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    T. B. K. Viswanathaswami Naiker v. Kamulu Ammal

    The Chief Justice. — We have had some doubt as to what is the proper course (or us to adopt in this case. But we have come to the conclusion that it is desirable that we should have before us, in dealing with the appeal, the evidence which the learned Subordinate Judge thought he ought to exclude with reference to the custom which the plaintiff sought to establish at the trial of this suit. Now it may well be, as Mr. Visvanadhier, the learned Subordinate Judge before whom the case came in its earlier stages, observed in his order of the 22nd July 1904, that the custom referred to in paragraph 4 of the plaint could not be construed as referring to the custom which the Judge describes in the earlier part of his order. If we turn to the plaint we find certain allegations of fact in paragraph 3, but no allegation as to the legal results that flow from these facts if the facts were established by evidence. We have no reference to the custom in paragraph 3. In paragraph 4 we have a reference to an alleged custom obtaining among the caste and to an alleged custom obtaining in the Zamindary. And, as I have said, it may very well be that the custom which was present to the mind of the pleader who drafted this plaint was a custom as alleged in paragraph 4 and not a custom in connection with the allegations made in paragraph 3.

    No doubt, as a general rule, a party who relies upon a custom must allege it with distinctness and certainty. Speaking for myself, however, I do not think it is possible or desirable in all cases in this country to pin the parties down to the precise form of their pleadings. If we were to deal with this question, having regard to the precise form of the pleadings, I feel bound to confess that one would have considerable difficulty in adopting a view different from that taken by Mr. Visvanadhier.

    When we turn to the course which events took at the trial we find that the 18th witness for the plaintiff on the 8th April 1904 gave evidence in support of the custom upon which the plaintiff now relies and no objection was taken to that evidence. On the 14th July another witness gave evidence in support of the custom and no objection was taken to it. It was not until the 15th July when the 26th wit ness for the plaintiff gave evidence that ‘a Kambala can take as his wife a virgin without marriage rites’ that objection was taken on behalf of the 1st defendant to the admissibility of this evidence on the ground that it was “beyond the scope of the case in the face of the wording of the second issue” and that objection was upheld. I do not suggest, of course, that because the defendant did not object to the evidence of the witness given in April he was estopped from objecting to the evidence to a similar effect given by another witness in July. But it seems to me, in deciding whether in the exercise of the discretion we shall have this further evidence it is material to observe that some two months before the evidence was given to which the defendant objected, evidence was given in the suit to the same effect without any exception being taken to it on behalf of the defendant. Now the actual form of the second issue as it now stands is:

    “Whether the arrangement set up in paragraph 3 of the plaint is true, and “whether such an arrangement in the absence of the factum of marriage, will “give the 4th defendant the status of a wife.”

    It is common ground that the expression ‘factum of marriage’ means ceremonies—marriage ceremonies in connection with the alleged marriage. As I observed, I have no doubt as a matter of scientific pleading this issue and the allegation in the plaint on which the issue is based ought to have contained particulars of the custom upon which the plaintiff sought to rely at the trial. There, can, I think, be no question that the words in themselves are wide enough to render evidence of the alleged custom admissible. Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar, who contended that we ought not to interfere with the order made by the Subordinate Judge referred us to a recent appeal to the Privy Council from Burma Ma Wun Di v. Ma Kin, and he called our attention to an observation made by their Lordships on page 242 with reference to a similar question. The observations are in these terms:

    “Whether the third issue in the suit was, in its terms, susceptible of the wider “construction thus suggested for it or not, the parties, by their conduct of the “case, have construed it in the narrower sense of assuming the existence of a “marriage.”

    As Mr. Rangachariar pointed out, this case cannot be regarded as on all fours with the case before us, because in the Burma case it was at the latest stage of the proceedings that the question came before the Privy Council—the question as to whether the parties could treat an issue as having a certain meaning and whether it was capable of that meaning in view of the fact that the issue had been construed in another and narrow sense at the earlier stage of the proceedings. But here the question has arisen at an earlier stage, namely, on appeal before us from the decision of the Subordinate judge declining to admit certain evidence.

    On the whole, we have come to the conclusion that it is desirable that the plaintiff should have an opportunity of adducing the evidence which the learned Subordinate Judge thought he ought to exclude. The case will therefore go back to the Subordinate Judge for a finding on the following issue:

    “Is there a custom among the Kambala caste which would create the “relationship of husband and wife without any marriage ceremony by the mere “fact of a Kambala taking a virgin of another sect into his family as his wife and “treating her as his wife, and which would give their offspring the same rights as “those of the offspring of a couple who have gone through a marriage ceremony.”

    The plaintiff will be at liberty to adduce additional evidence and the defendants will also be at liberty to adduce evidence with regard to this issue.

    Our order is of course without prejudice to the question as to the validity of the custom, if proved. The findings should be returned in six weeks and seven days will be allowed for objections.

    Ayling, J.—I agree.

    [In compliance with the above order the Subordinate Judge of Madura returned a finding that the custom set up namely of a Kambala bringing a virgin of another caste and living with her as wife and treating her as his wife, was neither a definite nor an ancient one, was not proved to be regarded as a proper one by the community, and was not plural or uniform and that he was unable to accept the nine instances referred to before him as sufficient to prove a custom, as instances of such unions having been challenged and recognized were almost wanting],

    [The appeal was then heard by Miller and Abdur Rahim, JJ.]

    JUDGMENT

    Miller, J.—The appellant is the son of the late Zamindar of Bodinayakanur who died on the 15th of December 1888. The principal question which we have to decide is whether his mother Karuppayee, the 4th defendant in the suit, was married to the Zemindar or not. The Subordinate Judge has found that she was not married, and I concur in that conclusion. It is conceded that there were no marriage ceremonies performed; it is conceded that there are ceremonies ordinarily in use in Kumbala caste to which the Zemindar belonged. The lady was a lady of a different caste—of the Marava caste—the daughter—so far as we know—of an agriculturist who lived in the town of Bodinayakanur. It is conceded that there is a secondary form of marriage which in Ramasami Kamaya Naik v. Sundaralingasami Kamaya Naik, was found to be a legal marriage in this caste in the Saptur Zemindary; and it is conceded that that form of marriage was not made use of on the occasion of the union of the Zemindar and the 4th defendant. What is alleged is that there was a marriage by mutual consent of both parties. The lady said that she would not go and live with the Zemindar, if he did not make her his wife, and the Zemindar agreed to take her as a wife. Now it was suggested—and a finding was called for on the point—that by the custom of the caste to which the Zemindar belonged, such as agreement amounts to a lawful marriage. The Subordinate Judge has found against the existence of the custom, and we are not asked to reverse that finding. So we have it, that there is no custom of the caste by which marriage by mutual consent is marriage; and we are driven to look in the law laid down in Shastras for some form of marriage by mutual consent which might be applied to this case. But it is necessary first to find that the agreement alleged by the lady is proved, and 1 am unable to differ from the Subordinate Judge's finding that that agreement is not proved. Immediately after the Zemindar's death, steps were taken by the Collector of the District, as is usually the case on such occasions, to ascertain facts in relation to succession and so forth of the Zemindary. On that occasion, as Exhibit I shows, this lady, the 4th defendant, made no claim of any sort to be the wife of the Zemindar. The Tahsildar in the Deputy Collector's presence took a statement from her, in which she did not say she was the Zemindar's wife, and before the Collector she made no claim of any sort to succession on behalf of her son. Now it seems to me that that could hardly have been her attitude at that time, if, as a matter of fact, some years before, she had insisted on being made a wife before she would consent to enter the palace at all. Consequently it seems to me that Exhibit I, and also Exhibit II, in which she did not hesitate to describe herself not as a wife, but as Bhogastri, are strongly against the alleged agreement. No doubt it is suggested that the term “Bhogastri” found in Exhibit II may be used to denote a married woman or wife and that was so in the Saptur Zemindary case: Ramasami Kamaya Naik v. Sundaralingasami Kamaya Naik. But here it seems to me that the lady's own evidence shows that she did not regard this word Bhogasiri as meaning a wife. She would resent being called Bhogasiri. It is pretty clear that at the time of the Zemindar's death she made no claim of any sort to be his wife.

