Chapman, J.:— A permanent lease was taken of Chak Gamharia in Mouzah Karudih by three parties. The first party may be represented for the purpose of this case by the name of Tejo Mian, the second party by the name of Karu Mian and the third party Chatru Mian. Each took one-third of the property leased. In the year 1906 Chatru Mian instituted a suit in which he claimed a raiyati right in 40 bighas of this land. The suit ended in a compromise in which it was agreed that each of the three parties should be recognised as having a separate right in one-third of the property, that one-third amounting in each case to 36 bighas. In the lands allotted to the party of Tejo Mian under that compromise, there lay the lands which form the subject of the present suit. In 1912 there was a survey Record of Rights, and this land, the subject of the present suit, was recorded in the name of Karu Mian. The present suit is a suit brought by Tejo Mian and his party for the recovery of possession of this land, the claim being based upon the compromise in the suit brought by Chatru Mian in 1906. A Civil Court Amin was appointed to lay out the boundaries in accordance with the compromise, and he reported that the lands in suit were within the allotment made to the plaintiffs in that previous compromise. The Munsif, however, held that the compromise was not admissible in evidence for want of registration, and in appeal the learned Judicial Commissioner has taken the opposite view and has held that registration was not necessary, with the result that he finds that the correctness of the survey record has been sufficiently rebutted by the evidence contained in the compromise decree. He accordingly decreed the plaintiffs' suit. Karu Mian now appeals to this Court. The first ground taken in appeal is that the learned Judicial Commissoner is wrong and that the compromise decree in the suit of 1916 is not admissible in evidence for want of registration.

2. The question for determination whether the case comes within the exemption from registration contained in Section 17(2)(1) of the Registration Act. The exemption is to the effect that the clause requiring registration in such a case as the present does not apply to a decree of Court. The first ground taken is that inasmuch as this compromise decree dealt with the property not mentioned in plaint in the suit it was to that extent an improper decree, and was therefore not a decree within the meaning of the exemption above referred to. Where however a case is compromised in the manner in which the suit of 1906 was compromised, what occurs is, that each defendant admits the plaintiff's claim to certain portions of the claim made by him in consideration of the plaintiff admitting each of the defendants' claims for certain property which each desires to retain. I under stand that in such a case their Lordships of the Privy Council have held that registration is not necessary, and as an authority for this I would refer to the case of Pranal Anni v. Lakshmi Anni(1), where at p. 514 the following passage occurs with reference to the objection made in that case that the compromise had not been registered.

3. Their Lordships say: “If the parties after agreeing to settle the suit of 1885, on the footing that they were each to take a half share of the lands involved in that suit and also a half share of the lands now in dispute, had informed the learned Judge that these were the terms of the compromise, and had invited him by reason of such: compromise, to dispose of the conclusions of the suit of 1885, their Lordships see no reason to doubt that the order of the learned Judge, if, it had referred to or narrated these terms of compromise, would have been judicial evidence, available to the appellant, that the respondents had agreed to transfer to her the moiety of the land now in dispute.” The same principle enunciated in more general terms will be found in a judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Bindesri Naik v. Ganga Saran Saha(2). At p. 180 their Lordships say that they are satisfied that the provisions of the Registration Act requiring registration do not apply to a proper judicial proceeding, whether consisting of pleadings filed by the parties or of orders made by the Court. It is true that the Calcutta High Courts in some cases have hesitated to apply the full doctrine, enunciated by their Lordships, and as an example of such a case I need only refer to the judgment of Mookerjee, J., in the case of Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrika Singh(3), but to my mind the principle should not be limited in its operation as it is founded not only upon authority but also on reason. The object of the Registration Act requiring that a document should be registered is merely for the purpose of ensuring publicity of record in order to facilitate proof of execution and to prevent fraud. These objects are certainly secured where a proceeding between the parties as one that takes place in the publicity of a Judicial Court and given effect to, by a decree which it would be impracticable to force or farbricate. It is, I understand, on this principle and no other that a decree which is an order of the Court has been exempted from registration. The question of Court-fee or Stamp does not appear to me to be relevant in the case. If the document requires a stamp, the omission to stamp it does not necessarily defeat the suit. The stamp can be recovered in the course of litigation. No question of Court-fees arises in the present case and this is an indication that the considerations of Court-fees are quite irrelevant in the present connection. The amount of Court-fee payable would not have been greater if the suit had been one for partition.

