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Smart Summary

Court Opinion Summary (Ross, J. and Chatterji, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The central dispute is whether Mussammat (Bibi) Sobratan dedicated certain property as a wakf (endowment) and appointed the plaintiff-respondent, Bibi Mariam (wife of Shaikh Ibrahim), as the mutawalli (manager). The plaintiff asserted a verbal wakf had been created (allegedly before 19 May 1923) and that Sobratan executed a wakfnama on 19 May 1923 confirming the dedication. The Subordinate Judge found in favour of Bibi Mariam, but disbelieved parts of her case: he rejected the earlier verbal wakf and the formal execution of the deed, yet concluded that what occurred on 19 May amounted to an oral wakf. Ibrahim (the original appellant) withdrew his appeal, which is now prosecuted by his transferees.

Evidence described in the opinion includes: (a) a 1910 will (Exhibit C) showing earlier testamentary dispositions; (b) a mortgage executed by Sobratan after the alleged creation date of the wakf; (c) draft documents prepared by Mukhtar Muhammad Osman at Ibrahim's instruction; (d) involvement of Maulavi Badrul Hussain (a pleader) who refused to attest the deeds because he doubted their execution; and (e) conflicting registration steps taken after Sobratan's death (including petitions and a Deputy Collector's inquiry).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Bibi Sobratan dedicated the property as a wakf (i.e., created a valid endowment) and appointed Bibi Mariam as mutawalli.
  2. Whether a verbal wakf alleged to have been created prior to 19 May 1923 was established by evidence.
  3. Whether Sobratan executed a formal wakfnama on 19 May 1923 (execution by signature, seal or thumb-impression) and whether that instrument is admissible and effective.
  4. Whether the oral events of 19 May 1923 (including a reported affirmative answer from behind the purdah) amounted to a valid oral declaration of wakf.
  5. Whether, given that the terms of a purported written disposition exist in a document, evidence of those terms can be given other than by the document itself (i.e., questions of admissibility under section 91 of the Evidence Act and registration requirements under the Indian Registration Act).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's (Bibi Mariam) Case

  • The plaintiff alleged a verbal wakf was made by Bibi Sobratan (some months earlier) and that the wakf was subsequently confirmed by a formal wakfnama executed on 19 May 1923.
  • The plaintiff also relied on the presence of Sobratan's seal and thumb-impression on the wakfnama and on Mariam's statement that Sobratan admitted execution in the presence of Maulavi Badrul Hussain as proof of execution.
  • It was asserted that possession had been given to the plaintiff (an allegation noted in the pleadings).

Defence / Respondent's Case (Ibrahim / transferees)

  • The defendants denied the creation of any wakf and denied that any formal deed had been executed by Sobratan or that the plaintiff received possession.
  • The defence maintained that Ibrahim orchestrated the document-drafting and the events to prevent his sister (Bibi Khatun) from claiming a share by inheritance; once it was ascertained she would not be a legal heir, the idea of executing the wakf was abandoned.
  • The defence pointed to contemporaneous acts (notably a mortgage by Sobratan) inconsistent with the existence of an earlier verbal wakf and to the suspicious circumstances around the signatures and attestation of the documents.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bibi Jinjira Khatun v. Mahomed Fakirulla Mea Held that a valid wakf may be created by declaration of endowment by the owner and that delivery of possession is not essential; followed Doe dem Jaun Beebee v. Abdollah. The court accepted the principle that delivery of possession is not essential to create a wakf, but emphasised that a clear declaration of dedication is still necessary; used this precedent to delineate the evidential standard and then found that the facts did not satisfy that standard.
Doe dem Jaun Beebee v. Abdollah Authority cited in support of the view that verbal declaration of endowment (wakf) by the owner can create a valid wakf without delivery of possession. Relied on by the court (via Bibi Jinjira Khatun) as supporting the proposition that delivery is not essential; still, the court required a reasonably clear declaration and found it lacking.
Mulla v. Subramania Authority supporting the proposition that a mere intention to set apart property for charitable purposes is not sufficient to create a valid wakf. Applied to reject the contention that mere intent or equivocal conduct sufficed; court held that intention, without a clear declaration or appropriate expression, does not create a wakf.
Banubi Kom Umarsaheb v. Narsingrao Hanejirao Mane (referred also as Banubi v. Narsingh Rao) Where there has been no actual delivery, a reasonably clear declaration is necessary to create a valid wakf; a mere statement in a will or an ambiguous endorsement is insufficient. The court applied this rule to conclude the absence of a reasonably clear declaration in the present case — the evidence did not show the required clear oral declaration of dedication.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court’s analysis proceeds through multiple factual and legal points, closely tied to witness credibility and documentary admissibility:

  1. Credibility and sequence of events: Both judges note that the plaintiff's account of an earlier verbal wakf was disbelieved by the Subordinate Judge, a finding not effectively challenged on appeal. A contemporaneous mortgage executed by Sobratan was treated as inconsistent with the existence of an earlier verbal wakf.
  2. Role of Ibrahim and circumstances: The evidence showed Ibrahim actively directed preparation of drafts and took witnesses to Sobratan's house. Witness testimony (Mukhtar Osman, Maulavi Badrul Hussain, Ziaul Huq) indicated Ibrahim's dominant role and an overarching objective to defeat a potential inheritance claim by Bibi Khatun. The court treated these facts as supportive of the defence that there was no genuine intention by Sobratan to create a wakf.
  3. Execution of the wakfnama: The court accepted the Subordinate Judge's conclusion that the signature was not proved. Badrul Hussain's testimony—stating doubt at rapid apparent signatures and refusal to attest—was accepted as showing a lack of proper execution. The plaintiff's evidence that Sobratan's seal and thumb impression were on the document rested largely on Mariam's own testimony, which was doubted because she had been disbelieved on signature evidence; the court therefore found it unsafe to accept her account as proof of execution.
  4. Whether Sobratan understood and approved the deed: The only witness saying the drafts were read over was Ziaul Huq, a clerk who did not sign as scribe nor endorsed the document to confirm explanation. The court regarded this solitary statement as insufficient to establish that Sobratan comprehended the deed's terms.
  5. Admissibility and effect of the document: The wakfnama was incomplete (the first page missing), unattested and unregistered. The court invoked section 91 of the Evidence Act: where terms of a disposition have been reduced to writing, proof of those terms ordinarily requires production of the document or secondary evidence of it. Further, under sections 17 and 49 of the Indian Registration Act the instrument required registration to affect immovable property. Given the document's status (incomplete, unregistered, unattested), it could not be used to supply the missing proof of the terms or to establish a wakf by reference to its contents.
  6. The oral affirmation on 19 May: The court examined the crucial event where, behind purdah, an old lady's voice reportedly answered "Yes" when asked whether she had executed the deeds. Both judges considered the limited nature of that response and surrounding circumstances (multiple documents, confused questioning, subsequent rapid appearance of signatures) and found that a simple "Yes" to an involved or ambiguous question did not constitute the clear oral declaration of dedication required by Muhammadan law. The court emphasized that the law requires at least a reasonably clear declaration of dedication where there is no delivery, and the mere admission of execution is not a substitute for an express declaration of wakf.
  7. Reliance on precedent: The court referred to authorities (e.g., Bibi Jinjira Khatun, Doe dem Jaun Beebee, Mulla v. Subramania, Banubi v. Narsingh Rao) to restate legal principles: delivery of possession is not essential, but a clear declaration of dedication is necessary; mere intention or equivocal acts do not suffice. Applying those principles to the facts, the judges concluded that none of the legal tests for a valid wakf were satisfied.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate court allowed the appeal: the decree of the Subordinate Judge in favour of the plaintiff was set aside and the suit was dismissed. (Ross, J. ordered the appeal decreed and the suit dismissed with costs; Chatterji, J. also held the appeal succeeds and the suit is dismissed.)

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The plaintiff's claim that the property was a wakf and that she was entitled as mutawalli failed; the suit was dismissed and the earlier decree for the plaintiff was set aside.
  • Evidential and procedural application: The decision underscores that (i) a wakf may be created verbally or in writing but requires a clear declaration when there is no delivery of possession; (ii) when the terms of a disposition are reduced to writing, proof of those terms ordinarily requires production of the document (section 91, Evidence Act) and compliance with registration requirements (Indian Registration Act); and (iii) suspicious circumstances surrounding execution and lack of corroboration will defeat claims of execution or dedication.
  • Precedential scope: The opinion applies established authorities to the facts but does not purport to create any new legal principle; its holding is a fact-specific application of existing law to conclude that the plaintiff did not establish a valid wakf.

