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  • Section 7 and Article 12 of the Lim. Act,
  • Article 95, Lim. Act.2.
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • Section 7 and Article 12 of the Lim. Act,
  • Article 95, Lim. Act.2.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two plaintiffs brought a suit seeking recovery of possession of the muli right in the suit property, challenging a Court-sale held in September 1917 at the instance of defendant 1. The sale was in execution of a decree for costs obtained by defendant 1 against the plaintiffs' mother in A.S. Nos. 209 and 229 of 1913 (District Court, South Kanara). The plaintiffs and defendants 2, 3 and 4 are children of the lady against whom the decree for costs was passed and form an Aliyasanthana family. Their mother died shortly after the decree, leaving the children minors.

In the execution proceedings defendant 1 initially proposed guardians for the minors; on their declining or not appearing, defendant 1 applied in R.B.P. No. 275 of 1917 for appointment of a Court officer as guardian for purposes of the execution sale. The Deputy Nazir was appointed; as the decreed costs were not deposited the minors' property was sold and purchased by defendant 1 himself in September 1917.

The present suit was instituted almost at the expiry of twelve years from the date of sale. The plaintiffs asserted they were not properly represented in the execution and that the sale is not binding on them; alternatively, they pleaded that they sued within three years of the fraud coming to their knowledge and relied on Article 95 of the Limitation Act.

Procedurally: the District Munsif dismissed the suit; on appeal, the District Judge set aside that decree and allowed the plaintiffs some relief; the present opinion is from a higher court on second appeal which considered limitation and the validity of the sale and ultimately allowed the second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court-sale in execution is valid and binding on the plaintiffs and their family (i.e., whether the sale is void or voidable).
  2. What remedy was open to the plaintiffs to challenge the sale — by suit or by proceeding under the procedural rules (e.g., Section 17 CPC or O.21, R.90)?
  3. Whether defendant 1 was guilty of legal fraud or suppression (in particular, by omission to disclose certain relatives when seeking appointment of a Court guardian) sufficient to render the sale void.
  4. If the sale is voidable, whether the plaintiffs' suit is barred by limitation — specifically the interplay of Article 95, Article 12 and Sections 6, 7 and 18 of the Limitation Act, and the effect of plaintiffs' minority/age.
  5. Whether the presumption under Section 7 of the Limitation Act (that an elder member manages joint family property) can be invoked without evidence of de facto management.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The minors were not really represented in the execution proceedings; therefore the execution sale is not binding upon them.
  • To meet the contingency that the sale might be held merely voidable (and not void), they asserted they sued within three years of the fraud coming to their knowledge, invoking Article 95 of the Limitation Act (i.e., they claim a discovery-based limitation period).

Arguments Advanced in the Opinion (by Counsel Identified as Mr. Sitarama Rao)

