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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Walmsley, J. and Mukerji, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendants (appellants) are successors in interest of Satyendra Nath Roy Choudhury, the proprietor of a khas Mahal holding sold under the Revenue Sales Law by the Collector on December 17, 1919. The plaintiff purchased the holding at that sale. Satyendra's attempts to have the sale set aside failed, and on July 6, 1920 a certificate was issued to the plaintiff stating his purchase took effect from May 1, 1920. On August 2, 1920 a declaration was made under the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the holding, and on March 11, 1921 the Deputy Collector awarded Rs. 2,181 for the land and Rs. 12,388 for the building on it. The building had been erected at the expense of Satyendra and stood on the land at the time of the plaintiff's purchase. The suit was brought to determine whether the plaintiff or the defendants were entitled to the compensation awarded for the building; there was no dispute that compensation for the land belonged to the plaintiff.

The learned Judge (first instance) held that the plaintiff should receive the compensation for the building as well. The appellants appealed against that finding. The appellate Court (Walmsley, J. and Mukerji, J.) considered statutory interpretation, the law as to improvements made by a person in possession in good faith, and relevant precedents, and reached the decision summarized below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the compensation awarded for the building (structures erected and standing on the land at the time of the revenue sale) belongs to the plaintiff (purchaser at the revenue sale) or to the defendants (successors of the ex-proprietor who erected the building).
  2. Whether structures or buildings standing on land pass to a purchaser at a revenue sale under Act XI of 1859 (as read with Act VII of 1868), or whether the ex-proprietor (or one in possession in good faith) retains rights to remove the building or to claim compensation.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff asserted that he took delivery of possession through the Collector in August 1920 (an assertion which the defendants denied and which the opinion records had no supporting evidence).
  • Implicit in the first-instance holding (and in the plaintiff's position) was the view that the purchaser at the revenue sale obtained entitlement to the building compensation.

Defendants' (Appellants') Arguments

  • The defendants relied on authority (cited as Thakoor Chunder Paramanik and related decisions) that a person in possession in good faith who erects improvements on land is entitled either to remove those improvements or to obtain reasonable compensation if they remain for the benefit of the owner of the soil — i.e., that ownership of the building could remain with the ex-proprietor.
  • They challenged any argument that definitions in other statutes (such as the Land Acquisition Act or the Transfer of Property Act) should be imported into Act XI of 1859 or Act VII of 1868 to make "land" include buildings for the purpose of revenue sales.
  • They contested any analogy equating a voluntary sale (to which Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act might apply) with a revenue sale under Act XI, arguing the purchaser at a revenue sale takes the estate from the Crown in the state in which it stood at the time of settlement, rather than stepping into the defaulting proprietor's full interest.
  • The appellants' counsel candidly conceded that the respondent (plaintiff) might be entitled to reasonable compensation for the period during which the structures remained on the land after the sale took effect (i.e., that the purchaser could claim reasonable ground rent or similar allowance for the time the building stood on his land).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thakoor Chunder Paramanik v. Ramdhone Bhattacharjee (also cited as Thakcoor Chunder Paramanik v. Ram Dhone Banerjee) Established that a person who, in good faith and in possession, erects improvements is entitled either to remove the materials (restoring the land) or to obtain compensation for the building if it is allowed to remain for the owner of the soil — i.e., the builder has an option. The Court relied on this authority to conclude that the plaintiff (purchaser) had the option to require removal or to pay compensation; because the plaintiff had not exercised that option, ownership of the building remained with the defendants' predecessor.
Maharaja Surjya Kanta Acharjya v. Sarat Chandra Roy Explained that on failure to pay Government assessment, the estate or interest is determined and a sale under Act XI vests the purchaser with the Crown's interest; the purchaser takes the estate as it stood at settlement, not as a voluntary transfer from the defaulting owner. The Court invoked this proposition to distinguish a revenue sale from a voluntary sale and to reject the contention that a purchaser at a revenue sale obtains all interests the defaulting proprietor possessed in the same way as in ordinary contracts of sale.
Shib Das Banerjee v. Baman Das Mookerjee Observed that if land is sold for arrears, the owner of a house built on the land might be entitled, as against the auction-purchaser, to reside in or enjoy the house by paying an equitable ground rent, whether built by a lessee or by the ex-proprietor. The Court relied on this passage to support the general rule that the builder (not a mere trespasser) retains rights in respect of the improvement and that the purchaser may be entitled only to compensation or ground rent if the improvement remains.
Ram Koomar (or Ram Kumar) Sen v. Mohesh Chunder Sen Used as an illustration/principle that a person who erects a house under a bona fide claim of title may have rights (cited in support of the rule giving protection to the builder or occupant). The Court cited this decision as a supporting authority for the proposition that the builder/ex-proprietor may either remove the building or be entitled to compensation; it was used to reinforce the general rule applied in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate Court's reasoning proceeded along two complementary lines (Walmsley, J. and Mukerji, J.):

