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citation codes
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Acts
  • section 241(f) of Act XIX of 1873, now section 233(k) of Act
  • section 233(k) of the Land Revenue Act. Section 233(k)
  • section 117 of Act III of 1901,
  • section 233 (k) of Local Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 241(f) of Act XIX of 1873, now section 233(k) of Act
  • section 233(k) of the Land Revenue Act. Section 233(k)
  • section 117 of Act III of 1901,
  • section 233 (k) of Local Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Lala Hanuman Prasad, the plaintiff in the court of first instance and respondent in the present appeal, claimed ownership and possession of certain zamindari property totaling 14 bighas 9 biswas. He alleged that the defendant, Lachman Das (now appellant), had no right or share in these plots except for two specific plots (numbers 979 and 1518), which were graveyards purchased by Lachman Das at auction. Hanuman Prasad further alleged irregularities in partition proceedings conducted by the Revenue Court following an application by a co-sharer, Bilas Rai, in 1905 for the partition of Kasba Khair.

Hanuman Prasad consented to the partition and requested a separate lot for his property. Lachman Das was present at the partition proceedings and later filed a petition claiming to be a co-sharer in khata No. 34. Without notice to Hanuman Prasad, the Revenue Court granted Lachman Das a share in the entire khata, including land claimed by Hanuman Prasad. In response, Hanuman Prasad instituted a suit on 22nd November 1907 for declaration of ownership and possession of the disputed plots.

The court of first instance dismissed the suit, holding that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction and that the plaintiff should have approached the Revenue Court. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge reversed that decision, holding that Hanuman Prasad could maintain a suit in Civil Court and remanded the case for trial on merits. Lachman Das then appealed, arguing that section 233(k) of Local Act No. III of 1901 barred the suit, that Hanuman Prasad should have raised his title during the original partition proclamation, and that the Revenue Court’s decision was res judicata. The partition proceedings concluded on 15th April 1909, after the suit was instituted.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit concerning partition or union of mahals when the Revenue Court has conducted partition proceedings.
  2. Whether section 233(k) of Local Act No. III of 1901 bars the suit instituted by Hanuman Prasad in the Civil Court.
  3. Whether Hanuman Prasad’s failure to raise objections during the Revenue Court partition proceedings precludes his suit in Civil Court.
  4. Whether the decision of the Revenue Court operates as res judicata in barring the Civil Court suit.
  5. Whether the irregularities alleged in the Revenue Court partition proceedings justify Civil Court intervention.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Section 233(k) of Local Act No. III of 1901 bars the suit in Civil Court regarding partition matters.
  • Hanuman Prasad should have raised any title issues when responding to the original proclamation for partition.
  • The Revenue Court’s decision operates as res judicata, preventing re-litigation of the title in Civil Court.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Hanuman Prasad alleged that Lachman Das’s petition to the Revenue Court was submitted out of time and was misleading.
  • Hanuman Prasad claimed to hold the land in severalty and that the Revenue Court allotted his lands accordingly under section 117 of Act III of 1901.
  • He contended that he was denied an opportunity to assert his title in response to Lachman Das’s petition and thus his suit should be maintainable in Civil Court, relying on precedents such as Khasay v. Jugla and Muhammad Jan v. Sadanand Pande.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Khasay v. Jugla Supports the proposition that a party must have an opportunity to assert title in partition matters. Distinguished from the present case as Hanuman Prasad’s situation did not meet the criteria to avoid the bar of section 233(k).
Muhammad Jan v. Sadanand Pande Similar principle regarding opportunity to assert title in partition proceedings. Distinguished from the present case for the same reasons as above.
Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram Held that Civil Court jurisdiction is barred by section 241(f) of Act XIX of 1873 (now section 233(k) of Act No. III of 1901) in matters affecting partition. Applied to hold that no Civil Court suit can disturb or affect partition distribution, regardless of title questions raised.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the jurisdictional bar under section 233(k) of Local Act No. III of 1901, which prohibits Civil Court suits relating to partition or union of mahals except as provided by sections 111 and 112. The court observed that Hanuman Prasad should have approached the Revenue Court to rectify the alleged irregularities in the partition proceedings rather than instituting a Civil Court suit.

Although the petition by Lachman Das was found to be irregular and possibly misleading, the court emphasized that the proper remedy lay within the Revenue Court’s jurisdiction. The court distinguished the precedents relied upon by Hanuman Prasad, noting that those cases did not apply to the present facts. The Full Bench decision in Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram was cited as authoritative, holding that the Civil Court cannot exercise jurisdiction to disturb partition orders, even when title questions are involved.

Consequently, the court held that the suit was barred by the statutory provision and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

The court dismissed the appeal, set aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge, and restored the decree of the court of first instance which dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. No order as to costs was made. The direct effect is that Hanuman Prasad’s suit in the Civil Court is barred under section 233(k) of Local Act No. III of 1901, reinforcing the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Court in partition matters. No new precedent was established beyond the reaffirmation of existing statutory bars on Civil Court jurisdiction in partition disputes.

