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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant appeals an order of the Subordinate Judge of Berhampore concerning a temporary injunction. A minor plaintiff in O.S. No. 14 (described variously in the record) seeks to set aside a Court sale in O.S. No. 39 of 1921 insofar as it affects his share. The appellant was the decree-holder purchaser at that sale. Failing to obtain possession, the appellant filed O.S. No. 56 of 1925 to eject the plaintiff and his father. That ejectment suit was long stayed but a decree was passed ex parte for the appellant on 10 March 1928. On 30 January 1928 the minor respondent filed O.S. No. 14 of 1928 with an application for a temporary injunction restraining the appellant from executing the decree in O.S. No. 56 of 1925. On 10 September 1928, after notice, the application was heard in the appellant's absence and an order was made staying delivery under the decree (referred to in the record as in O.S. No. 66 of 1925) until disposal of O.S. No. 14 of 1928. On 11 September 1928 the appellant applied under O.39, R.4 to dissolve that order. On 24 October 1928 the Subordinate Judge purported to vary the injunction by allowing a receiver to collect half the current fasli rents and staying further execution. The appellant appealed against that variation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the scope of the Court's jurisdiction under Order 39, Rule 4 (O. 39, R. 4) to vary, discharge or set aside an injunction?
  2. Whether the Subordinate Judge validly varied the original injunction order by appointing a receiver and modifying the injunction without new matter available at the original hearing.
  3. Whether the appellant's failure to appeal the original injunction order of 10 September 1928 bars him from challenging a subsequent order that merely reiterates or slightly modifies the original order.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • O. 39, R. 4 permits the Court on application to vary an injunction "whenever and in whatever manner it likes," so the original order was superseded by the subsequent order which is appealable.
  • The appellant contended (as represented in the record) that he had applied for review of the original order on grounds for not filing a counter in time, though that review was dismissed.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The appellant did not appeal the original 10 September 1928 order; that order is final and binding on him, making the present appeal futile.
  • The lower Court did not properly vary the original order but merely appointed a receiver—a power neither party sought and which has no relation to O. 39, R. 4 or the injunction.
  • A wide interpretation of O. 39, R. 4 so as to permit re-opening of matters already heard and decided is untenable.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed O. 39, R. 4 and concluded it covers two classes of cases: (1) where an urgent ex parte injunction has been granted under R. 3 and the affected party applies to have it discharged, varied or set aside; and (2) where an injunction already in force, owing to fresh circumstances not previously available, has become unduly harsh, unnecessary or unworkable and either party applies under R. 4 to discharge, vary or set it aside.

The Court held that R. 4 does not authorize re-opening or varying an injunction after a full hearing where both parties had an opportunity to be heard and no new matter is shown. R. 4 cannot be used to circumvent the ordinary course of the court (cursus curiae) by allowing a party who failed to present his case at the original hearing to obtain a re-hearing or variation on the same grounds later.

Applying this principle, the Court found that the Subordinate Judge's revised order effectively reiterated the original stay of delivery and purported to modify it by appointing a receiver to collect half the current rents. The Court accepted the respondent's point that the original order remained in full force and that a mere reiteration or immaterial modification of the original injunction cannot be the subject of a fresh appeal where no timely appeal was taken from the original order.

The Court noted the Subordinate Judge stated he varied the order to do "substantial justice," but emphasised that modification on that ground alone is not permissible under R. 4 absent new matter. The Court therefore concluded that the order under appeal was without jurisdiction and that the appellant had no right in law to have his petition under O.39, R.4 entertained.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; ORDER UNDER APPEAL IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION.

Implications:

  • The appeal is technically allowed because the order of 24 October 1928 was beyond the Subordinate Judge's jurisdiction under O. 39, R. 4.
  • C.M.P. No. 526 of 1928 is dismissed as the appellant had no right in law to have his petition under O.39, R.4 entertained.
  • The original injunction order of 10 September 1928 remains in full force.
  • Costs: each party shall pay his own costs in this appeal; the respondent will obtain his costs in C.M.P. No. 526 of 1928.
  • The opinion does not purport to establish a broader precedent beyond the stated interpretation of O. 39, R. 4 as confined to the two classes of cases identified.

    Govinda Ramanuja Das Goswmi v. (Appala) Vijiaramaraju

    1. The appellant appeals against the order of the Subordinate Judge of Berhampore in the matter of a temporary injunction in the following circumstances.

    2. The minor plaintiff in O.S No. 14 of 1925 on the file on the lower Court is suing to set aside a Court sale in O.S No. 39 of 1921 so far as it relates to his share of the property sold. The appellant was the decree-holder purchaser at the Court sale. Unable to get possession under his sale, he filed O.S No. 56 of 1925 to eject the present plaintiff and his father.

