Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge

Petitioners approached this Court claiming the following substantial reliefs:

“(i). Issue a writ of certiorari or direction in the nature of writ of certiorari quashing/setting aside order dated 28.2.2013 passed by respondent No. 1 in Reference Case No. 6 of 2011.

(ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or direction in the nature of writ of mandamus directing the respondent No. 1 to proceed with the reference No. 6/2011 again and dispose of the same in accordance with law.”

2. The specific case of the petitioners is that once their matter had been referred to the Arbitrator in terms of Section 18(3) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (for short 2006 Act’) read with Rule 10 of the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council Rules, 2007 (for short ‘Rules’), then the Arbitrator so appointed could not close the proceedings by not resorting to further steps as contemplated in these provisions thereby leaving the petitioners in lurch.

3. It is not disputed that a reference under Section 18(1) of the Act for recovery of Rs. 32,26,760/- (Principal) as delayed payment + Rs. 70,20,386/- (Interest) as interest on delayed payment for the goods supplied to the respondent No. 2 by the petitioner No. 1 firm, was made to the council. In these proceedings certain recoveries were made and thereafter the council tried to bring the parties to an agreement for payment of the balance amount of principal and interest but the parties remained adamant on the respective stands and the council in its 8 meeting held on 28 February, 2013 unanimously decided that the reference be dropped from the proceeding of the H.P Micro and Small Facilitation Council and advised the parties to the reference to redress and sort out their matter regarding balance payment of principal and interest due at an appropriate legal forum. The operative portion of the order is thus:

“…..In all these meetings of the council, the council tried to bring the parties to the reference to an agreement for the payment of balance amount of principal & interest. But the parties remained adamant on their respective stands. The council in its 8th meeting held on 28th February, 2013 unanimously decided that the reference be dropped from the proceeding of the H.P Micro and Small Facilitation Council and advised the parties to the reference to redress and sort out their matter regarding balance payment of principal and interest due at an appropriate legal forum.”

4. In this background, it is apt to reproduce Section 18 of the Act as under:

“18. Reference to Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council.

(1) Not withstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any party to a dispute may, with regard to any amount due under Section 17, make a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council.

(2) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1), the Council shall either itself conduct conciliation in the matter or seek the assistance of any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services by making a reference to such an institution or centre, for conducting conciliation and the provisions of Sections 65 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to such a dispute as if the conciliation was initiated under Part III of that Act.

(3) Where the conciliation initiated under sub-section (2) is not successful and stands terminated without any settlement between the parties, the Council shall either itself take up the dispute for arbitration or refer it to any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services for such arbitration and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall then apply to the disputes as if the arbitration was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement referred to in sub-section(1) of Section 7 of the Act.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council or the centre providing alternate dispute resolution services shall have jurisdiction to act as an Arbitrator or Conciliator under this section in a dispute between the supplier located within its jurisdiction and a buyer located anywhere in India.

(5) Every reference made under this section shall be decided within a period of ninety days from the date of making such a reference.”

Rule 10 of the Act reads as under:

“(10) When the conciliation mentioned in sub rule (9) above does not lead to settlement of the dispute, the Council shall either itself act as an Arbitrator for final settlement of the dispute or refer it to an institute for arbitration, in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The supplier and the buyer may, either in person or through their legal representatives, present his case before the Council or the institute during the arbitral proceedings. The institute shall submit its report to the Council within such time as the Council may stipulate.”

5. Therefore, the short question which arises for consideration is as to whether the respondent No. 1 could have adopted a course as has been done while adjudicating a reference which admittedly was under Section 18(1) of the 2006 Act.

6. Mr. Deepak Sibbal, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that complete mechanism of decision making has been provided in Section 18, particularly sub-section (3) thereof of the Act, when read in consonance with Rule 10 ibid.

