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Judges
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  • S. 224, Act 8 of 1859,
  • S. 263, Act 8 of 1859
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • S. 224, Act 8 of 1859,
  • S. 263, Act 8 of 1859
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mukerji, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

A suit for declaration of title and recovery of khas possession was dismissed at trial but, on appeal, the plaintiffs obtained a decree declaring title and directing that the plaintiffs be given khas possession of the land, that defendants remove structures within two months or be removed in execution, and that plaintiffs recover costs with interest. The appellate decree was passed on 5 October 1923. The defendants preferred a second appeal to this Court.

While the second appeal was pending, the decree-holder applied for execution on 1 August 1924, seeking khas possession by removal of the judgment-debtors and the structures, sale of the structures with proceeds applied to the decree, and, if necessary, attachment and sale of movables. A writ under Order XXI, Rule 35, CPC was issued, returnable 27 August 1924. On 20 August 1924 a peon purportedly delivered possession to the decree-holder's agent by fixing a bamboo and beating a drum; the agent gave a receipt. The judgment-debtors sought a stay; the executing Court adjourned consideration until the process was returned. On 27 August 1924 the Court recorded "Possession delivered on the decretal land."

The judgment-debtors then obtained an interim stay from this Court (rule issued 28 August 1924) of execution as to possession until the second appeal was disposed of; the decree-holder did not press the point in that proceeding. The second appeal was dismissed on 26 June 1926. On 1 August 1927 the decree-holder made a further application for execution, again seeking khas possession and removal of structures. The judgment-debtors objected that the decree had already been executed and possession taken by the decree-holder. The executing courts upheld that objection, and the decree-holder appealed to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a decree-holder who (through a court officer) has obtained only a symbolical delivery of possession, when the decree entitles him to actual (khas) possession, may apply again in execution proceedings for delivery of actual possession.
  2. Whether symbolical possession obtained by the decree-holder through a court officer (peon) operates as actual possession against the judgment-debtor so as to preclude a subsequent execution application for khas possession.
  3. If a second execution application is not maintainable, what is the decree-holder's appropriate remedy?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Court must enforce its processes effectively and in the manner contemplated by law; if the peon delivers only symbolical possession when the decree requires delivery of actual possession, the Court should rectify the error.
  • Consequently, the decree-holder was entitled to make a second application for execution seeking actual (khas) possession and removal of structures and persons.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Symbolical possession taken by the decree-holder, obtained through an officer of the Court and process of law, is equivalent to actual possession as against the judgment-debtor, making the judgment-debtor a trespasser from that time.
  • Therefore a second application for execution to obtain actual possession does not lie; the decree-holder's remedy, if any, is by way of a suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lokeswar v. Purgun [1882] 7 Cal. 418 Calcutta High Court decision treating symbolical possession (though erroneously delivered) as operating as actual possession against the judgment-debtor. The Court notes this as part of a line of Calcutta decisions holding that symbolical delivery by court officer operates as actual possession against the judgment-debtor; Mukerji, J. cites it but distinguishes its application to the facts here.
Hari Mohan v. Babur Ali [1897] 24 Cal. 715 Another Calcutta decision in the same line (symbolical possession treated as actual possession). Cited as part of consistent Calcutta authority that symbolical delivery through court officer is effective as against judgment-debtors; Court recognizes the principle but does not accept that it entitles the decree-holder to a later second execution in the circumstances of this case.
Bhulu Beg v. Jatindra, A.I.R 1923 Cal. 138 Calcutta decision treating symbolical delivery by officer as operating as actual possession, requiring suit for actual possession to be within limitation (12 years). Cited alongside the other Calcutta cases; the opinion acknowledges these decisions but stresses they do not prevent a decree-holder from repudiating symbolic possession if conduct shows such repudiation — though here the Court finds no such repudiation.
Robson v. Maseyk [1865] 3 W.R. Mis. 2 Held a decree-holder who obtained possession under S.224 might apply under S.223 for parts actually in occupation by judgment-debtor; such application maintainable if decree warranted it. Described as distinguishable: applied where facts showed part of property in actual occupation of judgment-debtor and the decree-holder sought the kind of possession the decree warranted; not authority for taking symbolic possession as first instalment then later seeking khas possession.
Adoremonee v. Prem Chand [1868] 9 W.R. 454 Plaintiff obtained possession under S.224 then applied under S.223 for a more perfect possession as against other defendants; held that a further application was permissible. Cited and characterized: Court regards facts as different from present case where the decree could be executed by symbolical delivery but the decree-holder's conduct here indicated acceptance of symbolical possession.
Banee Mahton v. Gopee Bhagat [1869] 12 W.R. 285 Plaintiff received possession under S.224, gave receipt, and later applied for khas possession; held an application under S.223 lay. Noted but regarded as distinguishable and of doubtful continuing authority in view of later Full Bench decisions (Juggobandhu Mukherjee). The Court says these cases do not support allowing a decree-holder to take symbolic possession as a first instalment and later demand khas possession.
Hur Rishore Nundy v. Sudoy Chunder [1872] 17 W.R. 80 Following Weekly Reporter cases, held Munsif had jurisdiction to order khas possession under S.263 though he had earlier ordered possession under S.264. Listed among Weekly Reporter cases but described as distinguishable from the present facts and not a controlling authority for the appellant's contention.
Juggobandhu Mukherjee v. Ramohunder Bysack [1880] 5 Cal. 584 (Full Bench) Full Bench decision cited as casting doubt on the continued validity of some earlier Weekly Reporter decisions concerning rights to seek further execution remedies. The Court relies on the Full Bench decision to question the authority of some Weekly Reporter cases and to justify not following them in the present matter.
Khetra Mohan Kundu v. Jogendra Chandra Kundu [1918] 45 I.C. 7 (unreported) Unreported decision referred to by the appellant; no reasons given in the report. The Court notes the decision but says no reasons were given and expressly declines to agree with the view taken by the Court below in that case if those are to be taken as its reasons.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion proceeds step-by-step to analyze the facts and applicable law and to determine whether the second execution application was maintainable.

