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Structured Summary of the Judgment — Mookerjee and Chatterjea, JJ.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a reference to this Court under section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of fifteen accused persons who were tried jointly (another co-accused had been acquitted by the Court below). The accused were charged under sections 147, 148 and 325 read with sections 149, 343 and 379, Indian Penal Code.

At trial the Jury returned a divided verdict: by a majority of four to one the Jury found all the accused not guilty of all charges; the minority verdict was that all the accused except Abdul Kader were guilty of all charges except the charge under section 379. The Sessions Judge accepted the unanimous verdict that Abdul Kader was not guilty and that Anwar Ali was not guilty under section 379. The Sessions Judge accepted the majority verdict only in respect of the charge under section 148 for Mamfru Chaudhuri, Fateh Chaudhury and Lakshmikanta, but declined to accept the majority verdict in other respects and referred the cases of the accused (other than Abdul Kader) to this Court for consideration.

The underlying dispute arose from possession and cultivation of a large khasmahal jote in Cox's Bazar sub-division. After purchase by Abdul Latif Chaudhury in 1919, and following earlier cyclone damage and related possession disputes, there were a series of disturbances and preventive proceedings (including proceedings under sections 107 and 144 CrPC) between rival claimants and their adherents. The prosecution stems from an incident alleged to have occurred on 11 January 1922, in which the accused party are said to have assembled, forcibly removed paddy worth Rs. 3,000 and, in the course of the conflict, three members of the complainant party were alleged to have been detained and two were ultimately taken across district borders and released later.

First information was lodged on 12 January 1922, the Sub-divisional Magistrate committed the accused to stand trial before the Sessions Court, and the result of that trial produced the divided jury verdict and the reference to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on examination of the evidence, the majority verdict of the Jury (acquitting the accused) should be accepted by this Court or whether the Sessions Judge's view should lead to a different outcome.
  2. Whether the Sessions Judge's extra-judicial observation that the majority verdict was "deliberately perverse" to secure the acquittal of a particular accused (Kshitish Chandra Deb Rai) was justified and what consequences, if any, should flow from that observation.
  3. Whether the prosecution had proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt on the charges under sections 147, 148, 325 read with 149, 343 and 379 IPC, having regard to discrepancies and other shortcomings in the prosecution case.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution (Mr. Dutt)

  • Pressed the Court to hold that the witnesses for the prosecution narrated a story substantially true and that the guilt of the accused was established beyond reasonable doubt.
  • Relied upon the Crown evidence and the trial record and placed a careful analysis and commentary of the relevant materials before the Court.

Defence (Mr. Mukerji)

  • Contended that the prosecution evidence contained many discrepancies and deficiencies such that the Court should not form an opinion adverse to the accused contrary to the majority verdict of the Jury.
  • Pointed out that the common object alleged in the charge (forcibly removing stacked paddy and taking possession of the land) was not consistently or fully established, and that crucial categories of witnesses (for example, Chakma tenants) were not examined or even named.
  • Suggested the possibility that elements of the prosecution story (notably the alleged abduction) may have been exaggerated or untrue, observing the late lodging of the first information and inconsistencies in recorded times.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Emperor v. Dhananjoy Raha Recorded opinion as to the manifest impropriety of extra-judicial observations by a Sessions Judge in a letter to this Court in connection with a reference under section 307 CrPC. The Court relied on its earlier expression of disapproval of such extra-judicial remarks and, in the present case, gave the Sessions Judge an opportunity to explain his comment before deciding the reference.
Emperor v. Olu Mahamad Illustrative authority (from English practice) that if a jury is proved by legal evidence to have misconducted themselves, the jury might be discharged and a new trial directed. The Court cited the case as an example of available remedies for jury misconduct but stressed that no action can be taken unless misconduct is established by evidence admissible in law.
Note to Davies v. Pierce (Tidd's Practice (1828) vol II, p. 922) English authority referenced for the proposition that a jury may be discharged and a new trial ordered where jurors have misconducted themselves. Used to illustrate the principle that procedural remedies exist in English law for proven jury misconduct; Court observed similar action could be taken only when misconduct is established by legal evidence.
Witham v. Lewis; R. v. Yeadon; R. v. Fowler; R. v. Murphy; Winsor v. Queen Examples of English cases dealing with actions available when jurors have misconducted themselves (i.e., discharge and retrial in appropriate cases). Referred to collectively to show that while judicial approaches may diverge, the common requirement is that juror misconduct must be established by evidence before any remedial action is taken.
Nibaran v. King Emperor Authority expressing disapproval where a trial judge's estimation of credibility was made dependent upon classification of witnesses by religion. The Court recalled its disapproval in Nibaran when criticizing the Sessions Judge's assumption regarding which juror constituted the minority and the inapposite use of communal classification in assessing the verdict.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a careful examination of the recorded evidence and had available analyses from counsel for both sides. The reasoning proceeded in two interrelated strands: first, a factual-appraisal of the prosecution case; and second, an examination of the propriety and effect of the Sessions Judge's extra-judicial remarks about the jury.