    Now as to the evidence in support of the agreement: The agreement is supported by evidence which I cannot regard as of any very great value. The plaintiff's 1st witness who was employed in the Zemindary; the plaintiff's 2nd witness who is the 4th defendant herself; the plaintiff's 4th witness who is the 4th defendant's cousin; the plaintiff's 5th witness who was a servant of the Zemindar; the plaintiff's 6th witness who was also a servant of the Zemindar—those are the persons who allege this agreement between the Zemindar and the 4th defendant, and none of them, it seems to me, is a person who can be trusted in this matter. The plaintiff's 1st witness might have known the circumstance when he was a storekeeper under the Zemindar; but he is not a person entitled to special credit, and there is no doubt that there are ways of obtaining evidence, in suits of this kind as in others, which have to be taken into consideration in judging the credibility of witnesses. The 2nd witness is the 4th defendant herself, and I am afraid that her statement on the subject cannot be relied on, having regard to Exhibit I and seeing how deeply interested she is in the result. The 4th witness is her cousin and the 5th witness is a petty servant of the Zemindar whose evidence cannot be said to be of very great value. The 6th witness is a servant of the Zemindar, of, perhaps, some higher status; but he is also a defaulting tenant of the 1st defendant: and that might have induced him to give evidence for the plaintiff. So that there is no direct evidence of any very great value on this point—none, certainly, sufficient to counteract that afforded by the strong fact that the lady never alleged a marriage at the time at which she might have been expected to do so, when upon it depended the right of her son to succeed as the son of the Zamindar, immediately after his death. So that I have no hesitation in finding that that agreement is not proved by this evidence. That being so, it is unnecessary to say whether I should have to hold that the Gandharva marriage by mutual consent would be a legal marriage between the Zemindar and the 4th defendant. There was no such marriage. The lady was taken into the palace under circumstances which have not been proved by any direct evidence, unless I accept the defence evidence that she was abducted without the knowledge of her family, but it is unnecessary for me to say anything about that.

    The lady not being married, the case of her son, the plaintiff, must be treated upon the footing that he was the illegitimate son of a continuous concubine of the Zemindar.

    Then we come to another question of fact which is to be decided, and that is, whether the family of the Zemindar was divided or not. It is perhaps really not necessary to decide it; because, if the family were divided, then it seems to me, on the decision in Parvathi v. Thirumalai, the plaintiff would be excluded by the widow if the family were not divided, then it seems to me, our decision must be that the plaintiff would be excluded by the 5th defendant. However, the Subordinate Judge has gone into the question, and it may be desirable to decide it on the evidence. I am of opinion that it has been rightly decided by the Subordinate Judge that division is not made out. But before I go on to say anything about this evidence, I ought to refer to some evidence on the question of marriage which I forgot to deal with just now: some circumstantial evidence relied upon by the plaintiff. Once we find that the terms of an agreement are not proved by the direct evidence, and that there is no custom in the caste of marriage by mere consent, then circumstantial evidence cannot go far to prove such a marriage in this case. The evidence is evidence of treatment of the 4th defendant and her son mostly during the life of the Zemindar, and might no doubt, standing alone, be used as an indication of a legally valid marriage in due form. But we know that there was no marriage in due form, that is, in any of the customary forms in the caste, and the evidence of treatment could only go to show that the Zemindar and his people believed that his union with the 4th defendant was a valid marriage. Considered in that light, the evidence of treatment is really of no great value in this case. But I may say generally that I agree in the finding of the Subordinate Judge that it does not show what it is intended to show. The plaintiff could show no more than that he was treated with affection and his mother was treated with affection and consideration by the Zemindar during his lifetime, and there is nothing incompatible in this evidence with the position of the lady as a favoured concubine and the mother of the Zemindar's only son. Two circumstances to which the Subordinate Judge refers— circumstances which occurred after the death of the Zemindar, the alleged putting of new clothes upon the 4th defendant immediately after the Zemindar's death and the throwing of earth upon the grave by the plaintiff—might point to the recognition of the 4th defendant by the family as the widow of the Zemindar, but upon these points there is a conflict of evidence, and it is not satisfactorily proved that either of those things was done, and even the circumstantial evidence is not all in the plaintiff's favour. We find that in the Zemindary accounts the lady is referred to simply by her name ‘Karuppayee’ and not with any of the courtesy titles which the Subordinate Judge points out are usually accorded in the Zemindary documents to the wives of the Zemindars. So all the circumstances are not in her favour; and on the whole, as I have said, I can attach little value to this evidence as evidence of the agreement which forms the only marriage alleged.

    Now to return to the question of division, it is not alleged that any partition of the property was made at any particular time. All that was alleged are certain circumstances such as separate residence and separate holding of property by different branches of the family. The branches lived in different houses but in the same compound. That, I think, is not evidence of division. Then it is said that they owned separate properties of the Zemindar; but all that that means, so far as I understand the evidence, is that some members of the family held, under the Court of Wards, or under the Zemindar, portions of the pannai lands, not as having been divided into shares as their own property, but as lessees. That could hardly prove division. There are two judgments in suits to which the 1st defendant was a party and in which she alleged division, and the Judge then held that the Zemindar was divided from his uncles. It was to the interest of the 1st defendant to allege it then, and I do not think those judgments are of any very great value in this case. On the other hand there is Exhibit 42 which shows that there was no division at its date, viz., the 1st November 1862. One member of the family, Vadamalai Muthu Naiker, was living separately, and the others were all living together as one family. That was in 1862 and there is no evidence of any partition thereafter. Surely if there had been a partition among the various branches of the Bodinayakanur Zemin family after 1862, there must have been some record of it. Then it is said that allowances which had been given by the Zemindar to members of the family were withheld by him in some case. There is evidence suggesting that the Zemindar was displeased with his relations, and he might have withheld the allowances on that account, and the fact that they did not go into Court and sue for them seems hardly to justify the conclusion that there must have been a division long before; though it may be some evidence in favour of it, is not enough to turn the scale in the plaintiff's favour. And, further, supposing that the evidence of separate holding of lands were taken in favour of the plaintiff as showing division of those lands (though I think that is not so here), even then that would not be enough to show that as regards the Zemindary itself there was a division. There is certainly no evidence in this case that there was any division of the Zemindary —that the Zemindary was made to form a share of the family property before that time and was allotted to any one branch of the family—or that, in any way there was a separation in regard to the enjoyment of the Zemindary among the co-parceners. The Subordinate Judge has examined the documentary evidence and he has come to the conclusion that there was no division. His judgment is full on the subject and it is not necessary that I should discuss those documents in detail. Once it is shown—and I think it is shown by Exhibit 42—that there was no division in 1862, it seems to me that much stronger evidence that we have in this case is wanted to show that a division was made between the co-parceners after that time.

