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Case Number

Appeal from Original Decree No. 110 of 1919

Attorney(S)

Babus Dwarka Nath Chakrabutty and Bankim Chandra Mookerjee for the Appellants.
Dr. Dwarka Nath Mitter and Babus Karunamoy Ghose, Sukhamoy Ghatterjee and Krishna Chaitanya Ghose for the Respondents.
Babu Sib Chandra Palit for the minor Respondent.

Judges

Chatterjea
Pearson, JJ.

Acts

Rules Nos. S. 147 and S. 148 of 1920

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion — Partition Suit concerning Mouza Ismail

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against the final decree in a suit for partition of a mouza called Ismail. The suit was instituted in 1907 and proceeded through investigation, Khanapuri (partition) work by a Commissioner, and appeals. Several defendants (including Defendant No. 2 Rakhal and Defendant No. 41 Sibani) died while proceedings were pending, and questions arose about substitution of heirs. The Appellant purchased a one-anna share claimed to have belonged to Ramanuj (and a share in Mouza Barathol) and sought partition by metes and bounds of the one-anna share in Mouza Ismail.

Procedurally, an application for substitution of heirs was made for Rakhal's heirs on 5 February 1921 and substitution was ordered subject to objection at the hearing; Rakhal had died on 24 May 1920. Rakhal's interest had earlier been sold in execution in 1918 and subsequently repurchased by his heirs on 23 January 1921, who were brought on the record on 5 May 1921 subject to objection. A preliminary objection was raised that substitutions were not made in time and that the appeal could not proceed in a partition suit. The Court considered that three months' limitation did not apply to devolution or assignment of interest pending the suit.

The appeal raises multiple contentions including (i) improper or delayed substitution of heirs and representation of minors, (ii) whether partition should have been of all co-sharers rather than only the plaintiff's one-anna share, and (iii) whether the allotment of lands prejudiced Defendant No. 37 (Jogendra). The Court set aside the final decree in part and remanded the case for fresh partitioning steps specified by the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the appeal can be heard despite deaths of defendants (Rakhal and Sibani) and late substitution of heirs, including whether substitution or amendment can be made on appeal and whether three months' limitation applies.
Whether an application to substitute parties (or to add a prayer under Order 22, rule 10) may be made for the first time in this Court when it was not made in the Court below.
Whether the final decree in the partition suit should be set aside because heirs were not substituted before the lower Court and certain minors were not properly represented.
Whether the partition ordered should have extended to all co-sharers of the mouza or been confined to the Plaintiff's one-anna share in light of earlier appellate directions.
Whether the allotment and classification by the Commissioner prejudiced Defendant No. 37 (Jogendra) and others (including minors), and whether further inquiry or fresh partitioning is required—particularly in relation to tanks, patit danga lands, and the status of Chak Aral.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

There was a preliminary objection that Defendant No. 2 Rakhal and Defendant No. 41 Sibani died and no substitution was made within time; therefore the appeal cannot be heard.
The Respondents contended that the application, if treated as one under Order 22, rule 10, was not made in the Court below and thus could not be made in this Court on appeal.
They also contended that, as a matter of fact, the application was not one under Order 22, rule 10 but merely an application for substitution of the heirs of the deceased.

Appellant's / Other Contentions Raised in the Appeal

The Appellant raised a contention that a number of defendants died while the suit was pending and their heirs were not substituted, and that certain minors were not properly represented, rendering the partition proceedings and the decree bad.
The Appellant contended that there should have been a partition of the mouza among all co-sharers and not merely of the Plaintiff's one-anna share; that the High Court's earlier judgment (25 August 1915) must be given effect only to the Plaintiff's share but did not prevent partition of other co-sharers' shares.
The Appellant contended that the allotment of lands prejudiced Defendant No. 37 (Jogendra), who alleged that the Commissioner had allotted lands in the Plaintiff's share from lands in Jogendra's rightful possession and refused to admit his documents or objections.

