Verma and Yorke, JJ.:— This is a first appeal by the plaintiff in a suit for the recovery of two sums of Rs. 3,500 and Rs. 5,000 alleged by the plaintiff to have been deposited by him with the banking firm of the defendants' family on the 8th July, 1930, and the 16th July, 1931. The plaintiff alleged that on each occasion he was given what he called a “chitthi” or letter signed by the then manager of the family business, Durga Prasad, stating the interest on the first deposit as 0-10-6 per mensem and that on the second deposit as 0-11-0 per mensem. According to the plaintiff's case there had been a banking business (karobar banking) in the family of the defendants from the time of their grandfather Seth Ram Chander Das, who died about the year 1924. It was alleged that after the death of Seth Ram Chander Das this business was managed by his son Durga Prasad, who died on the 7th of August, 1931, leaving a widow Mst. Bhupi Kunwar, defendant No. 4. Plaintiff further alleged that this business was continued by the defendants Anand Prasad, Har Prasad and Kanti Prasad, of whom Kanti Prasad is a minor and Har Prasad deaf and dumb, sons of Jyoti Prasad, Durga Prasad's brother, who had died in 1923, predeceasing his father Seth Ram Chander Das. The suit was filed on the 5th July, 1933, and it was definitely and clearly, in a series of different paragraphs of the plaint, alleged that the claim was based on deposit and not on loan. The object of this allegation in, the plaint is entirely free from doubt. If there was in the family of Seth Ram Chander Das, Durga Prasad and the present defendants a banking business, then no question would arise of legal necessity or of any of the points which ordinarily arise in cases of loan, whereas prima facie, as the suit contained a reference to two chitthis, which by appearance are promissory notes, the suit should have been an ordinary money suit based on loans taken by Durga Prasad. To avoid the necessity of proving legal necessity the suit was carefully framed as a suit in which no plea of absence of legal necessity would be open to the defendants.
On behalf of the defendants a number of pleas were taken. It was contended that there never was any banking business of the family. It was said that the family of Seth Ram Chander Das, his sons and grandsons was a joint family which possessed joint family property in the shape of zamindari. As regards these two amounts evidenced by the promissory notes it was said that these were not deposits but personal borrowings by Durga Prasad, who, it was said, had been a spendthrift and had found himself in a position of freedom from restraint upon the death of his father Ram Chander Das and had proceeded to incur numerous debts. It was pleaded that these being personal borrowings of Durga Prasad, even if taken by him as manager of the family estate, they were not binding upon the defendants.
The learned Subordinate Judge framed three issues:
(1) Was any ancestral joint family banking business carried on by Durga Prasad in 1930 and 1931 (the years in which these two transactions took place)?
(2) Was the money in suit deposited by the plaintiff with the said banking firm?
(3) Is the debt in question binding upon the defendants and/or they are personally liable?
He dealt with the first two issues together and he held that the plaintiff had completely failed to establish that Durga Prasad was carrying on any joint family banking business in 1930 and 1931, and he also held that the money in suit was not deposited with Durga Prasad in connection with any joint family banking business. On the third issue he held that the debt in question was not binding upon the defendants and that they were not personally liable.
Before dealing with the arguments in the case we think it necessary to emphasise the fact that, the plaintiff's case, deliberately so stated by him, was that the family of Seth Ram Chander Das, his sons and grandsons had a joint family business which was a banking business in which members of the public used to make deposits of money. The phrase “karobar banking” is used in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the plaint, and in paragraph 3 of the plaint it is said that “The banking business continued for the benefit of the members of the family and all the members were benefited thereby. Other persons also considered this business as reliable and firm, and people used to deposit their money with the defendants' on interest.” In paragraph 4 it is said that the plaintiff too reposed much confidence and had reliance on the banking business of the defendants and consequently he also deposited money with the joint family of the defendants. He should of course have said “in the defendants' bank”, but there is no room for doubt about the nature of the claim which was being made.