    Holding, then, with the Subordinate Judge, that there was no division, it remains to be seen, what is the position of the plaintiff, as the illegitimate son of the Zemindar, in an undivided family. Now there is a decision in Parvathi v. Thirumalai, which is directly in point. There it was held that in the case of impartible property the widow excludes the illegitimate son, and where the property is separate property, both the widow and the illegitimate son would be entitled to have a share in such property. Now the contention on behalf of the appellant was that that decision was shaken by the decision of the Privy Council in Jogendro Bhupati Hurrochundra Mahapatra v. Nityanand Man Sing. In a later case in this Court no doubt it was said that that decision was some what shaken inasmuch as it expressed some doubt as to the correctness of the decision in Jogendro Bhuputi v. Nittyanund Man Singh(3), which was upheld by the Privy Council. That it has ever actually been overruled is certainly not the case, and in this Court in Karuppa Goundan v. Kumarasami Goundan(4), it was pointed out that the Privy Council case might properly be confined to its own facts, the case of the succession of an illegitimate son to the share of his legitimate half brother. There was a legitimate son and an illegitimate son of the same father and the Privy Council held that they were co-parceners. But in I.L.R, 25 Mad., 429 it was pointed out that the decision stopped there and need not be extended so as to involve a co-parcenary in the other collateral relations. Now 25 Mad., 429 is a case which is binding on us, and, if I may say so, it seems to me, that it is a proper interpretation of the Privy Council's decision, and that their Lordships did not intend to decide anything that was unnecessary for the purpose of deciding the question before them. Then we have some decisions of this Court as regards collaterals, that the illegitimate son is not entitled to succession in competition with them. There is the case to which I have referred and I.L.R, 27 Mad., 32, which no doubt is a case of partible property. But 1 shall show at once that that can make no difference.

    So far as joint family property goes in this Presidency, the decision in the Privy Council case does not prevent us from following the decisions of this Court that an illegitimate son is excluded by his father's co-parceners. Now Mr. Rangachariar contends that we ought not to treat the property as joint property, but that since the decision in Sartaj Kuari's case, an impartible Zemindari has come to be held to be the separate property of the Zemindar; and we must so treat it; the Zemindari in this case descends by lineal primogeniture, and the plaintiff though illegitimate is a son; and it is only in the absence of sons that we need look for any other heir; on these grounds we ought to decide that the son is entitled to succeed to his father in preference to the widow or co-parceners. But the rule, as I understand it, when we have to look for the heir to an impartible Zemindary, is to see what the law of succession would be if the property were partible, with reference to the nature of the property, as ancestral or separate, and choose the successor accordingly, and if the successors would be the whole joint family, select one of the members by applying the rule of primogeniture or whatever it be, applicable to the particular case. Now if that is so,—no decision has been cited to us which shows that it is not—if we are to have regard to the nature of the property and see what would happen in the case of partible property, then there can be no doubt, according to the decisions of this Court, that the plaintiff is excluded by his father's co-parceners. All the cases which have been cited to us by Mr. Rangachariar as showing that there is no co-parcenery, properly speaking, in a case where the property is impartible, as indicating that we ought to treat this as the separate property of the Zemindar, do not, in any way, deal with or depart from the rule which is to be adopted in looking for a successor to the Zemindar. There is, it may be, no real, at any rate, no effective co-parcenery in the case of an impartible estate; no effective interest in any collateral member of the family during the lifetime of the Zemindar. That may be the effect of the cases, but they do not, in any way, interfere with the rule that when you have to look for a successor you should find a person to succeed who would be one of the co-parceners if the property were partible. Now if this property were partible and the family joint, the 5th defendant would succeed. If it were separate property, the 1st defendant would succeed [Parvathi v. Thirumalai]. Consequently without going into all the cases which were cited, there is really no doubt that the plaintiff must, as the illegitimate son of the Zemindar, be excluded from succession by the 5th defendant. The suit must fail so far as that goes.

    There is another question. There was a question raised, whether the plaintiff is bound by a release executed by his mother (Exhibit II). That is a question raised on behalf of the respondent in bar of the plaintiff's claim. On the finding that his claim to the Zemindary fails, it is only necessary to discuss the question of release in view of another question, whether he may be entitled to share in certain property which is alleged not to form part of the impartible Zemindary. The release was made by the plaintiff's mother, the 4th defendant, on his behalf during his minority, and by it she gave up all claims to anything in the Zemindary and all the properties forming part thereof. She gave it up on his behalf in consideration of the allotment to him of certain land, a small amount of property compared with the Zemindary. It is not shown that the lady had any independent advice in the matter. It was suggested that there was one person, the defence witness No. 20, who was her adviser: but he does not say so, and there is no suggestion that she had any other. On the other hand, we have it, the persons who drew up the document are persons employed by the 1st defendant. So that it seems to me that it is very difficult to agree with the Subordinate Judge that this was a bona fide settlement by the family of family disputes or matters about which there were likely to be disputes. I think it will have to be held that the act of the 4th defendant was not binding upon her son and that the release is not a bar to the claim made by him to the Zemindary.

    The remaining question is whether there is any property left by the Zemindar which is not part of the Zemindary. If so it seems to me on the decision of this Court that the plaintiff, the illegitimate son of the Zemindar, is entitled to share it with the 1st defendant. We should have to find that it is separate property of the Zemindar and not property of the joint family, and that it was not incorporated in the Zemindary at the time of the Zemindar's death. Now in the plaint in the suit the plaintiff did not claim a share; he claimed the whole and did not add an alternative prayer that, if he is not found entitled to succeed to the Zemindary; he might be given a decree for a share in the property which does not form part of the impartible Zemindary; and on this ground the Subordinate Judge has held that he cannot be allowed a share by the decision in this suit. I think that that is not right. There is really no reason why the plaintiff should not be given his share if he is found entitled to it. A more difficult question, to my mind, is, whether he has any title. That was not made an issue until after the close of the evidence and during the argument. But the question was raised before that—at any rate the question was raised whether there was any property winch does not form part of the impartible Zemindary. On this point the parties put in statements but no issue was framed at that time. It is not easy to say definitely that evidence was not let in on this question, or that any evidence which could have been let in was excluded. But at the same time, inasmuch as there was no issue—before the evidence was closed—I think it difficult—it is unsatisfactory to make an attempt—to decide a question so large as this upon evidence which it is not clear was all the evidence which would have been led to the issue. Consequently I think that it will be necessary to admit further evidence upon this question.

    A further question arises, whether if the plaintiff can be given a share, he is not bound to bring in all the property which has been alotted for him under the release, and of which he is in possession. That question depends somewhat upon evidence as to whether that property was allotted to him by the release or had been given to his mother for him by the Zemindar, and if the latter, on the circumstances under which it was given. In considering the issues which 1 propose to send down, the Subordinate Judge can deal with this matter.

