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  • section 285 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882),
  • section 295 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882).
  • provisions of rule 11, Order XXXVIII
  • provisions of rule 57 of Order XXI
  • rule 57 of Order XXI, C.P.C,
  • rule 11, Order XXXVIII
  • Order XXXVIII, rule 11,
  • Rule 57 of Order XXI
  • rule 57, Order XXI,
  • rule 11 of Order
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 285 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882),
  • section 295 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882).
  • provisions of rule 11, Order XXXVIII
  • provisions of rule 57 of Order XXI
  • rule 57 of Order XXI, C.P.C,
  • rule 11, Order XXXVIII
  • Order XXXVIII, rule 11,
  • Rule 57 of Order XXI
  • rule 57, Order XXI,
  • rule 11 of Order
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a Second Appeal by the first defendant against concurrent decisions of the Subordinate Judge of Nadia and the Munsif of Ranaghat. The plaintiff sued for: (a) a declaration of title to certain land; (b) ejectment of the first defendant; and (c) setting aside the first defendant's purchase of the suit land on 12 May 1922, which purchase was made by the decree-holder in execution against the second defendant. The plaintiff's claim rests on an earlier private purchase by the plaintiff on 29 September 1921 from defendant No. 2.

The pivotal factual and procedural timeline (as stated in the opinion) is:

  • 10 Aug 1919: property attached before judgment;
  • 10 Jun 1920: decree passed in favour of decree-holder;
  • 9 Feb 1921: appeal from the decree dismissed;
  • 14 Jun 1921: decree-holder applied for execution;
  • 24 Jun 1921: fresh attachment in execution taken out;
  • 6 Sep 1921: the execution proceeding (arising from the 14 Jun application) was dismissed for default;
  • 19 Sep 1921: another application for execution was made;
  • 29 Sep 1921: date of the plaintiff's private purchase (critical date for dispute);
  • 3 Dec 1921: decree-holder again took out a fresh attachment;
  • 12 May 1922: property ultimately sold to decree-holder (sale under execution);
  • The first defendant is the heir of the decree-holder who bought in execution on 12 May 1922.

The courts below held that the original attachment before judgment had ceased to subsist by 29 September 1921 because the later reattachment (24 June 1921) fell under Rule 57 of Order XXI and ended when the execution application was dismissed on 6 September 1921.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on 29 September 1921 (the date of the plaintiff's purchase), the property was under an attachment that rendered the plaintiff's purchase subject to the decree-holder's rights.
  2. Whether an attachment before judgment subsists for the purposes of a subsequent execution when, after that attachment, an application for execution is brought and later dismissed for default — specifically, whether Rule 57 of Order XXI applies to attachments before judgment.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant-Appellant's Arguments

  • Relied principally on the decision in Ganesh Chandra Adak v. Banwari Lal Ray, which the appellant says supports the proposition that an attachment before judgment subsists for the purpose of a subsequent execution even if an initial execution application has been dismissed for default.
  • Contended that Rule 57 of Order XXI does not apply to an order for attachment before judgment.