  1. The Court first summarizes the competing legal positions: the appellant (decree-holder) urged that the Court must correct a peon's shortcoming where only symbolical possession was delivered whereas the decree entitled to actual possession; the respondents maintained that symbolical possession delivered by a court officer operates as actual possession against the judgment-debtor.
  2. The Court examined the conduct of the decree-holder on the material dates. It found that the receipt given by the agent could be read merely as a recital of what the peon had done and was not decisive. More important was that the decree-holder never complained to the executing Court that the writ had not been duly executed.
  3. On the returnable date (27 August 1924) the decree-holder appeared before the Court, but only for a separate step (application for processes for costs under O.21, R.30). He did not then seek a fresh execution for actual possession, nor did he object when the order-sheet recorded "Possession delivered on the decretal land." The Court reasons that if he had been dissatisfied he had a duty to ask for fresh and proper execution on that date.
  4. Although an interim stay was later granted by this Court (from 28 August 1924 until disposal of the second appeal), the Court finds that the decree-holder's earlier acquiescence in the closure of the possession proceedings indicates he accepted the symbolical possession at that time. The peon's conduct is thus explicable only on the footing that the decree-holder's agent wanted merely symbolical possession then.
  5. The 1 August 1927 application is characterized as a fresh execution application rather than a complaint about the peon's act. The Court treats the facts as an instance where a decree-holder, armed with a decree for khas possession, executes the decree initially by accepting symbolical possession and thereafter attempts to obtain khas possession as a second instalment — a practice the Court deems impermissible.
  6. The Court reviewed authorities cited by the appellant (including English and colonial decisions) and distinguished them on their facts, particularly where those decisions permitted a different execution route because portions of land were in the actual occupation of the judgment-debtor or where the decree-holder had not elected to accept symbolic possession in lieu of khas possession. The Court also observed that some Weekly Reporter decisions were of doubtful authority after the Full Bench decision in Juggobandhu Mukherjee v. Ramohunder Bysack.
  7. On this factual and legal analysis, the Court concluded that the decree-holder had, by his conduct, accepted symbolical possession and thereby precluded a subsequent execution application for khas possession; accordingly, the second execution application was not maintainable.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Holding (core ruling): The Court held that the second application for execution (made 1 August 1927) for delivery of khas possession and removal of structures was not maintainable where the decree-holder had earlier accepted symbolical possession delivered through a court officer and had not protested or sought fresh execution when the writ was returned.