End of summary — prepared strictly from the provided opinion text.

    Shaikh Muhammad Ibrahim v. Bibi Mariam

    Ross, J.:— The only Question in this appeal is whether Bibi Sobratan, the aunt of the original, appellant Ibrahim, dedicated her property to God and appointed the plaintiff-respondent, Bibi Mariam, the wife of Ibrahim, the Mutawalli. It appears that Ibrahim, has parted with the property. The Subordinate Judge decided in favour of Bibi Mariam and Ibrahim appealed; but he has withdrawn from the appeal which is now being prosecuted by his transferees.

    The plaintiff's case was that Bibi Sobratan dedicated the property by a verbal wakf; and subse-quently, on the 19th of May, 1923, nine days before her death, she confirmed the dedication by executing a wakfnama. The learned Subordinate Judge has disbelieved the story of a verbal wakf for the sufficient: reason that after the alleged date of its creation, namely, on the 9th of May, 1923, Bibi Sobratan executed a mortgage of some of the wakf property. He has also declined to believe that the wakfnama was executed by Bibi Sobratan; but he has found that what happened on the 19th of May amounted to an oral, wakf. The learned Advocate for the respondent does, not accept this finding in its entirety. His contention was that the execution of the wakfnama was sufficiently proved and he argued that the fact that Sobratan's seal and thumb-impression were put on the document and that she admitted execution of the document in the presence of Maulavi Badrul Hussain, Pleader, amounted to execution. There seems to me to be insuperable difficulty in the way of this argument. With regard to the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge, it may be observed that it is not the case of either side. The plaintiff's case of a verbal dedication sometime before the 19th of May, 1923 has been definitely disbelieved; and it was not argued on behalf of the respondent that the finding on this point was wrong. The plaintiff's case of the execution of the wakfnama on the 19th of May has also been disbelieved; and it is consequently difficult to ascertain what the terms of the wakf were, because all that is its is the answer of the lady to a question regarding execution; and if this is to be taken as a verbal wakf, contrary to the plaintiff's own case, then it would be necessary to refer to the document to ascertain its terms and this raises the question, whether the document is admissible in evidence—a question which, also arises on the line of argument adopted by the respondent in this appeal. But before dealing with this question, I shall briefly refer to the evidence indicating the circumstances in which this document came into existence.

    Exhibit C is a will executed by Bibi Sobratan on the 21st of December, 1910, bequeathing to her nephew Ibrahim two-thirds of her property and to her niece, Ibrahim's sister Bibi Khatun, one-third. Subsequently to 1910 Bibi Khatun married; and at the instance of her husband's relations, Sobratan made a gift of a one-third share to Bibi Khatun; but as she did not wish to be out of possession of her property until her death,—a fact admitted by Mariam herself—she took a mukarrari lease of this same property from Khatun for her life. The defence to the present suit is (and this defence is amply corroborated by the evidence of the plaintiff's witness Maulavi Badrul Hussain) that Ibrahim apprehended that on the death of Sobratan, Bibi Khatun might still claim a third of the property that remained; and it was with the object of defeating any such claim that the idea of a wakf of which the plaintiff's wife should be the Mutawalli arose. The evidence shows that everything was done by Ibrahim. The Mukhtar Muhammad Osman admits that it was under the instructions of Ibrahim that he made the draft and that Ibrahim went to him several times after the draft and that he was taken along with Badrul Hussain Bibi Sobratan's house to attest the deed. The evidence, of Badrul Hussain also shows that Ibrahim spoke to him about Sobratan's intention to execute a wakf and that he came to him and paid his fees and took her in a carriage to her house along with Osman. It is true that in his cross-examination (though it is difficult to say why the question should have been put in cross-examination) he said that he gathered that it was the intention of Sobratan to create a wakf and as Ibrahim was a man of profligate habits, she proposed to make Bibi Mariam the Mutawalli. It is doubtful whether this statement is admissible in evidence as it seems to be merely an expression of opinion; and in any case it is inconsistent with the activity of Ibrahim in the matter as well as with what followed. When Badrul Hussain suspected that the deed had not been properly executed, he refused to attest it and advised Ibrahim to change the page containing the stamp and to get the deed properly executed. In fact the stamped paper was returned to the Collector and the value of the stamp was refunded. Then Badrul Hussain had a conversation with Ibrahim's agent from which he discovered what was troubling Ibrahim, namely, his apprehension about the inheritance, and he advised him that Bibi Khatun was not a legal heir at all. Thereafter nothing more was done in the matter of the wakfnama; and, after the death of Sobratan when the usual proceedings were taken for registration of names in the Collectorate and in the municipal records by Ibrahim, petitions were filed by Mariam withdrawing her objection which, she said, had been made at the instance of her father, and declaring that Ibrahim was entitled to be registered. Her father still opposed and the Deputy Collector made an enquiry into the matter and has recorded that he verified the statement in the petition by enquiring from Mariam herself; and he therefore ordered the registration of Ibrahim's name. The learned Subordinate Judge has come to the conclusion that Bibi Mariam was not a free agent in this, but that is a matter of speculation. All these circumstances therefore are consistent with the defence that there was no real intention on Sobratan's part to create a wakf, but that the whole proceedings were taken with the view of securing Ibrahim in his inheritance.

