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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Lingaraj Das

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Lingaraj Das (about 28 years old), was tried on a charge under section 302 read with section 34, Penal Code, for the murder of Ulia Bewa, a woman who was a prostitute. An alternative charge under section 201, Penal Code, was included but the appellant was acquitted on that charge by the Sessions Judge.

Factual narrative from the opinion: the deceased, originally from a Dhenkanal State village, was seen in company with Bhaskar Dhir (then absconding) and the appellant at various times on 26 August 1940 (about 4 p.m., again at 8–9 p.m., and lastly at about 11 p.m.). The dead body — severed in two near the waist and found naked — was located on the railway-line between telegraph posts 17 and 18 on the 222nd mile between Garh Madhupur and Haridaspur on the morning of 27 August 1940. Railway employees discovered the body and the Government Railway Police commenced an investigation; an inquest was held and a post-mortem examination took place on 28 August 1940.

The appellant was arrested on 3 September 1940. He made a statement which was in part excluded under section 25 of the Evidence Act; however, portions of the statement that led to recoveries were admitted. These recoveries included a dhoti from Bhabadei tank (produced by a fisherman), two gold ear-rings obtained from Adikanda Sahu, and broken pieces of conch-shell bangles found near “Rajapola.” The G.R.P. sub-inspector forwarded the appellant and recovered articles to the local police for completion of investigation; a charge-sheet was submitted.

Procedural history: the appellant had made a confession before a Magistrate on 7 September 1940. After charge-sheet submission, an inquiry by Mr. Tripathy discharged both accused by an order dated 13 January 1941. On revision, the District Magistrate set aside that discharge and directed commitment to the court of session on 5 November 1942. Both accused were then absconding for a period; following the appellant's later arrest he was committed to the Sessions Court and tried (the trial was held in 1944, as explained by the delay recounted in the opinion).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant's confession made before the Magistrate was voluntary and true.
  2. If the confession is true, whether it establishes an offence under section 302 read with section 34, Penal Code (i.e., murder by persons acting with common intention), given the medical evidence and the manner of death (run over by a train).
  3. Whether the articles recovered and produced in evidence were proved to belong to the deceased and, if so, whether those recoveries corroborate the confession and connect the appellant to the crime.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (through counsel Mr. Sahu) contended that the confession is untrue when measured against the medical and other evidence on record.
  • Even if the confession is accepted as true, it does not, according to the appellant, establish a case of murder under section 302.
  • The articles recovered by the sub-inspector (P.W.13) were not proved to be those of the deceased and therefore do not connect the appellant to the alleged murder.
  • The appellant denied having pointed out the tank and the place near “Rajapola” to the sub-inspector, and alleged police inducement to make the Magistrate's confession; he admitted selling the two ear-rings but claimed they were his own.

Prosecution's Case / Position (as presented in the opinion)