4. It is then contended that the compromise was not given effect to in the decree. The decree is in the usual terms, that is to, say, that the suit is decreed in terms of the compromise the compromise is incorporated in the decree and is referred to therein. The compromise recites, as I have said, that an area similar in extent to that claimed by the plaintiff in the suit should be allotted to him and each of the parties of defendants. This means that there was a give and take and that the defendants' assent to the allotment of the lands so given to the plaintiff was moved by the consideration of a similar assent by the plaintiff to the allotment to the two defendants. It is impossible to say that such a compromise and such a decree in a case if that kind is not a proper proceeding and a proper decree within the meaning of the words of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case reported as Bindesri Naik v. Ganga Saran Sahu. It is also impossible to say that this give and take between the plaintiff and the defendant was not actually in fact given effect to in the decree; it was incorporated in it. The question whether the other defendants could have executed the decree is a different question. The fact is that the decree is, as it stands, evidence of an agreement between the parties under which certain lands were allotted to each and inasmuch as it was a proper decree it was exempted from registration. I therefore hold that the learned Judicial Commissioner was correct in the view which he took of the law on the subject of registration.

5. It is last contended that the learned Judicial Commissioner should have gone into the question of the reports submitted by the Civil Court Amin, which had not been dealt with by the Munsif and to which objections have been made on behalf of the appellant. It is true that no mention is made of these objections in the judgment of the learned Judicial Commissioner, but before we could interfere on this ground we should have to be satisfied that these objections were brought to the notice of the learned Judicial Commissioner. The fact is that no mention of this point is made in the memorandum of appeal even to this Court. The learned Judicial Commissioner says in this connection that the report clearly shows that the lands in suit fell to the share of the plaintiff-appellant. In my opinion the grounds taken in appeal to this Court fail. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

6. Jwala Prasad, J.:— I agree. The lands in suit were allotted to the plaintiffs in 1906 by a compromise decree bearing date 10th August, 1906 in connection with a Suit No. 398 of 1916 brought by defendant 2 against the present plaintiffs and defendant 1. The Amin, who was deputed to indentify the lands in the present suit with those mentioned in the compromise decree of 1916, has held that the lands are identical with those allotted to the present plaintiffs in the said compromise decree. The only ground upon which it is contended by the learned vakil for the appellant (defendant 1 in this case) that the decree of 1906 should not be given effect to is, that the decree embodied some lands which were not the subject matter in that case. That suit was for certain lands measuring roughly about 40 bighas, which the plaintiffs in that case (now defendant 2) claimed as his one-third share out of the entire 16 annas of the mourusi lease lands in Chak Gamharia Tanr held by him and defendants 1 and 2 in that case as his co-sharers. The parties came to terms; all the 16 annas lands of the mourusi lands in Gamharia Tanr were divided amicably amongst the parties and land equal to one-third was given to each of the three co-sharers. In such a compromise it is impossible to say that the Court could have given effect to only the lands claimed in the suit and not to the 16 annas lands which were divided between the co-sharers. Under R. 3, O. 23 of the CPC “Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the Court shall order such agreement or compromise to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith, so far as it relates to the suit.” Now this evidently contemplates that all terms which form the consideration for the adjustment of the matters in dispute, whether they form the subject-matter of the suit or not, become related to the suit and can be embodied in the decree. It would have been impossible for the Court to confine itself to the lands which the plaintiff chose to claim in that suit without taking into consideration all the lands of the chak held by the co-sharers and which they divided amongst themselves and thus settled their disputes once for all.

7. All the lands of the chak though not actually claimed in the plaint were lands which related to the suit. The Court therefore had jurisdiction to give effect to the compromise lands, though not strictly claimed in that suit. The principle of the ruling in Joti Kuruvetappa v. Izari Sirusappa(4) may well apply to this case. The contention of the appellant must therefore fail. The terms of the compromise were accepted by the Court and incorporated in the decree based on the compromise. Under Section 17 of the Registration Act, Cl. (2)(vi), “a decree or order of a Court” does not require registration. To my mind all that we have to see is whether the subject-matter of the present suit was embodied in the decree or not, and if the lands were embodied in the decree it is not our business to go behind the decree and find out whether the lands were the subject-matter of the suit in which the decree was passed. It will be presumed in a case of this nature, where a co-proprietor seeks to have his share of the property, that the terms of the compromise, which purports to divide the entire property among all the co-proprietors parties to the suit, were before the mind of the Court when the decree was passed. I do not therefore think that there is any substance in the contention that the compromise decree in so far as it related to the land which was not directly the subject-matter of the suit of 1916, required registration under the Indian Registration Act. The point appears to be concluded by the principles deducible from the Privy Council authorities in Bindesri Naik v. Ganga Saran Sahu. It has not, moreover, been shown that the lands claimed in the present suit were not the lands included in those mentioned in the plaint of the former suit.

8. The point of attack is a general one that the compromise decree dealt with more lands, i.e, 16 annas of the chak, whereas what was actually claimed by the plaintiff in that suit was a one-third share in the chak. I concur with all the other reasons and the view of the law on the subject as set forth in the judgment of my learned brother just delivered and agree that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

V.S/R.K

9. Appeal dismissed.