    Having given the matter the best consideration I can, I think that it is desirable to have the assistance of the Subordinate Judge upon it and he will be requested to record findings upon two issues, namely, (1) whether any of the property in suit, and if so, what property, is the separate property of the Zemindar and not part of the impartible Zemindary and if so, (2) to what share (if any) is the plaintiff entitled in it or any part of if.

    I think that fresh evidence may be called as to the questions of fact which arise on those two issues. Two months' time will have to be allowed for finding and seven days for objections.

    Abdur Rahim, J. — I have arrived at the same conclusion. This suit was instituted by the plaintiff who is the appellant before us, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Madura West, to recover the Zemindari of Bodinayakanur. His claim is that he is the son of the late Zamindar who died in 1888 and as such entitled to the property.

    One of the principal questions that are raised by the appeal is whether the plaintiff is the son of the Zamindar as claimed by him. It is alleged that his mother, the 4th defendant in the suit, was married to the late Zamindar in the Gandharva form of marriage and it is urged that this form of marriage is valid, according to Hindu Law, in the Kambala caste to which the Zamindar belonged. The Subordinate Judge, in a very full and exhaustive judgment, has found that the plaintiff is, in fact, the son of the late Zamindar but, he says, that he is his illegitimate son as there was no marriage between the 4th defendant and the Zamindar. There can be no doubt on the facts that the plaintiff's mother was introduced into the palace of the Zamindar while she was very young and that she lived with him till he died and the plaintiff was born to her. The form of marriage which is alleged to have been gone through according to the plaintiff was this, both the parties, that is, the Zamindar and the 4th defendant, who is of the Maravar caste and of humble extraction, agreed that they would live as husband and wife, that the latter should be regarded as the legal wife of the Zamindar; and that she accordingly lived with the Zamindar in the capacity of a wife. As regards the arrangement under which the 4th defendant came to live with the Zamindar, I think the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge is right, that, in fact, there was no agreement on the part of the Zamindar to accept the 4th defendant as his wife and that she lived with him merely as a concubine. The learned Vakil for the appellant has challenged this conclusion mainly upon certain circumstances which, he says, furnish strong evidence that the 4th defendant must have been living in the palace as a wife and not as the Zamindar's concubine. All those circumstances are carefully considered by the learned Subordinate Judge and I think that neither any one of them in particular, nor all of them taken together, are such as can be said. to be less consistent with the plaintiff's mother consenting to live with the Zamindar as his concubine rather than as his wife. No doubt the late Zamindar treated the 4th defendant, so far as it appears from the evidence, with affection. He apparently took her about to temples and wherever he went on journeys. He gave her accommodation in a part of the palace where his own mother used to live and some other female relations of his had their quarters. The plaintiff's mother was also allowed a separate cooking establishment and at the plaintiff's birth certain ceremonies were performed. It also appears that in a certain photograph which was taken of some members of the Zamindar's family the plaintiff, who at the time was quite a child, was included in the group. On the other hand, there is a very significant circumstance which goes against the case of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's mother is described in the accounts of the Zamindari merely as “Karuppayee “, that is, by her bare name without any such title as is customarily given to ladies of the Zamindar's family. The plaintiff himself is described merely as ‘Thambi’. The Subordinate Judge, in my opinion, rightly relies on this fact as showing that, although the plaintiff's mother enjoyed the protection and affection of the Zamindar, she was not regarded by him or by his officials as his legitimate wife. Also as regards the oral evidence which is adduced in support of the arrangement put forward by the plaintiff, 1 think the Subordinate Judge has taken the right view. This evidence consists of the testimony of a number of persons who cannot be said to be disinterested and certainly are not people who can be implicitly relied upon to speak the truth. The Subordinate Judge rightly remarks that the fact that the 4th defendant's mother and other female relations of hers did not accompany her to the palace at the time she was first taken there, must be taken as considerably discounting the evidence of the witnesses who were cited to prove the alleged arrangement. On the other hand, there is evidence of certain witnesses for the defendant, including her pleader, that at or about the time the 4th defendant was taken to the palace, there was a criminal complaint lodged by certain relations of hers charging the Zamindar with abduction. The case apparently came to nothing, as the enquiry showed that the 4th defendant went to the palace willingly and there was no abduction. But what is absolutely conclusive against the case of the plaintiff is the conduct of the 4th defendant herself after the Zamindar's death. There was an inquiry held by the Collector as to who were the heirs of the Zamindar, and the 4th defendant did not, at the time, put forward any claim on behalf of herself as his married wife, or on behalf of her son as the heir of the Zamindar. It is inconceivable that if she was conscious that she occupied the status of a legal wife she would not have asserted that position at once. On the other hand, in the statements that were taken at the time, the 4th defendant is described as “Bhogastri’. Admittedly, this description is not ordinarily applied to the wives of Zamindars No doubt Mr. Rangachariar contends that ‘Bhogastri’ may simply mean an inferior sort of wife, but the evidence of the 4th defendant herself on the point rather tends to support the case of the defence that ‘Bhogastri’ means only a concubine and not a wife. It was really not until the institution of this suit, which, it may be mentioned, is financed, by a number of strangers, that a claim was put forward by the 4th defendant that she was married to the late Zamindar and the plaintiff was his legitimate son. I, therefore, agree with the Subordinate Judge that the arrangement alleged by the plaintiff under which his mother lived in the palace has not been proved.

    This is sufficient to conclude the case of the plaintiff so far as the question of legitimacy is concerned. But there is a further question which has been discussed by the Subordinate Judge and which has also been argued before us, namely, that, even if the alleged arrangement were proved, it would not, in law, amount to a valid marriage. It is not necessary to discuss this question at any length, but having heard the matter fully discussed at the Bar, I wish to express my clear opinion that the agreement set up by the plaintiff even if proved, would not amount to a valid marriage in Hindu Law! I do not desire to consider the question whether the Gandharva form of marriage requires any right or ceremony or not. My opinion is that if this amounts to Gandharva form of mariage, it has not been shown that such marriages are valid in the caste to which the late Zamindar belonged. It may be that the ancient Hindu Law texts allowed much greater latitude to Sudras in the matter of marriage than to the higher castes, or rather to the Brahmins, and that, perhaps among the Kshatriyas the Gandharva form of marriage has, even within recent times, been recognized as prevalent in some parts of India. But if this form of marriage were valid among the Sudras or rather in the caste to which the late Zamindar belonged I should have expected some evidence to be forthcoming as to its being in vogue among them. Mr. Rangachariar did not refer to any such evidence, and, as a matter of fact, the evidence, so far as it goes, shows that the Gandharva form of marriage has long ceased to be practised, if it ever prevailed, in the Kambala caste. He admitted that there was a regular form of marriage, or rather two forms of marriage, one of a superior and the other of an inferior character, prevalent in the Kambala caste. Supposing, therefore for argument's sake, that the Gandharva form of marriage would, according to the ancient texts, be permissible among the Sudras, I am of opinion that, so far as this caste is concerned, it must, upon the evidence in the case, be held to be obsolete and no longer recognized as valid, Mr. Rangachariar has strongly contended that if ancient Hindu Law texts sanction this form of marriage, we must hold that it is valid. But I am not inclined to accept that position. If I find that a certain caste among the Hindus has long given up this form of marriage, and this is shown by their consistently adopting other more regular forms, I do not think that we are still obliged to recognize its validity in that caste.

