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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
  • Beasley, C
Acts
  • Section 73 or other sections of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act;
  • Sections 92 and 93 and Rule 8, Order 1, Schedule 1, Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Section 73 Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act,
  • Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, particularly Section 73,
  • provisions of Section 73(2). Hindu Religious Endowments Act,
  • provisions of Section 73, Hindu Religious Endowments Act,
  • provisions of Section 92(1). An amendment of Act XX
  • Section 73, Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act,
  • SECTION 92 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 73, Hindu Religious Endowments Act.
  • Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act.
  • provisions of Section 92 (1).
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
  • Beasley, C
Acts
  • Section 73 or other sections of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act;
  • Sections 92 and 93 and Rule 8, Order 1, Schedule 1, Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Section 73 Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act,
  • Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, particularly Section 73,
  • provisions of Section 73(2). Hindu Religious Endowments Act,
  • provisions of Section 73, Hindu Religious Endowments Act,
  • provisions of Section 92(1). An amendment of Act XX
  • Section 73, Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act,
  • SECTION 92 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 73, Hindu Religious Endowments Act.
  • Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act.
  • provisions of Section 92 (1).
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from a judgment of Waller, J., arising from a suit originally against seven defendants concerning alleged maladministration of a temple trust in the Chingleput District. The plaintiffs sought various reliefs (including removal of a trustee, an account and other remedies) which are identified in the plaint as being properly obtainable under Section 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. It was alleged that maladministration by a trustee (Defendant No. 1) resulted in certain temple property being alienated and coming into the hands of other defendants.

The Endowments Board had granted the sanction contemplated under the Act. In the lower court the plaintiffs' counsel did not press the claim against Defendant No. 1 (also a trustee), and that suit against Defendant No. 1 was dismissed because the plaintiff could not pursue that remedy in the High Court in view of the provisions of Section 73. The remaining defendants included several alienees of trust property; all alienees except Defendant No. 2 accepted the lower court's treatment (that transfers might be inquired into). Defendant No. 2, an alienee of the most valuable trust property (wholly situated in Madras), appealed on the ground that the suit against him falls within Section 73(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act and that this Court therefore lacked jurisdiction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit between trustees of a temple and private alienees (strangers to the trust) claiming recovery or setting aside of alleged wrongful alienations is covered by Section 73 (including subsection (2)) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act so as to deprive the High Court of jurisdiction.
  2. Whether the mere fact that proof of an alienation requires evidence of maladministration is sufficient to attract the operation of Section 73(2) (and thereby the special procedure) to suits against alienees who are strangers to the trust.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Defendant No. 2)

  • The appellant argued that the wording of Section 73(2) should be read broadly: any suit in which the question of administration or management of a religious endowment arises (even incidentally) is governed by Section 73 and the special procedure, thereby ousting the ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court.
  • He relied on the decision in Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi v. Temple Committee (reported) to support a broad construction that issues touching administration attract Section 73.
  • The appellant further contended that even if Section 92 (CPC) did not directly apply, proving the plaintiff's case against an alienee would necessarily require evidence that the alienation resulted from mismanagement by a trustee, and that this factual overlap should bring the claim within Section 73.

Respondent's Position (as represented in the judgment)