Specific Petition by Defendant No. 37 (Jogendra)

Jogendra petitioned (7 September 1918) that the Commissioner was allotting lands and jamas in his rightful possession to the Plaintiff, not listening to objections, refusing documents, and effectively ignoring Jogendra's claimed mokurari and lakheraj interests (3 annas 4 gandas each). He requested partition according to classification rather than the Commissioner's alleged practice of assigning lands by convenience.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Civil Rules Nos. S.147 and S.148 of 1920 (disposed of on 11th March 1921) — Division Bench of this Court	That an application for substitution or to make parties can be made on appeal (i.e., the application can be made in this Court).	The Court relied on this authority to hold that the application to amend/add a prayer under Order 22, rule 10 could be entertained in this Court and therefore amendment on appeal was permissible.
R.A. No. 197 of 1910 (this Court)	The principle that the Appellate Court had directed a partition by metes and bounds of Ismail, declaring the Plaintiff entitled to the one-anna share claimed and two annas five gandas in Barathol; identified the scope of issues to be determined.	The Court applied that earlier decision to hold that other issues and partition of shares of other co-sharers could not be gone into in this suit, and that the decree in that appeal is to be treated as a preliminary decree to be worked out.
High Court judgment dated 25th August 1915	Addressed scope of relief in relation to the Plaintiff's share and limitations on further partition of other co-sharers' shares.	The Court treated that judgment as limiting the present proceedings: the High Court's direction must be given effect to only to the extent of the Plaintiff's defined share and prevents partition of undefined shares of other co-sharers in this suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed the preliminary objection concerning deaths and substitution. It examined the chronology: Rakhal died on 24 May 1920, the application for substitution was made on 5 February 1921, and his heirs re-purchased the interest on 23 January 1921 and were placed on record on 5 May 1921 subject to objection. The Court reasoned that because Rakhal's interest had been sold in execution in 1918, on his death the interest devolved on a third party; after repurchase the heirs were the persons on whom the interest devolved and were made parties before the hearing. The Court further held that the three months' limitation does not apply to cases of assignment or devolution of interest pending the suit.

On the Respondents' objection that the application had not been made in the Court below and so could not be made on appeal, the Court relied on a Division Bench holding (Civil Rules S.147 & S.148 of 1920) that such applications can be made on appeal. The Court observed that although the present application was not filed expressly under Order 22, rule 10, it could be amended to add such a prayer. Because all parties were before the Court, the Court was not inclined to dismiss the case for that procedural deficiency and permitted amendment.

Concerning Sibani, the Court found that her heirs were already on the record and ordered a note that her interest survives against Defendant No. 37.

On the substantive objections regarding deaths and minors, the Court noted the lower Court's misapprehension that substitution was unnecessary because deaths occurred before the Commissioner completed survey work. The Court found that the facts of deaths were not brought to the lower Court's attention (save one incidentally) and that the Plaintiff apparently lacked knowledge. Since all heirs are now on record and all persons interested are before the Court, the Court refused to dismiss the suit for failure to substitute earlier.

Addressing whether the partition should have extended to all co-sharers, the Court relied on the appellate direction in R.A. No. 197 of 1910 that the Plaintiff was entitled to the one-anna share and that the other issues and the shares of other co-sharers had not been defined by the High Court; therefore the present suit could not be used to partition other co-sharers' shares or re-open issues that the High Court did not direct to be determined. The earlier decree was to be treated as the preliminary decree to be carried into effect.

Turning to the complaint by Jogendra and the alleged prejudice to minors, the Court examined the classification and allotment made by the Commissioner. The Commissioner reported that he could not distinguish lands in possession of Ramanuj and Jogendra during Khanapuri work and largely recorded lands in Ramanuj's name and accordingly allotted lands to the Plaintiff from those in Ramanuj's possession; in some cases the Commissioner departed from strict correspondence to convenience and practicality (e.g., whole tanks, certain patit danga lands). The Court found Jogendra appeared to have been prejudiced because no land had been recorded in his name despite his claimed share, and the minors were not properly represented and thus their interests were not fully protected.

Balancing the long pendency and expense of the proceedings against the substantive defects, the Court concluded that although remand is regrettable given the history, the prejudice to minors and to Jogendra (who was partly responsible for delay) warranted setting aside the final decree insofar as required to protect those interests. The Court preserved the Khanapuri classification but required the Commissioner to record lands in the possession of Ramanuj and Jogendra separately in the presence of all defendants after notice, then to proceed to allot lands for the Plaintiff's one-anna share and to partition tanks and patit danga lands in the Plaintiff's one-anna share in the presence of all defendants.