    The position, therefore, is this: The plaintiff is the illegitimate son of the last Zamindar, and the question remains, whether, as such, he is not entitled to succeed to the Zamindari in preference to the 1st defendant, the widow of the Zamindar, or the 5th defendant his cousin. With reference to this matter, we have to ascertain whether the family of the late Zamindar was divided or not. Upon this point the Subordinate Judge has discussed the evidence at great length, and I have no hesitation in saying that his conclusion that the family remained joint must be adopted. Mr. Rangachariar does not allege that there was any formal division at any particular time, but he only points out certain circumstances from which he asks us to conclude that there must have been a division of the family. The circumstances he relies on are, mainly, that since about 1884 some members of the Zamindar's family, the uncles and cousins of the Zamindar, held separate properties and had separate dealings in respect of those properties and with the exception of one uncle, the others have not been receiving any allowance or maintenance. He also relies upon certain observations in the judgment in a suit between one Kulasekara, an uncle of the Zamindar, and the present 1st defendant to the effect that the plaintiff therein was divided from the Zamindar. But none of those circumstances, to my mind, really compel us to come to the conclusion that the family was divided. It is perfectly clear from the documents exhibited in the case, that up to at least 1862 all the members of the family lived together, though not in the same building, in the same compound. They received allowances and were treated in every other respect as members of the co-parcenery. Even the Court of Wards, when it had the management of this estate, treated the family as joint, and if there had been a separation after 1884 or 1862, surely there would have been evidence forthcoming as to that. In the absence of that evidence, from the mere fact that some of the members of the family had separate property or cultivated some family lands, it does not follow that there was any alteration in the joint status of the family so far as the Zamindari is concerned. The discontinuance of allowances to some of the co-parcerners since 1884 was apparently due to the fact that they had quarrelled with the Zamindar. As regards the observation in the judgment to which I have referred, not much importance can be attached to it as the question of division or non-division was not in issue in that suit. If, therefore, the Zamindar and his uncles and cousins were members of one joint Hindu family, then, I think it must be held that the plaintiff has no title to the Zamindari as against 5th defendant. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that, according to established law, the holder of an impartible Zamindari has absolute power of disposition over it and therefore we must treat the question of succession on the basis of the Zamindari being the separate property of the Zamindar. I do not think that that conclusion at all follows. All the decided cases lay down that, for the purpose of finding out the heir to an impartible Zamindari where the Zamindar Was a member of an undivided family, we have to look to the co-parcenery. That is to say, we have to see who would be entitled to the property if it were the case of an ordinary partible joint family property. It may be that for purposes of enjoyment and disposition by the Zamindar for the time being, the Zamindari stands, to a great extent, on the same footing as the private property of the Zamindar; but with that we have nothing to do. We have before us only the question of succession, and for that purpose we must treat the Zamindary as ordinary joint family property if the Zamindar remained undivided from his co-parceners. Then the question arises, can the plaintiff be said to be a co-parcener just as a legitimate son would be and as such entitled to succeed to the Zamindari which is descendible by the rule of Primogeniture. Upon that point the weight of authority is against the plaintiff, at any rate so far as this Presidency is concerned. The illegitimate son of a Sudra is, no doubt, not one of the twelve kinds of sons mentioned in the Mitakshara, Ch. I. Sect. II. He is not a Sapinda of his natural father and cannot demand a share in the family property during his father's lifetime. In the Mitakshara, Ch. 1, Sect. 12, his case is treated as a special case, and all that that section lays down is briefly this: The father may, if he chooses, give a share to his illegitimate son; on his death the illegitimate son is entitled to half the share of the legitimate son, he is also entitled to a share along with the daughter's son; and it has been ruled that upon a proper interpretation of the text, the illegitimate son does not exclude the widow or the daughter. I think the text clearly indicates that the illegitimate son is not a member of the co-parcencry to which his putative father belonged. Much reliance is, however, placed upon the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogendro Bhupati Hurrochundra Mahaputra v. Niiyanand Man Sing., but all that this decision lays down is that, where a man has left a legitimate son and an illegitimate son, on the death of the legitimate son, the illegitimate son succeeds him by survivorship, because, as I understand the decision, the text of the Mitakshara, already alluded to, gives him a share along with the legitimate son of his natural father and thus a co-parcenery is thereby created between these two. It has also been decided that if the legitimate son dies leaving a son of his own, that son will take his father's share. But I find no warrant for extending the scope of the Privy Council ruling so as to hold that an illegitimate son is a co-parcener along with his father's uncles and cousins. On the other hand, in a series of cases in this Court it has been held that the text of the Mitakshara relating to the illegitimate sons of Sudras, only applies to separate property and not to property belonging to a co-parcenary. (See Krishuayyan v. Muttusami, Ranoji v. Kandoji, Parvaihi v. Thirumalai, Karuppa Goundan v. Kumarasami Goundan(5) and Gopalasami Chetti v. Arunachellam Chetti(6)). Of these eases I.L.R, 10 Mad., 334, which relates to impartible estate, is directly in point.

    I am, therefore, of opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to succeed to the Zamindari as against the 5th defendant. Nor, in my opinion, can he oust the widow if the Zamindari were, in fact, the separate properly of the Zamindar. He clearly occupies an inferior status, not only in comparison with the legitimate son, but also the widow, the daughter and the daughter's son, even if it can be said that he is entitled to an equal share with these persons.

    On all these points, therefore, the plaintiff's case fails.

    I may mention that the Subordinate Judge has also found that the plaintiff is debarred from claiming the Zamindari by reason of a release executed by his mother, the 4th defendant, by which she relinquished, on behalf of her son and herself, all rights in the Zamindari in consideration of having received certain properties from the first defendant. But I am unable to agree with the learned Judge on this point. When the 4th defendant purported, on behalf of her minor son, to relinquish his claim to the Zamindari, which is of considerable value, on receipt of comparatively insignificant properties, it does not appear that she had obtained any legal advice as to the right of the plaintiff to the Zamindari. There was no active dispute or question raised as to the plaintiff's title to the Zamindari and, in my opinion, it would be going too far to say, that the arrangement can be upheld as a proper family arrangement. I think a release of this nature is beyond the power of a guardian and cannot be upheld unless it is proved that it was executed after careful consideration of the minor's claims.

    The only other point which we are asked to decide in the appeal is whether the plaintiff is entitled in this suit to obtain his share in the separate properties of the Zamindar supposing he left any. The suit as instituted was one for recovery of the Zamindari and other properties forming part of the Zamindari and no partition was asked for in the plaint of any properties which might be found to be the private property of the Zamindar. It, however, appears that, during the progress of the suit, an issue was raised as to what were the private properties of the Zamindar, though even then the question was not distinctly raised as to the right of the plaintiff to a share in those properties. But, apparently, the question was argued and the Subordinate Judge refused to go into the matter only because this was a suit in ejectment, and he was of opinion that the plaintiff could not get any relief in respect of the private property of the Zamindar in this suit. I do not appreciate the difficulty in giving relief to the plaintiff with respect to the separate property of the Zamindar. It is not shown that all the parties who would be interested in the decision of such a question are not before the Court. The state of the record, as it stands at present, is not, however, very satisfactory and I agree with my learned brother that we could not arrive at a satisfactory conclusion without having a proper finding of the Subordinate Judge on the point.

    For these reasons, I agree in the order proposed.

    [The Memorandum of Objections preferred by the 1st respondent was next argued.]

