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  • S. 16(1)(a)(i) and (ii) and S. 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
  • BA.07.07 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules
  • PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT
  • P.F.A Rules 1955
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • S. 16(1)(a)(i) and (ii) and S. 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
  • BA.07.07 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules
  • PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT
  • P.F.A Rules 1955
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Food Inspector of Calicut Corporation purchased six packets of an article sold as "Glucose C.D." from the shop of the accused. Samples were taken and analysed by the Public Analyst. The analyst's report recorded: sulphated ash 0.06% (dry basis); cane sugar 99.8% (dry basis); tests for glucose — negative; acidity 0.06 ml per 5.0 grams; sulphur dioxide 5.0 ppm; moisture 1.6% (dry basis); artificial sweeteners absent. There was no complaint about the sample collection or the Public Analyst's report.

The accused were prosecuted under S.16(1)(a)(i) and (ii) and S.17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The trial court acquitted the accused on the basis that a statutory standard under the Rules existed only for "Dextrose" and not for "Glucose", and that Glucose and Dextrose were not the same; accordingly, the article was held not to be "adulterated" or "misbranded" under the Act. The Food Inspector challenged that acquittal and obtained special leave to appeal to the court that produced this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purposes of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and its Rules, "Dextrose" and "Glucose" are the same substance such that the statutory standard for Dextrose applies to articles sold as Glucose.
  2. Whether the sale of an article labelled and advertised as "Glucose" that on analysis contains no glucose (and is composed overwhelmingly of cane sugar) constitutes "adulteration" or "misbranding" within the meaning of the Act.
  3. Whether procedural compliance with mandatory provisions of the Act (specifically S.13(2) regarding supply of the analyst's report) affects the validity of prosecution and any conviction or acquittal (as raised in relation to the second accused).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Food Inspector) — Position and Evidence

  • The Food Inspector purchased and proceeded to prosecute on the basis that packets sold and labelled as "Glucose" were not in fact glucose: the Public Analyst's report showed tests for glucose were negative and the sample was certified as not conforming to the standard prescribed for Dextrose under the P.F.A. Rules 1955.
  • The complaint as placed before the lower court recited that the Public Analyst certified the sample did not conform to the Dextrose standard and was therefore adulterated, and alleged the accused committed offences under the P.F.A. Act.
  • The appellant's counsel accepted, in the course of the appeal, that the acquittal of the second accused must be maintained because a copy of the analysis report had not been given to the second accused — a violation of S.13(2) of the Act — which was fatal to the prosecution against that accused.

Respondents / Accused — Position (as reflected by the trial court and the record)

  • The trial court found Glucose and Dextrose to be different substances and noted that the statutory rules fixed a standard only for Dextrose and not for Glucose. On that basis the court concluded there was no "adulteration" within the meaning of the Act and no case of misbranding, and therefore acquitted the accused.
  • The appellate record does not set out detailed plea or arguments by the accused beyond the trial court's stated reasoning and the formal admissions made in the appeal (including the procedural point about supply of the analyst's report to the second accused).

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the issue by examining definitions and authoritative descriptions of "Glucose" and "Dextrose" from multiple reference works and pharmacopoeial sources quoted in the opinion:

  • Dictionary and encyclopaedia definitions (Webster's Third, Chambers Encyclopaedia) and the Merck Index were cited to show that "glucose" and "dextrose" are used by chemists and the medical profession as referring to the same monosaccharide (D-glucose or dextrose). Chambers was relied on to show that commercially "glucose" can sometimes indicate a variable mixture from starch hydrolysis, but also that the word is "loosely used" to mean D-glucose/dextrose.
  • The British Pharmacopoeia entry equates "Dextrose Monohydrate" and "Glucose", describing identical physical characteristics, solubility, identification tests (including the production of a copious precipitate of cuprous oxide upon heating with potassium cupritartrate), and acidity standards. The Pharmacopoeia directs that when "Glucose" is prescribed or demanded, "Dextrose" shall be supplied.
  • The Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules' Appendix A.07.07 prescribes standards for "Dextrose" (e.g., description as white/light cream granular powder; cuprous oxide test; acidity standard; "Glucose not less than 99.0% on dry basis"; sulphur dioxide limit). The court noted there is no separate entry or standard expressly labelled "Glucose" in the Rules.
  • From the concordance of descriptions, tests and numerical standards across the Rules, Pharmacopoeia and other authorities, the court concluded that "Dextrose" and "Glucose" are two names for the same chemical compound (i.e., D-glucose) and that the standard for Dextrose in the Appendix effectively fixes the standard applicable to articles sold as Glucose.
  • The court found nothing in the cross-examination of Pw.1 (the Public Analyst) to discredit his testimony that both Dextrose and Glucose have similar structures, chemical properties and reactions, and that the only substantive difference is the presence of a molecule of water of hydration in the monohydrate form. The trial court was therefore held to have erred in rejecting the analyst's evidence and concluding that Glucose and Dextrose are different.
  • On application of the statutory definition of "adulterated" (an article sold by a vendor that is not of the nature, substance or quality demanded by the purchaser or not of the nature, substance or quality it purports or is represented to be), the court observed that the purchaser asked for "Glucose" but the analyst reported no trace of glucose in the sample — supporting a finding of adulteration or misrepresentation under the Act.
  • Procedural compliance: the court accepted the appellant's concession that the acquittal of the second accused must be maintained because the mandatory provision in S.13(2) (supply of the Analyst's report) had not been complied with; this omission was fatal to the prosecution against that accused.
  • The court directed that the case be returned to the trial court for disposal according to law in light of the observations made, including consideration whether the charge should be amended in view of the facts before the court so that the accused may be given an opportunity to answer any appropriately framed charge consistent with the statutory definition of adulteration.