  • The prosecution relied on (a) eyewitness testimony that the appellant was seen in company with the deceased until about 11 p.m. on 26 August 1940; (b) the appellant's confession made before the Magistrate on 7 September 1940 (portions admitted); and (c) recoveries and other circumstances that corroborated the confession (dhoti from the tank, two ear-rings sold to Adikanda Sahu, and broken bangles at the alleged assault site).
  • The prosecution theory, as adopted by the Sessions Judge and this court, was that the appellant and Bhaskar Dhir shared a common intention to kill the woman in order to rob her of ornaments, and that the series of acts constituting assault and disposal of the body formed a single transaction judged by that common intention.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
King-Emperor v. Nehal Mahto Principle that if the intention is to kill and the killing results from a series of closely connected acts carried out in furtherance of that intention, the offence is murder. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that where there is a common intention to kill and a series of acts effectuate that intention, the result is murder under section 302 even if death occurs through subsequent acts (here, a train running over the victim).
In re Kaliappa Goundan Similar principle as above from a Madras decision: when intention to kill exists from the outset and the acts are intimately connected, the entire series constitutes murder. The court cited this Madras case to show that multiple stages of action, linked by a pre-existing intention to kill, constitute a single transaction judged by that intention; the opinion uses it to reinforce the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of murder.
In re Thavamani Emphasizes that the crucial question is whether there was an intention to cause death from the beginning; if so, the offence is murder though carried out in stages. The court quoted and relied on the observations in Thavamani to hold that where the intention to kill was present at the outset, later acts forming part of the same transaction (even if in stages) are to be taken together and amount to murder.
Patna case (unnamed in opinion) Authority noting that absence of evidence that accused believed the victim to be dead when carrying the body to the railway-line bears on whether the later act constituted an independent phase distinct from the killing act. The opinion discusses this Patna case to compare factual distinctions — in that case there was no evidence the accused thought the woman dead when carrying the body — and to explain that the present case differs because the appellant's confession stated the woman was thought to be dead when removed to the railway-line.
Madras case (unnamed; reference to 57 Madras 158) Examined the legal effect of two-stage transactions and whether the second stage (disposing of the body) can be treated as part of the same transaction when intention to kill existed from the outset. The court referred to this Madras authority in support of the view that where intention to kill exists from the beginning, the acts forming the whole transaction should be considered together; the opinion cites the decision to justify treating the assault and disposal as one transaction amounting to murder.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a series of analytical steps, each tied to evidence presented in the record:

  1. Identity and timing: The court accepted identification of the deceased as Ulia Bewa via the pre-post-mortem photograph, and fixed the time window of death between about 11 p.m. on 26 August 1940 (last seen alive) and the early morning of 27 August 1940 (when the body was found).
  2. The evidence corpus: The court summarized the material evidence against the appellant as (a) eyewitness testimony that he was seen with the deceased until about 11 p.m., (b) the confession made before the Magistrate (portions relied upon), and (c) circumstantial corroboration by recoveries (dhoti, ear-rings) and broken bangles at the alleged assault place.
  3. Voluntariness and truth of the confession: The court found no basis to doubt the voluntariness of the Magistrate confession. Although the confession emphasized the other accused (Bhaskar Dhir) more prominently, the court treated it as not self-exculpatory in a manner that undermined its truth. The confession had been retracted at trial, so the court assessed corroboration and consistency with other evidence.
  4. Medical evidence reconciled with the confession: The medical evidence negated death by throttling and attributed most injuries to the train passing over the body; one earlobe injury was said to be post-mortem. The court held that medical evidence did not render the confession inherently improbable: it was plausible that an earlier assault rendered the victim unconscious and that the body was later placed on the line and run over. The court gave weight to the fact the body was found stark naked (which, in the court's view, ruled out accident or suicide) and to the presence of broken bangle pieces at the alleged assault site.
  5. Corroboration by recoveries and circumstances: The court found that the recoveries (the dhoti from the tank, the ear-rings sold to Adikanda Sahu, and broken bangles at the site indicated on the sketch map) materially corroborated parts of the confession and connected the appellant to the events.
  6. Legal characterization of the offence: Confronting the contention that acceptance of the confession established at best an offence other than murder, the court relied on precedents (King-Emperor v. Nehal Mahto, In re Kaliappa Goundan, In re Thavamani) to state that where there is a clear intention to kill from the outset, and a series of closely linked acts are carried out to effect that intention, the whole transaction amounts to murder under section 302. Importantly, the court observed that in this case the confession expressly stated the accused thought the woman was dead when moving her to the railway-line, distinguishing it from some cited authorities where there was no such belief. Thus, even though the immediate cause of death was the passing train, that result flowed from the original common intention to kill.
  7. Sentencing consideration: The Sessions Judge had imposed a lesser sentence (transportation for life rather than a greater penalty) because of the long delay in bringing the matter to trial; the appellate court declined to interfere with that penalty choice.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction under section 302 read with section 34, Penal Code, and the sentence of transportation for life imposed on the appellant.