Respondent's Arguments

  • That by reattaching in execution the decree-holder had waived or abandoned the prior attachment before judgment.
  • That the attachment before judgment merged into the subsequent attachment in execution, and thus became subject to the infirmities (e.g., dismissal under Rule 57) applicable to the latter.
  • That, properly construed, Rule 57 of Order XXI causes an attachment before judgment to come to an end when the application for execution is dismissed under that rule.
  • That because, under the first application for execution, a sale of the property had been held (though not completed by a sale-certificate), the effect of that sale was to convert the attachment before judgment into an attachment in execution (relying on Arunachalam Chetty v. Periasami Servai).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ganesh Chandra Adak v. Banwari Lal Ray Held that an attachment before judgment subsists for the purpose of a subsequent execution even though the first application for execution was dismissed; Rule 57 of Order XXI does not apply to attachment before judgment. The Court followed this decision as correct and controlling; Rankin, C.J. approved Ganesh Chandra and declined to send the matter to a Full Bench. The Court relied on this case to hold that the earlier attachment continued to subsist despite the dismissal of an execution application.
Meyyappa Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar (Full Bench, Madras) Represented the contrary view in which the majority held that dismissing an execution application under Rule 57 affected a prior attachment (the decision was treated as conflicting with Ganesh Chandra). The Court considered the Full Bench decision carefully but concluded that the dissenting judgments in that case (Schawbe, C.J. and Wallis, J.) were persuasive only in result; overall, the Court did not follow the Madras majority and rejected the view that Rule 57 applies to attachments before judgment.
Arunachalam Chetty v. Periasami Servai Cited by respondents for the proposition that an attempted sale under an execution application could convert or treat the attachment before judgment as an attachment in execution. The Court rejected the respondents' reliance on this point, holding that an ineffective sale under an execution application does not render Rule 57 applicable to an attachment before judgment and that this argument ignored the scope and purpose of Rule 57.
Ramkrishna Das Surrowji v. Surfunnissa Begum Referred to historical practice where parties reattached in execution though an attachment before judgment was subsisting. The Court noted the practice was referred to by the Judicial Committee and used this to show that reattachment in execution has historically occurred; it was relied on to reject the thesis that reattachment necessarily constitutes abandonment of a prior attachment.
Bhugwan Chunder Kritiratna v. Chundra Mala Gupta Considered for its treatment of wording in prior Codes (section 285, Civil Procedure Code 1882) about attachments and the comparability of attachments before judgment and after decree. The Court (Mukerji, J.) observed this decision's limited relevance: the wording and statutory context differed and the decision did not bear directly on the present Rule 57 question.
Sewdut Roy v. Sree Canto Maity Used to show that upon an application for execution being made, an attachment effected before judgment could be regarded as an attachment in execution for certain purposes (in older Code provisions). The Court accepted that the two attachments might be treated on the same footing for some statutory purposes, but refused the leap that all incidents of attachments must be identical; it declined to treat this precedent as mandating Rule 57's application to attachments before judgment.
Protap Chandra Gope v. Sarat Chandra Gangopadhyaya Remarks (not central to its decision) suggesting that revival of execution does not revive an attachment before judgment so as to prejudice intervening purchasers. The Court treated remarks in this case as obiter and noted the case did not directly involve attachment-before-judgment questions relevant to Rule 57; thus it did not persuade the Court to depart from Ganesh Chandra.
Patringa Koer v. Madhava Nand Ram and Mahabharat Dutta v. Surja Kanta De Referenced by a judge in prior obiter comments (relating to revival of execution and attachment-before-judgment consequences). The Court noted these cases did not address the dismissal-for-default scenario under Rule 57 and therefore had no direct bearing on the present contention that dismissal under Rule 57 affects an attachment before judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds from a close reading of the statutory rules and the historical purpose behind them, applied to the concrete timeline of attachments and execution applications in this case.

Key elements of the Court's step-by-step reasoning (as expressed by Rankin, C.J., and concurred in by Mukerji, J.) are:

  1. Purpose and scope of Rule 57, Order XXI: The Court examined Rule 57 (introduced in 1908) and determined its principal object was to deal with the frequent practical problem arising where, after an attachment in execution, an application for execution cannot be proceeded with because of the decree-holder's default. Rule 57 was intended to require courts to either adjourn to a definite date or dismiss the execution application, thereby preventing informal "striking off" of execution petitions and the legal uncertainty that practice produced.
  2. Narrow construction of "attached in execution": Given that Rule 57 was directed at attachments in execution (i.e., those made upon an application for execution), the Court concluded that its last sentence (which specifies the effect of dismissal on an attachment made under that application) is aimed at attachments made in execution and was not intended to encompass an attachment that existed before any execution application was made (an attachment before judgment).
  3. Relation with Rule 11, Order XXXVIII: The argument that Rule 11 (that "it shall not be necessary upon an application for execution to apply for a reattachment of the property") converts an existing attachment-before-judgment into an attachment in execution (for all purposes) was rejected. The Court held that Rule 11 does not provide a textual or contextual basis for reading "attached in execution" under Rule 57 to include attachments before judgment.
  4. Reattachment does not imply abandonment: The Court rejected the proposition that a decree-holder who reattaches in execution is thereby taken to have waived or abandoned the earlier attachment before judgment. There was no evidence of express abandonment and it would ordinarily be contrary to the decree-holder's interest to abandon a right. The Court held there is no general rule of law that doing something unnecessary must be taken as abandonment of an existing right.
  5. Doctrine of merger not applicable: The Court declined to adopt a doctrine of merger by which an earlier attachment would be subsumed into, and lose its characteristics because of, a later attachment in execution. The Court held that the effect of two attachments is simply that the property is under attachment, and a person entitled to the benefit of either attachment remains so entitled absent abandonment.
  6. Ineffective sale under execution does not convert prior attachment's character: The Court further held that an unsuccessful or ineffective sale held under an execution application does not operate to make Rule 57 applicable to an attachment before judgment. While Rule 11 may prevent a sale in execution from being said to be without any basis, this does not alter the purpose of Rule 57 or that Rule's targeted application.
  7. Precedential alignment: On these bases the Court considered the earlier decision in Ganesh Chandra Adak (which held attachments before judgment subsist for the purposes of subsequent execution despite dismissal of an execution application) to be correctly decided and binding in this context; the Court therefore declined a Full Bench reference and allowed the appeal.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED

Holding (core ruling): The Court allowed the first defendant's Second Appeal. Judgment was entered for defendant No. 1 with costs in all courts against the plaintiff. The Court held that an attachment before judgment which was made on 10 August 1919 continued to subsist on 29 September 1921 (the date of the plaintiff's purchase), and that Rule 57 of Order XXI does not apply so as to terminate that pre-existing attachment merely because an intervening execution application had been dismissed for default.

Implications:

  • The direct practical effect is that the plaintiff's purchase of 29 September 1921 was subject to the earlier attachment and therefore the decree-holder's later acquisition (and the first defendant as heir) prevailed; judgment accordingly was entered for the defendant No. 1.
  • The Court affirmed and applied the principle in Ganesh Chandra Adak v. Banwari Lal Ray; it declined to treat the matter as requiring a Full Bench reference and thereby maintained the existing line of authority on this point within this Court.
  • Beyond the parties, the opinion clarifies the Court's interpretation of the scope and purpose of Rule 57 of Order XXI and distinguishes attachments before judgment from attachments made in execution for the precise purpose of Rule 57; no novel broad principle altering prior law was announced beyond reaffirming Ganesh Chandra's position and explaining the statutory purpose behind Rule 57.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion text and contains no information or interpretation beyond that opinion.

    Shibnath Singh Ray v. Sheikh Saberuddin Ahmed

    Rankin, C.J:— This is a Second Appeal by the first defendant from the concurrent decisions of the Subordinate Judge of Nadia and the Munsif of Ranaghat.

    The plaintiff's suit was for a declaration of title to certain land, for ejectment of the first defendant and for setting aside the purchase of the suit land by the first defendant on the 12th May, 1922, in execution of a decree against the second defendant. The plaintiff's claim is rested on a prior purchase made by him at a private sale on the 29th of September, 1921, from defendant No. 2.

    The question between the parties turns upon whether or not, on the date of the plaintiff's purchase, the property was under attachment. The material dates are as follows:—

    The property was attached before judgment on the 10th of August, 1919; a decree was passed on the 10th of June, 1920; an appeal from the decree was dismissed on the 9th of February, 1921; the decree-holder applied for execution on the 14th of June, 1921; and took out a fresh attachment on the 24th of June, 1921; this execution proceeding was ultimately dismissed for default on the 6th of September, 1921; another application for execution was made on the 19th of that month.

    This was the position on the date of the plaintiff's purchase. After the plaintiff's purchase, the decree-holder again took out a fresh attachment on the 3rd of December, 1921, and the property was ultimately sold to the decree-holder on the 12th of May, 1922. The first defendant is the heir of the decree-holder.

    Now the question is whether the attachment before judgment made on the 10th of August, 1919, was subsisting on the 29th of September, 1921, notwithstanding that the application for execution brought on the 14th of June, 1921, had been dismissed for default on the 6th of September. The courts below have held that the attachment before judgment had by that time ceased to exist, that there had been a reattachment on the 24th of June, 1921, which, under Rule 57 of Order XXI, C.P.C, came to an end when the application for execution was dismissed on the 6th of September.

