Derbyshire, C.J:— On December 23rd, 1940, the District Magistrate of Dacca submitted his monthly statement showing the state of the files in the Courts of the Magistrates of his District at the end of November, 1940. In that statement the case No. G.R 660 of 1940—Emperor v. Rahamatali—under secs. 148, 325 and 353/188 of the Indian Penal Code was shown as pending for over three months in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Narayanganj. The explanation of the delay in the disposal concluded with the words—

“On the prayer of the C.S.I the case has since been adjourned sine die.”

Upon that the Registrar of this Court called for the record of the case from the District Magistrate of Dacca. It was submitted to this Court and was seen by the Criminal Bench whereupon on February 28th, 1941, a Rule was issued on the District Magistrate of Dacca to show cause why the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer of Narayanganj dated December 3rd, 1940, should not be set aside and such other and further order made as to this Court seems fit and proper.

The record of the case is as follows:

On August 3rd, 1940, the accused Rahamatali and Sultan were brought up under arrest charged under secs. 148—rioting armed with deadly weapons, 325—voluntarily causing grievous hurt, 326—voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means, 324—which is the same setting out the nature of the offence and sec. 188 disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant. The accused were remanded until August 17th, 1940. Both the accused were suffering from wounds and injuries.

The first information report reveals that some thirty persons were involved in a not out of which this charge arose. On August 12th, 1940, another accused, Muzafar Rahaman, was brought under arrest and he was committed to Hajat till August 17th 1940. On August 14th, 1940, accused Muzafar Rahaman was released on bail. On August 17th, 1940, the Sub-Inspector asked for time and time was allowed till August 31st, 1940. The accused were on bail. The accused Rahamatali and Sultan were admitted to bail on August 22nd, 1940. On August 31st, 1940, the case was adjourned to September 7th, 1940, the accused being still on bail. On September 7th, 1940, a charge sheet was received against the accused Rahamali, Sultan, Muzafar and Kismatali under secs. 148, 325, 353 and 188 of the Indian Penal Code. Kismatali was said to be absconding. A warrant was issued for his arrest. Apparently he is still absconding. On September 27th, 1940, the Court Sub-Inspector asked for the withdrawal of the case against Kismatali and he was discharged under sec. 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

On October 2nd, 1940, the Sub-Divisional Officer fixed October 23rd and October 24th, 1940, for trial and directed fifteen prosecution witnesses to attend on each day. On October 23rd, thirteen prosecution witnesses and two accused were present, but the accused Rahamali did not appear. The Sub-Divisional Officer fixed November 13th, 1940, for the prosecution witnesses to appear. On October 28th, 1940, accused Rahamali appeared and he was granted a fresh bail of Rs. 800 until the date fixed.

On November 13th, 1940, the Court Sub-Inspector asked for an adjournment. All the accused were present and an adjournment was allowed until November 22nd, 1940. The accused were given bail as before and the prosecution witnesses were bound over on personal recognisance of Rs. 25 to appear on call.

On November 22nd, 1940, all the accused were present and the Sub-Divisional Officer made an order:

“Call the witnesses for 16.12.40 when the case will be heard.”

The accused were again granted bail. On December 3rd, 1940, there was an application by the Court Sub-Inspector as follows:

I have the honour to apply for a remand of 6 week i.e, until 2nd week of January, 1941, in the case of Emperor v. Rahamatali under secs. 148, 379, 353 of the Indian Penal Code to enable me to obtain Government orders regarding the prosecution of the case. I have just received orders from the Superintendent of Police, Dacca, to pray for an adjournment until the 2nd week of January 1041. In this the witness may be asked not to attend on 16th December, 1940, if they have already been snmmoned.”

Upon that the following order was made:

“The case will now be considered adjourned sine die. Outside P.W.S to give personal recognisance of Rs. 50 to appear on call. Accused on bail as before.”

Since then no further steps whatever were taken in this matter beyond that this Court called for the record and issued this Rule.

