Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

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Case Number

Appeal No. 339 of 1931

Judges

Walsh, J.

Acts

Section 3, Clause 5 of the Estates Land Act,

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Smart Summary

Legal Opinion Summary — Receiver Appointment in Partition Suit (Tanjore)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges an order of the District Judge of Tanjore appointing a receiver in O.S. No. 2 of 1929. The plaintiff (respondent) instituted a partition suit in respect of his share in a village and sought a decree directing division of lands by metes and bounds, delivery to him of lands appertaining to his 9 and 7/16ths pangus (Schedules A and C), division of Schedule B lands, and ascertainment and delivery of the plaintiff's melwaram rights. As an alternative, the plaintiff sought confirmation of possession of lands in Schedule D and division of the remaining undivided lands.

The village is described as a mirasi village in Tanjore District with occupancy raiyats and three admitted classes of land: (1) iruvaram lands, (2) lands with tenant occupancy rights, and (3) waste/forest lands belonging to the melwaramdar. At a stage in the proceedings the plaintiff applied to the Collector under Section 3, Clause 5 of the Estates Land Act to be declared senior proprietor (to facilitate rent collection); that application was refused. The District Judge subsequently appointed a receiver to collect melwaram rents pending suit. Several defendants (some of whom appealed) contested the receiver's appointment. The present document records the appellate court's consideration of objections and the dismissal of the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a receiver may properly be appointed in the circumstances of this partition suit for the purpose of collecting melwaram rents pending determination of entitlements in the suit.
Whether (given the plaintiff's fractional share — 9 and 7/16ths pangus — and the possession claimed by many defendants) the appointment of a receiver would be an improper interference with the parties' possession or prejudicial to larger shareholders.
Whether procedural or factual matters asserted by defendants (delay in seeking a receiver; alleged absence of difficulty in collecting rents up to suit; impossibility of identifying boundaries) preclude the exercise of the court's discretion to appoint a receiver.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants / Defendants' Arguments

The appointment of a receiver is inappropriate in a partition suit (relying on authority stated to that effect).
The plaintiff owns only 9 and 7/16ths pangus of the 40 pangus in the village; the interests of larger shareholders should weigh against disturbing possession or appointing a receiver.
The petition for a receiver was filed two years after institution of the suit (delay argued as a ground against appointment).
There was no evidence that rents were difficult to collect prior to the suit; therefore appointment of a receiver was unnecessary.
Many defendants claim to be in possession of their respective shares and assert that the lands of each party are known — so appointment would disturb settled possession.
Defendants alleged it was impossible to identify many plots by pymash numbers (the pymash account being about a century old) and that boundaries vary with time, making on‑ground identification and distribution impracticable and likely to cause a scramble for property.
Some defendants asserted most raiyats own both warams of many lands and that no rent is payable to melwaramdars; this suggested that a receiver would be a mere representative of melwaramdars and have limited lawful scope.