    The defendant-appellant relies upon the case of Ganesh Chandra Adak v. Banwari Lal Ray. It does not appear from the report of that case that after the attachment before judgment the property had been reattached in execution. But it was held that an attachment before judgment subsists for the purpose of a subsequent execution, notwithstanding that the first application for execution has been dismissed. It was said that the provisions of Rule 57 of Order XXI have no application to a case in which an order for attachment before judgment has been obtained. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended, first, that by reattaching in execution, the decree-holder has waived or abandoned the attachment before judgment; secondly, that the attachment before judgment merges in the subsequent attachment; thirdly, that, on a true construction of rule 57, Order XXI, an attachment before judgment comes to an end when the application for execution is dismissed under that rule; fourthly, that in the present case, under the first application for execution a sale of the property had been held, though this did not ultimately proceed to completion by sale certificate and that the effect of that sale was to make the attachment before judgment an attachment in execution: Arunachalam Chetty v. Periasami Servai.

    On the third of these propositions, it is contended that Ganesh Chandra's case, supra, was wrongly decided and that the decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Meyyappa Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar, should be followed; This is a substantial point and we must carefully consider whether we ought to dissent from Ganesh Chandra's case and refer this matter to a Full Bench.

    In my opinion the decision in Ganesh Chandra's case was right and I agree in the result arrived at by the dissenting judgments of Schawbe, C.J and Wallis, J. in Meyyappa's case, supra, though not in all the arguments which were adduced by them. Rule 57 of Order XXI was a new provision introduced in 1908. It is evident from the language of the rule itself, and it is still more evident from the circumstances under which it was passed, that it was intended to provide a remedy for the grievance or inconvenience which is apt to arise, where, after an attachment in execution, the application for execution cannot further be proceeded with by reason of the decree-holder's default. This was, and still is, a very common case. The decree-holder makes some informal arrangement to give the judgment-debtor time without obtaining full satisfaction of the decree; the application for execution is not further prosecuted; it is not withdrawn; neither party attends. In these circumstances, the object of the rule is to say that the court must make either an order for adjournment or an order of dismissal. The reason why it was necessary to require the court, if it did not adjourn a proceeding to a definite date, to dismiss the application for execution formally and definitely can be amply illustrated from the decided cases. In the absence of a definite order of dismissal the files of the Courts became encumbered with a number of applications for execution which were water-logged and derelict, and a, practice arose whereby such applications were ordered to be “struck off.” This was a practice not justified by the Code and in cases where attachments in execution had already been ordered, the question arose whether the effect of an order “striking off” was that the attachment made upon application for execution was itself struck off or whether it remained notwithstanding such an order. Many other awkward and important questions arose out of this practice and the object of rule 57 was to ensure that this illogical and inconvenient practice should be stopped. Applications for execution were to be definitely dismissed if they were not adjourned to a future date. The object of the last sentence in rule 57 is to settle the question, whether, when the application in execution is dismissed, any attachment, made under that application should fall to the ground or should subsist, and the legislature has provided that it is to fall to the ground. In these circumstances, it seems reasonably clear to me that it is no part of the intention of this rule to say that an attachment before judgment, which existed, before any application could be made in execution, and which prima facie would continue to have effect if no application for execution had been made, should fall to the ground merely because a subsequent application for execution has come to nothing. I quite agree with Courts-Trotter, J., that this is not a question of giving a strict construction to a penal provision. Still the phrase “attached in execution of a decree” can only be extended beyond its proper meaning by reason of an implication required by the object of the rule or else by showing very clearly that it is required by some other rule of a germane character. Prima facie the “mischief” of the rule involves no reference to attachments before judgment. A perusal of the judgments in the Madras case does not disclose to me any ground upon which it could be held that unless upon the dismissal for default of an application for execution the attachment before judgment shall come to an end the true intention of any other rule is interfered with. Indeed I do not gather that any of the judgments of the Judges who formed the majority in that case claims that any other rule necessitates this for its own sake. What is argued is that they throw light upon the meaning of rule 57. In this way they attribute to rule 57 a meaning which is foreign to its purpose.

    Again by rule 11 of Order XXXVIII, it is provided that “it shall not be necessary upon an application for execution to apply for a reattachment of the property.” From this it is contended that, upon an application for execution being made, the attachment before judgment becomes an attachment in execution and nothing more, so as to be subject to all the infirmities of an attachment in execution. Doctrines of merger and other theories are ingrafted upon the simple language of the Code that it shall not be necessary to reattach. By reason of this provision no execution based upon an attachment before judgment can be distinguished in validity or character from an execution based upon an attachment in execution unless indeed some particular enactment can be seen to be addressed to this distinction. There is, however, nothing in rule 11, Order XXXVIII to give colour to the view that for the purposes of rule 57, Order XXI “attached in execution” is a phrase which covers attachment before judgment.

