Henderson, J.:— In this case the first appellant Paltua has been convicted under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The other appellant have been convicted under section 397, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment each. Paltua and Bhure, one of the other appellants, pleaded guilty at the commencement of the trial before the Sessions Court, but notwithstanding their plea of guilty, they were not thereupon convicted, as they might have been under Section 271 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. With regard to this matter the Sessions Judge in his judgment says:—“Paltua and Bhure Singh plead guilty. To avoid complication and to allow their statements to be considered under section 30 of the Evidence Act as against the other accused, I did not convict them on their pleas,” It has been held in more than one case that after a prisoner has pleaded guilty he cannot be treated as being Jointly tried with his co-accused—see Queen-Empress v. Pahuji , Queen-Empress v. Lakhshmayya Pandaram , Queen-Empress v. Pirbhu . In these cases it was held that confessions made by the accused who pleaded guilty could not, under section 39 of the Indian Evidence Act, be taken into consideration against the other accused. Section 271 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if the accused pleads guilty the plea shall be recorded, and he may be convicted thereon. It does not say that he shall thereon be convicted, and it seems to me, therefore, that it is open to the Court in certain circumstances to continue the trial without convicting the person who pleads guilty on his plea, as, for example, when it is thought necessary for the purpose of fixing the amount of punishment to know the actual part taken by him in the matter out of which the trial has arisen. In Queen-Empress v. Chinna Pavuchi it was pointed out that where such a procedure was adopted the trial of the confessing accused did not terminate with the plea of guilty, and therefore a confession by him might be taken to consideration under section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act as against any other person who had been jointly tried with him for the same offence, and that the trial did not strictly end unless the accused had been either convicted, or acquitted or discharged. In that case the following remarks, which seem to have a special application to the case before us, were made by the Court:—“The only case in which there may be a doubt is where neither of these courses has been explicitly adopted, but the accused who has pleaded guilty is left in the dock merely to see what the evidence will show as against him, though the Court intends ultimately to convict him on the plea of guilty. In such a case we should be inclined to hold that it would not be fair to allow his confession to be considered as against his co-accused, for that would be in effect to comply with the forms of justice while violating it in substance.” In the present case it is clear from the judgment of the Sessions Judge that he merely deferred conviction of the accused who pleaded guilty in order that he might use their confessions against their co-accused. According to the decisions in the three cases to which I first referred, one of them being a decision by a Bench of this Court, these confessions cannot be taken into consideration against the two appellants who did not plead guilty. According to the decision in 23 Madras in strictness the confessions of the appellants who pleaded guilty might be considered against the other appellants. As I have said, I consider, as the Madras Court has held, that it is open to the Court, under certain circumstances, to continue the trial without convicting an accused upon his plea of guilty. But I agree entirely with the observations, which I have quoted, made by the learned Judges who decided the case in Madras, and in my opinion it is unfair to defer convicting accused persons who plead guilty merely in order that their confessions may be considered against other accused who are being tried with them. This entails no hardship upon the prosecution, as it is open to the prosecution where a prisoner is convicted on his plea of guilty, to call him as a witness in the trial against his co-accused who has not pleaded guilty. Having regard to the decisions to which I have referred, I think that it would be safer under the circumstances to exclude consideration of the confessions of Paltua and Bhure altogether. I am not prepared to say that; in point of law they must necessarily be excluded. I have gone through the whole evidence in this case very carefully in order to see whether apart from the consideration of the confessions of Paltua and Bhure, there is sufficient evidence to support the convictions of the other appellants. I think that the Sessions Judge has very rightly discarded the evidence of the informer Behari, whom he has described as “an excellent specimen of a sneaking, contemptible liar, on whose words I cannot place any reliance.” But I find as against both of the appellants Ganga Singh and Jhallia that there is the evidence of Mullu, Kamod and Devi, which has been accepted by the Sessions Judge. I have very carefully considered the evidence of these witnesses, and it seems to me that the Sessions Judge is right in the view which he took of it. It the evidence be true, and I see no reason to doubt it there can be no question as to the guilt of all the appellants. The sentences that have been passed do not appear to me too severe. I therefore dismiss the appeals.