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Judgment Summary — Fazl Ali, J. (with Das, J. agreeing)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs and defendant no. 1 were co-sharers in village Barkangango. Defendant no. 1, who lived abroad, had an arrangement with the plaintiffs under which the plaintiffs were in possession of his share and delivered to him annually half the produce. In Jeth 1980 (June 1923) defendant no. 1 entered into a contract of sale with the plaintiffs for his 8-pies share; the plaintiffs paid Rs. 200 as earnest and received a receipt (Exhibit 1). On 5 October 1923 defendant no. 1 sold the same share to defendants nos. 2 to 7 by kebala. This transaction led to criminal proceedings and, on 18 January 1924, the plaintiffs filed the suit for specific performance of the contract with defendant no. 1 that is the subject of this appeal.

At trial the learned Munsif dismissed the suit, holding that the agreement relied upon had not been proved and that Exhibit 1 was not genuine; however, the Munsif observed that if the contract had been proved he would have held that defendants nos. 2 to 7 were affected with constructive notice because the plaintiffs were in actual possession when the kebala was executed. The plaintiffs appealed; the Subordinate Judge allowed the plaintiffs' appeal, finding that defendant no. 1 had entered into a valid contract prior to executing the kebala and that the plaintiffs were in possession as sajhadars before defendants nos. 2 to 7 took conveyance. The Subordinate Judge held that defendants nos. 2 to 7 had constructive notice of the prior agreement.

The present appeal (by defendants nos. 2 to 7) challenged only the finding that they were constructively charged with notice of the prior contract.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, as a matter of law on the facts found by the lower appellate Court, defendants nos. 2 to 7 were constructively charged with notice of the prior contract between the plaintiffs and defendant no. 1 (i.e., whether the purchasers were under a duty to inquire of the persons in possession and, failing such inquiry, were bound by the equities of that person).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants nos. 2–7) Arguments

  • The defendants contended that because the plaintiffs were admittedly in possession as sajhadars and this fact was known to defendants nos. 2 to 7, the defendants had no reason to suspect that the plaintiffs had any other title; they were entitled to assume the plaintiffs' possession was in the capacity of sajhadars.
  • On this basis the appellants argued it would be an unreasonable extension of the doctrine of constructive notice to hold that they were under an obligation to make inquiry of the plaintiffs about the nature of their possession and that mere failure to inquire should not be treated as constructive notice of a prior contract.

Plaintiffs' Position (as reflected in the lower Courts)

  • The plaintiffs relied on the written contract (Exhibit 1) and their possession as sajhadars, asserting a prior contract of sale with defendant no. 1 executed before the kebala to defendants nos. 2–7 and hence contending that the subsequent purchasers were bound by constructive notice of that prior contract.
  • The lower appellate Court accepted that defendant no. 1 had entered into a valid contract with the plaintiffs before executing the kebala and that the plaintiffs' possession put the subsequent purchasers on inquiry.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hunt v. Luck (Vaughan-Williams, L.J.) If the purchaser knows the vendor is not in possession, he must make inquiries of the person in possession (tenant) and will be bound by the tenant's rights if he fails to inquire. The court quoted this statement to set out the English rule that a purchaser must inquire of the person in possession and will take subject to that person's equities if he neglects to do so.
Daniels v. Davison (Lord Eldon) A tenant in possession who has an agreement to purchase has an equity that can repel the claim of a subsequent purchaser who made no inquiry; the purchaser was bound to make inquiry of the tenant. The court treated Daniels v. Davison as a leading authority on constructive notice in analogous circumstances and held that the present case fell within the rule of that case.
Kondiba v. Nana Shidrao Possession in certain cases can have the same effect as registration for notice; a purchaser with knowledge of another's possession must inquire into that person's title. The opinion recounts the facts and holding at length and relied on it to confirm that where a purchaser knows of another's possession, he is bound to inquire and is affected by equities discoverable by such inquiry.
Magoo Brahma v. Balkrishna Das (and Beachcroft, JJ.) Where defendants (not vendors) were in occupation at the time of conveyance to the purchaser, it was incumbent on the purchaser to enquire under what title they claimed to be in occupation; the purchaser cannot assume they remained merely tenants. The court relied on this passage to show that a purchaser must not assume tenancy and is obliged to inquire where another person is in occupation.
Puthenpurayil Parkum Chathu Choyichimkandiyal Parkum Poovamulla v. Kandiyal Koovan Vengadam Pakhiri Where a person in possession claimed to be a mortgagee but had an agreement to purchase, purchasers could not assume the possessor continued merely as mortgagee; purchasers must inquire and can be affected by constructive notice. The court cited this decision as one of several Indian authorities applying Daniels v. Davison and rejecting the contention that a purchaser could simply assume the possessor's status without inquiry.
Hari Charan Kuar v. Kalu Rai Distinguished Daniels: where the person with the contract was in possession of only a small portion of the property later sold, it may be too far to hold that mere possession of part amounts to constructive notice of a contract affecting the whole. The court noted this decision as a limiting case but distinguished it from the present facts (which, the court found, fell within Daniels v. Davison and the Indian cases that follow it).
Baburam Bag v. Madhab Chandra Pallay; Nandi Reddi v. Thimmakka; and others (listed collectively) Indian decisions cited as following or applying the doctrine that possession by a person other than the vendor can impose a duty of inquiry on a purchaser and may give the possessor an equity binding on subsequent purchasers. The opinion groups these Indian cases with Daniels v. Davison and Kondiba as part of a long series of authorities endorsing the duty to inquire and constructive notice in like circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Fazl Ali, J. proceeded by surveying a "long series" of English and Indian authorities establishing the principle that when property to be sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, a purchaser who knows of that possession must inquire of the person in possession and will be bound by that person's equities if he does not inquire.