Implications:

  • The direct consequence is that the appellant's conviction and sentence remain in force.
  • The court applied established authorities to hold that a pre-existing common intention to kill, carried out through a sequence of closely connected acts culminating in death (even by a passing train), constitutes murder under section 302. The opinion therefore reinforces the principle, drawn from prior decisions, that multipart transactions undertaken pursuant to an intent to kill are to be judged as a whole.
  • The opinion does not announce any novel legal principle; it applies existing case law and the facts of this matter to reach the conclusion that the confession (found voluntary and corroborated) and attendant circumstances established guilt. No new precedent is stated to have been created by the decision; the court confined itself to applying established doctrines and affirming the sentence, with leniency on quantum due to trial delay.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed. (Das, J. — delivered the opinion; Sinha, J., concurred.)

    Lingraj Das v. King-Emperor

    Das, J.:— The appellant, Lingaraj Das, aged about twenty-eight, was tried by the learned Sessions Judge of Cuttack on a charge under section 302 read with section 34, Penal Code, for murdering a woman called Ulia Bewa, who was a prostitute by profession. He has been found guilty of the charge and sentenced to transportation for life. There was an alternative charge under section 201, Penal Code, of which the appellant has been acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge.

    The deceased woman, Ulia Bewa, was originally a resident of a village in the Dhenkanal State. She was a prostitute, and used to go to Calcutta for earning money. Some days before the 26th of August, 1940, the woman was seen in company of one Bhaskar Dhir who is now absconding. She was seen in company of Bhaskar Dhir in village Garh Madhupur and some neighbouring villages, such as, Bhobanpur, Kakudakhali, etc. On the 26th of August, 1940, which was the Janmastami day, the woman was seen in company of the present appellant and Bhaskar Dhir at different times in village Garh Madhupur. She was seen in company of the appellant and Bhaskar Dhir at 4 p.m, then again at 8 or 9 p.m and then at about 11 p.m This was the last time when the woman was seen alive. On the 27th of August, 1940, at about 5-30 a.m, the dead-body of the woman was found on the railway-line between telegraph posts 17 and 18 on the 222nd mile between stations Garh Madhupur and Haridaspur. One Mr. Butcher (P.W 11) was in charge of the up goods train. The engine-driver of the said train noticed the dead-body and stopped the train. Mr. Butcher alighted from the train, and went up to the dead-body. It was found that the body had been severed in two near about the waist. Mr. Butcher sent information to the station-master of Haridaspur. The station-master instructed his assistant to send a telegram to the Government Railway Police at Cuttack. The telegram was received by the Government Railway Police at Cuttack at about 10 a.m on 27th August, 1940. A case of unnatural death was started by the junior sub-inspector, Sri Udayanath Santra (P.W 21), on the basis of the telegram. The junior sub-inspector sent the assistant sub-inspector, Minaketan Dora (P.W 20), to the spot for investigation. Minaketan came to the spot on 27th August, 1940, and held an inquest over the dead-body. The dead-body was then sent to Cuttack for post-mortem examination. Before such examination was held, a photograph of the upper part of the dead-body was made. The identity of the deceased woman has been established by means of that photograph. The post-mortem examination was held at about 2-30 p.m on 28th August, 1940. Sri Udayanath Santra (P.W 21) investigated into the case from 31st August, 1940, to 2nd September, 1940. On that date he made over charge of the case to his senior sub-inspector, namely, Sri Kripasindhu Mohapatra (P.W 13). On 3rd September, 1940, Sri Kripasindhu Mohapatra arrested the appellant. The appellant made a statement to Sri Kripasindhu Mohapatra. This statement has not been admitted in evidence inasmuch as it is hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act. Portions of the statement, leading to recovery of certain articles, have been admitted in evidence. It appears that at about 2-30 p.m on that date the appellant took Sri Kripasindhu Mohapatra to a tank known as Bhabadei tank. There the appellant pointed out a place on the western side of the tank, saying that Bhaskar Dhir had thrown the clothes of Ulia Bewa at that, place. The sub-inspector asked a fisherman, Gopal Sahu (P.W 17), to dive under the water. Gopal Sahu brought out a black-bordered, dhoti, about 9 cubits long. At about 3 p.m on the same day, the appellant took the sub-inspector to the house of one Adikanda Sahu (P.W 2), a goldsmith of village Gopinathpur. The appellant stated that two gold ear-rings given to him by Bhaskar Dhir had been sold to Adikanda Sahu. The sub-inspector questioned Adikanda, and the latter brought out two gold ear-rings. At about 5-30 p.m on the same day, the appellant took the sub-inspector to a place on the road near “Rajapola”. This was the place which the appellant pointed out as the place where an attempt was made to throttle the woman: The sub-inspector examined the place, and found some broken pieces of bangles made out of conch-shell. The position of the place where these broken pieces of bangles were found would appear from the sketch map (Exh. 11). The sketch map shows the position of the place with reference to “Rajapola” and the place on the railway-line where the dead-body was found. As the alleged place of assault was within the jurisdiction of Dharamsala police-station, the G.R.P sub-inspector sent the appellant in custody along with the recovered articles to the sub-inspector of Dharamsala police-station. This latter sub-inspector completed the investigation and submitted charge-sheet.