On the evidence, the Court identified multiple and material shortcomings in the prosecution case which, taken together, justified accepting the majority jury verdict of acquittal:

  • The prosecution evidence contained significant discrepancies between diverse accounts of the incident (for example, differing statements as to the time of occurrence recorded in the Sub-Inspector's diary and the complainant's account).
  • Important categories of witnesses were absent: no Chakma tenant (whose stacked paddy was at issue) was examined or named in the record.
  • Suspicious circumstances surrounded the first information, including its unusually late lodging, creating plausibility in defence submissions that aspects of the abduction story might be exaggerated or untrue.
  • A paper alleged to be an undertaking signed by an accused (Kshitish Chandra Deb Rai) was open to suspicion.
  • The absence of medical evidence was notable despite claims that two complainant members were severely injured and hospitalized for about 25 days.
  • Given these lacunae and discrepancies, the Court found abundant reasons to distrust the prosecution evidence and concluded it did not establish the incident as narrated (in time, place and circumstance) nor the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

On the Sessions Judge's comment that the majority verdict was "deliberately perverse" to secure the acquittal of an educated accused, the Court:

  • Recalled its prior observation in Emperor v. Dhananjoy Raha about the impropriety of extra-judicial observations made in letters of reference under section 307 CrPC.
  • Gave the Sessions Judge an opportunity to explain the grounds for his remark and set out the Judge's explanation in full in the record.
  • Noted the impropriety and unfairness of making behind-the-back imputations against jurors—such imputations are not assisted by the record, cannot be verified by jurors (who have no opportunity to state their reasons), and are unfair both to the jurors and to the judicial process.
  • Emphasized that a trial Judge may disagree with a jury and is obliged to express his view on the merit; however, the Judge should not make speculative reflections about jurors' motives that are unsupported by evidence on the record.
  • Stressed that any action against a jury for alleged misconduct can only follow if misconduct is established by legal evidence—citing English authorities (Emperor v. Olu Mahamad; Davies v. Pierce note; Witham v. Lewis; R. v. Yeadon; R. v. Fowler; R. v. Murphy; Winsor v. Queen) as illustrating that remedies like discharge and retrial are tied to proof of misconduct.
  • Criticized the Judge's assumption about the religious identity of the minority juror and recalled the Court's previous disapproval (Nibaran v. King Emperor) of basing credibility estimations on communal classification.

Taking the foregoing together, the Court concluded there was no admissible evidence before it establishing juror misconduct or justifying rejection of the majority verdict; the deficiencies in the prosecution case independently supported acceptance of the majority verdict of not guilty.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Reference discharged; the verdict of the majority of the Jury is accepted; all the accused are acquitted and discharged from their bail.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The accused named in the reference are acquitted and discharged from their bail.
  • Procedural guidance: The judgment emphatically cautions against extra-judicial imputations by a trial Judge about the motives or honesty of jurors when such remarks are unsupported by evidence on the record. While a Judge may disagree with a jury, speculative reflections about jurors' motives are improper and unhelpful to appellate consideration.
  • Standard for action on alleged juror misconduct: The Court reiterates that no remedial action (such as ordering a new trial) can be taken unless juror misconduct has been established by evidence admissible in law; the decision cites English authorities to illustrate this principle.
  • On credibility and communal classification: The Court reaffirms disapproval of assessing credibility or interpreting verdicts by reference to communal or religious classifications of jurors or witnesses (recalling Nibaran v. King Emperor).
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any new statutory rule; it accepts the majority jury verdict in this case and explains the limits on a Judge's extra-judicial comments and the necessity for proof before impeaching a jury.
B.M.S
Reference discharged.

    Mamfru Chaudhuri v. Emperor

    Mookerjee and Chatterjea, JJ.:— This is a reference under section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of fifteen accused persons; they were tried jointly with another who has been acquitted by the Court below. The accused were charged with offences under sections 147, 148 and 325 read with sections 149, 343 and 379, Indian Penal Code. The Jury returned a divided verdict. By a majority of four to one, the Jury found all the accused not guilty of all the charges. The minority verdict was that all the accused except Abdul Kader were guilty of all the charges except the charge under section 379. The Sessions Judge accepted the unanimous verdict that Abdul Kader was not guilty and that Anwar Ali was not guilty under section 379. He further accepted the verdict of the majority of the Jury in so far as they acquitted Mamfru Chaudhuri, Fateh Chaudhury and Lakshmikanta of the charge under section 148; but he declined to accept the majority verdict in other respects and decided to refer the cases of the accused other than Abdul Kader (who was acquitted) to this Court for consideration.