  1. Factual assessment and the builder's option (Walmsley, J.):
    • The Court noted the uncontested fact that the building was erected at the expense of Satyendra (the defaulting proprietor) and stood on the land at the time of the plaintiff's purchase.
    • Relying on established authority (Thakoor Chunder Paramanik), the Court held that where an improvement is erected by one in possession in good faith, the builder has an option: either remove the building or accept reasonable compensation if the building remains for the owner's benefit.
    • The plaintiff had the option but did not exercise it. The plaintiff's assertion that he took delivery of possession through the Collector in August 1920 was denied by the defendants and unsupported by evidence. On that basis, Walmsley, J. concluded the ownership of the building remained with the defendants (their predecessor) at the time of the award, so the first-instance decision in favour of the plaintiff as to the building compensation was wrong and required reversal.
    • Nevertheless, because the defendants allowed the building to remain on the plaintiff's land for a long time, they were not entitled to the entire award for the building; they should pay reasonable compensation for use of the land. Walmsley, J. agreed with the first-instance judge on the amount to be allowed to the plaintiff as such compensation.
  2. Statutory interpretation and the nature of revenue sales (Mukerji, J.):
    • Mukerji, J. analysed Act XI of 1859 and Act VII of 1868 (and later statutory developments relating to land registers) to show that what is sold under the Revenue Sales Law is the "estate" or assessed land as entered in the registers — prima facie the land or share in the land — and not necessarily structures or buildings standing on it.
    • The Court rejected attempts to import definitions of "land" or "immovable property" from other statutes (e.g., the Land Acquisition Act or the Transfer of Property Act) into Act XI/Act VII; those definitions are expressly restricted to the enactments in which they appear and cannot be read into the revenue-sale statutes.
    • The Court refused an analogy equating a voluntary sale with a revenue sale: a purchaser at a revenue sale does not obtain the same unqualified transfer as in a voluntary sale. Citing Maharaja Surjya Kanta Acharjya, the Court emphasized that the purchaser takes the estate from the Crown in the state it was at settlement; the purchaser's rights differ fundamentally from those of a buyer in a voluntary transaction.
    • The Court found that structures or buildings are not "encumbrances" for the purposes of s.37 of Act XI and that the law of fixtures (and specific Transfer of Property Act provisions like s.108 clause (h)) has limited application in this country and did not control the result.
    • Relying on Shib Das Banerjee and the Thakoor Paramanik line of authority, Mukerji, J. concluded that the appellants' predecessor (the ex-proprietor) retained ownership of the structures and buildings; however, equitable considerations required the Court to allow the purchaser reasonable compensation for the period during which the structures remained on his land before removal or before the Collector took possession.
    • On the facts the Court fixed the reasonable allowance at Rs.100 per month for 23 months (total Rs.2,300) as due to the plaintiff out of the compensation awarded for the structures and buildings; the remainder of the award for structures and buildings was to go to the defendants.
  3. Relief and practical consequences:
    • The Court ordered that the first-instance decree be set aside and a decree be drawn declaring the plaintiff's title to the compensation for the land and trees and to Rs.2,300 out of the amount awarded for the structures and buildings; the remainder of the structures/buildings award would go to the defendants.
    • The Court noted that the plaintiff had withdrawn the whole compensation after the first-instance decision; the plaintiff must refund the balance after deducting the amount allowed to him (i.e., Rs.2,300).
    • Costs were ordered to be proportionate in both Courts, having regard to the relative success and defeat of the parties.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; DECREE SET ASIDE.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The plaintiff retains the compensation awarded for the land and trees (no dispute as to these amounts).
  • As to the compensation awarded for the structures and buildings (Rs.12,388 as awarded by the Deputy Collector), the defendants (successors of the ex-proprietor) are entitled to the whole amount except that Rs.2,300 is to be paid to the plaintiff as reasonable compensation for the period (23 months at Rs.100 per month) during which the structures stood on the plaintiff's land.
  • The plaintiff, having withdrawn the entire compensation after the first-instance decision, must refund the balance of the funds after deducting the Rs.2,300 allowed to him.
  • Proportionate costs are awarded in both Courts in light of the mixed results.

The opinion applies existing authorities and statutory interpretation to allocate compensatory rights between a purchaser at a revenue sale and an ex-proprietor who erected improvements; the Court did not announce that it was creating any new broad legal principle beyond that application, and no broader new precedent was expressly stated in the opinion.