    JUDGMENT

    Miller, J. — We have decided that the plaintiff is excluded from the Zemindari as the illegitimate son of the Zemindar, and we have intimated our intention to send down to the Lower Court questions for finding whether there is my part of the property left by the late Zemindar in which the plaintiff is entitled to share. Before asking the Subordinate Judge to find upon these questions it has become necessary for us to consider certain objections taken on behalf of the 1st defendant, the result of which, if accepted in their entirety, would be to exclude the plaintiff even from the separate property.

    The objections are two; the first defendant relied upon a will which she alleges was executed by her late husband, the evening before his death, by which she took a life estate in the whole of the Zemindari and the separate properties: and there was also alleged during the course of the suit a custom by which in the caste to which the late Zemindar belonged illegitimate sons are refused a right to succeed to their father's property. The Subordinate Judge has found both points against the first defendant and the objections relate to them. His decree dismissing the suit is now sought to be supported on the ground that both those points also ought to have been found against the plaintiff.

    I am doubtful whether on a true construction of the will (Exhibit VI), which is propounded, it could be said that it deals with separate property of the Zemindar at all. If it does not, of Course it is unnecessary for us to consider whether it is genuine or not; but we have heard arguments fully upon the evidence and it may be desirable that we should pronounce our opinion upon the fact.

    First then, the first defendant alleges that Exhibit VI is the last will of her husband. The plaintiff alleges that Exhibit VI is a forgery. The Subordinate Judge has found that Exhibit VI is not proved to be the will of the late Zamindar, and he has given in his judgment very full reasons for his finding. He has considered the evidence very minutely and at considerable length; he has dealt with a number of circumstances which have led him to the conclusion that the will should not be accepted, and I have come to the conclusion that his decision on the point is one with which I ought not to differ. I admit I have come to this conclusion with some hesitation because I have found great difficulty in deciding whether the evidence is sufficient or not to prove the will; but on the whole I am satisfied that I ought not to differ from the Subordinate Judge's finding, and I shall shortly state the principal reasons why I have come to that conclusion.

    I agree with the Subordinate Judge that on the evidence the state of the health of the Zemindar was on the 14th December such that it is difficult to accept the signature in Exhibit VI as the signature which a man in his condition was likely to make, that the Zemindar was able so late as 5 or 6 in the evening on the 14th December to make a signature so steady and so strong as that in Exhibit VI—that is a point which we have to bear in mind. Seeing then that the appearance of the will itself suggests suspicion, we have to look to the circumstances before and after the Zemindar's death to see whether it is more likely that he signed it or that he did not. The Subordinate Judge is of opinion that there is clear proof on the evidence that the Zemindar was comtemplating making a will. I am not quite sure that is so. The letter which he received from his legal adviser in Madura, the late Mr. Pole, dated the 9th December, suggests to my mind that until then at any rate it was not the intention of the Zamindar !o make a will. From the letter I gather that he sent agents to Madura to see Mr. Pole and consult him whether an adoption could be made. He had been ill for some time, he had been in September to Madura for treatment, he returned in November to Bodinayakanur. Then early in December he appears to have sent agents to Madura to see Mr. Pole, and Mr. Pole in reply to their representation gives his opinion as to adoption and as to the provision to be made for the illegitimate son, the plaintiff, in the event of adoption being made, but he says nothing about the will. Exhibit XXVIII to my mind clearly shows that he had not considered that question. There is no doubt Exhibit XXIX, a letter written by Mr. Pole's clerk to the manager of the Zemindari in which he makes some reference to the will and to himself as executor, was written about the same time. But it may be that the manager consulted the clerk as to the desirability of the form in which the Zemindar should make a will in the event of his making one—it may possibly be the manager recognised that the illness of the Zemindar was assuming a serious aspect. However that may be, I do not think that Exhibits XXVIII and XXIX suggest that a week before death the Zemindar himself had any idea of making a will. Then there is Exhibit XXXI, a letter of the 13th December, which he is said to have sent to the Sub-Registrar of Periyakulam to bring him to Bodinayakanur in order “to register a bond and a will which I intend doing.” We have not the original of Exhibit XXXI. We have only what purports to be an office copy of it written by the Zemindar's clerk, defence 36th witness, which is suspicious to this extent that it is the last entry in the book that was kept at the time and might have been inserted at any time. The Sub-Registrar's attendance was not procured, the original of the letter which is put in was not produced and his clerk, the defence 37th witness, says that the original of the letter brought by the Zemindar's servant on the 14th December never came into his office records at all. So apart from the evidence of the defence 36th witness we really do not know what was actually sent to the Sub-Registrar, or whether whatever was sent by the authority of the Zemindar or merely of the first defendant or the manager. Secondly it is difficult to say that this evidence proves, even if we take it that a letter was sent and contained as Exhibits XXXIV, XXXV and XXXVI would seem to indicate, some reference to the registration of a will, it is difficult to say that it is proved that the making of the will was in contemplation of the Zemindar himself.

    That being the state of things as to the Zemindar's intention to make a will it seems to me there are circumstances which make it improbable that any will was made. As to what happened on the 14th, we find the accounts (Exhibits WWWW), show certain payments to various persons of sums of money on that day and these persons are no doubt the attestors of the will. I only allude to this because the Subordinate Judge relies on it, but those payments might have been explained if these witnesses had been asked to explain them, but they have not been so asked, and I therefore take it that the account ought not to be used as evidence against the will. But there is no doubt that the conduct of the first defendant on the 15th December immediately after the Zemindar's death does give rise to some suspicion. Before her husband's dead body was removed from the house she made considerable gifts of land—100 gulies each, worth about Rs. 200 a guli— to a representative of each branch of her husband's family. That suggests undoubtedly that at that time she had some necessity, some need of securing that they should not attack whatever she might do, and we find, when the Deputy Collector a few days later suggests to them and asks them questions as to the will, all of them say they do not know whether there is a will or not. That again suggests that in spite of the gifts to them they were not prepared to give up entirely any claim there might arise in their favour by denouncing the genuineness of this will and—I do not say it is strong evidence, but it does suggest that the facts surrounding the production of this will were not altogether satisfactory to the relations of the Zemindar.

    There are only one or two other matters with which I shall have to deal. In Mr. Pole's letter there is a suggestion for a provision for the plaintiff, the illegitimate son. The will as propounded makes no provision for him. I think it is unlikely that unless the Zemindar's agents had put the matter to Mr. Pole he would have said anything about any provision to the plaintiff in the letter So that suggests that the Zemindar was intending a provision for the plaintiff on the 9th December. The fact that the will contains no such provision is commented upon by the Subordinate Judge and in these circumstances I think rightly, as pointing against the probability that it was a will made by the Zemindar himself. A stronger point perhaps is the fact that of all the nine attestors to the will there is not one of whom it can be said, he is a person in a position of such independence that it could be said of him that it is highly improbable he would have been a party to a forgery of the will On the 14th December—during part of the day at any rate—there were present two Zemindars at Bodinayakanur, the Zemindars of Peraiyur and Gantamanaickanur, and it seems to me extremely difficult to believe that at any time during the day when they had been there, one or the other was not asked to attest it. The Peraiyur Zemindar was a friend of the late Zemindar, and yet the evidence on behalf of the first defendant is that while he and Gantamanaickanur Zemindar were away in the afternoon the will was made If the Zemindar was so strong as the first defendant would have us to believe, there is no reason why he could not have waited till their return; if on the thirteenth he contemplated the making of the will, it is likely that he would ask at leas one of these two gentlemen to be an attestor. It is suggested that the Zemindar would not like to attest for fear of having to come to Court to support the will; and it is suggested that the Zemindar would like to keep the contents secret from them. But why he should have done so, it is not at all clear to me, and the fear of having to have to support the will in a Court does not seem to be a sufficient reason to deter his friends from attesting his will.