Holding and Implications

Holding: 1) The acquittal of the first accused is set aside; the matter is remanded to the lower court for disposal according to law in light of the opinion's observations.

2) The acquittal of the second accused is maintained on the short ground that a copy of the analyst's report was not supplied to him in compliance with S.13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, which is fatal to the prosecution against him.

Direct consequences and procedural instructions:

  • The trial court is to reconsider the matter and may, if warranted by the facts already on record, amend the charge and give the accused an opportunity to answer any newly framed charge consistent with the statutory definition of adulteration.
  • The first accused may raise any questions available in law on remand except those concluded by this appellate judgment.

Broader implications and observations (as expressed by the court):

  • The court emphasised public-health and consumer-protection concerns: if products sold as "Glucose" contain no glucose, there are serious risks given the common use of glucose to provide quick, assimilable energy, particularly for the sick and for children.
  • The court urged enforcement authorities to test glucose products available in the market, prosecute diligently against adulteration, and ensure strict compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Act and Rules (observing that many prosecutions fail for want of procedural compliance).
  • The court suggested that manufacturers might also need to be proceeded against where adulteration is shown and recommended that statutory provisions be reviewed and streamlined in light of recurrent lacunae identified by courts.

Disposition: Allowed (appeal allowed in part as described above).

    Food Inspector, Corporation Of Calicut v. Kochunni & Another

    1. If Cane sugar is sold as Glucose, are there still loopholes in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for acquittal? Dextrose has a statutory standard. But Glucose none. Is Dextrose Glucose? Or, is Glucose Dextrose? These questions, simple as they seem, are sufficiently complicated, according to counsel, especially with reference to the specific statutory provisions. The doubt, if any, should go to the accused. So the contention runs. Glucose is reputed to be “a quick and convenient energy food”, recommended, it is said, “as an excellent nutrient during sickness” and declared in advertisements as providing “extra energy required by the body to overcome tiredness”. Glucose is understood by the common man as “assimilated ready source of energy for body issues”. When he purchases therefore Glucose and gets cane sugar, does the Act still protect the seller is he short question.

    2. The Food Inspector, Calicut Corporation, purchased from the shop of the accused 6 packets of Glucose C.D kept for sale. Samples were taken, they were analysed by the Public Analyst who reported thus:

    “Sulphated ash —0.06 percent by weight on dry basis Cane sugar —99.8 percent by weight on dry basis Tests for glucose —Negative Acidity —0.06 ml. per 5.0 grammes Sulphur dioxide —5.0 parts per million Moisture —1.6 percent by weight Artificial Sweeteners —Absent”.

    3. The accused are prosecuted for offences under S. 16(1)(a)(i) and (ii) and S. 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. There is no complaint about the samples or the report of the Analyst.

    4. The lower court found that Glucose and Dextrose are not the same; standard has been fixed under the rules only for Dextrose and not for Glucose; and therefore this article was not adulterated within the meaning of that expression in the Act and there was no case for the prosecution that the accused had exhibited for sale misbranded articles. The accused were therefore acquitted. Challenging the acquittal the Food Inspector has filed this appeal after obtaining special leave.

    5. Standard has been fixed for Dextrose in Appendix B—A.07.07 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules thus:—

    “A.07.07-Dextrose is a white or light cream granular powder, odourless and having a sweet taste

    When heated with potassium cupritarate solution it shall produce a copious precipitate of cuprous oxide. It shall conform to the following standards:

    Sulphated ash…… Not more than 0. 1 per cent on dry basis.

    Acidity…… 5.0 gm. dissolved in 50 ml. of freshly boiled and cooled water requires for neutralisation not more than 0. 20 ml. of N/10 sodium hydorxide to phenolphthalein indicator.

    Glucose………Not less than 99.0 per cent on dry basis.

    Sulphur dioxide content shall not exceed 70 p. p.m”

    6. There is no description of Glucose or standard for Glucose under the rules. This is the basis for the contention that there is no adulteration.