Immediate implications for the parties:

  • The decree-holder's second execution application was dismissed; the Court concluded that his remedy, if any, lies in instituting a suit properly constituted for that purpose rather than by a second execution application.
  • The Court did not make any order as to costs in the circumstances.
  • Rankin, C.J. concurred with Mukerji, J., and the appeal was dismissed.

Note: The opinion discusses multiple precedents and distinguishes them on the facts; it does not purport to lay down a novel principle beyond applying established execution-law principles to the facts before it.

    Jagadish Nath Roy v. Najar Chandra Paramanik

    Mukerji, J.:— This appeal has been preferred by a decree-holder from an order passed by the District Judge of Dinajpur affirming on appeal an order of the Munsif, by which an execution case was dismissed on the objection of the judgment-debtors.

    2. A suit for declaration of title and recovery of khas possession was dismissed by the trial Court. On appeal, this decision was reversed and a decree was passed by which it was ordered as follows:

    “Plaintiffs' title be declared and plaintiffs do get khas possession of the land. Defendants do remove the structures within two months from this date in default they shall be removed in execution of this decree…… Plaintiffs do get costs of both the Courts with interest at 6 p.c per annum.”

    3. This appellate decree was passed on 5th October 1923. The defendants thereupon preferred a second appeal to this Court. While this second appeal, was pending the decree-holder on 1st August 1924 applied for execution. In the prayer column of the tabular statement there was a prayer for khas possession by removal of the judgment-debtors and of the structures standing on the land and also a prayer that the structures be sold and the proceeds credited against the dues under the decree and that the expenses of getting possession by removal of structures be paid out of the sale proceeds and if the said sale proceeds be not sufficient then the balance be realized by attachment and sale of the judgment-debtor's moveables. The application was registered and a writ under O. 21, R. 35 of the CPC, was issued fixing 27th August 1924 for its execution and return. The writ was exactly in form No. 11, Appendix E, to the Code, directing the bailiff to put the decree-holder in possession and authorizing him to remove any person bound by the decree who might refuse to vacate. On 20th August 1924 the peon delivered possession to the agent of the decree-holder by fixing up a bamboo accompanied with the beating of drum and the latter gave a receipt acknowledging that he had received delivery of possession of that character. On the same day, as the order sheet shows, the judgment-debtor applied to the Court for stay of delivery of possession, but the Court finding that process for delivery of possession had already been issued passed no definite orders but only adjourned the consideration of the application till the process was received back from the Nezarat. On 27th August 1924 the decree-holder put in talabana for issue of processes under O. 21, R. 30 of the CPC, as regards the execution of the decree for costs, but raised no objection on the ground of his not having received khas possession in accordance with the terms of the writ and the Court recorded on the order-sheet: “Possession delivered on the decretal land.” In the meantime, on 25th August 1924, the judgment debtor filed an application in this Court, praying for stay of execution but omitting all reference to what had taken place on the 20th as regards delivery of possession; and on this a rule was issued on 28th August 1924 with an order for interim stay. At the hearing of this rule the decree-holder appeared, but no reference appears to have been made on his behalf either as to what the peon had done on the 20th. All that this Court ordered on the rule was to make it absolute, and, in so far as execution as to possession was concerned, to say that the decree-holder had no objection to the stay of execution as to delivery of possession and that the same should be stayed till the second appeal was disposed of. The second appeal was dismissed on 26th June 1926. On 1st August 1927 the decree-holder made a second application for execution praying for khas possession by, removal of the judgment-debtors and also of the structures. The judgment-debtors objected that no such application lay as the decree for possession had been executed before and possession had been already been taken by the decree-holder in that execution. This objection has been upheld by the Courts below. The decree-holder has then preferred the present appeal.