The District Magistrate of Dacca wrote a reply enclosing a report from the Sub-Divisional Officer of Narayanganj to himself, dated March 8th, 1941. It is headed: “The Murapara Rioting case,” and reads as follows:

With reference to the Additional District Magistrate's Memo. No. 3440, dated Dacca, the 6th March, 1941, regarding the explanation required from me by the Hon'ble High Court in connection with my order dated 3rd December, 1940, in Case No. G.R 660 of 1940 which concerns the not at Murapara, I have the honour to submit my explanation as follows:—

The order under reference states that “the case will now be considered adjourned sine die.” It will be seen from the order sheet that on 22nd November, 1940, a definite date was fixed for the hearing of the case namely, 16th December, 1940. On 3rd December, 1940, I was informed that the Crown would ask for a further adjournment on the hearing date pending the receipt of instructions regarding the prosecution by the local Court Sub-Inspector. On two previous occasions, namely, 23rd October, 1940, and 13th November, 1940, the Crown had also prayed for an adjournment for the same reason, although on the first of these dates there was an additional reason for an adjournment since one of the accused did not appear. In the circumstances since I had no assurance that the case could be proceeded with on any date with the Court might fix, I passed the order of sine die adjournment for the convenience of the Court and the witnesses, both official and private and in order to save public funds. The local Court Sab-Inspector had instrnotions that the Court was to be informed whenever the Crown were prepared to proceed with the case.”

The District Magistrate of Dacca in a covering letter to the Registrar dated March 11th, 1941, wrote:

“I have the honour to refer to your letter No. 1786 Cr. dated 1st March, 1911 and in returning herewith the record of the case Emperor v. Rahamat-ali to forward a copy of the explanation submitted by the Sab-Divisional Officer, Narayan ganj. In my opinion, sines the Crown was unable to proceed with the case, the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 3rd December, 1940, was justified. The fact that the Crown is not yet in a position to proceed with the case shows uncontrovertibly that the Sub-Divisional Officer's order was Bound. I have the honour to add that the case is one of considerable public importance.”

The Crown has appeared before us this morning and the learned Advocate for the Crown has referred us to sec. 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a justification for the order that has been made. Sec. 344 reads as follows:

“(1) If, from the absence of a witness, or any other reasonable cause, it becomes necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn any enquiry or trial, the Court may, it thinks fit, by order in writing, stating the reasons therefor, from time to time, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody;

Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time,

(2) Every order made under this section by a Court other than a High Court shall be in writing signed by the presiding Judge or Magistrate.

Explanation—If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand this is a reasonable cause for a remand.”

There is no question of the absence, of a witness in this case. It has not been suggested that there was a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence and that further evidence may be obtained by a remand. The section states that “the Court may, if it thinks fit, by order in writing, stating the reasons therefor, from time to time, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable.”

The learned Sub-Divisional Officer has not stated any reasons in his order for a remand in this case. Whatever reasons he had for a remand in this case, it was his duty under this section to state them. In the absence of that the order is a bad one.

The section says that an enquiry or trial may be adjourned until such time as it considers reasonable. In this case there was a plea by the Court Sub-Inspector for a definite period of adjournment for six weeks. The learned Sub-Divisional Officer adjourned the case sine die with the result that no further proceedings have been taken. That is not the proper way to deal with the case.

For these reasons the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer of Narayanganj dated December 3rd, 1940, must be set aside and the case remitted to the Court from which it came with a direction that it be dealt with according to law. The attention of both the District Magistrate and the Sub-Divisional Officer is drawn in this connection to the provisions of sec. 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Henderson, J.:— I agree. The Magistrate could only adjourn the case for a reasonable cause. In the application by the Court Sub-Inspector the ground for the adjournment was taking orders from the Local Government.

Now, no orders from the Local Government were necessary at all. The prosecution could go on perfectly well without them. The Magistrate should, therefore, have prosecuted the matter further to discover why it was that the Police were unwilling to go on with the case. Unless they were able to produce some reasonable excuse he should have insisted that the trial should go on.

We are ourselves completely in the dark, and we do not know whether there was any real reason for an adjournment or not. The District Magistrate says nothing about it but is content with a vague statement to the effect that the Crown is not yet in a position to proceed with the case. Mr. Roy Chaudhuri who appears on behalf of the Crown is also in the dark and is unable to enlighten us. All that we can say is that on the proceedings on the record there was absolutely no reason whatever for adjourning this case.

P.C