  • The respondents (and the lower court) proceeded on the basis that suits between trustees and strangers/alienees for recovery of trust property are not the kind of suits contemplated by Section 73 (or by Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code) — those sections and the corresponding procedure apply to suits directed against trustees or concerning administration in the context of trustee-worshipper or inter-trustee disputes, not to suits against unrelated alienees.
  • It was submitted (and accepted by the Court) that Section 73 does not broaden the substantive reliefs beyond what Section 92 (CPC) allowed previously, and consequently does not extend the special procedure to suits against alienees which previously fell outside Section 92.
  • It was also pointed out that other alienees had accepted the lower court's position and that, even if successful here, the appellant would not gain a bar of limitation against filing the same claim in the District Court (Chingleput), undermining the practical utility of the appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi v. Temple Committee (Tinnevelly) — A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 101 Held that a suit to establish the plaintiff's personal right as hereditary trustee of a village temple was not a suit in respect of administration or management under Section 73 (i.e., it was a claim to a private right, not a claim about administration). The court distinguished that decision from the present facts: it concluded that Vythilinga Pandara concerned a private/hereditary right and did not support the appellant's broad contention that any suit touching administration automatically falls under Section 73.
Venkatarama Iyengar v. Kasturi Ranga Ayyangar (Full Bench) — 33 C. 789 Held that a suit to recover trust property from its alienees does not come within Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code (i.e., Section 92 did not apply to suits against strangers/alienees). The court relied on this Full Bench authority to support the conclusion that a suit against alienees is outside Section 73 of the Madras Act (since Section 73 reproduces parts of Section 92 but does not extend it to suits against alienees).
Burden Das v. Chooni Lal — (1917) M.W.N. 400 Principle: the section (Section 92 / corresponding old code provision) is directed against trustees and has been held not to apply as against strangers (alienees). The court cited this case as authority for the proposition that suits contemplated by Section 92 (and by analogy Section 73) are suits directed at trustees, and thus do not extend to suits against alienees.
Sajedur Raja Chowdhry v. Gour Mohan Das — 24 C. 418 Held in one case that a claim to eject an alienee could be joined with a claim for administration of the trust that falls within the section. The court noted this decision but rejected its reasoning (calling the latter claim open to the charge of misguide) and observed that a later decision dissented from it (Budhsingh Dudhuri).
Budhsingh Dudhuri v. Niradbaran Ray — 2 C.L.J. 431 Express dissent from the decision in Sajedur Raja Chowdhry; supports the view that the claim to eject an alienee should not be treated as within the scope of the section. The court preferred this dissenting view and agreed that joining an ejectment claim against an alienee with a Section 92-type administration claim was not correct.
Abdur Rahim v. Mohamad Barkat Ali — (Privy Council) A.I.R. 1928 P.C. 16 Held that the legislature did not intend Section 92 (CPC) to cover all suits founded upon any breach of trust for public, charitable or religious purposes irrespective of the relief sought; only suits claiming the reliefs specified in subsection (1) are to be instituted under its procedure. The court relied on the Privy Council's articulation to support the narrow construction: the Legislature did not enact a blanket provision to require all such trust-related suits to follow the Section 92 procedure; by parity Section 73 should not be read to oust jurisdiction in the present context.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a textual and purposive analysis of Section 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act in relation to Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The core analytical steps were:

  1. Examination of the text and scope: The Court observed that while Section 73 reproduces some parts of Section 92 (CPC) and provides for certain reliefs, it does not, on its face, expand the class of suits to which the Section 92-type procedure applies. The judge considered whether Section 73 was intended to embrace any relief that could not formerly have been obtained under Section 92, and concluded it was not.
  2. Distinction of party relationships: The Court distinguished suits that are intra-trust (trustee v. trustee or worshippers v. trustees) — which plainly fall within the regulatory and administrative reach of the Act — from suits between trustees and entirely unrelated alienees (strangers), where different considerations apply. The Court emphasized that Section 92 and its counterpart in the Madras Act are traditionally directed against trustees and do not apply to suits against strangers.
  3. Assessment of precedents: The Court reviewed authority (including the Full Bench in Venkatarama Iyengar and the Privy Council in Abdur Rahim) holding that Section 92-type provisions were not intended to sweep in all suits touching trust administration and that suits to recover trust property from alienees lie outside Section 92. The Court also addressed the appellant's reliance on Vythilinga Pandara by observing that that decision concerned a claim to a private hereditary right and did not support a broad reading of Section 73.
  4. Rejection of the 'incidental administration' argument: The Court rejected the appellant's further contention that whenever proof against an alienee required demonstration that the alienation resulted from mismanagement, Section 73(2) would be immediately attracted. The Court regarded such an interpretation as an impermissible and wide amendment of subsection (2) by implication — depriving litigants of their choice of forum without express enactment — and therefore unsustainable.
  5. Conclusion on jurisdiction: Applying the legal principles and authorities, the Court concluded that the learned trial judge was correct in holding that the High Court had jurisdiction to proceed against the appellant (Defendant No. 2) and that Section 73 did not oust jurisdiction in this instance.