    Jatindra Nath Roy Choudhury v. Narayan Das Khetry

    Walmsley, J.:— The Appellants are the defendants, the successors in interest of Satyendra Nath Roy Choudhury, who was the proprietor of a khas Mahal holding. This holding was sold under the Revenue Sales Law by the Collector on December 17, 1919, and bought by the plaintiff. Satyendra's efforts to have the sale set aside were fruitless, and on July 6, 1920 a certificate was issued to the plaintiff saying that his purchase took effect from May 1st, 1920. Then on August 2, 1920 a declaration was made under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the holding, and on March 11, 1921 the Deputy Collector awarded Rs. 2181 for the land, and Rs. 12,388 for the building standing on it. This building was admittedly erected at the expense of Satyendra, and it was standing on the land at the time of plaintiff's purchase. The suit was brought to determine whether the plaintiff or defendants were to take the compensation money. There is, of course no question about the compensation for the land; that must go to the plaintiff. The learned Judge has held that the plaintiff should also get the compensation for the building. It is against that finding that the appeal is directed.

    2. It is conceded on all hands that the holding is one that can be sold under the Revenue Sales Law. Unfortunately the language of Act XI and Act VII seems hardly, to refer to a small holding, like the present one. Here the holding is a homestead or a residential site, and in the occupation of the proprietor. The learned Judge proceeds frankly on the doctrine “omne quod inadificatur solo cedil,” although he admits that it has but a limited application in this country. In this I think, he was wrong. The point was discussed, and settled in 1866, in the case of Thakoor Chunder Paramanik v. Ramdhone Bhattacharjee(1), and incidentally it was pointed out that the Civil Law gave some protection to the man who, being in possession of land in good faith, erected a building on it. On the authority of that decision, I think it is clear that the plaintiff bad the option of calling upon the defendants to remove the building or to accept such sum as might be found to be reasonable compensation. The plaintiff did not exercise that option. He says that he took delivery of possession through the Collector in August, 1920, but that allegation is denied by the defendants and there is no evidence adduced in support of it. I need not consider when a purchaser must exercise his option in such a case: for my present purpose it is enough to say that the plaintiff had not exercised his option. It appears to me to follow, from this failure on the part of the plaintiff, that ownership of the building remained with the defendants, and that it was still with them when the award was made. Consequently, I think that the learned Judge's decision is wrong, and that it must be reversed. The defendants, however, are not entitled to the whole of the compensation for the building; they allowed it to stand on the plaintiff's land for a long time, and they ought to pay a reasonable sum for the use of the land. I agree with my learned brother as to the sum.

    3. We are told that the whole of the compensation money was withdrawn by the plaintiff after the decision by the first Court. The plaintiff must refund the balance after deducting the amount allowed to him as indicated above.

    4. The appeal will be allowed and the suit decreed in the form indicated with proportionate costs in both Courts.

    Mukerji, J.:— I agree and wish to add a few words.

    5. Act XI of 1859 is described in its title as an Act to improve the law relating to the sales of land for arrears of revenue in the Lower Provinces under the Bengal Presidency. In the Regulations and enactments dealing with settlement of revenue, it is the land which is assessed to revenue. Under Act XI of 1859 what is sold for arrears of revenue is the ‘estate’. The word is not defined in that Act but in Act VII of 1868. In the latter Act ‘estate’ has been defined as meaning any land or share in land subject to the payment to Government of an annual sum in respect of which the name of a proprietor is entered on the register known as the General Register of all Revenue paying estates, or in respect of which a separate account may in pursuance of s. 10 or s. 11 of the Act XI of 1859 may have been opened. These Registers are now prepared and maintained under the Land Registration Ant VII of 1876, s. 2 of which gives a definition of ‘estate’ as including land, and it is the lands which are so entered as assessed or unassessed. Prima facia therefore, and in the absence of anything else, I should think that it is the land or the share in the land, as stated above, which passes at the sale, and not the structures or buildings on the land.

    6. To make out that the structures and buildings pass with the land or the share therein, several arguments have been put forward and I propose to consider them in their order.

    7. Reference is made to the definition of ‘land’ as given in Section 3 sub-s. (a) of the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) and the definition of ‘immoveable property’ as given in section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882). Both these definitions however, are expressly restricted to the enactments in which they appear and cannot be imported into Act XI of 1859, with which the provision? of Act VII of 1868 have to be read by reason of s. 30 of the latter.

    8. It is urged that though the provisions of section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act do not apply to a ale by operation of law the principles underlying those provisions will apply to a purchase made at a revenue sale. It is urged that at such a sale an unqualified transfer takes place which conveys all the interest which the defaulting proprietor possessed, and the rule of interpretation that every grant is to be most strongly taken against the grantor is to be applied. It is contended that where there is no reservation, the structures and buildings will pass by necessary implication. This argument is based upon a supposed analogy between a transaction as between a vendor and a vendee and a revenue sale. The rights of a purchaser at a revenue sale are entirely and radically, different from those of a purchaser at a, voluntary sale. The Judicial Committee in the case of Maharaja Surjya Kanta Acharjya v. Sarat Chandra Roy(2) in dealing with the case of a sale held under Act XI of 1859 enunciated the proposition that on the failure of an owner to pay the Government assessment his estate or interest in the land is forfeited or rather determined, and that under such a sale, what is sold is not the interest of the defaulter owner, but the interest of the Crown, subject to the payment of the Government assessment. In a sale held under that Act the estate is sold in the condition in which it stood at the time of the settlement; the purchaser does not derive his title from the defaulting proprietor, but takes the estate from the Crown in the state in which it was at its inception at the time of the settlement.