    Thereafter, the case has had a chequered career. The appellant had made a confession before a Magistrate on 7th September, 1940. After submission of the charge-sheet, an inquiry was made by Mr. Tripathy. He discharged both the present appellant and Bhaskar Dhir by his order, dated the 13th January, 1941. On revision the District Magistrate set aside the order of discharge, and directed commitment of both the accused persons to the court of session. This order was passed on the 5th November, 1942. Thereafter, both the accused persons were found absconding, and, after the arrest of the present appellant, he was committed to the court of session by the present Sub-divisional Magistrate of Jaipur. The other accused person, Bhaskar Dhir, is still absconding. The above facts explain why a crime which was committed in August, 1940, came to be tried in 1944.

    The defence of the appellant was a denial of his guilt. He said that the police had induced him to make a confession before the Magistrate. He denied having taken the sub-inspector to Bhabadei tank and to have pointed out the place where the clothes of Ulia Bewa were thrown. He also denied having pointed out to the sub-inspector the place on the “rasta” near Rajapola where some broken pieces of bangles were found. He, however, admitted that he had sold two gold ear-rings to Adikanda Saha. He stated, however, that the gold ear-rings belonged to him.

    The learned Sessions Judge has found that the appellant was seen in company of Bhaskar Dhir and Ulia Bewa from about 4 p.m till about 11 p.m on the 26th August, 1940. Bhaskar Dhir and the appellant were seen going with the woman from Garh Madhupur village towards Garfi Madhupur railway-station. In view of the medical evidence in the record, the learned Sessions Judge has further found that Ulia Bewa was not actually throttled. There was an attempt to throttle her, and she became unconscious. After she had become unconscious, she was taken to the railway-line where her body was placed. Then, she was run over by a passing train. On these findings the learned Sessions Judge has found the appellant guilty under section 302 read with section 34, Penal Code. I may note that the learned Sessions Judge finds that both the present appellant and Bhaskar Dhir had the common intention of killing the woman in order to rob her of her ornaments.

    Mr. Sahu has with great ability and thoroughness contended on behalf of the appellant that—

    (1) the confession is not true in view of the medical and other evidence in the record;

    (2) even if the confession is true, it does not make out a case of murder against the appellant; and

    (3) that the articles recovered by the sub-inspector of police (P.W 13) have not been proved to be those of the deceased woman and do not, therefore, connect the appellant with the alleged murder.