Plaintiff's (Respondent's) Arguments

The plaintiff had attempted to obtain recognition as senior proprietor from the Collector (under the Estates Land Act) to facilitate rent collection but was refused; this refusal and resulting difficulty in collecting rents justified appointment of a receiver.
The plaintiff adduced documentary title (documents dated 1873, 1876 and 1881) to support his claim to his 9 and 7/16ths pangus.
Rents had not been paid for two years and some kudiwaramdars were said to have purchased small portions of melwaram pangus to obstruct the melwaramdars' rent collection, creating disputes and justifying protective intervention.
Two defendants (the 73rd and 59th) who hold 7 and 2 pangus respectively did not oppose the appointment of a receiver, and they have documentary evidence admitted in the record.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For (as stated in opinion)	Application by the Court (how the opinion uses the authority)
Bhupendra Nath Mukherjee v. Monohar Mukerjee, A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 456 at 458	Cited for the appellant (no specific principle attributed in the opinion beyond that it was quoted by appellant).	The case was listed among authorities relied on by the appellant; the opinion does not identify a distinct rule from it or rest its decision on this authority.
Kunhan Mohun v. Kannam Menon, A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 482	Quoted by appellant to support the proposition that a receiver could not be appointed in a partition suit.	The court characterized that case as peculiar and held it was not authoritative for the present point; it distinguished the case rather than following it.
Tireth Singh v. Shronami Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, A.I.R. 1931 Lah. 688	Cited by appellant (the opinion does not specify a concrete principle attributed to it in the text).	Listed among authorities presented by the appellant; the opinion does not indicate that the court treated it as decisive.
Poreshnath Mukerjee v. Omertro, [1890] 17 Cal. 614	Presented in the opinion as direct authority to the contrary of the proposition that a receiver cannot be appointed in a partition suit (i.e., supports appointment).	The court treated this as direct authority contrary to the appellant's contention and relied on it as support for the propriety of appointing a receiver in the present circumstances.
Supresanna v. Upendra Narain, A.I.R. 1914 Cal. 439	Also cited as direct authority to the contrary (supporting the appointment of a receiver despite the partition context).	The court regarded this decision as direct authority contrary to the appellant's argument and used it in support of affirming the lower court's exercise of discretion.
Woodroffe on Receivers (p.131) and Kerr on Receivers (p.5)	Textual authorities on the law and practice concerning receivers; cited by the appellant (no specific proposition extracted in the opinion).	Referenced among the materials cited for the appellant; the opinion does not indicate that these texts were decisive in the court's reasoning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the objections to the appointment of a receiver in a step‑by‑step fashion, focusing on the practicalities associated with rent collection, the nature of the parties' claims and possession, and the precedent on the appointment of receivers in partition suits. The core elements of the reasoning were:

Delay objection: Although the petition for a receiver was brought about two years after institution of the suit, the court observed the plaintiff had taken other steps (notably the application to the Collector for recognition as senior proprietor) to secure rent collection; this undercut the objection that the plaintiff had slept on his rights.
Credibility of difficulty in collection: The court accepted the plaintiff's factual assertions that tenants were postponing payment (alleging they themselves were melwaramdars or that they had to pay someone else) and that rents had not been paid for two years — facts which supported the need for protective interim measures.
Shareholding and support for receiver: Although the plaintiff held only 9 and 7/16ths pangus, the court noted that defendants who did not oppose the receiver (notably the 73rd and 59th defendants holding 7 and 2 pangus) together with the plaintiff accounted for about 18 and 7/16ths pangus — nearly half the village — indicating that a substantial portion of stakeholders either supported or did not oppose protective relief.
Vagueness of defendants' written statement and absence of specific prejudice: The defendants' written statement was described as vague about the shares each defendant owned and, critically, none of the objecting defendants identified a specific plot or definite interest that would be prejudiced by appointment of a receiver. The court emphasized that if an individual defendant had shown a particular, demonstrable prejudice (for example, by asserting exclusive ownership of a particular plot and that a receiver would prejudice that right), the court would have given weight to that contention. No such specific, substantiated prejudice was put forward.
Substantive difficulty of boundary identification and risk of scramble: The defendants argued that identification by pymash numbers was impracticable because the pymash accounts were old and the description of plots had changed; previous measurements and decrees were said not to reflect the "true state of things" which varied over time. The court treated this admission as indicating a real dispute about boundaries and ownership of specific plots and as evidence of a likely scramble that justified appointing a receiver to secure rents pending adjudication.
Effect of defendants' substantive claim that no rent is payable: Some defendants asserted they owned both warams and so no rent would be payable to melwaramdars, suggesting that the plaintiff would face difficulty in collecting rents even if ultimately entitled. The court regarded this as further evidence that a neutral mechanism (a receiver to collect and pay into court) was an appropriate protective measure.
Precedent and discretion: The court addressed the authorities cited for the appellant. It observed that Kunhan Mohun v. Kannam Menon had been relied upon to argue that receivers cannot be appointed in partition suits but found that case peculiar and not authoritative for the present circumstances. By contrast, the court identified Poreshnath Mukerjee v. Omertro and Supresanna v. Upendra Narain as direct authority to the contrary (i.e., supporting appointment of a receiver in analogous circumstances). On this basis the court concluded that the lower court had not abused its discretion in appointing a receiver.