    4. It has been contended before us on behalf of the appellant that it is for the Court to enforce its own processes effectively and in a manner contemplated by law and that if the peon in the discharge of his duty delivers only symbolical possession to a decree-holder, who is entitled under the decree to get actual possession, it is the duty of the Court to rectify the error, and that consequently the appellant in the present case was entitled to put in a second application for execution with the prayers that he did. On the other hand the respondents have contended that, as between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor symbolical possession taken by the former is equivalent to actual possession so as to make the judgment-debtor a trespasser from the point of time when such symbolical possession is taken, and that therefore a second application for execution by way of delivery of actual possession does not lie, but that the decree-holder's only remedy is by way of a suit.

    5. So far as the decisions of the Calcutta High Court are concerned, they have, unlike the decisions of the Bombay High Court and the later decisions of the Madras High Court, uniformly laid down that where, as here, symbolical possession has been erroneously delivered to a decree-holder as against the judgment-debtor, the decree providing for actual and not symbolical possession, such delivery of possession is not a nullity but being possession obtained through an officer of the Court and process of law and the judgment-debtor being, in the contemplation of law, party thereto, it operates as actual possession as against the latter and his representatives and that from this point of view a suit for actual possession against the judgment-debtor must be instituted within 12 years from the date in which symbolical possession has been given: Lokeswar v. Purgun . [1882] 7 Cal. 418., Hari Mohan v. Babur Ali . [1897] 24 Cal. 715., Bhulu Beg v. Jatindra . A.I.R 1923 Cal. 138. These decisions however do not mean that a decree-holder to whom the peon erroneously delivers symbolical possession cannot refuse to take such possession and stand upon his rights to get the kind of possession that the decree has entitled him to. If in the present case the conduct of the decree-holder might be construed as indicating a repudiation on his part of the symbolical possession which the peon had given him or at least as disclosing a desire on his part not to be content at the time with the kind of possession that the peon had given him but to get the khas possession which he was entitled to under the decree and for which he had prayed in his first application for execution, I should be prepared to hold that he was perfectly within his rights to come before the executing Court to have his remedy. But I am unable to put any such meaning on his conduct.

    6. I do not lay much stress on the receipt that was given on his behalf, for the receipt may in my opinion, be read as merely reciting what the peon had done. What is more important, in my opinion, is that he never complained before the Court that the writ had not been duly executed. On the returnable date fixed for the writ, i.e, 27th August 1924, it was his duty if he was dissatisfied with what the peon had done, to ask for a fresh and proper execution of the writ by delivery of actual possession. There was appearance on his behalf before the Court on that date, though for a different purpose namely for issue of processes under O. 21, R. 30 of the CPC, as already stated. It is true that by virtue of the rule and the interim stay order issued by this Court, there could be no fresh execution on or after 28th August 1924 until the second appeal was disposed of. But his acquiescence in the closure of the proceedings as to possession on 27th August 1924 with the Court's remark in the order sheet that possession had been delivered can lead to only one conclusion namely that symbolical possession was the only kind of possession that he wanted to have at that stage. The peon's action is explicable on no other footing than that the decree-holder's agent, when on the spot, wanted to have nothing more than symbolical possession.

    7. It is also noteworthy that the application of 1st August 1927 on which the present proceedings are founded is not a complaint against the peon's act but a fresh application for execution. The case therefore seems to me to be one of those cases in which a decree-holder having armed himself with a decree for khas possession executes that decree in the first instance by obtaining symbolical possession only with some ulterior object of his own, and thereafter subsequently and as a second instalment asks for khas possession. The question is whether such a course is permissible under the law. I am of opinion that it is not.