    It is, therefore, necessary to see how far these contentions are correct. As to the identity of the deceased woman, there can be no doubt. Several witnesses have seen the photograph taken before the post-mortem examination was held, and have said that the protograph was that of the deceased woman Ulia Bewa. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the dead-Body severed into two parts, which was found on the railway-line on 27th August, 1940, was the dead-body of Ulia Bewa. The time of occurrence is also fixed within certain limits. The prosecution evidence is that the deceased woman was seen alive at about 11 p.m on 26th August, 1940. Her dead-body was found in the early morning of 27th August, 1940. It is clear, therefore, that she must have been killed after 11 p.m in the night between 26th August, 1940, and 27th August, 1940.

    Therefore, the main question for consideration in the appeal is if the present appellant is responsible for the murder of Ulia Bewa. The evidence against the appellant consists of—

    (a) the direct testimony of witnesses who saw the appellant with the deceased woman till about 11 p.m on 26th August, 1940;

    (b) the appellant's own confession made before the Magistrate (P.W 12) on 7th September, 1940; and

    (c) certain circumstances, such as, the recovery of the articles to be mentioned hereafter, affording corroboration to the confession.

    As to the witnesses who saw the appellant in company of the woman on 26th August, 1940, till about 11 p.m, they are Dayanidhi Das (P.W 6), Pitabas Jana (P.W 7), Govinda Parida (P.W 16) and Banchu Malik (P.W 18).

    If the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses is accepted—and I see no reason why their evidence should not be accepted as correct—then the irresistible conclusion is that the appellant and Bhaskar Dhir were seen with the woman on 26th August, 1940, and they were seen going with the woman towards Garh Madhupur railway-station at about 11 p.m

    There is no direct evidence to show what happened thereafter. The confession of the appellant made on 7th September, 1940, is the only piece of evidence which shows what happened after 11 p.m on 26th August, 1940. * * *

    The first point for consideration is if this confession is voluntary and true. * * *

    I have no reason, to doubt that the confession was anything but voluntary. It is true that there is no guarantee of truth in a confession in which the maker of the confession entirely exculpates him and throws the blame on some other person. The confession which is under our consideration is not, however, a self-exculpatory statement. It does not implicate the maker substantially in the offence, though it gives a more prominent part to the other person, Bhaskar Dhir.

    The confession was retracted in the court of session, and it is necessary to see how far it is true and to what extent it is corroborated by other evidence in the record. The most important point about the truth of the confession arises out of the medical evidence given in the case * * * * * * * the evidence of the doctor negatives the possibility of the woman having been done to death by throttling. The doctor has further said that all the injuries on the body could be caused by a train passing over her except the injury on the right ear-lobe which, according to the doctor, was a postmortem injury. Therefore, the very pertinent question arises as to whether, the confession can be held to be true in view of the medical evidence given in the case. It can be taken as established that the woman did not die of throttling. * *

    There is no improbability, as far as the medical evidence is concerned, that some of the injuries were caused earlier than the passing of the train over the body of the woman. In this connection the fact that the body was found stark naked on the railway-line should also be considered. The fact that the body was found stark naked rules out the possibility of death having been caused accidentally or as a result of suicide. It is not reasonable to hold that a woman committing suicide would strip herself of all clothes, or that a person who is accidentally run over by a passing train would be moving over the railway-line in a stark naked condition. The fact that the body was found stark naked clearly indicates that somebody must have placed the body on the railway-line after the woman had been made unconscious by an assault. There is therefore, nothing improbable if the woman had been assaulted at the place indicated by the appellant to the sub-inspector, and then her body was removed to the railway-line when she had become unconscious. That there was an earlier assault on her is also indicated by the fact that broken pieces of bangles were found at the place. * * * * *

    It cannot, therefore, be said that the medical evidence is so inconsistent with the confession that the confession must be held to be totally untrue. The confession substantially makes out a case of an earlier assault and then the placing of the body on the railway-line. This case is not inconsistent with the medical evidence. I would, therefore, reject the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the medical evidence is so inconsistent with the confession that the confession must be held to be totally untrue.

