1. The petitioners are the defendants in B.B No. 33 of 1938 on the file of the Revenue Divisional Officer of Kumbakonam. The respondent is the plaintiff in the suit, which he has brought under Section 55 of the Madras Act 1 of 1908, alleging that by virtue of Madras Act 18 of 1936, he has become entitled to occupancy rights in certain lands hitherto held by him on lease from the defendants in the village of Ganapati Agraharam. The plaintiff applied to the Revenue Divisional Officer for a temporary injunction under O. 39, R. 1 of the CPC, and an ex parte injunction was ordered but was subsequently cancelled by the Revenue Divisional Officer after hearing both sides. The plaintiff appealed to the District Judge, and his appeal has been allowed. The defendants now seek to have the order of the District Judge set aside. It does not appear that the Provincial Government have made any rules under Section 192(1) of the Madras Act 1 of 1908, as amended in 1934, declaring that any pro visions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not apply to suits, applications, appeals or other proceedings under the Act, in any Civil or Revenue Court. I shall therefore assume that the Revenue Divisional Officer had jurisdiction to issue an injunction under O. 39, R. 1, and that an appeal lay to the District Judge: vide Section 106 of the CPC.
2. The petitioners are however justified in contending that the order of the learned District Judge is vitiated by material irregularity. He has completely lost sight of the first principle governing applications under O. 39, R. 1 of the CPC. That is, that the applicant for a temporary injunction must show that he has a prima facie case. The learned Revenue Divisional Officer showed in his order dated 16th June 1938 that the plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case, and the learned District Judge has not held that the learned Revenue Divisional Officer was wrong. He has nowhere expressed the view that the plaintiff has a good prima facie case. He has granted an injunction merely because the plaintiff has filed a suit and has asked the Court to preserve the status quo. The defendants on the other hand showed that the plaintiff himself had taken a lease of the lands in dispute from them for Fasli 1347. The plaintiff was the successful bid der for the lease at an auction held by the receiver on 18th May 1937, and it is only in pursuance of the lease granted to him thereafter that he was holding the lands at the time he filed the suit, if in fact he was at that time in actual possession, a question which has not yet been decided.
3. In the muchilika executed by him after the auction, the plaintiff has expressly covenanted that he has no kudiwaram interest in the lands and that he will never put for ward any such claim. This covenant he entered into long after Madras Act 18 of 1936 came into force, and he added to it a further covenant that he would surrender possession to the Estate Officer at the expiry of the lease. It is therefore clear that whatever rights he may be able to establish in the suit, he has, prima facie, no case. In these circumstances the order of the learned District Judge is liable to be set aside. Allowing this petition I direct that the injunction granted by the lower Appellate Court be cancelled. The petitioners will recover their costs in all the Courts from the plaintiff.
C.R.K/R.M
4. Petition allowed.