Manohar Lall, J.:— This is an application by the plaintiff and arises out of a suit instituted by him in the Small Cause Court to recover his dues on a handnote.
A sum of Rs. 200 has been found to have been advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant by a handnote on the 8th of August, 1934. The plea of the defendant that he has received only Rs. 100 was not accepted. The suit to recover the dues was instituted by the plaintiff on the 4th of May, 1943. In order to save limitation he relied on two payments made by the defendant, one on the 4th of August, 1937, for Rs. 20, and the other on the 16th of June, 1940, for Rs. 7. The factum of the payments has been established. But the learned Small Cause Court Judge relying upon the Privy Council case of Rama Shah v. Lal Chand refused to give effect to these payments as amounting to an acknowledgment within the meaning of section 20 of the Limitation Act because the payments were not made ‘as such’ towards interest. Accordingly he dismissed the suit.
It is contended before us on behalf of the petitioner that the suit was instituted after the provisions of section 20 of the Limitation Act were amended by the amending Act XVI of 1942 which came into operation on the 30th of March, 1942. This Act was passed to remove the difficulties which had arisen by reason of the interpretation of their Lordships of the provisions of section 20 of the Limitation 4Act in the case referred to by me. It is now provided by the amendment that
“Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy…………………a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made.”
It is clear, therefore, that if this amended provision applies, the suit of the plaintiff is within time.
But it is argued by Mr. Yasin Yunus, who appears for the respondent, that the right of the plaintiff to institute a suit to recover his dues under the handnote was extinguished in 1937 and also in 1940 because he could not rely upon this acknowledgment as extending the period of limitation within the meaning of the rule as laid down by the Privy Council in Rama Shah's case. In my opinion this contention is not pound. It is now well settled that the law of limitation which governs an action is the law which prevails on the date when the suit is instituted. Here the suit was instituted in 1943 when section 20 as amended by Act XVI of 1942 was in operation, and, therefore, the provision of that Act must be applied.
In the case of Lola Soni Ram v. Kanhaiya Lal one of the contentions raised before their Lordships was that the Limitation Act applicable to the case was Act XIV of 1859, and, therefore the acknowledgment of the existence of certain mortgages of 1842 which were contained in some deeds which were executed by two ladies was sufficient to keep the right alive. Sir John Edge in delivering the judgment of their Lordships observed as to this contention at page 84: “As to that contention it is sufficient for their Lordships to say that they agree with the High Court that Act XIV of 1859 does not apply to this suit and that the Limitation Act which does apply is Act XV of 1877, and further that the acknowledgments which were made by Musammat Jamna and Musammat Janki were not acknowledgments within the meaning of section 19 of Act XV of 1877 made by a person or persons through whom the defendants derived title or liability”. In the present case the position is just the converse as it is sought to be argued on behalf of the respondent that the acknowledgments which are good acknowledgments under the Act which prevails on the date of the suit were not good acknowledgment as interpreted by their Lordships of the Privy Council when the unamended Act of 1908 was in force.
Mr. Yasin Yunus also relied upon the case of Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain where in a suit to recover possession of immoveable property an observation was made by their Lordships that no suit could be brought to enforce the right after the lapse of twelve years from the time the cause, of action arose and that nothing in article 442 of Act IX of 1871 or of article 141 of Act XV of 1877 could lead to the revival of a right that had already become barred. Now here the right of the plaintiff to recover the debt had not become barred when Act XVI of 1942 was passed. The provisions of section 28 of the Limitation Act apply only where the right in question is a right to recover property and not a debt or legacy. It was faintly suggested that the right of the defendant to refuse to pay the debt of the plaintiff was a right which had become vested in him and it could not be defeated by the new amendment of 1942. This argument is equally without any substance. There is no such right which can be recognised by law.
For these reasons I would allow the application, set aside the decision of the learned Small Cause Court Judge and decree the suit of the plaintiff with costs both in this Court and in the court below. Hearing fee one gold mohur.
Beevor, J.:— I agree.
Rule made absolute.
K.D