The first question in the case is whether these two sums of money were actually advanced to Durga Prasad. On that question we feel no doubt, in view of the two chitthis or promissory notes, dated Asarh Sudi 13, Sambat 1987, and Asarh doem Sudi Ekam, Sambat 1988. The wording is much the same in each. It runs: “To Messrs Hira Lal Gordhan Das. From Ram Chandra Das Durga Prasad, Saharanpur. Our compliments to you. We having borrowed” (in the second chitthi, “taken”) “Rs. 3,500 from you have credited the same to you and we shall pay interest thereon at the rate of 0-10-6” (in the second, “0-11-0”) “and shall pay the money to you on demand. Letter written on….” The first letter is signed by Roshan Lal, munim, and Durga Prasad, and the second by Durga Prasad only. Evidence has been given in support of these two promissory notes and it can hardly be doubted that these two sums were paid over to Durga Prasad. We may note that in the first of these two chitthis the words used for “having borrowed” are “udhar lekar”, which clearly suggest a loan rather than a deposit.
On behalf of the plaintiff a large volume of documentary evidence was produced which was intended to show that a banking business was carried on and not merely that Seth Ram Chandra Das and after him Seth Durga Prasad did a certain amount of what is commonly called “len den”, that is moneylending. Learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant has taken us through a whole series of documents which, he argued, induce an inference that a banking business was carried on. We may note first that there is a broad distinction between a banking business and a moneylending business (though it is questionable whether the evidence would even be sufficient to establish that Seth Ram Chandra Das and after him Seth Durga Prasad actually carried on a moneylending “business” and did not rather do a certain amount of moneylending along with management of their zamindari and transactions in connection with, for example, grain). In this connection we have been referred to Tannan's Banking Law and Practice in India, second edition, 1933, which is said to be a standard work on banking in this country. The author remarks at page 30:
“There being no statutory definition to guide, some of the leading writers on banking law have, from time to time, attempted to define the terms. Dr. Herbert L. Hart, author of the well known treatise ‘Law of Banking’ says (page 1): ‘A banker is one who, in the ordinary course of his business, honours cheques drawn upon him by persons from and for whom he receives money on current accounts.’ This definition is based upon the dicta given in a number of decisions beginning with Foley v. Hill(1). According to this definition the essential function to enable a person, firm or institution to be regarded as a banker or a bank is that of receiving current deposits against which cheques are to be drawn.”
The learned author goes on to refer to some cases and particularly to In re Birkbeck Permanent Benefit Building Society(2), and to a definition given by Sir John Paget, whom he describes as another great authority. He quotes as follows from Sir John:
“It is a fair deduction,” says Sir John Paget, reviewing the Birkbeck Building Society case and other legal decisions, “that no person or body, corporate or otherwise, can be a banker who does not (1) take deposit accounts, (2) take current accounts, (3) issue and pay cheques and (4) collect cheques crossed and uncrossed for his customers.”
We are prepared to concede (subject to the remarks contained in a decision of this Court to which we shall refer at a later stage) that some modifications of this strict view may be necessary in dealing with the case of what we may call “native banks” of the kind which were generally called kothis. These kothis, we understand, used to keep accounts which were accepted as final by all who had to deal with them. They gave no receipts and no pass books and did not make use of cheques, but they operated more or less as bankers receiving deposits and making payments against those deposits on demand. In point of fact the very existence of the two promissory notes signed by Durga Prasad in the present case itself throws a doubt on the allegation that the defendants' family were bankers in any sense whatever. With these preliminary remarks we may come first, as learned counsel has chosen, to deal, with the evidence in that order, to the documentary evidence.
Learned counsel refers first to two decrees in favour of Seth Ram Chandra Das, one a mortaore decree and the other a money decree. Neither of these is any indication of the existence of a “banking” business. He took us next to a number of plaints and decrees in suits instituted by Durga Prasad. In one such case the defendant had executed a mortgage in favour of the sons and grandsons of Seth Ram Chandra Das. It is true that there were a number of such plaints and decrees but the existence of such plaints and decrees which make no reference to any banking business is no indication whatever that the family of the defendants ever had anything in the nature of a “banking” business.