7. Mr. Ajay Mohan Goel, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has only raised technical objection regarding maintainability of the petition and has taken a further stand that the agreement which was entered into between the petitioners and respondent No. 2 specifically contain an arbitration clause and thus according to him, the reference itself under Section 18 of the 2006 Act was not maintainable.

8. We find force in the submissions made by the petitioners. The respondent No. 1 could not have dropped the proceedings and left the parties to redress and sort out their matter before an appropriate legal forum. Once a specific procedure had been prescribed for determining the disputes, then undisputably the authority was bound to follow the prescribed procedure in determining the dispute. The respondent No. 1 being a statutory authority had no jurisdiction to deviate from the prescribed procedure as it is required to act within the frame work of law as laid down in the Act and the Rules. The respondent No. 1 has not only violated the statutory provisions but has transgressed its jurisdiction.

9. It is cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides for a particular thing, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. Meaning thereby, that when a statute provides for a particular procedure, the authority has to follow the same and cannot be permitted to act in contravention of the same. In Selvi J. Jayalalithaa v. State of KarnatakaJT 2013 (13) SC 176 wherein it has been held as under:

“29.1 There is yet an uncontroverted legal principle that when the statute provides for a particular procedure, the authority has to follow the same and cannot be permitted to act in contravention of the same. In other words, where a statute requires to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way and not contrary to it at all. Other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden. The aforesaid settled legal proposition is based on a legal maxim “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius”, meaning thereby that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular way, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner and following any other course is not permissible.

In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh [AIR 1964 SC 358], this Court held as under:

“8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor [(1876) 1 Ch D 426] is well recognised and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted.”

(See also: Accountant General, State of Madhya Pradesh v. S.K Dubey [JT 2012 (3) SC 210: (2012) 4 SCC 578]).”

The same principle has also been reiterated in a later judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dipak Babaria v. State of Gujarat2014 AIR SCW 1425 wherein it has been held as under:

“53. It is well settled that where the statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. This proposition of law laid down in Taylor v. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch D 426, 431 was first adopted by the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmed Accused v. Emperor ., reported in AIR 1936 PC 253 and then followed by a Bench of three Judges of this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1954 SC 322. This proposition was further explained in paragraph 8 of State of U.P v. Singhara Singh by a Bench of three Judges, reported in AIR 1964 SC 358 in the following words:

“8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor is well recognised and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted…..”

This proposition has been later on reiterated in Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad, reported in (1999) 8 SCC 266: (AIR 1999 SC 3558), Dhananjaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2001) 4 SCC 9: (AIR 2001 SC 1512) and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd. ., reported in (2008) 4 SCC 755: (AIR 2008 SC 1921).”

Therefore, once the statute provides for a complete mechanism of adjudicating the disputes under Section 18 of the Act read with Rule 10 of the Rules ibid, the respondent No. 1 was required to adjudicate the dispute strictly in terms of Section 18 of the Act and was necessarily prohibited from doing the Act in any other manner than the one which had been prescribed in any case could the authority be permitted the Act in contravention of the same.

10. At this stage, Mr. Ajay Mohan Goel, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has strenuously argued that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present case since under Section 19 of the Act, it was incumbent upon the petitioners to have deposited 75% of the amount in terms of the impugned order before filing this writ petition and having failed to do so, the present writ petition is not maintainable. Section 19 of the Act reads as under:

“19. Application for setting aside decree, award or order.

No application for setting aside any decree, award or other order made either by the Council itself or by any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services to which a reference is made by the Council, shall be entertained by any court unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy five per cent of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, the other order in the manner directed by such court:

Provided that pending disposal of the application to set aside the decree, award or order, the court shall order that such percentage of the amount deposited shall be paid to the supplier, as it considers reasonable under the circumstances of the case, subject to such conditions as it deems necessary to impose.”