The judgment:

  1. Quoted the authoritative statement from Hunt v. Luck that a purchaser must make inquiries of the person in possession and will take subject to the possessor's rights if he fails to do so.
  2. Relied on Daniels v. Davison as a direct precedent where a tenant in possession with an agreement to purchase was held to have an equity repelling a subsequent purchaser who made no inquiry; the court noted that Daniels has been described as an "extreme case" but that it has been followed by Indian courts.
  3. Examined Indian decisions (including Kondiba v. Nana Shidrao and Magoo Brahma v. Balkrishna Das) that applied the same doctrine: where a purchaser had notice of another's possession he was under a duty to inquire into the nature of that possession and could not simply assume the possessor remained a tenant or mortgagee.
  4. Considered the limiting authority of Hari Charan Kuar v. Kalu Rai, where the doctrine was not extended to a case in which the possessor held only a small portion of the property; the Chief Justice observed that Daniels should not be applied where possession was of only a small part of the property sold to another.
  5. Distinguished Hari Charan Kuar from the present case by reference to the facts: on the findings of the lower appellate Court the plaintiffs were in possession as sajhadars prior to the kebala, and the prior contract was made before the kebala; accordingly, the case fell within the rule of Daniels and the cited Indian decisions rather than within the exception in Hari Charan Kuar.
  6. On that basis, the judge concluded that the lower appellate Court had correctly held that defendants nos. 2 to 7 were constructively affected with notice of the prior contract because they were on inquiry by reason of the plaintiffs' possession and failed to make or pursue those inquiries.

The reasoning is grounded entirely on application of established authority on constructive notice and the specific factual findings of the lower appellate Court (valid contract prior to kebala; plaintiffs in possession as sajhadars before conveyance to defendants nos. 2–7).

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The judgment of the lower appellate Court, which had allowed the plaintiffs' appeal, is upheld; the higher Court dismissed the defendants' appeal with costs.
  • On the facts as found by the lower appellate Court, defendants nos. 2 to 7 are treated as having been constructively affected with notice of the prior contract between the plaintiffs and defendant no. 1 because the plaintiffs were in possession and the purchasers failed to make inquiries.
  • Das, J. agreed with the result; the formal disposition recorded was "Appeal dismissed."

Broader implication: The opinion applies existing English and Indian authorities on constructive notice; it does not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond those precedents.