Holding and Implications

Holding: THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Implications and direct consequences (based exclusively on the opinion's content):

  • The High Court's jurisdiction to proceed with the suit against Defendant No. 2 was affirmed; the trial court was correct to continue the proceedings.
  • The decision applies the established principle that suits to recover trust property from alienees (strangers) are not within the scope of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and, by parity, are outside the scope of Section 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act as contended by the appellant.
  • The other alienees' positions (who accepted the lower court's treatment) remain unchanged by this appeal. The opinion records that even if the appellant were successful, there would be no bar by limitation to a suit claiming the same reliefs being filed in the District Court at Chingleput, underscoring that the appeal provided no effective advantage to the appellant.
  • The Court's judgment follows existing authorities and applies them to the facts; the opinion does not purport to lay down a novel or expansive rule extending Section 73 to suits against alienees beyond what prior authorities permit.

This summary is drawn solely from the text of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what the judgment contains.

Show full summary ...

    Hazarimall Chandukchand And Anr. v. N.R. Vedachala Chettiar And Anr.

    1. This is an appeal from a judgment of Waller, J. He had before him a suit claiming reliefs against seven defendants. Defendant No 1 was one of the trustees of a temple in the Ohingleput District and the beliefs sought against him were his removal from trusteeship, an account and various other beliefs which are properly to be obtained under Section 73, Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. It was alleged that he had badly administered the trust and that as a result of the maladministration, some [property belonging to the temple and set out in the plaint got into the hands of the other defendants. The only defendant appealing here is defendant No. 2 and he is admittedly the alliance of the most valuable of all the trust property and that property is wholly situate in Madras. It is quite true that the suit has all the appearances of a suit under the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. The sanction Of the Endowments Board has been obtained and the reliefs sought are, as already pointed out, reliefs which are properly obtainable under that Act But something happened in the lower Court. Mr. Narasimha Ayyar who was appearing for the plaintiffs did not press his claim against defendant No. 1. It should be remarked that plaintiff No. 1 is also a trustee of the temple and, whether it was so stated at the time or not, it is quite clear that he could not have pursued his remedy here against defendant No. 1 by reason of the fact that the suit in this High Court was barfed by the provisions of Section 73, Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. Accordingly the suit against defendant No. 1 was dismissed. That leaves only the alienees. Of these the alienees other than defendant No. 2 have been content with the position of affairs as decided in the lower Court which was that, as regards the suit properties, the question whether their transfers can be set aside is to be inquired into. Defendant No. 2 appeals. His contention here is that the claim against him is one within the provisions of Section 73(2). Hindu Religious Endowments Act, and that this Court therefore has no jurisdiction to try the suit. He puts forward this contention by reason of the wording of that sub-section which is as follows:

    Sections 92 and 93 and Rule 8, Order 1, Schedule 1, Civil Procedure Coda, 1908; shall have no application to any suit claiming any relief in respect of the administration or management of a religious endowment and no suit in respect of such administration or management shall be instituted except as provided by this Act.

    2. These words, it is argued, mean that any suit between any parties in which the question of the administration of a religious endowment comes into question immediately attracts the provisions of Section 73, Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. It is argued that that section is wide enough to embrace any suit in which such a matter has to be considered. The appellant prays in aid Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi v. Temple Committee, Tinnevelly Circle 133 Ind. Cas. 14 : A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 101 : 54 M. 1011 : 34 L.W. 254 : Ind. Rul. (1931) Mad. 702 : 61 M.L.J. 815, a decision of a Bench of this Gourt consisting of Curgenven and Cornish, JJ. There, what the court had to consider was a claim of a purely personal nature. It was a suit to establish the plaintiff's personal right as hereditary trustee of a certain village temple; and it was held that the provisions of section 73 did not apply to any such claim. Then the Bench went on to state as follows:

    The suit raises no issue as to the manner in which the trust property has been administered or should in future be administered.