The Court also identified an unresolved question about Chak Aral: the Commissioner treated it as part of Mouza Ismail for partition but there was material (a petition in an execution case) suggesting it might be held under a different rent-holder and possibly excluded from Ismail. The Court directed the lower Court to decide whether Chak Aral forms part of Mouza Ismail before the Commissioner makes fresh allotments; if Chak Aral is not part of Ismail it should be excluded from partition, otherwise it should be partitioned along with the mouza.

The Court imposed procedural and monetary conditions: the Appellant was allowed to amend the 5 May 1921 application to add a prayer under Order 22, rule 10; persons named in that application were to be added in supersession of the earlier substitution order; an annotation was to be made regarding Sibani's interest; the Appellant had to pay five gold mohurs costs of the amendment to the Respondents by a specified date or face dismissal of the appeal with costs; the Appellant must deposit costs for the fresh partition within time fixed by the lower Court or the already effected partition would stand. The Court assessed hearing-fees for Chak Aral and the rest of the lands, and ordered that the Plaintiff-Respondent pay the costs of this appeal to the Appellant.

Holding and Implications

CORE HOLDING: The final decree of the Court below is set aside and the case is remanded for fresh partition proceedings as directed.

Direct consequences and practical implications:

The Appellant is permitted to amend the application dated 5 May 1921 by adding a prayer under Order 22, rule 10; the specified persons are to be added as Respondents in supersession of the order of substitution dated 5 May 1921.
A note shall be made on the record that the interest of the deceased Sibani survives against Defendant No. 37.
The Appellant must pay the costs of the amendment (five gold mohurs) to the Respondents by the date fixed, failing which the appeal will be dismissed with costs.
The Khanapuri classification made by the Commissioner will stand; however the Commissioner must in the presence of all defendants (after notice) record lands separately in the possession of Ramanuj and Jogendra, then allot lands for the Plaintiff's one-anna share and partition tanks and patit danga lands in the Plaintiff's one-anna share. To that limited extent the Commissioner's earlier allotments are set aside and fresh partitioning is ordered.
The lower Court must determine whether Chak Aral is part of Mouza Ismail before fresh allotments; if Chak Aral is not part, it shall be excluded from partition, otherwise it shall be partitioned along with the mouza.
The Appellant must put in costs for the fresh partition within time fixed by the lower Court, failing which the already effected partition will stand.
The Court assessed hearing-fees: three gold mohurs for Chak Aral (to abide the result) and Rs. 100 for the rest of the lands.
The Plaintiff-Respondent must pay the costs of the appeal to the Appellant.
No new legal principle beyond the application of prior authorities was established; the decision primarily resolves procedural and factual defects by remand and by permitting amendment/substitution on appeal in the circumstances described.

Disposition: Case remanded. (J.N.R.)

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Rajani Kanta Roy v. Raja Jyoti Prosad Singh Deo

The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

This appeal is against the final decree in a suit for partition of a Mouza called Ismail.

There is a preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal on the ground that the Defendant No. 2 Rakhal died and no substitution was made within time, that another Defendant No. 41 Sibani Debya also died and no substitution was made in time, and that the suit being one for partition the appeal cannot proceed.

Rakhal died on the 24th May 1920. The application for substitution of his heirs was made on the 5th February 1921, and substitution was ordered to be made subject to objection at the hearing.

It appears that Rakhal's interest was sold away in execution of a decree in 1918. On Rakhal's death, therefore, the interest was not in his heirs but devolved on a third party. It was re-purchased on the 23rd January 1921 by his heirs and they were brought on the record on the 5th May 1921, subject to objection at the hearing. The Appellant was not bound to recognise the purchaser and could have proceeded against the heirs of the deceased; but there was a devolution of the interest of Rakhal, and before the appeal came on for hearing the persons on whom the interest devolved were made parties to the case. Three months limitation does not apply to a case of assignment or devolution of interest pending the suit.

It is contended for the Respondents that the application even if treated as one under Or. 22, r. 10 not having been made in the Court below, the suit cannot be made in this Court and that as a matter of fact, the application was not under that rule but substitution of the heirs of the deceased.

So far as the first point its concerned, it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court (Civil Rules Nos. S. 147 and S. 148 of 1920 disposed of on the 11th March 1921) that the application can be made on appeal.

With regard to the second contention there is no doubt that the application was not under Or. 22, r. 10. But the application can be allowed to be amended and having regard to all the circumstances we are not inclined to dismiss the case on such a ground when all the parties are before the Court, and the application for substitution may be allowed to be amended.