  • Mr. Sitarama Rao argued that even if defendant 1 did not make a false statement in the guardian-appointment affidavit, defendant 1 was guilty of suppression of truth by not disclosing the existence of the maternal grandmother and the maternal grandfather of the minors; the lower appellate court held defendant 1 guilty of fraud on that basis (citing 37 Mad 535).
  • He further contended that the sale must be held to be void (not merely voidable), and thus any suit filed within twelve years would be in time; in support he relied on observations in 44 MLJ 515.
  • He also contended that Section 7 of the Limitation Act could not operate unless there was proof that plaintiff 2's elder brothers or sisters were in actual management of the family property.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
16 Mad 436 Earlier Madras decision bearing on presumption of management / limitation questions under S.7 (referenced with 38 Mad 118). The court observed that the learned District Judge's view that these Madras cases were no longer good law after 48 All 152 is not tenable; the court treated these decisions as still authoritative for the presumptive capacity of the major member to be manager.
38 Mad 118 Authority on presumptive managerial capacity of the major member in a joint family (basis of S.7 application). Relied upon to support the view that the major member has a presumptive capacity to be manager; the court endorsed that this presumption may be displaced by proof of another in de facto management but does not require affirmative proof of de facto management in every case.
48 All 152 Privy Council decision thought by some to have overruled Madras decisions. The court rejected the contention that this Privy Council decision had overruled the Madras cases (16 Mad 436 and 38 Mad 118), relying on subsequent authorities to show those Madras cases remain good law.
37 Mad 535 Observation that omission to mention relations in guardian applications may be relevant to fraud. The lower appellate court had relied on observations in this case to attribute fraud to defendant 1 for not mentioning certain relations; the present court expressed doubt about attributing fraud solely on that omission and treated the matter cautiously.
44 MLJ 515 Passages suggesting that certain sales in execution might be treated as void (language described as general). The court noted the language used in 44 MLJ 515 is somewhat general; it observed difficulty reconciling that decision with 37 Mad 535 and relied on Ramesam J.'s further discussion (34 MLW 317) to limit its effect. The court did not treat 44 MLJ 515 as controlling to declare the sale a nullity here.
34 MLW 317 (Ramesam, J.) Explanation and discussion of relevant authorities, clarifying the effect of prior decisions (including 44 MLJ 515 and 37 Mad 535). The court found Ramesam J.'s explanation persuasive: it supports the view that a sale in circumstances like this is at most voidable rather than a nullity.
25 Bom 337 Case dealing with sales held to be voidable where appointment or process issues occurred. The court considered the present case more analogous to 25 Bom 337 than to cases treated as producing nullities; this supported the view that the sale was voidable.
32 Cal 296 Authority dealing with cases where sales were treated as nullities (distinguished from present case). The court distinguished 32 Cal 296 (and 31 All 572) as not analogous: those cases involved different circumstances leading to nullity, whereas the present facts suggested only possible wrongful appointment of a guardian and thus a voidable sale.
31 All 572 Authority on sales being nullities in particular strong circumstances (distinguished here). Distinguished as not applicable to the facts of the present case; the present case lacked absolute non-representation or appointment prohibited by statute.
58 Mad 155 Division Bench decision of the Court pointing out that certain Madras decisions remain good law after Privy Council decisions. Used to support the view that earlier Madras decisions (16 Mad 436 and 38 Mad 118) were not overruled by 48 All 152; reinforced the court's position on application of S.7 presumptions.
1933 Lah 479 Decision cited by counsel (Lahore case) on the effect of the major member's relationship and management presumption. The court observed counsel had relied on this case; it noted that the Lahore case cautioned against automatically inferring managerial capacity in unusual relationship situations, but did not accept that it laid down a rule requiring proof of de facto management in all S.7 invocations.
46 Bom 535 Authority discussing circumstances where de facto management by another party may displace presumption about the major member. The court noted support in 46 Bom 535 for the argument that de facto management may displace the presumption; nonetheless it rejected the stringent view that S.7 cannot operate without proof of de facto management in every case.
28 MLJ 115 Case concerning raising objections for the first time in second appeal and allegations of collusion. The court recommended reading 28 MLJ 115 in context: its observations were concerned with procedural questions about raising objections late and an allegation of collusion, and thus not authority for the stricter rule urged by counsel here.
55 Cal. 608 Decision where a minor had been represented by his mother as guardian in a joint decree, affecting the managing member's authority. The court noted 55 Cal. 608 concerned a situation where representation by the mother displaced the managing member's authority; it was not directly analogous to the present facts and therefore not controlling for counsel's argument.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise manner, addressing procedural and substantive points strictly on the material before it:

  1. Remedy and procedure: The District Munsif thought the plaintiffs' remedy was by application (O.21, R.90) and implicitly under Section 17 CPC if by application. The higher court rejected the narrow view that the plaintiffs could not proceed by suit and accepted that a suit remedy was available to challenge the sale.
  2. Fraud and representation in execution: On the merits, the court was not satisfied the lower courts were justified in assuming defendant 1 was guilty of "legal fraud" in relation to the guardian-appointment petition (R.F.P. No. 5475 of 1917). The court noted that the affidavit relied upon was not exhibited, so it would be unfair to assume false statements. The court was also cautious about attributing fraud merely because defendant 1 did not mention some relations in a guardian application.
  3. Void vs voidable characterization of the sale: The court examined authorities and commentary (including Ramesam J. in 34 MLW 317) and concluded that, on the facts, the sale (if open to challenge) was at best voidable and not a nullity. The court found the present case analogous to 25 Bom 337 rather than to cases treated as producing nullities (32 Cal 296, 31 All 572).
  4. Limitation analysis: If the sale is voidable, the plaintiffs were required to take proceedings within one year under Article 12 (subject to extension under Section 6). The court observed the suit was beyond that period with reference to the age of plaintiff 1. The plaintiffs had not invoked Section 18 of the Limitation Act to allege concealment by defendant 1. Thus, unless other provisions shielded the plaintiffs, the suit would be barred.
  5. Application of Section 7 (presumption of management) and effect of minorities: The court considered whether Section 7 could bar the suit by reason of other elder family members knowing of the sale. It rejected the strict contention that S.7 requires proof of de facto management in every case. The court accepted the rule in 38 Mad 118 that major members carry a presumptive capacity to manage family property and that this presumption can be displaced by evidence of someone else in de facto management — but such displacement must be shown, it is not a precondition in all cases.
  6. Age of plaintiff 2: The evidence as to plaintiff 2's age was imprecise. The court stated that, even assuming plaintiff 2 had not completed 19 at suit institution and the suit was within one year of his attaining majority, Section 7 nevertheless operated to bar the suit in view of family circumstances and the combined operation of Section 7 and Article 12. Therefore the court did not call for further findings on plaintiff 2's precise age.
  7. Precedential assessment: The court rejected the District Judge's view that the Madras cases (16 Mad 436 and 38 Mad 118) had been overruled by the Privy Council decision in 48 All 152; it relied on subsequent decisions (58 Mad 155 and the Lahore case cited) for that conclusion.
  8. Conclusion on limitation and relief: Combining the characterization of the sale as at most voidable, the applicable limitation periods (Article 12, with Sections 6 and 7), and the lack of invocation of Section 18, the court concluded the plaintiffs' suit was barred by limitation even on assumptions most favorable to them.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The second appeal was allowed; the decree of the lower appellate Court was set aside and the decree of the District Munsif (which had dismissed the suit) was restored. The court ordered that the appellant will have his costs here and in the lower appellate Court. The opinion concludes with "Appeal allowed."

Implications:

  • The direct legal effect is that the plaintiffs' suit to set aside the execution sale is barred by limitation: the sale was held to be, at best, voidable (not a nullity), and the plaintiffs failed to bring timely proceedings under the relevant limitation provisions (Article 12 read with Section 7 and subject to Section 6) and did not rely on Section 18.
  • The court rejected the argument that earlier Madras precedents had been overruled by the Privy Council decision (48 All 152), reaffirming the continuing relevance of those Madras decisions for presumption of management under Section 7.
  • No broader novel precedent was announced by the court; the decision applies the existing limitation principles and precedents to the facts and restores the first-instance dismissal. The opinion confines itself to the parties' rights and limitation consequences rather than articulating a new rule of law.
C.R.K/B.D

    Nemmayya Shetty v. Nagaraja Shetty

    1. This second appeal arises out of a suit brought by the two plaintiffs for recovery of possession of the muli right in the suit property, free from the Court-sale held at the instance of defendant 1 in execution of a decree for costs obtained by defendant 1 against the mother of the plaintiffs, in A.S Nos. 209 and 229 of 1913 on the file of the District Court of South Kanara. The plaintiffs and defendants 2, 3 and 4 are the children of the lady against whom the decree for costs was passed, and constitute an Aliyasanthana family. She died shortly after the decree, leaving all these children minors. In the execution proceedings taken by defendant 1 he first proposed certain persons as guardians for the minors and on their declining to act as guardians or not appearing in response to the notice, defendant 1 applied in R.B.P No. 275 of 1917 to have an officer of the Court appointed as guardian of these minors for the purpose of the execution sale. The Deputy Nazir was accordingly appointed and as the costs decreed were not deposited, the property of the minors was brought to sale and purchased by defendant 1 himself September 1917 This suit has ben instituted by the plaintiffs almost at the expiry of the period of twelve years from the date of sale. In substance, their case is that they were not really represented in the execution proceedings and the sale is accordingly not binding upon them. To meet the contingency of the sale being held voidable and not void, they added that they are suing within three years of the fraud coming to their knowledge, it being assumed that in that view the suit will be governed by Article 95, Lim. Act.