    Balchand Mahton v. Bulaki Singh

    Fazl Ali, J.:— This is an appeal by defendants nos. 2 to 7 in a suit for the specific performance of a contract of sale in respect of 8-pies share in village Barkangango in the district of Hazaribagh. The facts of the case are briefly these:

    The plaintiffs and defendant no. 1 were both co-sharers in village Barkangango and as the defendant no. 1 used to live abroad he had entered into an arrangement with the plaintiffs by virtue of which the plaintiffs were in possession of the defendant's share in the property and used to deliver to him every year half the produce of the lands. In, Jeth 1980 (which corresponds to June, 1923) the defendant no. 1 entered into a contract with the plaintiffs for the sale of his 8-pies share to the plaintiff and the plaintiff paid Rs. 200 by way of earnest money and got a receipt for the amount from him. On the 5th October, 1923, the defendant no. 1 sold his share to the defendants nos. 2 to 7. This gave rise to certain criminal cases and ultimately on the 18th January; 1924, the plaintiffs brought the suit out of which the present appeal arises for the specific performance of the contract of sale between himself and the defendant no. 1.

    The learned Munsif, before whom the suit had been brought dismissed it holding that the agreement relied upon had not been proved and the agreement for sale (Exhibit 1) was not genuine. The learned Munsif, however, observed that if he had held that the contract was proved he would have also found that the defendants must be affected with constructive notice of the contract inasmuch, as the plaintiffs were in actual possession of the disputed lands at the time the kebala was executed in favour of defendants nos. 3 to 7.

    The plaintiffs thereupon appealed and their appeal was allowed by the Subordinate Judge before whom it came up for hearing.

    The facts found by the lower appellate Court were that the defendant no. 1 had entered into a valid contract for the sale of the property to the plaintiffs before he executed the kebala in favour of defendants nos. 2 to 7 and that the plaintiffs were in possession of the property as sajhadars before the defendants nos. 2 to 7 took conveyance in respect of the disputed property. On these facts it was held by the lower appellate Court that the defendants nos. 2 to 7 had constructive notice of the prior agreement in favour of the plaintiff, and in arriving at this conclusion the learned Subordinate Judge approved of the reasoning of the trial Court that the fact that a person other than the vendor was in possession of the property was sufficient to put the purchaser on inquiry as to the nature and extent of the vendor's interest and if that inquiry was not pursued by the purchaser he should be deemed to have constructive notice of the contract entered into by the plaintiff for the purchase of the disputed property.

    The only point raised in this appeal on behalf of the appellant was that under the circumstances of the case the Court below should not have held that the appellant had constructive notice of the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant no. 1. It is said that the plaintiffs being admittedly in possession as sajhadars and this fact being known to the defendants nos. 2 to 7 they had no reason to suspect that the plaintiffs had acquired any other title and it was no business of theirs to direct an inquiry to find out in what capacity they were in possession, because they knew that the plaintiffs were in possession as sajhadars. It is therefore, contended that it would be stretching the doctrine of constructive notice too far to hold in a case like this that the defendants nos. 2 to 7 were under an obligation to make inquiries from the plaintiffs as to the nature of their possession and to hold that they must be affected with constructive I notice merely because they had not made any such inquiry.

    Now, in a long series of English, as well as Indian decisions, it has been laid down that if the property to be sold is not in the possession of the vendor but of another person it is the duty of the purchaser to make inquiries from that person and that he is bound by all the equities which the party in possession may have in the property. In the case of Hunt v. Luck Vaughan-Williams, L.J stated the law on the subject as follows: “If a purchaser or a mortgagee had notice that the vendor or mortgagor is not in possession of the property he must make inquiries of the person in possession—of the tenant, who is in possession—and find out from him what his rights are. And if he does not choose to do that, then whatever title he acquires as purchaser or mortgagee will be subject to the title or right of the tenant in possession.” This doctrine of constructive notice was applied in the case of Daniels v. Davison under circumstances which are not dissimilar to the circumstances of the present case. In that case the tenant in possession of a public house and garden had entered into a contract for the purchase of the property and his subsequent purchaser was held to have constructive notice of the contract as he was held to have been bound to make inquiry from the tenant which would have led him to a knowledge of it. Lord Eldon while deciding the case observed as follows: “My opinion therefore considering this as depending upon notice is that this tenant being in possession “under please with an agreement in his pocket to become the purchaser those, circumstances altogether give him an equity repelling the claim of a subsequent purchaser who made no inquiry as to the nature of his possession.” It is true that the case of Daniels v. Davison has been held to be an extreme case beyond which the doctrine of constructive notice ought not to be extended but at the same time it has been followed by the Indian Courts in a number of cases. Kondiba v. Nana Shidrao, Baburam Bag v. Madhab Chandra Pallay, Magu Brahma v. Bholi Das, Nandi Reddi v. Thimmakka and Puthenpurayil Parkum Chathu Choyichimkandiyal Parkum Poovamulla v. Kandiyal Koovan Vengadam Pakkiri. In the case of Kondiba v. Nana Shidrao the facts were as follows:—