    Coming now to the recovery of the articles and the circumstances which support the confession, it would appear that the confession is supported on many material points by the other evidence given in the case.* * * *

    This also is a circumstance which connects the appellant with the crime, and corroborates the confession made by him.

    I, therefore, hold that the confession is voluntary and true, and it is supported by other circumstances connecting the appellant with the crime in question * * *

    The only other point which requires consideration is the offence which the appellant has committed if the confession is accepted as voluntary and true. It has been strenuously contended that, even if the confession is accepted as true, it does not make out an offence under section 302, Penal Code, against the appellant. The confession makes it quite clear that both the appellant and Bhaskar Dhir had the common intention of killing the woman and taking her gold ear-rings. There is a clear statement in the confession that Bhaskar Dhir told the appellant that the woman would be taken towards the station on the pretext of taking her to Puri, and that, on the way, she would be killed and her ornaments removed. If both the appellant and Bhaskar Dhir had the common intention of killing: the woman, then the series of acts by which they assaulted the woman and then placed her body on the line would be one transaction. That transaction would be judged by the common intention which they originally had. If the common intention was to kill, and they gave effect to their intention by a series of acts, the offence will be clearly one of murder, in the case of King-Emperor v. Nehal Mahto and In re Kaliappa Goundan the same question has been considered. It has been held in the Madras case that if, the intention is to kill and the killing results, the accused succeed in doing that which they intended to do; and if the acts follow closely upon one another and are intimately connected with one another, then the offence of murder has been committed. The learned Advocate appearing for the appellant tried to distinguish the two cases on the ground that in none of them did the accused person believe that the person whom they had assaulted was dead. In the Patna case it was held that there was no evidence that the accused, when he carried the body to the railway-line, was under the belief that the woman was dead and that he was handling a dead-body. In the Madras case also it was not found that the accused persons thought that the deceased woman was dead when they put her dead-body across the rails. In the present case, however, the appellant has clearly stated in his confession that the woman was thought to be dead when she was removed to the railway-line. The question, therefore, is whether this destination makes any difference in the legal position. It has been pointed out in the case of In re Thavamani that the most important point is whether there was any intention to cause death. There is a reference to certain earlier cases where, in the absence of an intention to cause death, it was held that the offence committed was one under section 307 or 326, Penal Code. Where, however, there is from the very beginning a clear intention to cause death, the offence is one of murder if death results from a series of acts. The following observations made in Thavamani, In re, make the position clear: “In 57 Madras, 158, however, and, in the present case, it is clear that there was at the beginning an intention to cause death. This intention was apparently completely carried into effect but in fact was not. Even if the intention at the second stage of the transaction had been merely to dispose of a dead-body, as is pointed out in 57 Madras, 158, the two phases of the same transaction are so closely connected in time and purpose that they must be considered as parts of the same transaction. The result of the actions of the accused taken as a whole clearly is to carry out the intention to kill with which they began, to act”. If the intention be to kill, the offence is one of murder even if the killing takes place by a series of acts in two stages. In the particular case under our consideration, the intention is clear from the confession itself. The facts that the appellant accompanied Bhaskar Dhir knowing that the woman was to be killed on the way for her ornaments, the fact that he removed the body of the woman to the railway-line, the fact that he sold the two gold ear-rings to Adikanda Sahu and shared the booty—all these show that the appellant had the same intention as Bhaskar Dhir, namely, to kill the woman and rob her of her ornaments. The mere fact that the earlier assault on the woman did not result in her death, but that she was killed by a passing train would make no difference. In view of the common intention to kill the woman, the appellant would be clearly guilty of the offence of murder.

    The learned Sessions Judge has imposed the lesser penalty in view of the long delay which has taken place in the trial of the appellant. The lesser penalty having been imposed, there is no question of interfering with the sentence.

    In the result I would dismiss the appeal and uphold the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant.

    Sinha, J.:— I agree.

    Appeal dismissed.
    K.D

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    Comments

    Lingraj Das v. King-Emperor
    (Dec 13, 1944)