Overall, the court weighed the practical difficulties (difficulty of rent collection, disputed boundaries, and the risk of disorderly appropriation of rents) against the absence of any appellant who demonstrated a concrete and particular prejudice from appointment. The court therefore upheld the lower court's exercise of discretion.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is DISMISSED. The appellate court upheld the District Judge's order appointing a receiver and dismissed the appeal with costs, the costs to be costs in the suit.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The appointment of a receiver by the District Judge of Tanjore in O.S. No. 2 of 1929 stands; the receiver is to collect melwaram rents as described in the lower court's order and pay them into Court pending final adjudication, and the appellants (defendants who challenged the order) are liable for costs as ordered.
Scope of the decision: The opinion affirms the court's discretion to appoint a receiver in the factual matrix before it — namely where collection of rents is shown to be difficult, where boundary and ownership disputes create a risk of scramble, and where objecting defendants do not demonstrate specific prejudice. The opinion distinguishes an authority (Kunhan Mohun) relied on by appellants and treats other decisions (Poreshnath Mukerjee and Supresanna) as supporting the appointment. The opinion does not purport to lay down a broader, novel rule of law beyond affirming the proper exercise of judicial discretion on the facts before it.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the provided opinion text and does not include information beyond that material.

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Komaraswami Pillai And Others v. Sri Soundareswaraswami Temple, Muthupet .

1. This is an appeal against the order of the District Judge of Tanjore appointing a receiver in O.S No. 2 of 1929. Some of the defendants in the suit prefer this appeal. The plaintiff-respondent filed the suit for partition of his share in a certain village praying that the Court should pass a decree directing that the lands in the suit village be divided by metes and bounds and that the lands appertaining to his 9 and 7/16ths pangus in Schs. A and C might be delivered to him and that the lands in Sch. B might be so divided, and the lands over which the plaintiffs has to get his melwaram may also be ascertained and the melwaram right in these lands may be delivered to him. In the alternative it was prayed that if it is contended that the lands in the separate enjoyment of the various pangudars have been divided and exclusively belong to them, and if the Court comes to the same conclusion, then the possession of the lands mentioned in Sch. D may be confirmed to the plaintiff and the rest of the undivided lands whether enjoyed in common by all the pangudars or only by some of the pangudars may be divided and the plaintiff's share may be delivered to him.

2. The village is a mirasi one in Tanjore District in which there are occupancy raiyats. I may say at once that the suit has proceeded hitherto on the supposition that the village is one under the Estates Land Act. At a certain stage the plaintiff applied to the Collector to be declared as the senior proprietor under Section 3, Clause 5 of the Estates Land Act, to facilitate collection of rent. The defendants objected to the same on the ground that a suit was pending before the Court and it was refused, apparently on the ground that the plaintiff did not show that he owned the largest fraction of the property. There are admittedly three classes of lands in the village: (1) iruvaram lands, (2) lands in which the tenants have got occupancy rights and (3) waste lands and forest which belong to the melwaramdar. How the iruvaram has arisen in the village it is unnecessary to inquire at the present stage.