As for Sibani, her heirs are already on the record and it is only necessary to have a note made on the record that her interest survives to those Respondents.

The Appellant is accordingly allowed to amend the application dated the 5th May 1921 by adding a prayer under Or. 22, r. 10, and we direct that the persons mentioned in the application be added as Respondents in supersession of the order for substitution passed on the 5th May 1921. We also direct that a note be made in the record that the interest of the deceased Sibani survives against the Defendant No. 37.

The Appellant, however, must pay the costs of this application for amendment, five gold mohurs, to the Respondents on or before the 12th July in this Court. The Plaintiff-Respondent will be entitled to withdraw the said amount if it is deposited in this Court. If the said costs are not paid within the time aforesaid, this appeal will stand dismissed with costs.

This disposes of the preliminary objection.

The first contention raised in this appeal is that a number of Defendants died while the suit was pending in the Court below and their heirs were not substituted.

It appears that some of these deaths took place before the case came on for hearing. It also appears that certain minors were represented by the Deputy Registrar when the case came up to this Court in Appeal No. 197 of 1910. When the case went back on remand, no guardian ad litem was appointed for them in the Court below and the decree bears the name of Mr. Joyce as their guardian ad litem. Those of them who have attained majority after the decree of the lower Court have (along with others) preferred this appeal and two of them are still minors and are Respondents represented by the present Deputy Registrar in this appeal. It is accordingly contended that the partition proceedings and the decree are bad as there was no substitution of the heirs of the deceased and the minors were not properly represented.

The Court below observed: “There is nothing to show that any of the Defendants died before the Commissioner did the survey work and the Khanapuri work.” But if the partition affects 15 annas co-sharers—a question which we will deal with presently—the decree for partition should not have been made in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased Defendants, and without the minors being properly represented.

But it is not only the Plaintiff but the Court below also seem to have been under the impression that substitution of the heirs was not necessary, as the death appeared to have taken place before the survey and Khanapuri works were finished. The fact of the death of the Defendants does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Court below except the death of one of them incidentally in an application filed on the 7th September 1908 objecting to the Commissioner's proceedings, and it does not appear that the Plaintiff had any knowledge of these deaths. All the heirs of the deceased Defendants have now been made parties to the appear and all persons interested in the property are before the Court. In these circumstances, we think that the suit should not be dismissed on the ground that the heirs were not substituted.

It is unnecessary to make any further order for substitution seeing that all the heirs have already been substituted and all the necessary parties are before the Court.

The second contention is that there should have been a partition of the Mouza among all the co-sharers and not merely of the Plaintiff's one anna share. It is urged that the judgment of the High Court dated the 25th August 1915 must be given effect to only so far as the share of the Plaintiff is concerned, but that it did not prevent a partition of the shares of the other co-sharers nor prevent a determination of the other issues in the suit.

It appears that the Plaintiff purchased one anna share of one Ramanuj and Elokeshi in Mouza Ismail and a certain share in Barathol and asked for a partition of those shares. The Court below originally dismissed the claim for partition of Ismail on the ground that the share of Ramanuj had previously passed to one Dinesh who preferred a claim to 2 annas 4 gandas share which had been attached by the Plaintiff's ancestor and the claim was allowed. This share subsequently passed by successive transfers to Jogendra, the son of Ramanuj and that therefore Ramanuj had no share in Ismail which could pass to the Plaintiff under his purchase and the Court merely declared the Plaintiff's right to 8 gandas share in Barathol which was let out in mokurari.

On appeal to this Court (R.A No. 197 of 1910) it was held that Ramanuj had other shares which he obtained from another branch of the family, sufficient to meet the claim of the Plaintiff. This Court directed that there must be a partition by metes and bounds of Ismail, it being declared that the Plaintiff is entitled to the one anna share he claims in Ismail and two annas five gandas in Barathol.” After this decision, the other issues raised in the case cannot be gone into, nor can the shares of other co-sharers be partitioned as those shares were not defined by the High Court, and the High Court did not direct the lower Court to determine those shares. It is no doubt hard that the co-sharers should not have their shares partitioned in this suit for partition but they did not ask the High Court for such an order. They did not do so probably because most of the lands were in the separate possession of each co-sharer. However that may be, having regard to the decision in R.A No. 197 of 1910, the other issues cannot be gone into, nor can the shares of other co-sharers be partitioned. The decree passed in that appeal must be taken to be the preliminary decree which is to be worked out. This contention, therefore, must be overruled.