    2. The first issue raised in the case was whether the Court-sale is not valid and binding on the plaintiffs and their family. The District Munsif was apparently of opinion that the sale was open to question but he thought that the plaintiffs' remedy was to proceed by way of application under O. 21, R. 90. I am not satisfied that this is the correct view as to the remedy open to the plaintiffs. If the remedy was to be by application, and not by way of suit, the application would be under Section 17 of the CPC. The District Munsif also held that even if the case should be held to be governed by Article 95, the other members of the family who were older than the plaintiffs must have known of the sale and all matters connected with it more than three years before the suit and that therefore the plaintiffs would also be barred under the terms of Section 7 of the Lim. Act.

    3. He accordingly dismissed the suit. On appeal, the learned District Judge set aside the decree of the first Court, holding that the remedy by suit was available to the plaintiffs and that in the application of Article 95 the plaintiffs cannot be prejudiced by the omission of defendants 2, 3 and 4 to sue in time. He thought that the principle of the decisions of this Court in 16 Mad 4361 and 38 Mad 1182 was no longer good law in view of the decision of the Privy Council in 48 All 1523. On the merits, I am not by any means satisfied that the Courts below were justified in assuming that defendant 1 was guilty of what is described as ‘legal fraud’ in connexion with R.F.P No. 5475 of 1917. For some reason the affidavit filed in support of that petition has not been exhibited in the case.

    4. It will not therefore be fair to assume that he made any false statement there. Mr. Sitarama Rao however argues that even if he did not make a false statement, he must have been guilty of suppression of truth in not disclosing the existence of the maternal grandmother of the minors and of the maternal grandfather. It is on this omission that the lower appellate Court has held defendant 1 guilty of fraud in view of the observations in 37 Mad 5354 I am inclined to doubt the propriety of attributing fraud to a party merely because he does not mention the existence of certain relations in connexion with a guardian application. Proceeding however on the footing that the circumstances connected with the appointment of a court guardian might have entitled the minors to question the sale, it appears to me that they must have taken the necessary proceedings within the one year allowed by Article 12, Lim. Act, subject to such extension of time as they may get under S. 6. In this case the suit is obviously beyond that period with reference to the age of plaintiff 1. No attempt has been made to invoke the aid of Section 18 of the Lim. Act, by suggesting that defendant 1 was responsible for keeping the plaintiffs from the knowledge of their rights. If the sale was only voidable, the suit will accordingly be barred by limitation, unless with reference to the age of plaintiff 2 and the effect of Sections 6 and 7 of the Lim. Act, the plea could be got; over. Mr. Sitarama Rao contends that the sale must be held to be void and that accordingly any suit filed within twelve years will be in time. In support of this proposition he relies upon the observations in 44 MLJ 5155. The language-used there is some what general, but if one is to take it in all its generality, it will be difficult to reconcile that decision with the observations in 37 Mad 535, Ramesam, J., who was a party to 44 MLJ 515, has explained himself more fully in 34 MLW 3176, and there discussed the relevant authorities. There is no question in the present case either of absolute non-representation or of the appointment of a, guardian whose appointment is prohibited by statute. The most that can be said is that defendant 1 has persuaded the Court to make a wrong order in the matter of appointing a Court officer as guardian. The case is certainly more analogous to the type dealt with in 25 Bom 3377, than to that dealt with in 32 Cal 2968 or 31 All 5729. I am inclined to agree, with the view indicated by Ramesam, J., in 34 MLW 317, that the sale is if at all only voidable and is not a nullity.