    I now turn to the question of the execution of the wakfnama. So far as the signature is concerned, it must be held, as the learned Subordinate Judge has held, that there was no execution. There were three deeds and the Pleader Badrul Hussain says that within a minute and a half the deeds were brought out duly signed and he there and then expressed his doubt about the signatures and he refused to take the risk of attesting such deeds; and Ibrahim apparently accepted the position, because he did remove the first page. But the respondent relies on the seal and thumb-impression. The only evidence that these were the seal and thumb-impression of the lady is the statement of Mariam; but as she also commits herself to the signature, and on this point has been disbelieved by the Subordinate Judge, it would be unsafe to accept her evidence as proving execution by seal and thumb mark. Moreover, the evidence that the lady understood the terms of the deed is in my opinion insufficient. This evidence is given by Ziaul Huq, a clerk of the mukhtar Osman. His direct evidence is that he made the fair copies of the drafts and took them to Sobratan and read them over to her and she admitted them. The witness does not even say that he explained the deed to the lady. But I am not prepared on this solitary statement to hold that the deed was even read to the lady, because this witness, who was the scribe of the document, has not signed it as scribe nor has he endorsed upon it that its contents were read and explained. Further, it is difficult to see how this document can be taken in evidence. It is admittedly incomplete, the first page being missing: it is unattested and unregistered. It is true that a valid wakf can be created without writing; but when the terms of a disposition of property have been reduced to the form of a document, under section 91 of the Evidence Act no evidence can be given in proof of the terms of such disposition except the document itself or secondary evidence thereof. But by section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, an instrument of this kind requires registration and, under section 49, it cannot affect any immovable property comprised therein unless it has been registered. For all these reasons it cannot be held in this case that there has been any wakf created by deed; and the argument on behalf of the respondent must fail. This, in my opinion, equally involves the failure of the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge. Apart from the fact that it was not the plaintiff's case and that the evidence was not directed to prove the creation of a verbal wakf on the 19th of May, all that we have is the answer ‘yes’ to a question by the Pleader, whether she had executed the deed. The question in itself is unintelligible, because the Pleader goes on to say that after the lady had answered ‘yes’, he said that the deed should be signed. But even if the effect of the evidence is a declaration by the lady that she accepted the deed as hers, then it would be necessary to refer to the document in order to ascertain the terms of the wakf; but, as I have pointed out above, this cannot be done. Moreover, there is no suggestion that there was any intention to create a wakf by word of mouth on the 19th of May and, apart from that, there is no evidence of the terms of this dedication. In Bibi Jinjira Khatun v. Mahomed Fakirulla Mea it was held following the decision in Doe dem Jaun Beebee v. Abdollah that a valid wakf is created by declaration of endowment by the owner and delivery of possession is not essential. It was further held following Mulla v. Subramania that a mere intention to set apart property for charitable purposes is clearly not sufficient to create a valid wakf. In Banubi Kom Umarsaheb v. Narsingrao Hanejirao Mane, it was held that where there has been no actual delivery, a reasonably clear declaration is necessary to create a valid wakf. According to Ameer Ali, in his Muhammadan Taw, Fourth Edition, Vol. I at page 217—

