Rankin, C.J:— In my opinion, the judgment of the learned Judge is right. The instrument before us is a promissory note. It is payable, in the first place, to Haridas Banerji. It is also payable to “bearer” and it is payable on demand in my judgment, the learned Judge was right in holding that it is sit by section 25 of the Indian Paper, Currency Act (X of 1923). That section is taken from the Bank Charter Act of 1844 (Sir Robert Peel's Act) where a similar provision was made, not, however, with reference to “any person” but only with reference to banks. It was part of the prohibition of issuing bank notes, except so far as regards Certain banks, who by that statute were permitted to continue to issue. By the Indian Act “No person in British India shall draw, accept, make or issue any bill of exchange, hundi? promissory note or engagement for the payment of money payable to bearer on demand.” In this case, although the name of Haridas Banerji is on the face of the instrument, it is an instrument that is payable to bearsr on demand. The learned Judge has pointed out that there is authority for saying that the mere mention of an individual on the instrument does not make the section inapplicable. Mian Bakhsh v. Bodhiya and Chidambaram Chettiar v. Ayyasawmi Thevan. So far, then, as regards the claim upon the maker of this promissory note, it would seem that the claim must be founded upon an illegal document. It is suggested that, in this case, the plaintiffs who are endorsees for value can at all, events sue their own endorsers and that line of reasoning was developed in the case of Arunachalam Chettiar v. Narayanam Chettiar. But in a subsequent case, namely, in the case of Alagappa Chetty v. Alagappa Chetty, it was pointed out by a Division Bench that “there can be no estoppel against a clear injunction of a statute” and, in my opinion, the moment it is seen that this being a promissory note cannot be a document covered by the proviso to section 25, it becomes impossible to deny that even a holder in due course is bound by the provision of the section and that an endorsee cannot on the basis of the instrument make his claim against the endorser. Iny judgment, the opinion of the learned Judge is correct and the plaintiff's suit must fail and this appeal must be dismissed with costs.
Buckland, J.:— I agree.
Attorneys for appellants: Dutt & Sen.
Attorneys for respondents: G.N Dutt & Co., A.N Roy Chowdhury.
S.M
Appeal dismissed.