Mullick, J.:— In this case one Moni Lal was the proprietor of 101 bighas of land. In 1868 he gave a mokurrari pattah for this land to a gentleman named Macdonald at an annual rent of Rs. 303. In 1869 he executed a zurpeshgi mortgage in favour of the same gentleman for a principal sum of Rs. 5,050, it being stipulated that the mortgagee was to retain the whole of the mokurrari rent as interest. The mokurrari is now in the hands of one Basudeo Das. The zurpeshgidar's interest passed by sale first to one Gulam Hosain and then in 1897 to three persons named Debi Prasad, Koshilanand and Gulab Chand. In 1899 Debi Prasad and his cosharers sold the zurpeshgi to the father of the plaintiffs before us for a sum of Rs. 5,000. In the meantime the Survey and Settlement authorities had recorded the rent payable by the mokurraridar Basudeo as Rs. 335 instead of Re. 303. The vendors, when selling the zurpeshgi to the father of the plaintiffs, represented that they had been collecting at the rate of Rs. 335 from the mokurraridar and executed an ekrarnamah in which they agreed to indemnify the purchaser for the difference between Rs. 335 and Rs. 303 in the event of his failing to realise it from the mokurraridar. The mokurraridar refused to pay the enhancement and the purchaser was obliged to sue. In 1903 the mokurraridar's plea that his rent was Rs. 303 succeeded and the suit of the purchaser was dismissed. In 1917 the plaintiffs brought the present suit for the amount due to them from the defendants as the legal representatives of their father for the default of the mokurraridar at Rs. 32 per year in respect of the years 1911-1917. The claim for previous years was given up as barred by limitation.
2. The Subordinate Judge finds that the defendants who, are the sons and grandsons of the vendors, being governed by the law of the Mitakshara, are not liable to pay the claim out of the ancestral property and as there is no other property belonging to the vendors in their hands be has dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs accordingly ask us to exercise on revisional powers under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. It is clear that the contract made by the defendant father is not one that dies with the promiser and that it is enforceable against his legal representatives. The defendants are the promiser's legal representatives in respect of his self acquired property inherited by them but the finding of the Subordinate Judge is that there is no such property. In regard to ancestral property in their possession the defendants are under Section 53 of the CPC, the promiser's legal representatives only for debts payable by them under the Hindu law. It is either admitted or found that there was neither antecedent debt nor legal necessity to render the contract enforceable against the defendants. The learned vakil for the creditor, however contends that the contract created a suretyship for the payment of money and he relies on the Maharaja of Benares v. Ram Kumar Misr(1) and Rasik Lal Mandal v. Singheshwar Roy(2). In my opinion although a contrary view was taken in Hiralal Marwari v. Chandrabali Haldarin(3), a Hindu son or grandson governed by the Mitakshara law is liable for the debt of his father o; grandfather due on account of a surety ship for the payment of money. The weight of opinion in the High Courts of Bombay, Allahabad, Madras and Calcutta is to this effect.
3. The first question to be decided there fore is whether the contract in the casa now before us was really one of suretyship. Now the principles applied to cases under the law of contract for determining the difference between a contract of surety and a contract of indemnity appear to me to be of general application and although the English cases are more particularly concerned with the question whether a particular contract falls within S. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, still it seems to me that the conditions required by the English law and by the Indian Contract Act for a contract of suretyship are also required for such a contract in Hindu law. There must be a creditor, a principal debtor and a guarantor or surety, who makes himself liable for the liability of the principal debtor. The relationship may be established by an agreement between the principal debtor and the surety to which the creditor is a party. This it the relationship contemplated by Section 126 of the Contract Act. It may also be established by an agreement to which the creditor is not a party, where there is a collateral contract between the surety and the principal debtor that one of them shall be liable on the default of the other. This is the contract contemplated under Section 132 of the Contract Act. But where the contract between the surety and the creditor is not a collateral undertaking but creates an original liability as between these two parties, then the contract is not one of surety bub one of indemnity within the meaning of Section 124 of the Contract Act. The distinction was discussed in Harburg India Rubber Comb Co. v. Martin(4) and in that case Vaughan Williams, L.J, cited with approval the following observations of Davey, L.J, in Guild v. Conrad(5):
“In my opinion there is a plain distinction between a promise to pay the creditor if the principal debtor makes default in payment and a promise to keep a person who has entered or is shout to enter into a contract of liability indemnified against that liability independently of the question whether a third person makes default or not.”
4. Now what was the object of the guarantee in the present case? The mokurrari tenancy purchased by Basdeo was created long before the guarantee. The father of the plaintiffs was not in any way induced to do anything or to forbear from doing anything in connexion with the giving of that lease. That lease formed no part of the consideration of the assignment of the zurpeshgi between the vendor and the vendee. The guarantee; was given not with the object of benefiting the lessee, and securing payment of the rent due from him, but for providing an additional inducement to the vendee for purchasing the zarpeshgi. Incidentally the result of the guarantee may have been to benefit the lessee, but the primary object of the contract was not to answer for his debt or default. In my opinion therefore the contract in this case was not a contract of surety at all but a contract of indemnity. In a sense every contract of indemnity is a contract of guarantee. But, in my opinion, when the Hindu law enforces liability for the suretyship debts of the father, it contemplates suretyship of the same kind as the Contract Act. The argument therefore that the contrast being one made by the promiser as surety for the payment of money his sons and grandsons are liable in Hindu law, fails.