    The prosecution was instituted by reason of an incident which is alleged to have taken place on the 11th January 1922. The subject matter of the dispute is a large khasmahal jote in Cox's Bazar sub-division which is now held under Government by Abdul Latif Chaudhury, who purchased it from Asrafali on the 30th March 1919. The land, which was formerly let out by Ashrafali to a number of tenants, abuts on a river on three sides and is protected by an embankment. This was damaged by a cyclone in 1916 with the result that Ashrafali took advantage of the catastrophe to bring the land into khas possession and to cultivate it by means of annual tenants. This caused some dissatisfaction among them, specially as Abdul Latif since his purchase in 1919 continued the policy initiated by his predecessor. This resulted in a series of small disturbances leading to proceedings under the preventive sections of the Criminal Procedure Code. The difficulty of the situation was increased when an adverse title was claimed by one Gaganeswari, the wife of Babu Ramratan Chaudhuri, who, set up some persons as her tenants. In such, circumstances there were as might have been expected, attempts by the rival claimants to secure exclusive possession of the disputed tract; this sufficiently accounts for the disturbed condition of the property during the years 1919, 1920 and 1921. On the 25th March 1921, there was a proceeding under section, 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which resulted in an order made on the 9th April 1921, when some members of the accused party were warned not to molest Abdul Latif and his men. This was apparently ineffectual, and a second proceeding under section 107 was instituted on the 1st July 1921, which terminated on the 15th November, 1921, when it is alleged the accused party filed a petition and agreed not to molest Abdul Latif and his adherents. Not satisfied with this Abdul Latif applied on the 13th December 1921, to the police for protection and a constable was deputed to keep the peace. On the 29th December 1921, the accused party informed the police that Abdul Latif was wrongfully cutting the paddy. On the 1st January 1922, the police intervened and directed both the parties not to enter the land till the orders of the Magistrate could be obtained. On the 3rd January 1922, the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Cox's Bazar made an order under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code directing several members of the accused party not to enter the disputed land. Abdul Latif was not slow to make the best use of this order and began to cut the paddy. This led to an application by the accused party to the Sub-divisional Magistrate on the 9th January 1922. He directed that if there were any ripe crops on the disputed land they should be cut and placed in the custody of a reliable third party. He farther directed the police to make an enquiry and to submit full particulars on or before the 16th January 1922. The case for the prosecution is that meanwhile on the 11th January 1922, the accused party assembled on the land in large numbers and by the use of force carried away their paddy worth Rs. 3,000. Information was sent to Abdul Latif who deputed his son Shamser Alam, his naib Habibulla, his durwan Rahmatulla and his muharir Harischandra Biswas. These with some of the tenants formed a party and pushed forward. The inevitable conflict followed. It is said that Lakshmikanta fired a pistol; Fatechan'd struck Shamser Alam with a gun; the latter in his turn fired a couple of rpunds from his gun. Lathis were freely used on both sides. Notwithstanding guns and lathis however no very serious injury was inflicted on the men on either side. But it is asserted that three members of the complainant party, namely, Shamser Alam. Habibulla and Tafazar Hossain were taken off to the khamar houses where the Chakma tenants had stacked their paddy and were there detained for the night. Tafazar Hossain was released next morning; but the other two were taken from place to place and were ultimately removed beyond the limits of the district of Chittagong into the district of Aracan in Burma, where they were let off: The first information was lodged by Maju Mia on the 12th January 1922, and the prosecution was commenced. The case was taken up by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, who committed the accused to stand their trial before the Court of Session, with the result already stated.