    5. It only remains to deal with the argument founded upon the possibility that the suit may be in time with reference to the age of plaintiff 2. Thera is no precise or consistent evidence as to plaintiff 2's age apparently because its bearing upon the question of limitation was not clearly recognized in the trial Court. If I had thought that his age would have a paternal bearing upon the ultimate determination of this second appeal, I should have called for a finding upon that point, even giving the parties an opportunity to adduce further evidence. But as I have come to the conclusion that even on the assumption that he had not completed 19 at the date of suit, that is, that the suit was not beyond one year of his attainment of majority the suit will nevertheless be barred by reason of the operation of Section 7 of the Lim. Act, I have not thought it necessary to call for a finding on the question of his age. The view taken by the learned District Judge that the decisions in 16 Mad 436 and 38 Mad 118 are no longer good law after the Privy Council decision in 48 All 152 is not tenable. This has been pointed out in a recent decision of a Division Bench of this Court in 58 Mad 15510. It has also been pointed out in the Lahore case which Mr. Sitarama Rao himself cited, namely 1933 Lah 47911. But he contends that, without proof that plaintiff 2's elder brothers or sisters were in actual management of the family property, the operation of S. 7 could not be invoked. There is no doubt some support for this argument in the observations in the Lahore case above referred to and also in 46 Bom 53512. In the Lahore case the learned Judge referred to the fact that the major member was in point of relationship only a nephew of the minor members and he accordingly hesitated to draw the presumption that the major member was in law or in fact the manager of the family. In the Bombay case the, learned Judges refer to the fact that during the minority of all the members, the mother was in de facto management of the property and there was nothing to show when the nephew took over the management from the mother. If in these cases the learned Judges meant to lay down that in all cases where the operation of S. 7 is invoked there must be proof of de facto, management by the major member, I am afraid this will be going to far. In 38 Mad 118 both Abdur Rahim, J. and Sadasiva Ayyar, J. referred to the presumptive capacity of the major member to be manager and the basis of the rule is the managing member's capacity to deal with joint property for proper purposes. It may be that if somebody else is in de facto management, the presumption of the major member being the manager may be displaced, but that is very different from saying that in all cases there must be proof of de facto management by she managing member. This is also the view taken by the Division Bench in 58 Mad 155. The observations in 28 MLJ 11513 must be read in the light of the fact that the learned Judges were there considering whether they should allow the objection to be raised for the first time in second appeal, particularly in view of an allegation in the pleadings that the major member was colluding with the opposite side. In 55 Cal. 60814 the question arose in connection with a joint decree in which the minor member had been represented by his mother as guardian and this naturally displaced the managing member's authority to deal with the minor's interest in the decree. Further, the learned Judges point out that it was not even shown whether they were members of a joint Hindu family. These cases are not therefore authorities for the position contended for by Mr. Sitarama Rao.

    6. In the present case it is suggested that there was a grandmother of these minors, but as the property in dispute belonged only to this particular branch and not to the whole group, the grand-mother was not in law the guardian or manager. It is then argued that this branch had no other property except the suit property and that therefore there was; nothing for a managing member to manage. That does not appear to me to be the test for the application of S. 7. For the purpose of this discussion we must assume that the suit property is the joint property of the branch and then consider whether the eldest member would or would not have a right to dispose of it for proper purposes if he could have done so, the case will be governed by Section 7 of the Lim. Act. The District Munsif took the view that S. 7 was applicable to the case and in the grounds of appeal to the District Court, no question of fact was raised that would have precluded the application of S. 7, but it only appears to have been argued before the learned District Judge as a matter of law that the Privy Council case had overruled the Madras cases. This contention not being correct, I am of opinion that the whole suit must be held to be barred by limitation by the combined operation of Section 7 and Article 12 of the Lim. Act, even on the assumption that plaintiff 2 had not completed 19 years of age at the date of the institution of the suit. The second appeal therefore must be allowed, the decree of the lower appellate Court set aside and the decree of the District Munsif restored. I do not propose to interfere, with the 1st Court's direction as to costs, but the appellant will have his costs here and in the lower appellate Court.

    C.R.K/B.D

    7. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Nemmayya Shetty v. Nagaraja Shetty
    (Apr 12, 1935)