Learned counsel came next to plaints instituted after Durga Prasad's death on the basis of bonds executed in his favour. He laid stress on the fact that the occupation of the plaintiff was described as moneylending, but again it can only be said that moneylending is an entirely different thing from banking and even if Seth Ram Chandra Das did some moneylending and after him his son Durga Prasad continued to do some moneylending and after their death Durga Prasad's nephews, the sons of Jyoti Prasad, continued to do some moneylending, that would not enable the plaintiff to get a decree against the defendants unless he could prove that legal necessity existed for the loans, which might of course be proved by showing that the loans were taken in the ordinary course of business. That, however, was not the case of the plaintiff who laid himself out from the very start to avoid any risk of being put to proof of legal necessity.
[The rest of the documentary evidence was then fully discussed.]
Reliance has further been placed on behalf of the plaintiff on the oral evidence of seven witnesses apart from the plaintiff himself. Those witnesses have been criticised in detail by the learned Subordinate Judge and we think that he has rightly refused to place any reliance upon them.
We think that neither the documentary evidence nor the oral evidence is of the smallest service to establish that Seth Ram Chandra Das or Seth Durga Prasad or the present defendants have ever carried on any banking business. It follows that the amounts in sum cannot have been deposited with Durga Prasad as alleged by the plaintiff. There is nothing whatever in this case to indicate that with either Seth Ram Chandra Das or any members of the family there have ever been made deposits against which the depositors could withdraw money either by cheque or by any other means whenever they liked to withdraw it. On the contrary what is proved is that Durga Prasad took two loans of Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 3,500 and it was for the plaintiff to establish that those loans were taken, for legal necessity and created debts by which the whole joint family including the present defendants were bound.
Learned counsel for the respondents has referred us in this connection to a decision of this Court to which we think it desirable to refer. In Dharam Das v. Ganga Devi, a Bench of this Court had to consider articles 59 and 60 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act. In discussing this matter they said that it was not easy to say to what class of cases the legislature meant article 60 to apply, but they found it unnecessary to come to a decision on the point, “holding, as we do, that it is not intended to apply to a transaction which is regarded by the law as a loan.” They went on to remark: “Now the authorities cited by the appellants clearly lay down that ordinary dealings between a native banker and his customers are in the nature of loans made by the latter to the former.” They accordingly refused to apply article 60 which provides for money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, including money of a customer in the hands of his banker so payable, a period of three years which begins to run from the date when the demand is made.
Learned counsel for the appellant has attempted to support his case that there was a banking business by insistence on the plea that the defendants were in possession of account books which they had failed to produce. The irresistible inference, he says, is that these account books would have shown that Ram Chandra Das and Durga Prasad after him and the defendants had a banking business which would have been apparent had these account books been produced…. Anandi Prasad defendant has denied receipt of account books from Durga Prasad and the only direct cross-examination on this point was aimed at eliciting an admission that he had produced account books before the Income-tax Officer. It is clear that Anandi Prasad was not bound to produce his account books in support of his own case if he did not think those account books to be useful or relevant evidence to prove his case, assuming of course that those account books existed. In actual fact the written statement had been filed on 14th August, 1933, and a statement was made by the defendants' counsel on 29th August that Anandi Prasad was not in possession of any bahi khatas, that is bahi khatas relating to the years 1930 and 1931 and, we suppose, earlier. The position taken up by the plaintiff was that the statement made by Anandi Prasad's counsel on the 29th August, 1933, was untrue, and on the 24th October, 1933, he made an unusual application in which he began by saying that the defendants had denied the existence of their account books. He went on to say that in fact account books had been kept and would show the money due to the plaintiff and other persons credited in those account books, and he said that was why the defendants did not want to produce them. He went on to ask that the defendants should be ordered to obtain and produce a copy of the statements and orders relating to assessment of income-tax passed against Durga Prasad and the defendants from the year 1925 up to the year 1931, the cost of which the plaintiff was ready to pay. The plaintiff of course could not himself obtain these copies from the income-tax department. For the appellant it is contended that this was a sufficient notice of demand to the defendants to produce their account books. On the other hand it has been contended on behalf of the respondents that no presumption can be drawn against a party for non-production of a document unless the party which wants that party to produce it has served upon him the necessary notice and followed the procedure prescribed by law. That procedure is laid down in order XI, rules 12 and 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it is not disputable in the present case that the plaintiff had entirely omitted to do anything of the kind. In this connection we may refer to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranji Singh, where their Lordships said with reference to certain accounts not produced:
“These books do not necessarily form any part of the plaintiff's case; it is of course possible that some entries might have appeared therein relating to the bungalow (the property in suit). But it is open to a litigant to refrain from, producing any documents that he considers irrelevant; if the other litigant is dissatisfied, it is for him to apply for an affidavit of documents, and he can obtain inspection and production of all that appear to him in such affidavit to be relevant and proper. If he fails so to do, neither he nor the court at his suggestion is entitled to draw any inference as to the contents of any such documents…. It is for the litigant who desires to rely on the contents of documents to put them in evidence in the usual and proper way; if he fails to do so no inference in his favour can be drawn as to the contents thereof.”
