Charan Sirdar v. Sarat Chunder Chowdhry, Duraisami Reddi v. Muthial Reddi and Subramaniya v. Munusawmi. We are of course bound to presume that the Judicial Committee had full regard to the history of the legislation on the point, including the facts that section 622 of Act VII of 1877 did not contain the words “or to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity” and that these words were inserted by section 92 of the Amending Act XII of 1879. It appears to me to be quite possible that what their Lordships meant to lay down was that the object of the amended section was to confer a discretionary power on the High Court to correct manifest injustice brought about by palpable errors and that the High Court should not interfere on the mere ground of an error of law in the decision of the lower Courts. The powers conferred on the High Court under section 115 are similar to those possessed by the High Courts in England to prevent injustice by the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. I do not propose to review the decisions which have attempted to place a meaning or no meaning on the expression “acting illegally,” as I am prepared to hold that this Court has power to interfere, under the first part of section 115. But it may be taken to be well-established that the decision of the Privy Council will not justify the refusal to give any effect to the words “acting illegally.” and that it would not be right to confine the right to interference to cases of irregularity in procedure where the first part of the section would not be applicable. In Kristamma Naidu v. Chapa Naidu, Collins, C.J, Muthuswami Ayyar, J., and Shepherd, J., held that a perverse decision on a question of law or procedure, that is, a conscious departure from some rule of law or procedure would amount to acting illegally or with material irregularity. Best, J., held that if the Court itself took a point of law in appeal without affording the parties an opportunity of proving what was necessary to meet it, that would be an irregularity within the meaning of section 622 and that an inadvertent admission of an appeal that is time-barred would be an illegality within the section. Davies, J., was of opinion that interference under the section should be confined to cases where the illegality or irregularity is such as might occasion a substantial failure of justice. I do not think that the case can be taken to have laid down an exhaustive definition of the causes which would justify an interference under the section. Cannot an error of law which makes the Court confer jurisdiction on a subordinate Court, be taken to amount to “acting illegally in the exercise of jurisdiction?” Such an error is of the most serious kind affecting what is regarded as the vital point in all litigation. I should be disposed, if necessary, to say that an erroneous holding on such a point would amount to “acting illegally in the exercise of jurisdiction.” But, I think it is unnecessary to place reliance on the latter part of section 115 to justify the interference of the High Court in such a case. My answer to the second question referred to the Full Bench is in the affirmative for the reasons given above.

    Sadasiva Ayyar, J.:— In the order of reference to the Full Bench, I have set out my reasons for doubting the correctness of the decisions which have shown an inclination to hold

    (a) that the words “acted illegally” in the old section 622 [new section 115, clause (b)] might include cases of mere erroneous decisions on questions of law, and

    (b) that if the erroneous decision of law related to the question of the jurisdiction of a Court other than that of the Court which gave the erroneous decision it might be even brought under clauses (a) and (b) of section 115 which use the words “to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law” and “to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested.”

    My doubts have been only confirmed by the arguments advanced before the Full Bench, Section 115 seems to me to permit the High. Court to interfere only on three specific grounds, viz.:—

    (a) where the Court whose decision is sought to be revised has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law,

    (b) where it has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or

    (c) where it has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

    Now, in the present cases, the Appellate Court had jurisdiction and was bound to hear the appeal preferred to it from the order of the District Munsif returning the plaint to be presented to the proper Court. The party aggrieved by the District Munsif's order was entitled under Order XLIII, clause 1(a), to appeal to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court was bound in the exercise of its jurisdiction to come to a conclusion whether the Munsif was right or wrong in returning the plaint to be presented to another Court. To arrive at either conclusion clearly involves the arriving at a finding as to jurisdiction or want of jurisdiction in the District Munsif to try the suit himself. I am perfectly clear that clauses (a) and (b) of section 115 can only apply to the jurisdiction of the Court whose order or decree is sought to be revised to pass such order or decree and not to its decision on the jurisdiction of some other Court. I entirely agree with the observations of Maclean, C.J, in Mathura Nath Sarkar v. Umesh Chunder Sarkari on this point and of Mr. Justice Miller in Chindan v. Kunhiraman quoted in my order of reference. The argument that as every Court has jurisdiction to decide as a preliminary question own jurisdiction before going into the other questions in the case, clauses (a) and (b) of section 115 would become unmeaning and useless does not in the least impress me as creating any difficulty, tor, the revising Court does not and need not deal with the preliminary opinion of the revised Court giving, itself jurisdiction but with the decree or, order of the revised Court which was passed after it erroneously gave itself, jurisdiction and which decree or order was really passed without jurisdiction though the revised Court might have erroneously thought that it had jurisdiction. Whether the revised Court considered at all the question whether it had jurisdiction or ignored the point altogether, the revising Court can come to its own conclusion and set aside the decree or order passed without jurisdiction.

    I also feel great difficulty in following the argument that where the Appellate Court deals with an appeal from an order of the Munsif returning a plaint to be presented to the proper Court and comes to an erroneous decision, it (the Appellate Court) wrongly gives itself or withholds from itself jurisdiction over the trial of the suit, simply because its order decides that the Munsif has, or has not, jurisdiction to try the suit.

    I think that the Privy Council case Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksk Singh followed by the Full Bench of the High Court in Kristamma Naidu v. Chapa Naidu, is binding on us, that these decisions if loyally followed, do not empower us to interfere in revision with orders and decrees of the lower Courts which merely involve an erroneous decision of, law (whether the law relates to a question of res judicata as in the Privy Council case or to the jurisdiction of some other Court as in this case) and that while we may be reasonably astute in trying to get round precedents if parties would be left entirely remediless otherwise, we could not get over the plain implications of the Privy Council decision. Especially in cases of orders passed in matters which are really or substantially of an interlocutory character and which leave room for parties to come in the regular course before us at later stages, should we refuse to clutch at revisional jurisdiction. In the present cate, the lower Court's decision as to the Munsif's jurisdiction, assuming it for argument's sake to be erroneous, can be set aside when the matter is brought before us on second appeal after the Munsif decides the suit in obedience to the Subordinate Judge's appellate order now sought to be revised.

    I shall further make a short reference to some of the latest cases before concluding. In Venkatasubbiah v. Seshachellum it was held that the District Munsif's order refusing to allow amendment of a plaint cannot be revised under section 115. In Ramgopal Jhoonjhoonwalla v. Joharmall Khemka* an erroneous decision as to limitation was held not revisable. In Ramjas Agarwalla v. India General Navigation and Railway Company, Ld., the refusal to frame and try a requisite issue was held revisable. In Venkata Subramaniam v. Kanchi Raju, Abdur Rahim, J., refused to interfere in revision where the lower Court had misconstrued section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

    In the result, I would give the following answer to the questions referred to the Full Bench. On the first question, the words “acted illegally” mean giving a wilfully perverse decision on a question of law as stated in Kristamma Naidu v. Chapa Naidu and not a mere erroneous decision on a question of law. On the second question, I hold that the erroneous decision of the Appellate Court on the question of the jurisdiction of the first Court does not come under any of the three clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 115, that the appellate Court cannot, by any reasonable use of language, be held in such a case to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it (the appellate Court) by law or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested (in itself) and that according to the cases—Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh and Kristamma Naidu v. Chapa Naidu it cannot be said to have acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

    N.R

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    Vuppuluri Atchayya v. Kanchumarti Venkata Seetharamachandra Rao
    (Aug 30, 1912)