    “When the intention to make a wakf is apparent, or can be inferred from the general tenor of the deed, or from the conduct of the donor, or from the nature of the object in favour of which the grant is made, or from surrounding circumstances at large, it will constitute a valid and binding wakf, though the word wakf might not have been used.”

    On the findings arrived at above, it seems clear that none of these tests is satisfied in this case. There is no reasonably clear declaration of dedication. The deed is not admissible to supply the defects in the evidence; and the circumstances of the case do not indicate even a clear intention to create a wakf. I would hold, therefore, that the plaintiff has not established her case.

    The appeal must be decreed and the decree of the Subordinate, Judge set aside and the suit dismissed with costs throughout.

    Chatterji, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit by the plaintiff for a declaration that the property in suit is wakf and for recovery of possession as mutawalli of the same. The property in question belonged to one Mussammat Sobratan, father's sister of the defendant Shaikh Ibrahim who is the plaintiff's husband. The case for the plaintiff is that the lady made a verbal wakf of property in March, 1923, and executed a formal deed on the 19th May, 1923, confirming the said wakf, but that the document could not be registered on account of the defendant's interference. There is also an allegation that she was put, in possession of the property.

    The defendants denied the creation of any wakf or the execution of any formal deed by the lady as also the plaintiff's allegation of possession. According to him the document was being created in order that his sister Mussammat Khatun who had been given one-third share of her property by Mussammat Sobratan might not get a share by inheritance, but the idea was given up when it was ascertained that she would not get any share by right of succession.

    The Subordinate Judge found that the plaintiff had failed to prove the creation of the alleged verbal wakf and execution of the deed of wakf on the 19th May, 1923, or any delivery of possession of the property to her. He has, however, held that

    “What happened on the 19th of May, amounted to creation of oral wakf in favour of the plaintiff” and passed a decree in her favou.

    In appeal it is urged that there must be a precise declaration to show a definite dedication, and what is, said to have happened on the 19th May cannot amount to the creation of a valid wakf. On behalf of the respondent the finding of the Subordinate Judge as to non-execution is challenged.

    There is, however, no dispute in this appeal over the finding that there was no delivery of possession. Their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court have held that delivery of possession is not essential for the creation of a wakf [vide Bibi Jinjira Khatun v. Fakirulla and the authorities cited therein]. The exposition by Abu Yusuf on this point has been adopted and I think I should follow this authority in preference to the opposite view taken by the Allahabad High Court where preference has been given to the opinion of Imam Mahammad.

    There is no controversy that a wakf may be created either verbally or in writing. The law will give effect to a dedication in whatever language it may be expressed or in whatever terms the wish may be formulated. There must, however, be a declaration of endowment. Even if the word ‘wakf’ be not used there must be at least a clear declaration from which the creation of a wakf may be presumed. The use of any express term or phrase is not necessary for the validity of wakf. But a mere intention to set apart the property for a charitable purpose is not sufficient to create a wakf. This view will receive support from the decision in the case of Bibi Jinjira Khatun v. Fakirulla, referred to above and from Banubi v. Narsingh Rao. In this last mentioned case it has been laid down by Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J, and Beaman, J., that a mental act although afterwards sufficiently expressed in conduct, will not, unless clothed in appropriate words, create a wakf. The Muhammadan Law requires imperatively an oral declaration of dedication where it is not created by any deed.

    I am in full agreement with the learned Subordinate Judge that the oral wakf said to have been created in March, 1923, has not been established. The evidence consists of the uncorroborated testimony of the plaintiff and he is falsified by the execution of a mortgage bond by the lady (Mussammat Sobratan) on the 19th May, 1923, in respect of a part of the alleged wakf property. Had she really made an oral wakf she would not have hypothecated the property as her own when the plaintiff is said to have been appointed the mutawalli.