In the present case if it was the plaintiff's contention that the defendants were in possession of account books which they were refusing to produce he should have taken steps in accordance with the law. Not having done so he is not entitled to ask the court to draw any inference from the non-production of those documents.
Learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant has sought to fall back on an alternative case that this was an ancestral family business of moneylending, and it is suggested, relying upon Raghunathji Tarachand v. Bank of Bombay, that in these circumstances even if these were loans, yet being loans taken by the karta of the family and part of a series of transactions by the family, they must be treated as taken in the course of the family business of borrowing and lending money. In that case it was held by Chandavarkar, J., that
“Under Hindu law a joint family which carries on a trade handed down from its ancestors becomes a trading family; trade being one of its kulacharas (duty or practice), it attracts to itself all the necessary incidents of trade. The rule of Hindu law that debts contracted by a managing member of a joint family are binding on the other members only when they are for a family purpose is subject to at least one important exception. Where a family carries on a business or profession and maintains itself by means of it, the member who manages it for the family has an implied authority to contract debts for its purposes, and the creditor is not bound to inquire into the purpose of the debt in order to bind the whole family thereby, because that power is necessary for the very existence of the family.”
Reference was also made to a case of the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Oudh in which the case of Raghunathji Tarachand was followed. This is Baba Din v. Bansraj, in which it was held that:
“Where a family carries on a business or profession and maintains itself by means of it, the member who manages it for the family has an implied authority to contract debts for its purposes, and the creditor is not bound to inquire into the finances of the business, so long as that business forms the purpose of the debts, in order to bind the whole family thereby, became the power to contract debts is incidental to the carrying on of the business, from which the family derives its means of subsistence and support.”
In order, however, to make the principles set out in these two decisions applicable it has to be found first that there was a family business or rather, we would say, an ancestral family business of trading or money-lending involving both borrowing and lending. Incidentally the business of “len den” by no means invariably involves the assumption that the moneylender is himself in the habit of taking loans. It will be sufficient for us to say that in our judgment this principle is only applicable in cases where there is an ancestral business; vide for example the decision of this Court in Ram Nath v. Chiranji Lal. The evidence on the record does not justify a finding that there was in the defendants' family an ancestral business of borrowing and lending. In any case it is important to remember that the plaintiff's case was not that it was unnecessary to prove legal necessity, etc., because there was an ancestral moneylending business but on the ground that there was a family “banking” business. In the present case the evidence goes little further than to prove that like his father Ram Chandra Das the son Durga Prasad also did some “len den”. To sum up, the plaintiff based his case on an allegation of a family banking business. That allegation he has entirely failed to establish. He fell back on an ancestral “family” business of moneylending and that also the evidence does not establish. What the evidence does establish is that as manager of this joint family Seth Ram Chandra Das was in the habit of doing some moneylending as also some business in wheat and the like besides managing his zamindari property. That same course was followed by his son Durga Prasad who seems to have added to these activities some dealings in cigarettes and petrol. In our opinion it is quite clear that the sums alleged by the plaintiff to have been taken by Durga Prasad as deposits were in fact taken as loans and the plaintiff has not attempted to establish necessity and in fact for reasons best known to himself, very probably the reason stated in the written statement of the defendants, he deliberately avoided the responsibility of having to establish the existence of legal necessity. In our judgment the plaintiff's suit was rightly dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge. There is no force in this appeal which accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.