    Then there is another thing against the will, that is, the form of it If it was the will the Zemindar had contemplated making, if it was as the first defendant would wish us to believe, copied from the draft of a pleader of Madura, Seshier, it is not in a form that one would expect it to be. The Subordinate Judge points out and places a perfectly legitimate reliance on the fact that this will does not appear to be copy of a draft which would have been made by a gentleman of what I may call literary competence in the Tamil language. It is not likely to be the work of Mr. Seshier; it is more likely to have been drawn up by some of the servants in the palace; and an extraordinary thing about it is that while Seshier was a pleader on behalf of the first defendant during the trial, and he was actually summoned to appear as witness, yet he was not put into the box to support the case that he drafted the will. That is a fact which is very much against the case that he drafted the will, and therefore against the case made by the defendant that the Zemindar had sent agents to Madura to get a draft of a will. The Subordinate Judge also points out that there were other persons, the Hospital Assistant who attended on the Zemindar, one of his relations Chockalinga Asari, persons who might have attested the will but whose attestation does not appear. Those, I think, are the strongest grounds (there are others relied on by the Subordinate Judge) in the case which make it improbable that the Zemindar did execute the will. As to the oral evidence, it is mainly the evidence of the attestors and as I have said, the attestors are not persons on whose word any great reliance can be placed. The oral evidence on both sides is, it seems to me, unworthy of any great credence— on the one hand there are the attestors and on the other hand there are witnesses who say that the Zemindar was in a state of collapse before the afternoon of the 14th, and that does not seem to be true; but the circumstances to which I have alluded and on which the Subordinate Judge relies are sufficient to throw so much doubt on the will as to justify me in accepting the Subordinate Judge's conclusion that it is not the will of the Zemindar.

    The other point raises the question of custom—the question whether by the custom of the Kambala caste an illegitimate son takes nothing of his father's estate or of the family property. The issue (21st issue) was framed at a late stage of the case after the defence evidence had been recorded: for our purpose the evidence must be strong enough to show that the plaintiff is excluded by custom, not from the Zemindari only but also from the partible property which belonged to the Zemindar. The Subordinate Judge has dealt, seriatim, with all the instances on which reliance was placed to make out this custom. In most of them he has disbelieved the evidence; he has disbelieved the evidence of some persons on the ground that they came to Court without summons, of others, that they are relations of the first defendant or persons favoured by the first defendant, of others, that they are men of straw. It has not been suggested to us that his appreciation of the evidence is not justified; thus a very large number of the instances to which he refers in paragraph 90 of his judgment are instances which—though he does not clearly say so in paragraph 91—he holds are not proved, and I think we must agree with him. Then he points out that most of these cases are cases in which the illegitimate sons were provided during the lifetime of their father with allotments for themselves: assuming these cases to be true, although it might be that this allotment might not in law prevent them from coming down upon their lather's estate for a share after his death still those are not cases in which the custom is distinctly proved. Because, it may be that the sons were satisfied with what was given them: that does not prove the custom set up. That leaves only a’ few cases which, as I have said, are for the most part discredited on the ground that the witnesses could not be believed. There is one instance the Subordinate Judge does not seem to disbelieve that spoken to by the defence 8th witness—he speaks of an illegitimate son not getting any property, but that would be only one instance and would hardly be sufficient to prove a custom. There is another, the 46th witness, an illegitimate son: he says that his father's widow made provision for his maintenance only—but this I find is one of the cases the Subordinate Judge has disbelieved on the ground that the witness attended the Court without summons. There are not, I think, any other cases of which it can be said that they are clearly cases in which illegitimate sons, by reason of a custom, have been excluded from inheritance of property which must have devolved on them under the ordinary law.

    This as to the oral evidence. Then there are two judgments against the custom—judgments in which the custom was alleged but held to be not proved; and there is Exhibit XXIV of 1849 in which a Zemindar alleged that by the custom of his caste illegitimate sons were not entitled to succeed to a Zemindari. That is a document which might be valuable, if necessary, to exclude the plaintiff from the Zemindari, but it is not of any value as we are dealing with the custom in reference to partible property. Considering the Subordinate Judge has disbelieved most of the evidence he is right in holding that the evidence is not distinct, clear, and sufficient to make out the custom. And as a matter of fact the custom set up in the written statement was not so general a custom as it was necessary to prove to enable the defendant to exclude the plaintiff from succeeding to the separate property. It is only a custom having reference to the Zemindari—that was the custom which was set up in the written statement of the 1st defendant: but even that custom was not at first made the subject of a distinct issue. It may be that the 17th issue was intended to include it, as the evidence the Subordinate Judge has considered was let in by the 1st defendant before the 21st issue was framed, but it is not quite clear to me that the question was properly raised in the suit. Assuming it was, I am prepared to hold that the Subordinate Judge was right in holding the custom was not made out. The effect then of my findings on these two questions raised by the 1st defendant is that the finding which we agree to call for will have to be furnished by the Subordinate Judge.

    Abdur Rahim, J. — I entirely agree that the Memorandum of Objections fails on the two points raised by it and I have nothing to add to the judgment which has been delivered.

    [The appeal was finally heard after the receipt of the findings by Sir John Wallis, C. J., and Srinivasa Iyengar, J.].

    Messrs. T. Rangachariar, C. S. Govindaraja Mudaliar, C. S. Venkatachariar and N. R. K. Tatacharlar for the Appellant:— The learned Subordinate Judge erred in holding that plaintiff was only entitled to? share in the properties. He ought to have held that he was entitled to share equally with the widow and entitled to a ½ share. Vide I.L.R, 8 Mad., 557; 10 Mad., 334, 343; 15 Mad., 307; 33 Mad., 226; 1 Bom., 97, where the authorities are elaborately considered; and 14 Bom., 282.

    Messrs. S. Srinivasa Iyengar, K. V. Krishnaswatni Iyer, T. V. Muthukrishna Iyer, P. Tirumalachariar and R. Padmanabha Chariar for the Respondents:—The learned Subordinate Judge is right in holding that plaintiff is only entitled to? share. The original text of Mitakshara is clearly in favour of that view. See Yajna valkya, Ch. II, Sect. 8, Verses 133, 134. See also the commentaries of Vignaneswara, Aparatka and Medhathithi. All these lay down that the illegitimate son is only entitled to a third share. All the Sanskrit knowing text book writers on Hindu Law have also construed the text in the same way.