    On the 16th June, 1876, one Revapuri mortgaged the lands in suit to the first defendant with possession, and the latter on the 26th June, 1876, leased them to the second defendant for one year. The second defendant remained in possession as tenant after the year had expired. On the 3rd December, 1878, while defendant no. 2 was in possession of the lands as tenant, Revapuri sold to him (defendant no. 2) her equity of redemption. The deed of sale was not compulsorily registrable under the Act then in force, and owing to the death of Revapuri it was not registered. On the 8th December, 1895, the heir of Revapuri sold the equity of redemption in the mortgage of 1876 by a registered deed to the plaintiff. At the date of this sale to the plaintiff the second defendant was still in actual possession. The plaintiff brought this suit to redeem the lands from the mortgagee (defendant no. 1), and added defendant no. 2 as a party alleging that he was in possession as a tenant of the first defendant. The lower Courts passed a decree for the plaintiff, holding that his registered deed gave him priority over the second defendant whose, deed was unregistered. It was held in these circumstances that the plaintiff's suit should be dismissed and that possession in certain cases, for the purposes of notice, had the same effect as registration. It was further held that the plaintiff, at the date of his purchase had notice of the possession of the second defendant, and that being so it was the plaintiff's duty to inquire of the second defendant under what title he held, and if the plaintiff had done so instead of assuming that the second defendant was still holding merely as tenant, he would have discovered that the second defendant had purchased the land. In the case of Magoo Brahma v. Balkrishna Das Mookerjee and Beachhcroft, JJ., disposed of an argument similar to that raised in the present case in the following passage: “In the case before us the defendants and not the vendors of the plaintiff were admittedly in occupation of the land at the time of the execution of the conveyance in his favour: it was consequently incumbent upon him to enquire under what title the defendants claimed to be in occupation. This he did not do, and in justification of his conduct it has been urged that he was entitled to assume that the defendants were in occupation as tenants, in other words, to assume that as they had entered into possession of the land as tenants, they had not subsequently acquired any other title. In our opinion, this position cannot possibly be supported.” In the case of Puthenpurayil Parkum Chathu Choyichimkandiyal Parkum Poovamulla v. Kandiyal Koovan Vengadam Pakhiri the facts were that the plaintiff was a mortgagee in respect of the disputed property and during the subsistence of the mortgage the mortgagor agreed to sell the property to him but subsequently sold it to other persons. The question arose whether the purchasers had notice of the contract of sale and the argument advanced for the appellant was that the appellant was not bound to make any further inquiry and that the was entitled to assume that the plaintiff continued possession as mortgagee and had not acquired any other title. The learned Judges, who decided this case; overruled this contention relying on the authority of Daniels v. Davison and certain Indian decisions. On the other hand in Hari Charan Kuar v. Kalu Rai the Court was asked to apply the doctrine laid down in Daniels v. Davison, but Chamfer, C.J, observed as follows. “There appears to be no case in the books in which the Courts have been asked to apply the doctrine of Daniels v. Davison to a case like the one before us in which the person who had the contract to purchase in his pocket was in possession not of the entire property, sold to another but only of a small portion of that property.” The distinguishing feature of this case was that the person who relied on the contract to purchase was in possession of only a few plots of land and not the entire property subsequently sold to another person, and under these circumstances it was held that actual notice of the contract not having been proved it would be going too far to hold that mere possession of part of the property amounted to constructive notice of the contract of purchase in respect of a whole property. I have already observed that the facts of the present case bring it well within the rule laid down in Daniels v. Davison and a number of Indian decisions and so in my opinion the case has been rightly decided by the lower appellate Court and I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

    Das, J.:— I agree.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Balchand Mahton v. Bulaki Singh
    (Aug 16, 1928)