    9. The decision of the learned Subordinate Judge is not, and, in my opinion rightly, not sought to be supported by a reference to the expression ‘free from encumbrance’ appearing in s. 37 of Act XI of 1859. Structures or buildings are not encumbrances within the meaning of the section and the said expression is irrelevant for our present purposes.

    10. It is conceded that the law of fixtures has but a limited application to this country and that the provisions of section 108, Clause (h) of the Transfer of Property Act have no application.

    11. The precise effect of a revenue sale on the building erected by the exproprietor was incidentally considered by this Court in the case of Shib Das Banerjee v. Baman Das Mookerjee(3), wherein at page 361 Norman, C.J, observed as follows:— “If the land had been sold for arrears of Government Revenue, the owner of a bouse built on the land might have been entitled, as against the auction-purchaser, to reside in or enjoy the house paying an equitable ground rent for the site to such purchaser; and that whether the house were built by a person holding under a lease granted by the former proprietor Act 1 of 1845, ss. 3, 26 and 27 and Act XI of 1859, ss. 3 and 7 or even by the exproprietor himself: see Ram Koomar Sen v. Mohesh Chunder Sen(4). The italics in the above extract are mine. This proposition of law enunciated so far back as 1871 has not been dissented from at any time till now, and I am not convinced that there is any reason to hold that it is otherwise than a correct one. It has been argued that the case of Ram Kumar Sen v. Mohesh Ohander Sen presents certain distinguishable features. I think it does; but the principle is there, and that is entirely in consonance with the general rule which must govern the rights and liabilities of the purchaser on the one hand and the exproprietor on the other. That general rule was laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Thakcoor Chunder Paramanik v. Ram Dhone Banerjee thus:

    “We thick it should be laid down as a general rule that, if he who makes the improvement is not a mere trespasser, but is in possession under any bona fide title or claim of title, he is entitled either to remove the materials restoring the land to the state in which it was before the improvement was made, or to obtain compensation for the value of the building, if it is allowed to remain for the benefit of the owner of the soil, the option of taking to the building or allowing removal of the material remaining with the owner of the land in those cases in which the building is not taken down by the builder during the continuance of any estate he may possess.”

    12. Applying this general rule in the present case, there is no escape from the conclusion that the ownership of the structures or buildings which were admittedly erected by the appellants' predecessor, the defaulting proprietor, did not pass to the respondent, the purchaser.

    13. From this, however, it does not follow that the appellants are entitled to the whole of the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector for the structures and buildings. We must take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case and we are competent to pass such orders as the equities of the case demand. The learned Advocate for the appellants with his usual candour has conceded that we may allow reasonable compensation to the respondent for the appellant's laches in not removing the materials of the structures and buildings before 1st of May, 1919 which was the date mentioned in the certificate from which the sale was to take effect, and the fact that the latter did not exercise the option of calling upon the ex-proprietor to remove them suggests that he allowed them to stand subject to payment of reasonable ground rent. The structures and buildings remained on the land till the 11th March 1921 on which date the Collector took possession of the premises. In the absence of any arrangement which it was dearly the duty of the ex-proprietor to make with the purchaser for allowing the buildings and structures to remain on his land, I think we may reasonably assess the compensation at the rata of Rs. 100 par month.

    14. The result is that out of the compensation awarded for the structures and buildings, the appellants should be held entitled to the whole amount less a sum of Rs. 2,300 due to the respondent, as compensation for 23 months during which period the structures and buildings stood on the land. There is no controversy as to the rest of the compensation money, that is to say, that awarded for the land or the trees. The decree of the Court below is set aside, and in lieu thereof a decree will be drawn up declaring the plaintiff's title to the whole of the compensation awarded for the lands and trees and also to the sum of Rs. 2,300 stated above, out of the amount awarded in Land Acquisition Case No. D. 37/95-96 of 1920-1921 of the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector's Court at Alipore, and the rest will go to the defendants.

    15. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, and the proportion of success and defeat of the respective parties, I think the proper order to make is to allow proportionate costs in this Court as well as in the Court below.

    16. Decree set aside.

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    Jatindra Nath Roy Choudhury v. Narayan Das Khetry
    (Mar 12, 1925)