The third contention relates to the allotment of the lands of Mouza Ismail to the Plaintiff. It is strongly pressed before us that the partition has seriously prejudiced the Defendant No. 37, Jogendra.

There are 138 bighas of Khas kanali lands. The Plaintiff purchased only one anna share of Ramanuj, and 2 annas 4 gandas share is alleged to have been acquired by his son Jogendra. The Commissioner classified the lands under various classes. There are as stated above 138 bighas of Khas Kanali lands; but Ramanuj alone was recorded as the owner of 12 bighas 9 cottas and nothing was recorded in the name of Jogendra. The total area of Khas danga land is 115 bighas. The Plaintiff under his one anna share would be entitled to about 7 bighas and Ramanuj was recorded as being in possession of 8 bighas 8 cottas, nothing being recorded in the name of Jogendra.

It is contended that Jogendra's share was more than the share of Ramanuj, that a proportionate quantity of land should have been left for him and that the whole of the lands should not have been given to the Plaintiff.

It appears that Jogendra, on the 7th September 1918 put in a petition to the Court below in which he complained as follows:—“The Commissioner instead of dividing and partitioning into shares according to the classification of lands is allotting the lands and jamas in the rightful possession of this Defendant to the share of the Plaintiff separately. He is not listening to any objections and is not admitting any documents and is expressing the opinion that he is not finding any land in the rightful possession of this Defendant in the said Mouza. This Defendant has got 3 annas 4 gandas mokurari interest and 3 annas 4 gandas lakheraj interest in the said Mouzah, and there are many lands in Khas possession and there is a Mouza, Chak Aral, at a permanently fixed rent. The Plaintiff has been admitting the said rights in the possession of the Defendants over and over again. But the Commissioner without noticing that and by dividing the lands in the rightful possession of the Defendant is about to allot them to the share of the Plaintiff. On representing it to the Commissioner, he said that he would make the division according to the convenience of all the parties and for that reason he asked all the parties to be present. The pleader for this Defendant having appeared before the Commissioner in accordance herewith, he said that the other parties had not been attending and so he would do as he pleased, and would refuse to take any documents on behalf of this Defendant. This Defendant would be greatly prejudiced by that. By classifying all the lands of the Mouza and by delineating the Plaintiffs share at one definite extremity, the convenience of all parties would be met and justice would be done.”

The Court directed the Commissioner to be informed of the said petition, and the latter reported as follows:—“During Khanapuri work I could not ascertain which lands are in possession of Ramanuj and which are in possession of Jogendra Narain Roy; nor did they point out those lands to me at that time. So far as I could ascertain from local enquiry I recorded the lands in possession of Defendant Ramanuj Roy. And as Plaintiff purchased the share of Ramanuj Roy, I think Plaintiff should be given lands in possession of Ramanuj Roy as far as possible and on that principle I have allotted the lands to Plaintiff's share.”

The Court by its order dated 9th September 1918 held that under the circumstances no action could be taken in respect of Jogendra's application.

It is contended that an enquiry should have been made into the allegations against the Commissioner, and that the matter should not have been disposed of in the manner it has been done.

In the absence of any enquiry on the point we are not in a position to determine the merits of the application of Jogendra. But he does not appear to have acted promptly, as the application was made after the Commissioner had finished the field work. At the same time it does appear that although Jogendra has a share, no land has been recorded in his name. We think therefore that Jogendra has been prejudiced.

The Commissioner appears to have given notice to the co-sharers by post as well as by beat of drum several times. The Commissioner says that only some of them appeared before him occasionally. But there were certain minors; they were not properly represented in the Court below and their interests do not appear to have been properly looked after in the partition proceedings as the Commissioner himself says that only some of the Defendants attended and that not regularly. In his report of the 19th September 1918 he says:—“I have allotted the Plaintiff's one anna share mostly from the lands in possession of Defendant Ramanuj Roy whose share the Plaintiff purchased. In a few cases I departed from this rule—one in case of partitioning tanks held in khas possession by the co-sharers and another in case of vatit danga lands. In the first case, I found no tank exclusively in khas possession of Ramanju Roy. So I allotted one entire tank which was held in khas possession jointly by all the co-sharers. I did so because in giving one entire tank to Plaintiff instead of one anna share in all the tanks, it would be convenient to the Plaintiff as well as to the Defendants to use and enjoy the tanks. In the second case, as the patit danga lands in possession of the tenants under Ramanuj Roy did not meet the demands of the Plaintiff, so I allotted to Plaintiff the small portion of khas patit lands in possession of Ramanuj which was left after giving the Plaintiff his share of the same class. But this even did not make up the deficiency. So I had to take a portion of the ejmali patit danga land (Plot No. 859) and ??? allot the same to the Plaintiff's share.”