He has pressed into service the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement(2010) 4 SCC 772 particularly the following observations:

“29. By referring to the aforesaid schemes under different statutes, this Court wants to underline that the right of appeal, being always a creature of a Statute, its nature, ambit and width has to be determined from the Statute itself. When the language of the Statute regarding the nature of the order from which right of appeal has been conferred is clear, no statutory interpretation is warranted either to widen or restrict the same.

30. The argument that writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be ousted by Parliamentary legislation is for too fundamental to be questioned especially after the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261. However, that does not answer the question of maintainability of a writ petition which seeks to impugn an order declining dispensation of pre-deposit of penalty by the Appellate Tribunal.

31. When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal Statute, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. In this case High Court is a statutory forum of appeal on a question of law. That should not be abdicated and given a go by by a litigant for invoking the forum of judicial review of the High Court under writ jurisdiction. The High Court, with great respect, fell into a manifest error by not appreciating the aspect of the matter. It has however dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.

32. No reason could be assigned by the appellant's counsel to demonstrate why the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 35 of FEMA does not provide an efficacious remedy. In fact there could hardly be any reason since High Court itself is the appellate forum.”

“34. Again in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603, in the background of taxation laws, a three judge Bench of this Court apart from reiterating the principle of exercise of writ jurisdiction with the time honoured self imposed limitations, focused on another legal principle on right and remedies. In paragraph 11, at page 607 of the report, this Court laid down: (SCC pp.440-41, para 11)

“11……It is now well recognized that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford [1859] 6 C.B (NS) 336 in the following passage (E.R.P.495)

‘……There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon statute….. But there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it……the remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to.’

The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Expres Newspaper Ltd. [1919] AC 368 and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. [1935] AC 532 and Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. AIR 1940 PC 105. It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine”.

35. In this case, liability of the appellant is not created under any common law principle but, it is clearly a statutory liability and for which the statutory remedy is an appeal under Section 35 of FEMA, subject to the limitations contained therein. A writ petition in the facts of this case is therefore clearly not maintainable.

36. Again another Constitution Bench of this Court in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 536, speaking through B.P Jeevan Reddy, delivering the majority judgment, and dealing with a case of refund of Central Excise Duty held:(SCC p.607 e-f, para 77)

“77…….So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 -- or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 - is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the power under Article 226.Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment.”

In the concluding portion of the judgment it was further held: (Mafatlal Industries Ltd. case (supra), SCC p.635 c, para 108)

“(x)….The power under Article 226 is conceived to serve the ends of law and not to transgress them.”

11. We are afraid that we cannot accept this submission made by learned counsel for respondent No. 2 for more than one reason.

Firstly, the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 could not point out any provision of law whereby any further statutory remedy has been provided against the order passed by respondent No. 1.

Secondly, the respondent cannot take advantage of its own wrong by firstly not adhering to the provisions of Section 18 of the Act read with Rule 10 of the Rules and then question the maintainability of the petition only on the ground of non-deposit of the amount.

Thirdly, it is a settled law that existence of alternate remedy is not in itself a bar for exercise of extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction.

12. In so far as the alternate remedy being a Bar for extraordinary writ jurisdiction is concerned, the law on this aspect is more than settled. However, it would be relevant to refer to the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal(2014) 1 SCC 603 wherein the legal position with regard to maintainability of the petition and existence of all alternate remedy has been summed up in the following manner:

“10. In the instant case, the only question which arises for our consideration and decision is whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the order passed by the assessing authority under Section 148 of the Act in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 when an equally efficacious alternate remedy was available to the assessee under the Act.

11. Before discussing the fact proposition, we would notice the principle of law as laid down by this Court. It is settled law that non-entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative remedy. However, the High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without availing the same unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such interference or there exist sufficient grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. (See: State Of U.P v. Mohammad Nooh ., AIR 1958 SC 86; Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa,(1983) 2 SCC 433; Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107; State of H.P v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 499).