    3. That, it is argued, is a decision to the effect that in all cases where there arises a question involving the consideration of administration of trust property, the provisions of Section 73, Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, are at once attracted. In my view, that is going much beyond what was expressed in that decision. What we have got to consider here is whether in a case where trustees of a temple are suing entire strangers to the temple, the provisions of Section 73, Hindu Religious Endowments Act, apply at all. As between a trustee of a temple and other trustees of the temple or as between the worshippers of a temple and the trustees of a temple and the persons interested in the temple, clearly when questions of administration of the trust arise, those are matters which come within the scope of Section 73, Hindu Religious Endowments Act. But entirely different considerations apply where the parties are on the one hand trustees of a temple and on the other hand entire strangers who are claiming to be alienees of property wrongly obtained by them through the maladministration of a trustee. It seems to me that there is nothing in Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, which has not been taken bodily out of that section and placed either in Section 73 or other sections of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act; and is seems to me clear that the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, particularly Section 73, does not embrace any relief which could not formerly have been obtained under the procedure set out in Section 92, Civil Procedure Code. It is admitted that such a claim as this would not have been one which was within the provisions or subject to the procedure of Section 92, Civil Procedure Code. Except for the decision of the Bench already referred to and some observations which appear in a Full Bench case, viz., Venkatarama Iyengar v. Kasturi Ranga Ayyangar 33 C. 789 : 10 C.W.N. 581, at page 232, no authorities have been quoted in support of the extreme contention of the appellant here. In that case the Fall Bench was dealing with a case very similar to this and it held that the claim there was not one which was within the provisions of Section 92 Civil Procedure Code, It is true that at the end of his j udgment Seshagiri Iyer, J, says at page 232Pages of 40 Mad.--[Ed.] as follows If I may venture a suggestion the time is come for the intervention of the Legislature to insert a clear and unambiguous provision in the Code of Civil Procedure that all reliefs relating to public, religious and charitable trusts, except those which partake of the character of personal or communal rights, should be litigated only under the provisions of Section 92(1). An amendment of Act XX of 1863 may be necessary to give full effect to this suggestion.

    4. Then Phillips, J., makes similar observations. It is suggested that it was in consequence of those expressions of opinion that Section 73, Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, came to be drafted in the form it is. It is curious that it should be suggested that observations made in 1917 were the reason and cause of a Statute which was only passed ten years later. Personally I can see no connection between those observations and Section 73 of the Act. There is ample authority in support of the position that Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, and the corresponding section of the old Oode do not apply to suits between trustees of a temple and alienees from a trustee of a temple of trust property. In Burden Das v. Chooni Lal 38 Ind. Cas. 73 : 40 M. 212 : 31 M.L.J. 777 : 20 M.L.T. 490 : 5 L.W. 625 : (1917) M.W.N. 400, Woodroffe, J., says at page 804. Page of 33 C.--[Ed] It is on this principle, viz., that the suit contemplated by the section is directed against trustees, that it has been held that as against strangers it does not apply.

    5. He then sets out a number of decisions two of which are decisions of this High Court on that point establishing that principle, and then continue:

    It has doubtless been held in one case that, where there is a claim for administration of trust which fulls within the section, a claim to eject an alienee may be joined with it; Sajedur Raja Chowdhry v. Gour Mohan Das 24 C. 418. But the latter claim does not, in my opinion, come within the scope of the section and is open to the charge of misguide, and the decision has been dissented from in a later case Budhsingh Dudhuri v. Niradbaran Ray 2 C.L.J. 431, with which I agree.