    We have examined the evidence on the record, and in this we have been assisted considerably by a careful analysis prepared by Mr. Dutt, who has placed before us all the relevant materials and commented on them. He has pressed us to hold that the story as narrated by the witnesses for the prosecution is substantially true and that the guilt of the accused has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Mr. Mukerji has, on the other handy reviewed the evidence and has contended that there are so many discrepancies in it that the Court should not form on the basis thereof, an opinion adverse to the accused and contrary to the verdict of the majority of the Jury. He has pointed out that the common object of the unlawful assembly as specified in the charge is said to have been twofold, namely, first to forcibly remove the paddy reaped and stacked, by complainant and other tenants of Abdul Latif, and secondly, to take possession of the land of the jote. No serious attempt was made in the evidence to establish the second of these objects; the evidence was directed in the main to show that the common, object of the assembly was to remove the paddy; which had been reaped and stacked by the tenants of Abdul Latif it is significant that nothing is stated in all this, as to who had cultivated the land and raised the crop. The case for the defence is that notwithstanding all the endeavours of Abdul. Latif, neither he nor his tenants ever obtained possession of the hand or brought it under cultivation. The majority of the accused disclaimed all interest in the land and denied participation in the alleged not four of them indeed pleaded an alibi. But five of the accused maintained that they held the land in the locality which had led to disputes with Abdul Latif. We are concerned, however, not so much with the truth or otherwise of the theory suggested by the accused as with the case for the prosecution. The proof of the case against the prisoners must depend for its support, not upon the absence or weakness of explanation on their part, but upon the positive affirmative evidence of their guilt that is given by the Crown. Tested from this point of view the evidence for the prosecution discloses serious flaws. A careful comparison of the diverse accounts of the incident as narrated by the witnesses for the prosecution shows material discrepancies and this indeed is the reason why the Sessions Judge accepted the majority verdict of not guilty in respect of the charge/under section 148 against Mamfru Chaudhuri, Fate Chaudhury and Lakshmikauta. There are obvious lacunae for instance not due chakma tenant has been examined, indeed none has ever been mentioned by name. We cannot further overlook suspicious circumstances as to the first information. As the Sub-divisional Magistrate pointed out in his order of commitment there is a divergence as to the time of the occurrence. According to the complainant it is stated to be about 1 or 2 P.M, the Sub-Inspector of Mangdaw in his case diary shows the hour of occurrence at 7 P.M in the heading tout in the body there is an erasure so as to make the time 2 P.M There is some plausibility in the suggestion made by Mr. Mukerji that an exaggerated, if not an uutrue story of abduction was started because the first information was lodged unusually late. Furthermore there are suspicious features with regard to a paper which is alleged to have been signed by one of the accused Kshitish Chandra Deb Rai on the 14th January 1922, and made over to the police as containing an undertaking with regard to the possession of the land. It is not necessary for us to set out all the discrepancies and exaggerations in the evidence; but finally we cannot ignore the absence of all medical evidence though two of the complainant's party are said to have been severely injured and detained in hospital for about 25 days. On the whole evidence we are of opinion that the majority of the Jury had abundant reasons to distrust the evidence adduced in support of the case for the prosecution. That evidence does not show that the incident alleged, happened at the time, in the place and under the precise circumstances narrated on behalf of the prosecution. We cannot in these circumstances accept the recommendation of the Sessions Judge and dissent from the verdict of the majority of the Jury.

    We cannot, however, leave the case here. We observe that the Sessions Judge in his letter of reference made the following observation:—

    “Four of the members of the Jury were Hindus and one Musalman. One of the accused Kshitish Chandra Deb Rai is an educated Hindu bhadralog. I cannot but think that the majority of the Jury returned a deliberately perverse verdict in order to secure the acquittal of this man”.

    We had occasion in the case of Emperor v. Dhananjoy Raha to record our opinion as to the manifest impropriety of an extra judicial observation of a somewhat similar character in a letter addressed by a Sessions Judge to this Court in connection with a reference under section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In the present case, we thought it right to give an opportunity to the Sessions Judge to explain the grounds for the opinion expressed, as Mr. Dutt, who appeared for the Crown, assured us that he had not been able to discover on a scrutiny of the record any material whatever which could justify the observation in question. We set out here the following extract from the explanation submitted by the Sessions Judge:

    “As regards the grounds of the remark in my letter of reference I cannot but think that the majority of the Jury returned a deliberately perverse verdict in order to secure the acquittal of this man (Khitish Chandra Deb Rai) the case was disposed of six months ago and I have not the record before me. I am not sure if the educational qualifications of the accused Kshitish appear from the record, but it was apparent during the trial that he had been educated in English. My impression is that he had a University education. I did not question the jurors as to the reasons for their verdict and I have no actual knowledge on the point whether the minority of one was the Muhammadan juror or one of the others.

    The opinion of the Judge as to what considerations have influenced the Jury to return a verdict which he considers wrong must always be a matter of inference. In the present case the grounds of my opinion may be stated concisely as follows:

    1. The evidence that a not took place and that Kshitish took a prominent part in it is overwhelming—

    2. In the circumstances it was impossible to find any of the accused guilty without returning a similar verdict against Kshitish.