    I also agree with the Court below that the deed of wakf was not executed by Mussammat Sobratan. The plaintiff states that she signed the document and put her seal and thumb mark on it. But the evidence of her witness Badrul Hussain shows that there was no execution; besides the plaintiff's statement stands uncorroborated by the lady herself. I am not satisfied with the evidence that she signed the document and put her seal or thumb-mark on it.

    The crucial question in this case is whether what happened on the 19th May, 1923, amounted to the creation of a wakf in favour of the plaintiff. The whole case on this point depends on the evidence of P.W 3 Maulavi Badrul Hussain who is a vakil of Muzaffarpur Court and relied on by the learned Subordinate Judge. His evidence shows that the defendant took him to the house of Bibi Sobratan to attest a wakf and two deeds of gift, one in favour of the plaintiff and another in favour of the defendant, to be executed by her. He states we asked Ibrahim (defendant) that the document should be signed by the Mussammat herself or by some near, relation of her if she was unfit to sign, in our presence. Then we would attest the deeds. Ibrahim went inside the purda with the deeds. I enquired of the lady if she had executed the deeds. We heard the voice of an old lady from behind the purda answering ‘Yes’. Then I said that the deeds be signed. Then within, a minute and a half, the deeds were brought duly signed. I doubted that the lady could not sign within that time and the signatures were made by Ibrahim himself. I told Ibrahim that his conduct was not fair and that we would not risk jail with him by attesting such a deed. Then we three told him that he should change the stamps and get the deeds properly executed when we would attest them. His cross-examination shows that Ibrahim was labouring under the idea that his sister Khatun would inherit a portion of Sobratan's property afterwards. He consulted Muhammadan Law and gave the opinion that Khatun was not a legal heir of Sobratan and that there was no necessity, for the document being executed. Nothing further appears to have been done in connection with the execution of the deeds.

    Thus, all that we get is the voice of an old lady saying “Yes” when the vakil asked whether she had executed the deeds. After that answer from behind the purda, the witness said ‘that the deeds be signed’. Thus the question perhaps was not whether she had executed the deeds but whether she would execute the deeds. The answer “Yes” to an involved question like this when three documents were to have been executed cannot, in my opinion, be construed as a declaration of the creation of the property as wakf.

    In the next place, the whole thing was being done by the defendant in order to prevent his sister from succeeding to a part of the lady's estate. It was he who got the drafts prepared and brought the attesting witnesses. It appears further that there was an abandonment of the idea after the expression of the vakil's opinion that Khatun would not be her legal heir. In the circumstances, I am not prepared to; accept the testimony of P.W 5, Ziaul Haq, who is the clerk of a mukhtar, that the drafts and the engrossed deeds were taken to Bibi Sobratan and read over to her by him. He goes to the length of saying that he made over the deed to her. There is no note in the document that he had read and explained the same to the executant. He did not even sign his name as a scribe. And I do not think that this respectable Muhammadan lady will appear before this man. The law throws around a pardanashin lady a special cloak of protection; and a deed of hers to be valid must be one really understood by her. Even if it be supposed that the document had been executed by the Mussammat when the question was asked by the vakil Maulavi Badrul Hussain, it is impossible to hold that she had comprehended the intent and scope of the deed.

    Lastly, if it be supposed that she understood what was being done, the evidence does not carry us further than this that she admitted the execution of the deed (of wakf). There is no use of any expression of dedication by her. The admission of execution cannot operate to create a wakf. As stated in Banubi's case, where there was the statement in a will that the testator had set apart certain funds for charitable objects, this is no adequate substitute for the oral declaration of dedication to God.

    In this particular case the plaintiff's allegation is that the wakf had been created two months previously and the deed was being executed on that day by way of confirmation. Therefore it was nowhere her case that the wakf was being created that day. The learned Subordinate Judge appears to me to have made out a new case which was never alleged in the pleadings. On a consideration of the entire evidence and the circumstances of the case, the only conclusion which is possible is that the lady did not create any valid wakf binding on the estate.

    In the result, the appeal succeeds and the suit is dismissed.

    Appeal decreed.

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    Comments

    Shaikh Muhammad Ibrahim v. Bibi Mariam
    (Dec 13, 1928)