    Upon the third contention of the plaintiff-respondent, I am, therefore, of opinion that the decision of this Court in Ganesh Chandra's case, supra, was correct and that there is no necessity to send this matter to a Full Bench.

    As regards the other contentions, it seems to me that they have little substance. At one time it was the practice to reattach in execution, although an attachment before judgment was subsisting. In Ramkrishna Das Surrowji v. Surfunnissa Begum, this practice was referred to by the Judicial Committee. The question is whether a reattachment in execution, notwithstanding the terms of Order XXXVIII, rule 11, is of itself a waiver or abandonment of the attachment before judgment. I can see no ground for saying as a proposition of law that a man who does something which is not necessary must be taken to abandon any right. In this case there is neither an express abandonment nor any reason to suppose that abandonment was intended. It was indeed manifestly contrary to the interest of the decree-holder.

    As regards the contention that the attachment before judgment merges in the subsequent attachment, and, therefore, becomes subject to all the infirmities of the subsequent attachment, I respectfully differ from the opinion expressed by Ramesam, J. in the Madras case (1). The effect of two attachments on the same property is merely that the property is under attachment, no doubt, but a person entitled to the benefit of either one of the attachments remains, in the absence of abandonment, entitled to it. No doctrine of merger seems to me to be in point.

    As regards the respondent's fourth point, I fail to see why, because an ineffective sale was held under the first application for execution, it can be contended that the provisions of Rule 57 of Order XXI become applicable to an attachment before judgment. The provisions of rule 11, Order XXXVIII may well operate to prevent its being said that a sale in execution of a decree is without any basis of attachment in execution, even although the decree-holder has availed himself in execution of the attachment before judgment. This, argument appears to me to be subject to the same objection as applies to many of the arguments adduced in the judgments in Meyyappa's case. It ignores the scope and purpose of the rule which is to be interpreted, namely Rule 57 of Order XXI.

    In my opinion this appeal should be allowed and judgment entered for the defendant No. 1 with costs in all courts against the plaintiff.

    Mukerji, J.:— I fully concur and desire to add a few words as regards the three cases of this Court upon which reliance has been placed on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent to induce us to dissent from the view taken in the case of Ganesh Chandra Adak v. Banwari Lal Ray. One of those cases in Bhugwan Chunder Kritiratna v. Chundra Mala Gupta*. In that case the question that arose was whether, under section 285 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), the court, which attached the property under execution before judgment, ranked with a court which attached it after decree, in the application of that section and it was held that it did. The only relevancy of this decision is that in the section aforesaid the words “has been attached in execution “occurred, which, however, have been altered to “is under execution” in the corresponding section, namely section 63 of the present Code, for reasons which have no bearing upon the present question. The next case is Sewdut Roy v. Sree Canto Maity, which only favours the view that, on an application for execution being made, attachment effected before judgment became an attachment in execution for the purposes of section 295 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). The two attachments may be treated as on the same footing and persons who are affected by such attachments may be in the same position so long as the attachments subsist, but from that it hardly follows that all the incidents relating thereto must necessarily be identical. Indeed the Code itself treats them as different in several important respects. As regards the remarks of Mookerjee, J. in the third case, on which reliance has been placed, namely, that of Protap Chandra Gope v. Sarat Chandra Gangopadhyaya, they appear to be obiter, as the case itself was one in which no question of attachment before judgment arose. The remarks are in these words: “In of attachment before judgment, the general rule applies that a revival of execution proceedings does not operate as a revival of the attachment so as to prejudice the rights of strangers who have, in the interval, acquired a title to the property.” Patringa Koer v. Madhava Nand Ram and Mahabharat Dutta v. Surja Kanta De. The remarks do not necessarily indicate that an attachment before judgment falls with the dismissal of an execution petition for default, and the cases on which they purport to rely had nothing to do with such an attachment. In this Court, the case of Ganesh Chandra Adak v. Banwari Lal Ray, does not appear to have been dissented from. I have carefully read the judgments of the learned-judges of other Courts who have taken a different view, but I am not convinced that we should dissent from the view that has been uniformly taken by this Court for a fairly long time.

    S.M
    Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Shibnath Singh Ray v. Sheikh Saberuddin Ahmed
    (Jun 22, 1928)