12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S Rashid and Sons v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207; Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425; Union Of India v. T.R Varma ., AIR 1957 SC 882; State Of U.P v. Mohammad Nooh ., AIR 1958 SC 86 and K.S Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089 have held that though Article 226 confers a very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ absolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or procedure required for decision has not been adopted.

(See: N.T Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422; Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar, (1965) 2 SCR 653; Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das, (1984) 2 SCC 436; S.T Muthusami v. K. Natarajan, (1988) 1 SCC 572; Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75; Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293; A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan,(2000) 7 SCC 695; L.L Sudhakar Reddy v. State of A.P, (2001) 6 SCC 634; Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha v. State of Maharashtra,(2001) 8 SCC 509; Pratap Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484 and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO, (2003) 1 SCC 72).

13. In Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Assn. of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, this Court has held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction for relief and observed as follows: (SCC pp.343-45, paras 12-14)

“12. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 this Court adverted to the rule of self-imposed restraint that the writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and observed: (AIR p. 1423, para 7).

“7…..The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.’

13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 this Court observed: (SCC pp. 440-41, para 11)

“11…. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford, 141 ER 486 in the following passage: (ER p. 495)

“…..There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon a statute… But there is a third class viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it……The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to.”

The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd., 1919 AC 368 and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. Ltd., 1935 AC 532 (PC) and Secy. of State v. Mask and Co., AIR 1940 PC 105 It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine.’

14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536 B.P Jeevan Reddy, J. (speaking for the majority of the larger Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para 77)

‘77……So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 - or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 - is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the power under Article 226.Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment.’”

(See: G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192; CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260; Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura,(1999) 1 SCC 472; Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5; C.A Abraham v. ITO, (1961) 2 SCR 765; Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433; H.B Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312; Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1; Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1998) 8 SCC 272; Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh ., (1999) 1 SCC 209 and Punjab National Bank v. O.C Krishnan, (2001) 6 SCC 569)

14. In Union of India v. Guwahati Carbon Ltd., (2012) 11 SCC 651, this Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle and observed:

“8. Before we discuss the correctness of the impugned order, we intend to remind ourselves the observations made by this Court in Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta, (1979) 3 SCC 83. In the said decision, this Court was pleased to observe that: (SCC p. 88, para 23).

“23…..[when] a revenue statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all the other forums and modes of seeking [remedy] are excluded.’”

15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognized some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, i.e, where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case, Titagarh Paper Mills case and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.

16. In the instant case, the Act provides complete machinery for the assessment/re-assessment of tax, imposition of penalty and for obtaining relief in respect of any improper orders passed by the Revenue Authorities, and the assessee could not be permitted to abandon that machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution when he had adequate remedy open to him by an appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The remedy under the statute, however, must be effective and not a mere formality with no substantial relief. In Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267 this Court has noticed that if an appeal is from “Caesar to Caesar's wife” the existence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and an exercise in futility.

17. In the instant case, neither has the writ petitioner assessee described the available alternate remedy under the Act as ineffectual and non-efficacious while invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court nor has the High Court ascribed cogent and satisfactory reasons to have exercised its jurisdiction in the facts of instant case. In light of the same, we are of the considered opinion that the Writ Court ought not to have entertained the Writ Petition filed by the assessee, wherein he has only questioned the correctness or otherwise of the notices issued under Section 148 of the Act, the reassessment orders passed and the consequential demand notices issued thereon.”

In view of the clear cut exposition of law, we hold the present petition to be maintainable. Even otherwise, as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chhabil Dass Agarwal (supra), the Courts have always recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy and one of such exceptions is where the statutory authority like in the present case has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question.

13. Thus, in view of the above discussion and taking into account the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we have no other option but to quash and set-aside the order dated 28.2.2013 passed by respondent No. 1 in reference case No. 6 of 2011 and direct the respondent No. 1 to restore the aforesaid reference to its original number and proceed with the same in accordance with law. Ordered accordingly.

14. The parties are left to bear their own costs.