    8. A number of decisions has been cited before us on behalf of the appellant as supporting his contention. In the case of Robson v. Maseyk . [1865] 3 W.R Mis. 2., a decree-holder who had obtained possession under S. 224, Act 8 of 1859, finding that certain part of the property was in the actual possession of the judgment-debtor applied for possession under S. 223 of the Act, and it was held that such an application was maintainable provided that the terms of the decree warranted such possession being given. S. 223 it may be mentioned, applied where the land was in the actual possession of the defendant and S. 224 where it was in the possession of ryots. In the case of Adoremonee v. Prem Chand . [1868] 9 W.R 454., the plaintiffs had sued for possession against the principal defendants and certain co-defendants in respect of a one-third share of an ejmali family taluk alleging that the co-defendants had fraudulently ousted her from the same; the principal defendants alleged that the taluk was the self-acquired property of the co-defendants and that they held it under a putni from the latter; and the Court held that the taluk was ejmali and not self-acquired and gave the plaintiffs a decree for possession. The plaintiff applied and obtained possession of the taluk under S. 224 and thereafter alleging that a more perfect possession was necessary as against the principal defendants in order to nullify certain obstructive acts of theirs applied for possession under S. 223.

    9. It was held that assuming for the sake of argument that the plaintiff had already been once put into possession under S. 224 there was no bar to her being put into the more direct and actual possession contemplated by S. 224. In the case of Banee Mahton v. Gopee Bhagat . [1869] 12 W.R 285., the facts as far as they may be gathered were that the plaintiff a reversioner had sued for possession of an eight annas share of a mouza and for setting aside a sale made thereof by a Hindu widow, and got a decree for possession. He received possession under S. 224 and gave a receipt that he had received possession in accordance with the decree. He then made a further application that the defendants refused to give him khas possession of some lands on the ground that they held those lands in ryoti. It was held that an application under S. 223 lay and not a suit. In the case of Hur Rishore Nundy v. Sudoy Chunder . [1872] 17 W.R 80., the facts do not appear, but it was held, following the last two Weekly Reporter cases, that the Munsif had jurisdiction to issue an order for khas possession under S. 263, Act 8 of 1859 although in the first instance he had ordered possession under S. 264 of that Act. Now, these decisions are certainly distinguishable from the present case.

    10. In the first of these cases the decree was for possession and when ordinarily possession under S. 223 would have been enough it was found on the spot that the judgment-debtor was in actual occupation of a part: in such circumstances it was held to be open to the decree-holder to come before the executing Court to apply for such possession, actual and effective, as he was entitled to under the decree. The facts of this case need not be read as showing that the decree-holder had chosen to take under the first execution something in lieu of or in satisfaction of what the decree entitled him to. As regards the second and the third cases, the decrees were such as could ordinarily be executed by the delivery of symbolical possession, and furthermore it is extremely doubtful if the view taken in those cases as to the rights of the respective parties can be regarded as good law after the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Juggobandhu Mukherjee v. Ramohunder Bysack . [1880] 5 Cal. 584, and the numerous cases which are based on it. The fourth case need not be separately considered. In any event, none of these decisions, in my judgment, need be regarded as an authority for the proposition that where a decree-holder is, under the terms of his decree, entitled to khas possession, he is at liberty to take by way of a first instalment symbolical possession only and thereafter apply for supplementing what he has got by being given actual possession.

    11. In the unreported decision of this Court in the case of Khetra Mohan Kundu v. Jogendra Chandra Kundu . [1918] 45 I.C 7. and to which our attention has been drawn, no reasons have been given, and, in any event, if what was said by the Court below whose view was affirmed on appeal by this Court, are to be taken as the reasons for the decision, I regret I am unable to agree therein.

    12. The result is that, in my judgment, the second application for execution was not maintainable and in my opinion the remedy of the decree-holder, if any, lies in a suit properly constituted for the purpose. The appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case I would not make any order as to costs.

    Rankin, C.J:— I agree.

    B.V/R.K

    13. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Jagadish Nath Roy v. Najar Chandra Paramanik
    (Jun 12, 1930)