Sanderson, C.J:— I think this appeal must be dismissed.
The point arises upon the plaint which was filed in this case. The learned Judge has held that the plaint was not one that merely asked for a declaratory, decree, but was one in which a consequential relief was claimed. The stamp which was upon the plaint was one of Rupees ten the stamp which is applicable to a plaint in a suit to obtain a declaratory decree, under Article 17, clause (iii) of the second Schedule to the Court Fees Act of 1870. The learned Judge, held that it was a plaint in which a consequential relief was asked and consequently it came within section 7, sub-section iv, clause (c) of that Act.
In my judgment there is no doubt that the learned Judge was right. The suit was instituted under section 111A. of the Bengal Tenancy Act; and in considering the nature of the suit regard must be had, to the actual words of the section. It provides that “No suit shall be brought in any Civil. Court in respect of any order directing the preparation of a record-of-rights under this chapter …”, with certain saving clauses—“Provided that any person who is dissatisfied with any entry in, or omission from, a record-of-rights framed in pursuance of an order made under section 101, sub-section. (2) clause (d), which concerns a right of which he is in possession, may institute a suit for declaration, of his right under Chapter VI of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. In my judgment these words must be strictly applied. What is it he is entitled to ask for in a suit brought under that section? He is entitled to ask for a declaration of the right of which he claims he is in possession. In this case the plaintiff claims that he is in possession of an occupancy, right. Therefore, he is quite entitled to ask for such a declaration as is comprised in paragraph (a) of paragraph 11 of his plaint. But he goes on in paragraph (b) to ask for a declaration that “the entry in the records as to his status as tenure-holder is a nullity. In my judgment that is not such a declaration as is contemplated by the proviso to section 111A. I think the words are so plain that the point which has been taken on behalf of the plaintiff is not really arguable. Therefore, I think the order of the learned Judge was right. Having come to the conclusion, as he did, that the plaintiff was asking for something more than a mere delaratory decree, and was asking for a consequential relief, what was the learned Judge to do? That is pointed out clearly by Order VII, rule II which says this.—“The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:—(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action” that is not the case here: (b) “where the relief claimed is under-valued and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so again that is not this case—“(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so”. In this case the relief was, properly valued at Rs. 5,225 at least there was nothing said to show that the relief was not properly valued. But the learned Judge rightly came to the conclusion that the plaint was written upon paper insufficiently stamped and the plaintiff on being required by the Court, to supply the requisite stamp paper within the time fixed by the Court, failed to do so. Therefore he had no other alternative but to reject the plaint in accordance with the terms of the rule. In my judgment, the learned Judge was right in his decision,—he had no alternative but to reject the plaint.
The learned counsel, who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, asked this Court to give the plaintiff leave to amend his plaint by striking out paragraph (b) of clause 11 in his plaint. In my judgment, he ought not to be allowed to do so for the reasons I have already given and this Court has no more power than the learned Judge, when it is shown that the case comes within Order VII., rule 11. This Court has no jurisdiction the provision is mandatory, and this Court, just, the same as the Court below, is bound by that section which provides that under the above-mentioned, circumstances the suit shall be rejected.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Mookerjee, J.:— I agree.
G.S
Appeal dismissed.