    3. The trial of that suit was stayed for a long time but a decree was passed in it ex parte in favour of the present appellant on 10th March, 1928. In the meantime on 30th January, 1928, the minor respondent filed his suit, O.S No. 14 of 1928, and with it an application for a temporary injunction restraining the appellant from executing his decree in O.S No. 56 of 1925. That application came on after notice to the appellant for hearing on 10th September, 1928. The appellant put in no appearance and filed no counter and an order was passed staying delivery under the decree in O.S No. 66 of 1925 till the disposal of O.S No. 14 of 1928. On 11th September, 1928, the appellant put in a petition under O. 39, R. 4 praying that the order of the previous day be dissolved. On 24th October, 1928, the Subordinate Judge passed orders on this directing that “in order to do substantial justice to both sides,” the injunction be varied allowing a receiver to collect half the current fasli rents and staying all further execution. Against this order, the appellant has come up in appeal.

    4. The respondent advances a technical plea that as the appellant has not appealed against the original order of 10th September, 1928 staying delivery, that has become final and binding upon him and that therefore the present appeal is futile. The appellant endeavours to meet this point by contending that O. 39, R. 4 allows a Court on application to vary an injunction whenever and in whatever manner it likes and that the original order has in that way been superseded by the present order under appeal which is itself an appealable order. The respondent rejoins that such a wide interpretation of O. 39, R. 4 is untenable and that the lower Court has not in fact varied its original order since it merely imposed on it an order appointing a receiver, which in any case it had no jurisdiction under O. 39, R. 4 to do, since neither party had asked for a receiver and since the appointment of a Receiver has nothing to do with the passing of an injunction and certainly nothing to do with O. 39, R. 4. The real point ab issue therefore is, what is the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court under O. 39, R. 4?

    5. We think the point taken by the respondent that the Subordinate Judge has not really varied his original injunction staying delivery, though he purports to do so by appointing a Receiver for the current rents, is a good point. The original order staying delivery remans in full force and is reiterated in the revised order. Whatever be the scope of O. 39, R. 4, it cannot be that a party can appeal against a mere reiteration of the original order of injunction when he has failed to appeal against the original order.

    6. We think it is clear that O. 39, R. 4 is intended to cover two classes of cases. (1) When an urge it order, ex parte has been passed under R. 3, R. 4 will allow the party against whom it has been passed to apply to have it discharged or varied or set aside, and (2). When an injunction order already in force has, owing to fresh circumstances, become unduly harsh or unnecessary or unworkable, it would be open to either party to apply under R. 4 to the Court to discharge, vary or set it aside. We are clear that R. 4 cannot give a Court jurisdiction to interfere with an injunction already passed when each side has had an opportunity of being heard, and no grounds other than those available at the original hearing appear or, are urged. When therefore a party has by his own fault neglected to put his case forward at the original hearing, he cannot come forward under R. 4 later and plead that he has a legal right under that rule to have the case re-opened and re-heard. R. 4 cannot be read so as to allow a party e.g, to let the appeal time slip by or to wait until his appeal has been dismissed and then to re-open his original case. We are satisfied that R. 4 is not intended to set at nought the ordinary cursus curiae that, once a Court has decided a matter after giving each side an opportunity of being heard, its order is final and binding on itself as much as on the parties, and cannot be re-opened except on the presentation of some new matter not available when the original order was passed.

    7. Although the point has been argued before us here, there is no question of the Subordinate Judge having re opened the matter because he thought the appellant had sufficient ground for not putting in his counter is time. The Subordinate Judge's order under the appeal does not say anything of the kind, and we understand from the appellant that he did put in an application for review of the original order on this very ground and that was dismissed. The order under appeal therefore was not passed because the Subordinate Judge thought that the appellant had good grounds for not putting in his counter in time but as he himself says because he thought substantial justice required that his original order should be modified. It may be that the appellant had excellent grounds to urge why the injunction should not be granted, but the best weapon is of no use unless it is used at the proper time. As we have held, the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to vary an order already passed on the ground of substantial justice or any other ground unless on the ground of new matter not available at the time of the original order. Hence if necessary, we should hold that the order under appeal is without jurisdiction. That of course would not benefit the appellant against whom the order of 10th September, 1928 still stands. The appellant might probably prefer that the appeal be dismissed and the order under appeal should stand, but we understand that in any case the order appointing a receiver proved futile because the rents had already been taken by the respondent.

    8. The only proper order therefore is technically to allow the appeal as the order appealed against is without jurisdiction and dismiss C.M.P No. 526 of 1928 as appellant had no right in law to have his petition entertained at all. The original order of 10th September, 1928 therefore stands. We direct each party to pay his own costs in this appeal, and respondent will gat his costs in the C.M.P No. 526 of 1928.

    P.R.S/M.N

    9. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Govinda Ramanuja Das Goswmi v. (Appala) Vijiaramaraju
    (Apr 5, 1929)