5. The learned vakil for the creditor however relies upon a much wider proposition, which is that under the Mitakshara law wherever the father has contracted a liability the son is bound by a pious obligation to discharge that liability out of the ancestral property in his hands, unless he can show that the liability was illegal or immoral. He contends that in the present case, unless it can be shown that the indemnity was illegal or immoral the plaintiffs are entitled to succeed and that it is wholly immaterial whether or not the transaction was for the benefit of the joint family. In my opinion this proposition is stated in too wide terms. The cases relating to the liability of a Hindu son have been reviewed by Mookerjee, J., in Chakouri Mahton v. Ganga Proshad(6). It has been held that the actual receipt of money by the father is not necessary. A contractual liability to pay money will constitute a debt which is enforceable against the son provided the transaction is neither illegal nor immoral and comes within the meaning of the term “Vyavaharika,” which has been, translated as lawful, usual or customary. Indeed the cases have gone so far as to hold that if the father is made liable for damages for breach of civil duty, then upon a decree made against the father the sons are liable to the extent of the ancestral property.
6. In the present case the indemnity given by the father would undoubtedly be enforceable against himself. If a decree upon it had been obtained against the father during his lifetime then it would be enforceable against the sons after his death provided it came within the list compiled by Mookerjee, J., in the abovementioned case. Here the liability will depend upon whether the act was lawful, usual or customary. The Subordinate Judge has not in terms said that the representation of the father that he had been collecting Rs. 335 per year from the lessee was false. If it was intentionally false and if it deceived the purchaser it might have rendered the father liable to prosecution for the offence of cheating. For myself, having regard to all the circumstances, I find it difficult to believe that it was true. The purchaser's failure to realize the enhanced rate by suit is strong evidence that the representation was not true and the view I take is that the purchaser did not honestly believe that the representation was true. Both parties knew that the true rent was Rs. 303. The purchaser was in no way deceived but intended to gamble on the chance of being able to realize the enhancement recorded by the Survey and Settlement Authorities. This conclusion is supported by the fact that while the original zurpeshgi was created in favour of Macdonald for a principal of Rs. 5,050 on the footing that the mokurrari rent was Rs. 303, the predecessor of the plaintiffs paid only Rs. 5,000 for it in spite of the rent being represented to be Rs. 335. I hold therefore that if the representation was intentionally false the liability created by the indemnity was immoral; if it was not intentionally false, the liability was not usual or customary and therefore not enforceable against the sons as a pious obligation, I agree that a mare error of judgment on the part of the father would not save the sons if the indemnity was in ordinary incident in the ownership of property. In Durbar Khachar v. Khachar Husur(7) it was held that a decree against the father for damages caused by the erection of a dam was not enforcible against the sons as a pious obligation. On the other hand in Khalilur Rahman v. Gobind Pershad(8) it was held that mere imprudence or unreasonableness will not be Sufficient.
7. As this would also seem to be the view taken by Mookerjee, J., in Chakouri Mahton v. Ganga Proshad, I think we must follow the Calcutta Court and judge the indemnity here by the test whether it was usual, that is to say whether it was one which an ordinary vendor might have been expected to give. Having regard to the state of the knowledge of parties and to the fact that the liability was indefinite and practically perpetual, my answer is in the negative. It might be urged that the liability was limited to the duration of the zurpeshgi but having regard to the fact that the zurpeshgi was created in 1869 and has not yet been redeemed, it may be regarded as practically perpetual. It is contended by the learned vakil for the plaintiffs that the indemnity was part of the consideration for the purchase-money and that as there has been failure of that consideration, the sons are liable to pay the present claim by way of partial refund of consideration money. The reply to this is that upon the facts I do not hold that the indemnity was any part of the consideration for the sale. In the view that I take it is not necessary to discuss at any length the contention of the defendants that an indemnity cannot create a debt. The indemnity in this case created a contractual liability to pay money on certain contingency. It is immaterial that the sum to be paid was not an ascertained sum but depended upon the extent of the moknrraridar's failure. In Pareman Dass v. Bhattu Mahton(9) the learned Judges did not dissent from the view that a right to damages for theft might create a debt. In my opinion such a right does create a debt whether the liability is based on a decree of Court or upon a contract.
8. But for the reasons given I am of opinion that the defendants are not liable to pay out of the ancestral property to which they have succeeded by survivor ship the debt created by the indemnity in the present case.
9. It is useless to give the plaintiffs a decree for execution against any other property, because the Subordinate Judge finds that there is no other property belonging to the promiser in the hands of the defendants. The application is therefore dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 80.
10. Thornhill, J.:— I concur.
V.S/R.K
11. Application dismissed.