Rambini and Pratt, JJ.:— The facts of this case are as follows:— The plaintiffs sue for a declaration that a certain plot of 2 bighas of land with the building thereon is their property by right of purchase on the 28th December, 1892 at an execution of a decree obtained against Suleman Bukt. They further pray that the defendant may be restrained from selling this property in execution of a mortgage decree obtained by the defendant's predecessor against Prince Rahimuddin. The defendant's predecessor sued Prince Rahimuddin on an equitable mortgage, and obtained a decree on the 6th October, 1890. Subsequently Prince Rahimuddin died, and his heirs, including his son Suleman Bukt, were substituted at their own request as defendants in the mortgage case. Afterwards the mortgage decree was made absolute; upon which, that is, on the 12th November, 1892, Suleman Bukt raised an objection that the property belonged to him in his own right. This objection was allowed by the Subordinate Judge of the 24-Parganas. The plaintiffs thereafter, as already mentioned, purchased the property. Then, on the 20th February following, the decree in the execution case was prepared, and an appeal was preferred to this Court, which was successful on the 18th June, 1894. It was held by this Court on the facts that the property in dispute was not the property of Suleman Bukt in his personal “capacity. Now the Lower Court has held (1) that the plaintiffs as the purchasers of Suleman Bukt's rights are bound by the decision of this Court, dated the 18th June, 1894, and (2) that in any case the plaintiffs purchased pendente lite, and accordingly acquired no aright in the property.
Dr. Rash Behary Ghose on behalf of the appellants contends that the Judge's decision on both points is wrong. We, however, cannot agree with him. In the first place, as the learned pleader for the appellant admits, it makes no difference that the appellant purchased the right of Suleman Bukt at an execution sale, and not at a private sale. See Gobind Chunder Roy v. Churn Kurmokar. In the second place, as the appellants purchased the rights of Suleman Bukt, and are in every way his representatives in interest and as will presently be shown, they purchased pendente lite, and as the proceedings in which Suleman Bukt's objection was disallowed, though subsequent to their purchase, were yet proceedings which they “might expect would take place” [see Kasumunnissa Bibee v. Nilratan Bose(2)], they are as much bound by a decision against Suleman Bukt, though personally no parties to it, as he, Suleman Bukt himself, is. It is true that the question which Suleman Bukt was allowed by the Subordinate Judge of the 24-Parganas to raise, was one which as the substituted heir of his father Prince Rahimuddin he perhaps should not have been allowed to raise; but he did raise it of his own accord, and he is bound by the ultimate decision of the objection, and the appellants as his representatives in interest and purchasers pendente lite are equally bound by it.
It has, however, been urged that the appellants purchased at a time when Suleman Bukt's objection had been allowed, and when no appeal against the subordinate Judge's order had been preferred. We have been referred to the terms of s. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act which prohibits the transfer of property during “the active prosecution” in any Court of a contentious suit relating to such property. It is said that when the appellants purchased, the suit of the defendant was not being “actively prosecuted.” Dr. Rash Behary Ghose has also referred us to Sugden on Vendors and Purchasers, p. 758, and to other English authorities.
But we are of opinion that the only reason why an appeal had not been preferred against the Subordinate Judge's order of the 12th November, 1892 at the time when the appellant purchased was because the decree had not been prepared. The appeal, “the inevitable appeal,” as the Lower Court correctly describes it, was preferred without undue delay after the decree “had been drawn up on the 20th February, 1893. We therefore consider that the appellants in this case may be said to have, purchased during the “active prosecution” of the suit.
Then, as to the English authorities cited by Dr. Rash Behary Ghose, we would only say that the law of lis pendens in England is different from that prevailing in this country. The law of lis pendens in this country is founded on the fact that it would be impossible to bring any suit to a successful termination if alienations pendente lite were permitted to prevail.
The case of Gobind Chunder Roy v. Guru Churn Kurmokar is directly in point. In that case, the facts of which are very similar to those of the present one, it has been said:—“The proceedings of the Appellate Court were but a continuation of the proceedings in the suit, and although for a time there was a decree in favour of the present plaintiff's predecessor in title, yet that was a decree which was open to appeal, and the decree having been appealed against, we Ought to take it that the decree of the Appellate Court was the decree in the suit, and the sale at which the plaintiff purchased having taken place pending the suit in which that decree was pronounced, we think the doctrine of lis pendens does apply to the case.” Other cases of this Court on the subject are Inderjeet Kooer v. Pootee Begum, Chunder Koomar Lahooree v. Gopee Kristo Gossamee(3), and Kishory Mohun Roy v. Mahomed Mujaffar Hossein(4). See also Moti Lal v. Karrabuldin(5). These on the whole support the view we take of this case.
We therefore dismiss the appeal with costs.
M.N.R
Appeal dismissed.