3. They are perhaps private lands of the landholder. The defendants did not object to the division of the waste lands. Certain facts are admitted which are these. The village which consists of 40 pangus had at one time belonged absolutely to one inamdar, but it has now been alienated in various directions to various persons. The plaintiff owns 9 and 7/16ths pangus. The defendants say that they are entitled to about 20 pangus. The plaintiff has got documents of title of 1873, 1876 and 1881 and it is an important point to be observed in this case that the 73rd defendant and the 59th defendant who did not oppose the appointment of receiver, own 7 pangus and 2 pangus respectively and they have also documentary evidence which is admitted. The other defendants have no documentary evidence to connect them with the original pangudars but the number of pangus that they own is not disputed. The plaintiff asked for the appointment of a receiver on the ground that his application to the Collector to be declared as the senior proprietor was dismissed, and so there would be difficulty in collecting the rents and that he had already found such difficulty. He stated that some of the kudiwaramdars have each purchased small portions for the purpose of obstructing the melwaramdars in the matter of collection of rents, and rents were not paid for two years. In para 6 of the plaint it is stated that as some of the tenants owning kudiwaram rights alone have purchased small portions of the melwaram pangus, they take advantage of their position and would not pay the rent properly and are creating disputes about the lands over which the melwaramdars have got both warams. The learned District Judge allowed the petition for the appointment of a receiver. In his order he says:

“I do not contemplate that a receiver should be asked to determine which lands are kudiwaram and which are iruvaram lands, which is part of the subject-matter of the suit. What I contemplate is that the receiver whose appointment I consider is necessary for the protection of the plaintiff's interest should be empowered to collect what represents the melwaram on all the lands in the village as if they were admittedly kudiwaram lands, that the melwaram so collected will be paid into Court and the parties heard with regard to their drawing shares of it if they can agree what shares they should draw pending suit. Their shares will then be adjusted at the final decision in the suit. If they cannot agree as to how the money should be shared during the hearing of the suit, the money may remain in Court or invested for their benefit.”

4. I shall now deal seriatim with the objections raised to this order. It is said that the petition was put in two years after the institution of the suit. But it will be seen that the plaintiff had taken further steps, though unsuccessfully, to try and get the rents collected by getting himself recognized as the senior landholder. Then it is said that there is nothing to show that there was any difficulty in collecting the rents up to the time of the suit. That might be so; but I see no reason to doubt his statement that the tenants were putting off payment of rent either by alleging themselves to be melwaiamdars also or that they have to pay it to somebody else.

5. The next ground alleged is that out of 40 pangus the plaintiff owns only 9 and 7/16th pangus and it is the interest of the larger shareholders which should be considered. The counter-affidavit against the petition for the receiver put in by defendant 40 says merely that he is conducting the case on behalf of a large number of defendants. As I have already said, defendants 73 and 59, who own 7 and 2 pangus respectively, did not oppose the application for a receiver, nor have they appealed against the order appointing a receiver. So that, of the 40 pangus in the village, those who wished for, or at least did not oppose, the appointment of a receiver held 18 and 7/16ths or nearly half. The defendants in the suit are no less than 233 in number and their written statement is entirely vague as to the shares each of them owns. Para 2 runs:

“It is true that the plaint village of Keelakurichi consists of 40 pangus, and that the plaintiff is the owner of 9 and 7/16ths thereof. But, it is not true that defendants 1 to 76 alone are the other pangudars.”

6. As to the other defendants some of them are stated to be also pangudars along, with defendants 4 to 76. It is also stated that some out of defendants 1 to 76 do not own any pangus. Thus as to the pangus which each of the defendants owns or whether they own the remaining pangus jointly, it is stated that:

“Most of the defendants own kudikani rights; in the kudivaram lands appertaining to 8 karais into which all the kudivaram lands in the village have been divided from time immemorial.”

7. Another significant extract from the written statement is made by the learned Judge in his order and it is characteristic of the statement put in by the defence in this case. It runs:

“Most of the defendants, raiyats, own both, warams in most of the lands and are not liable to pay any kind of rent to any melwaramdar and no rent is liable to be paid for their lands and neither the plaintiff nor any other melwaramdars are entitled to collect any rent. Hence any receiver will be only a representative of the melwaramdars and that only with respect to kudivaram lands the melwaram of which is not owned by the raiyats owning the kudivaram lights.”