    Lachman Das v. Hanuman Prasad

    Knox and Griffin, JJ.:— Lala Hanuman Prasad, respondent in the present appeal was plaintiff in the court of first instance. He came to court saying that he was the owner in possession of certain zamindari property, consisting of numbers which are given in the schedule to his plaint, of which the total amount is 14 bighas 9 biswas. He alleged that the defendant had no right or share in these plots of land, that in the same village, the defendant Lachman Das, now appellant had purchased at auction 2 bighas 5 biswas, which was a grave-yard, and of which the numbers were 979 and 1518. He makes other allegations regarding the defendant Lachman Das' possession quoad these plots, but we are not concerned with these allegations in this appeal. He then goes to say that Bilas Kai, one of the co-sharers in Kasba Khair, applied to the Revenue Court in 1905 for the partition of the kasba Khair. The usual proclamation regarding partition was issued, and before the time allowed by the proclamation had expired, Hanuman Prasad came before the Collector and said that he had no objection to the partition and asked that a separate lot might be prepared of his property. Apparently Lachman Das had notice of the application of Bilas Rai, and it is admitted that he was present at the partition proceedings which ensued. According to Hanuman Prasad, when then proceedings had gone on some way, namely, in October 1907, and after the amin had drawn up lots, Lachman Das put in a petition to the effect that be was a co-sharer in khata No. 34. Hanuman Prasad gays that to notice was given to him of this petition, and that behind his back the Revenue Court passed an order on the 21st of October, 1907, to the effect that Lachman Das was to have a share in the whole of the khata corresponding to the amount claimed by him, the result of which was that, instead of Lachman Das being given merely the two plots of grave land, he was given a share in the lands of the khata and, amongst that, of land which the plaintiff had asked to be marked out in a separate lot in his favour. Upon this Hanuman Prasad, on the 22nd November, 1907, instituted the suit out of which this appeal has arisen, asking for a declaration that he was the owner and in possession of the plots in suit.

    The court of first instance, holding that the plaintiff ought to have applied to the Revenue Court and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction, dismissed the suit. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge, holding that Hanuman Prasad had no opportunity to assert his title in answer to the petition put in by Lachman Das and could maintain a suit in the Civil Court, which could adjudicate upon the question of title raised before it, set aside the decree of the first court and remanded the case for trial on the merits. In appeal, Lachman Das urged that section 233 (k) of Local Act No. III of 1901 bars the suit. He further contended that the plaintiff ought to have raised any question of title he possessed when he appeared in answer to the original proclamation for partition, and also that the decision of the Revenue Court operated as res judicata to the present claim. The partition proceedings, we are told, were not completed until the 15th of April, 1909, some 18 months after Hanuman Prasad instituted his suit in the Civil Court. So far as we can judge from the papers before us, the petition put in by Lachman Das was untrue, misleading and put in before the Revenue Court out of time. The allegation of Hanuman Prasad is that he holds the land in severalty. This appears to be the fact, and the allegation appears to have commended itself to the partition offices and he acting, as he would, under section 117 of Act III of 1901, allotted to Hanuman Prasad the lands held by him in severalty. The only lands, if any, to which the defendant was entitled were the two plots which we may term in this judgement the cemetery land. The procedure of the court, so far as we may say anything about it, after Lachman Das' application was entirely irregular. At the same time we are also compelled to hold that Hanuman Prasad should have gone to the Revenue Court and to get put right the manifest irregularity in procedure which he says was committed by the Revenue Court. Had he done so, and if his allegations are correct, we have little doubt that the Revenue Court would have put matters right. Instead of that he has come to this court and he is met by the bar contained in section 233(k) of the Land Revenue Act. Section 233(k) says that no person shall institute any suit or other proceedings in a Civil Court with respect to the partition or union of mahals except as provided by sections 111 and 112. Unless Hanuman Prasad can show that his case comes clearly within the provisions of section 111, his suit is barred by section 233(k). He attempts to show this by saying that Lachman Das in his application of the 21st of October, 1907, raised a question of title, and as he never had any opportunity to answer that question of title, and in this way he tries to bring his case within the rulings in Khasay v. Jugla and Muhammad Jan v. Sadanand Pande. Both these cases are clearly distinguishable from the present case. We can only repeat here what was laid down in the Full Bench case of Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram, in which it was held that any exercise of jurisdiction of a Civil Court which would disturb or in any way affect the distribution of land made by partition is barred by section 241(f) of Act XIX of 1873, now section 233(k) of Act No. III of 1901, no matter whether a question of title or any other question is raised in the suit.

    We decree the appeal, set aside the decree of the court below and restore the decree of the court of first instance. We make no order as to costs.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Lachman Das v. Hanuman Prasad
    (Aug 11, 1910)