    6. This decision of the Calcutta High Court was one under the corresponding section of the old Code. There is further authority to be found with regard to section 2 of the present code in a decision of the Privy Council: Abdur Rahim v. Mohamad Barkat Ali 108 Ind. Cas. 361 : A.I.R. 1928 P. C. 16 : 55 I. A. 96 : 55 C. 519 : 9 P.L.T. 65 : I.T.T.40 Cal. 19 27 L. W. 339 32 C.W.N. 482 : 26 A.L.J. 464 : 54 M.L.J. 609 : 30 Bom. L.R. 774 : 48 C.L.J. 55 : (1928) M.W.N. 926. (P. C, Lord Sinha in delivering the judgment of their Lordships states at page 526.

    It is urged broadly on behalf of the respondents that all suits founded upon any breach of trust for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, irrespective of the relief sought, must be brought in accordance with the provisions of s, 92, Civil Procedure Code. The short answer to that argument is that the Legislature has not so enacted. If it has so intended, it would have said so in express words, whereas it said, on the contrary, that only suits claiming any of the reliefs specified in Sub-section (1) shall be instituted in conformity with the provisions of Section 92 (1).

    7. Nevertheless the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant here is that, although suits between a trustee of a temple and trespassers or alienees from the trustee of temple are not within Section 92, Civil Procedure Code directly, it is necessary to prove the plaintiff's case by evidence that the alienation was the result of mismanagement by that trustee, the provisions of Section 73 Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, are at once attracted. I can see no warrant for any such contention. To so contend is to very widely amend the words in Sub-section (2) of that section. If it had been intended to deprive the litigant of his right of the choice of the forum, it would have been done so by express enactment and not left to be a matter of mere implication. I cannot myself see that that deprivation is even implied in subs. 2 to that section. Under these circumstances it is quite clear to me that the learned trial Judge was quite right in deciding that the court had jurisdiction to proceed with the case as 8gainst the appellant. It is very difficult to see with what object this appeal bas been presented. The other alienee defendants have been quite content with the position imposed upon them in the lower Court and it is conceded here by the learned Counsel for the appellant that there can be no bar of limitation even in the event of the appellant's success here, to a suit claiming exactly the same reliefs being filed in the District Court at Chingleput. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to see what the appellant had to gain by presenting this appeal unless it be time. This appeal must be dismissed with costs.

    Cornish, J.

    8. I agree. I find it difficult to understand hew the judgment reported in Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi v. Temple Committee, Tinnevelly 133 Ind. Cas. 14 : A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 101 : 54 M. 1011 : 34 L.W. 254 : Ind. Rul. (1931) Mad. 702 : 61 M.L.J. 815, to which I was a party, is supposed to give support to the appellant's contention that if a (Suit raises a question touching the validity of an alienation of trust property by a true-tee, it is a suit in respect of the administration or management of that trust within Section 73, Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. The sole question in that case was whether a suit to establish a claim to the hereditary trusteeship of a temple was barred by Section 73. We held that it we not for the reason that it was a suit to establish a private right and not a suit in respect of the administration or management of a temple. In my opinion the effect of Section 73 of the Act is simply this that a suit which could only be instituted by the Advocate-General or some persons with his consent under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code must, when it relates to a religious endowment governed by the Act, be institutted by the Endowments Board or by some person having an interest and with the consent of the Board, It is pointed out in Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi v. Temple Committee, Tinnevelly 133 Ind. Cas. 14 : A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 101 : 54 M. 1011 : 34 L.W. 254 : Ind. Rul. (1931) Mad. 702 : 61 M.L.J. 815, that though some of the reliefs specified in Section 92, Civil Procedure Code are reproduced verbatirk in Section 73 of the Act, the others are provided for elsewhere in the Act. And as it has been held by the Full Bench in Venkata Rama Iyengar v. Kasturi Ranga Ayyangar 33 C. 789 : 10 C.W.N. 581, that a suit to recover trust property from its alienees does not come within section 92 of the code, I think it follows that such a suit is equally outside the Escape of Section 73 of the Act, and that this appeal fails.

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    Comments

    Hazarimall Chandukchand And Anr. v. N.R. Vedachala Chettiar And Anr.
    (Oct 27, 1931)