    3. Kshitish is an educated Hindu bhadralog of much the same social standing as four of the five jurors.

    4. The Jury returned a verdict of not guilty by a majority of four to one.”

    We have ascertained from the Sessions Judge as also from Mr. Mukerji the names and status of the jurors in this case:

    1. Babu Surendranath Benerji, Foreman, clerk in charge of the office of District Traffic Superintendent, Assam-Bengal Railway, pay Rs. 220 a month.

    2. Babu Nirmal Chandra Das Gupta, typist, Chittagong Port Commissioners' office, pay Rs. 100.

    3. Babu Abinas Chandra Dutt, clerk, Chittagong Commissioner's office, pay Rs. 60.

    4. Babu Bijaychandra Baruya, ticket printer, Assam-Bengal Railway, pay Rs. 90.

    5. Maulvi Khalilur Rahman, Government pensioner, Rs. 27 a month.

    The impropriety of speculative remarks as to the motives which it is asserted by the Sessions Judge, might have influenced the opinion of the jurors or of a majority amongst them, cannot be exaggerated. The list of jurors is prepared, it may be presumed, with care and after enquiry. At the trial any juror may be challenged either by the accused or by the prosecutor. When the jurors have been chosen they are sworn under section 5 of the Indian Oaths Act, 1873, as prescribed by section 281 of the Criminal Procedure Code. By his oath the juror undertakes, that he will well and truly judge between his Sovereign and the prisoner at the Bar and will give a true verdict according to the evidence. In these circumstances, it may be reasonably expected that a judicial officer would hesitate to charge a juror that he has broken his oath. Such an imputation is unfair to the juror; for it must be remembered that it is made behind his back, without his knowledge and after he has finished, his labours, apart from the fact that a juror suffers from the disadvantage that the law does not give him an opportunity to state the grounds for his opinion. The imputation is unfair to the Judge himself; it detracts from the value of his opinion as it is impossible to determine how far his judgment, which the law requires him to express upon the evidence, may or may not have been affected by speculative considerations of this character. The imputation is unfair to the accused, who is entitled to have due weight attached by this Court to the opinion of the Jury as expressed by their verdict, without aspersions, unverified and un-verifiable, made against them. The imputation is unfair to this Court whereon the duty is imposed to consider the entire evidence and to acquit or convict the accused after giving due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and the Jury; such opinion of the Sessions Judge is manifestly his opinion on the merits of the case based on the materials placed before him at the trial and does not include his speculations as to what might or might not have influenced the jurors. We cannot but express our regret equally with our surprise that a Sessions Judge should make an observation of this character which is of no assistance in the determination of the case by this Court and may indeed create embarrassment as the acceptance of the opinion of the Judge on the merits of the case may be construed to involve an adoption of his aspersions upon the jurors. We are not called upon to consider what course a Judge should adopt if in the course of the trial the Jury should be proved by legal evidence to have misconducted themselves. In England in such circumstances it is said the Jury might be discharged and a new trial directed; see Emperor v. Olu Mahamad and the note to Davies v. Pierce(2) Tidds Practice (1828) volume II, page 922. A similar course might be followed if the misconduct was discovered after verdict; Witham v. Lewis(3) R. v. Yeadon(4), R. v. Fowler(5), R. v. Murphy(6), Winsor v. Queen(7). But whatever room for divergence of judicial opinion there may be as to the action to be taken when jurors have misconducted themselves, this much is plain that no action can be taken unless the misconduct has been established by what is regarded as evidence in the eye of the law. It would, in our opinion, be most unfortunate, if persons of respectability called upon to discharge the responsible duty of jurors were exposed to the risk of aspersions of this character. It is open to the Judge to disagree with the Jury; it is indeed incumbent upon him to do so, if he is clearly of opinion that such a course is necessary for the ends of justice; but this does not require that he should make reflections upon the conduct of the jurors, which are not supported by evidence on the record. We further observe that in this case the Judge has assumed that the Muhammadan juror must have been in the minority though the Jury included Hindus, Buddhists and Mahomedans. We do not appreciate the bearing of this upon the decision of the case, and we need only recall the disapproval expressed by this Court in Nibaran v. King Emperor where the estimate of the trial Judge as to the credibility of witnesses was made dependent upon his classification of them as Hindus and Muhammadans.

    After the most anxious consideration of the entire evidence in this case, we have come to the conclusion, that the reference must be discharged, the verdict of the majority of the Jury accepted and all the accused acquitted and discharged from their bail.

    B.M.S
    Reference discharged.

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    Comments

    Mamfru Chaudhuri v. Emperor
    (Oct 3, 1923)