8. The lower Court rightly observed that in the face of this statement it is unlikely that the plaintiff will be able to collect any rent even on the lands in which he may ultimately be found entitled to the rent.

9. The next objection urged is that as the plaintiff himself alleges that himself and the defendants are in possession of their respective shares it is not right to disturb this possession. The argument is that the lands of which each one is in possession are well known. The plaintiff no doubt states definitely which are his lands and which the defendants' and when asked for further particulars he has given a very detailed schedule with pymash numbers, extents, etc. In reply the defendants objected to this. In para 5 of the written statement they say that the real extent of Sch. B lands is much larger than that given in the plaint. As regards Sch. C lands, they deny that they belong to the melwaramdars exclusively and state that some of them are iruvaram lands and others kudivaram lands. In para 6 they say that the description of the plaint schedule lands by pymash numbers is not in accordance with the enjoyment of lands in the village and that

“it is not possible to identify most of the plots enjoyed by the several defendants by pymash numbers, as the description of the various plots contained in the pymash account has completely changed since the days of the pymash, which is one century old.”

10. So that according to these defendants there is no use giving pymash boundaries. In para 7 they say that the detailed description of the plaint lands given by the plaintiff is no improvement over the plaint description as the lands could not be identified even with the help of the said memo. In para 8 they make a very strong statement with reference to certain lands of the defendants which were handed over to the plaintiff in O.S No. 6 of 1889 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court of Tanjore, and about which the previous trustee of the plaint temple, which the plaintiff now represents, had accepted the Court measurement, that even that measurement does not correctly represent the right of the parties, “which vary from time to time.” The statement of the defendants clearly amounts to this: it is absolutely impossible to determine the boundaries on the ground, so much so that even a decree of measurement by a civil Court does not represent the true state of things which varies from time to time. This fact coupled with the statement that the real extent of Sch. B land is much larger than that given in the plaint clearly indicates that there is a dispute as to whether certain lands belong to the plaintiff's pangus or not and that there is likely to be a scramble for the property. If any single defendant had come forward and said:

“I own both warams in such and such a definite plot of land. It would prejudice me if a receiver is appointed,”

such a plea would have been worth attention. But here there is a vast number of defendants who at the best own slightly more than half the pangus in the village (I am speaking of course of these defendants who object to the appointment of a receiver) and none of those defendants who objects to the Court's orders has given the Court the smallest help by stating where his particular plot of ground is or what the extent of his pangu is. The following cases have been quoted for the appellant; Bhupendra Nath Mukherjee v. Monohar Mukerjee, A.I.R 1924 Cal. 456 at 458, Kunhan Mohun v. Kannam Menon . A.I.R 1924 Mad. 482. Tireth Singh v. Shronami Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, A.I.R 1931 Lah. 688; Woodroffe on Receivers, 131 and Kerr on Receivers, p. 5. It was argued on the strength of Kunhan Mohun v. Kannam Menon, that a receiver could not be appointed in a partition suit. That case is a peculiar one and I do not consider it to be on authority for the present point. There is direct authority to the contrary in Poreshnath Mukerjee v. Omertro . [1890] 17 Cal. 614. and Supresanna v. Upendra Narain . A.I.R 1914 Cal. 439. I am not therefore prepared to say that the lower Court has not exercised a proper discretion in appointing a receiver in this case. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs which will be costs in the suit.

P.R.S/B.V

11. Appeal dismissed.

Komaraswami Pillai And Others v. Sri Soundareswaraswami Temple, Muthupet .

Legal Opinion Summary — Receiver Appointment in Partition Suit (Tanjore)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants / Defendants' Arguments

Plaintiff's (Respondent's) Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Komaraswami Pillai And Others v. Sri Soundareswaraswami Temple, Muthupet .

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