    JUDGMENT

    The first question to be decided is whether the plaintiff, as the illegitimate son of his deceased father, is entitled to share equally 2193

    with his widow, the 1st defendant, or whether he is only entitled to half of her share, i.e, to ?rd of the properties. In a series of cases in Madras beginning with Ranoji v. Kandoj, it has been held that an illegitimate son succeeding to his deceased father along with a widow, daughter or daughter's son is entitled to half of the properties and not merely to one-third [Parvathi v. Thirumalai, Chinnammal v. Varadarajulu, Meenakshi Anni v. Appakutti]. In Rahi and others v. Govind Valad Teja, Chief Justice Westropp elaborately reviewed all the texts of Hindu Law dealing with the rights of an illegitimate son and came to the conclusion (as we understand the judgment) that the illegitimate son was entitled to a half share of the properties; and in Shesgiri v. Girewa, Sargent, C.J, who delivered the judgment of the Court, took the same view and understood the decision in Rahi v. Govind as laying down the same rule. The learned Vakil for (he respondent invited us to construe for ourselves the original text of the Mitakshara which he says is clearly in his favour. He also cited the commentary of Apararka on the text of Yagna-valkya and the commentary of Medhathithi, the well known commentator of Manu on the same text. He further contended that all the text book writers on Hindu Law who knew Sanskrit have construed the passage of the Mitakshara in the way he construes it. Much may no doubt be said in favour of this construction. But the decisions of this Court are not based merely on the interpretation of the text of the Mitakshara. In Ranoji v. Kandoji, in which the position of an illegitimate son was fully considered, reliance was placed on a passage from the Dattaka Chandrika which states in clear terms that the illegitimate son shares equally with the widow, daughter and daughter's son. It was this very passage of the Dattaka Chandrika which was relied on as authority for not excluding the widow from the succession when there is an illegitimate son, whereas the Mitakshara omits the widow from the category of persons who are not excluded by the illegitimate son. The Dayabhaga, which gives the illegitimate son an equal share with the daughter and daughter's son, was also referred to. In this state of things, we are not prepared to depart from the course of decisions in this Court which hold that the plaintiff is entitled to share equally with the widow.

    The next question is whether the last Zemindar's step-brother, Vadamalai, was disqualified by reason of insanity from sharing with his brother their father's separate property. Vadamalai, it should be mentioned, who was older than the Zamindar but was the son of a junior wife, did not press his claim to succeed to the Zemindary in preference to his brother, nor did he, after the brother's death, claim the Zemindary against the widow. As regards the first point the respondents explain that according to the custom of Kambala Zemindars the son by the senior wife succeeds to the Zemindary. As regards the separate property left by their father it is urged that there was no need for a partition as Vadamalai lived with his brother, the late Zemindar, in the palace, and after his death, went on living with his widow, the 1st defendant, whose sister's daughter he had married. These facts, it is suggested, explain his conduct in not having put forward a claim to the Zemindary after his brother's death, and at the time of the compromise between the widow and the more distant co-parceners. The mere fact that Vadamalai did not press his claim to the Zemindary is not, in our opinion, sufficient proof of insanity. On the other hand we have the fact that he gave evidence in Court in Original Suit No. 15 of 1891 and though subjected to a lengthy examination gave rational answers, and that he married and had issue. On the whole we think the evidence does not establish that Vadamalai was disqualified from inheriting. It follows, therefore, that the late Zemindar's share in his father's separate properties on his death passed by survivorship to Vadamalai and that the plaintiff has no claim to them. On this ground his claim to the properties mentioned in Exhibit ZZZZZ also fails.

    Item 55 of Sch. A, the next item claimed by the plaintiff, is a bungalow in Madura built by the Court of Wards during the minority of the late Zemindar at a cost of Rs. 60,000 on a site inherited by the Zemindar and his brother from their father. The 1st respondent contends that either the bungalow became the joint property of the two brothers as the site was joint property, or that it was built as a town residence for the Zemindar and was intended to pass with the Zemindary, and that in either view the plaintiff's claim must fail. We agree with this contention.

    The 1st respondent objects to items 61, 65 to 69, 73 to 76, 79 to 113, 116 to 118, 120 to 127, 129 to 138, 149, 151 to 177, 185, 221, 248, 249, 254, 285, 308 to 318, 322, 324, 330 to 345, 348, 350, 352, 354 to 357, 359 to 366, 375 to 379, 63, 64, 371 to 374, 380 to 410, 62, 70 to 72, 77, 78, 139, 140, 146, 323, 326, 328, 358, 367, 217, 218, 228 to 231, 247, 252, 259 to 264, in this Sch. A, which have been allowed to the plaintiff. They are lands within the ambit of the Zemindary and the Zemindar was entitled to the melvaram therein. He purchased the Kudivaram right in items 61 to 410 and succeeded to the Kudivaram right in the remaining items on the death of his mother. All these lands were cultivated as pannai along with the other pannai lands of the estate. They are clearly properties intended to be held with the Zemindary; in fact they are accretions to the Zemindar's interest in the Zemindary. Following the decisions of this Court in Lakshmipathi v. Kandasami, Ramasami Kamaya Naik v. Sundaralingasami Kamaya Naik, The Ramnad case we disallow the plaintiff's claim to these items.

    The plaintiff also claims items 57, 69, 135 and 136 of Schedule C. Item 57 is a jewel usually worn by women. The 1st defendant swears that the jewel was purchased for her. Considering that at that time that 1st defendant was the only lady in the Zemindar's family who could have worn such a jewel we are inclined to believe her evidence and disallow the plaintiff's claim to this item. The respondent admits that the plaintiff is entitled to item 69. Items 135 and 136 are loose pearls and rubies and the 1st defendant claims them as her Stridhanam. She did not set up this claim in Exhibit K and there is only her evidence in support of her claim. We are not prepared to act on it. We, therefore, allow the plaintiff's claim to these two items.

    The 1st respondent claims the cattle used for cultivating the pannai lands, i.e, items 173 to 203 of Schedule C. The appellant admits that if the pannai lands are held to be part of the Zemindary he would not be entitled to a share in them. As we hold that the pannai lands are appurtenant to the Zemindary we disallow the plaintiff's claim to these items. The plaintiff admits that the 1st defendant is solely entitled to item 231 of this schedule. The plaintiff accepts the valuation given by the 1st respondent for item 229, viz., Rs. 1,300, and will be entitled to his share of this sum and not to Rs. 2,607 as claimed by him. The 1st defendant argues that she ought not to have been made accountable for certain jewels said to have been given by her to her daughter and claims contribution from the partible properties for the expenses connected with her daughter's marriage. This claim was not made in the Lower Court and we, therefore, disallow it.

    The 1st defendant also contends that the Lower Court was wrong in making her liable for items 9, 11, 15 and 17 of schedule D. Plaintiff's witness No. 48, who was the 1st defendant's manager for a considerable time, says that these items were collected by the 1st defendant. She denies this but does not produce the bonds which should be in her possession. In these circumstances we agree with the Lower Court that she is liable to the plaintiff for his share of these items.

    The finding of the Lower Court will be modified accordingly.

    As the release Exhibit II. has been set aside, the plaintiff must deliver to the 1st defendant items Nos. 1 to 3 in Schedule I to that deed as they are pannai lands and are therefore impartible. In the fourth item and the moveables in the same Schedule he is entitled to a half share and he must account to the 1st defendant for the other half.

    The plaintiff and the 1st defendant will pay and receive proportionate costs in the appeal.

    The Memorandum of Objections is dismissed with costs; and the Pleader's fee payable will be on Rs. 1,588-15-0 + Rs. 541-1-0.

    Decree modified.

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    T. B. K. Viswanathaswami Naiker v. Kamulu Ammal
    (Oct 26, 1915)