The tank and the patit danga lands being joint, the allotments certainly affected the minors.

The suit was instituted in 1907 about 15 years ago and a large sum has been spent in the partition proceedings; and although under the circumstances we are reluctant to remand the case, we think that the minors as well as Jogendra have been prejudiced though Jogendra himself is partly responsible for it. Having regard to the fact that the minors have not been properly represented, that the partition affects their interests and that the heirs of the deceased were not brought on the record before the decree, we think that the final decree should be set aside.

The Khanapuri of the classified lands made by the Commissioner will stand. But the Commissioner will proceed to record the lands in the possession of Ramanju and Jogendra separately in the presence of all the Defendants after giving notice to them, and then proceed to allot lands in one anna share of the Plaintiff. There will also be a partition of the tanks and patit danga lands in the Plaintiff's one anna share in the presence of all the Defendants. To this extent only the proceedings of the Commissioner are set aside and there will be a fresh partition, as indicated above.

As regards Mouza Barathol the Commissioner (Bibhuti Babu) reported (as would appear from the judgment of the Court below) that the Plaintiff should get a certain sum as his share of the rents of the Mouza and neither party took any objection to the same.

As regards Chak Aral the Commissioner says:—“The men present stated it to be a separate Mouza and not a part and parcel of Mouza Ismail, but the revenue survey map shows that it is a part of Ismail. Defendants did not produce any document before me to show that it was a separate Mouza. So I could not leave it aside. But I have made a separate list of the lands in this chak and have partitioned these lands separately so that if this chak be not a part of Ismail, this portion of the partition work may be left aside without affecting the partition of the rest of the Mouza.”

It is contended, on behalf of the Appellant that, Mouzah Ismail is held under the Raja of Pachait, whereas in the petition of claim made by Ramesh Chandra Mukerjee on the 24th April 1895 in Execution Case No. 293 of 1895 in which the ancestor of the Plaintiff was the decree-holder and Ramanuj and Ramgopal were the judgment-debtors, it was asserted that Chak Aral was held under one Priya Sakli Debi and that it was released from attachment. Now, if this assertion is true (we cannot decide that point here) prima facie it would not form part of Mouzah Ismail. This question does not appear to have been gone into fully by the Court below. The learned Subordinate Judge merely says that “Aral Chak being within Mouza Ismail, is liable to partition.”

We accordingly direct the Court below to go into this question and if that Court finds that Chak Aral is not a part and parcel of Mouza Ismail, then it will be excluded from partition. If, on the other hand, it finds that it is a part and parcel of Mouza. Ismail as purchased by the Plaintiff, then it must be partitioned along with the Mouza.

The Court will decide this question of Chak Aral before the Commissioner is directed to make fresh allotments.

The final decree of the Court below is accordingly set aside and the case sent back to that Court in order that fresh partition may be made as directed above and the case then disposed of according to law.

The Appellant must put in the costs of the fresh partition within the time to be fixed by the Court below, failing which the partition, already effected, will stand.

So far as the costs of Chak Aral are concerned, we assess the hearing-fee at three gold mohurs which will abide the result and as regards the rest of the lands, we assess the hearing-fee at Rs. 100.

The Plaintiff-Respondent must pay the costs of this appeal to the Appellant.

As the case has been pending for a very long time, we trust that the Court below will take it up at an early date.

J.N.R

Case remanded.

Rajani Kanta Roy v. Raja Jyoti Prosad Singh Deo

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion — Partition Suit concerning Mouza Ismail

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

Appellant's / Other Contentions Raised in the Appeal

Specific Petition by Defendant No. 37 (Jogendra)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Rajani Kanta Roy v. Raja Jyoti Prosad Singh Deo

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