    7. Glucose, in Webster's Third New International Dictionary, has this meaning:—

    “an aldose sugar known in dextrorotatory, and levorotatory and recamic forms; esp: the sweet colourless soluble dextrorotatory D-form that is readily obtained crystalline in both the alpha and beta modifications, that occurs esp. in plant saps and fruits, normally in blood, pathologically in the urine (as in diabates mellitus), and combined in many disaccharides, trisaccharides, polysaccharides, and glucosides in most plant and animal tissues, and that is a chief source of protoplasmic energy and in its simple state is the usual form in which carbohydrate is assimilated into the animal body.”

    8. Dextrose has this meaning:—

    “dextrorotatory to glucose obtained usu, by acid hydrolysis of starch as sweet crystals of the anhydrous compound or of the monohydrate and used chiefly in foods and beverages, in making caramel, and in intravenous feeding-called also corn sugar, grape sugar”.

    9. Dex-tro-rotatory also dex-tro-rotary means:

    “turning toward the right hand or clockwise; esp: rotating the plane of polarization of light toward the right band—crystals—sugar solutions—abbr, dextro-??? opposed to levorotatory;”

    10. In Chambers Encyclopaedia, ‘Glucose’ means:

    “The word glucose is loosely used by chemists to mean the monosaccharide ‘d-glucose’ or ‘dextrose’ (see CARBOHYDRATES). The medical profession use the word in this sense. Commercially the word means a variable mixture of carbohydrates resulting from the hydrolysis of starch.

    When starch is treated with acid or enzymes it breaks down and takes up successive molecules of water, forming the progressively simpler substances dextrin, maltose and dextrose. Commercial glucose can have a very variable composition as shown by the following range of the solid matters in some commercial products, e.g confectioners glucose; dextrose, 12-21 per cent; maltose, 24-36 per cent.; dextrin, 47-60 per cent.

    xxxxxx”.

    11. In the British Pharmacopoeia, Dextrose is described thus:

    “Dextrose Monohydrate; Glucose

    Description Colourless crystals or a white or cream-coloured, crystalline or granular powder; odourless; taste, sweet.

    Solubility Soluble in 1 part of water and in 200 parts of alcohol (95 per cent).

    Identification A. When heated, it melts, swells up, and burns, evolving an odour of burnt sugar.

    B. When heated with potassium cupri-tartrate solution, it produces a copious precipitate of cuprous oxide.

    Acidity 5.0 g. dissolved in 50 ml of freshly boiled and cooied water, requires for neutralisation not more than 0.20 ml of 0.1 M sodium hydroxide, phenolphethalein solution being used as indicator.

    When Medicinal Glucose or Purified Glucose is prescribed or demanded, Dextrose shall be dispensed or supplied.”

    12. It is necessary to notice in this definition:

    (a) that Dextrose is known also as Glucose;

    (b) that the description of ‘Dextrose’ in the “Appendix” as white or light cream granular powder is the same as the description for “Glucose”;

    (c) when Glucose is prescribed, “Dextrose” shall be dispensed or supplied;

    (d) Dextrose and Glucose produce copious precipitate of cuprous oxide when heated in the potassium cupritartarate solution-the same standard fixed for Dextrose in the Appendix to the rules;

    (e) that the acidity for Glucose is 5.0 grm, dissolved in 50 ml, of freshly boiled and cooled water, the same as for Dextrose;

    (f) that Sulphur dioxide is not more than 70 parts per million for both Dextrose and Glucose.

    13. The Merck Index, “the comprehensive interdisciplinary encyclopedia of chemicals, drugs and biological substances”, in its Ninth edition at 4290 states thus:—

    “Glucose; D—Glucose; dextrose; blood sugar; grape sugar; corn sugar; Dextropur; Dextrosol; Glucolin. mol. wt. 180.16-A main source of energy for living organism.

    14. In “Organic chemistry” “Cram and Hammond”, 4th Edition, at page 775 it is stated thus:—

    “A unique system of nomenclature has developed in the field of carbohydrate chemistry since the IUPAC system leads to rather long and awkward names………consider for example, the very important monosaccharide D—Glucose (often known as dextrose).”

    15. The standards fixed for ‘Dextrose’ in the Pharmacopoeia of India are practically the same as fixed in the Appendix to the Food Adulteration Rules. ‘Dextrose’ is described as “a sugar, a white crystalline or granular powder with the chemical formula

    16. From the above facts, it seems to be clear that ‘Dextrose’ and ‘Glucose’ are both made from carbohydrates, have the same chemical characteristics and formula and what is sold as ‘Glucose’ in the market is Dextrose mentioned in the Appendix to the Food Adulteration Rules. The standard for ‘Dextrose’ under the rules is 99 percent of Glucose which thus clearly implies that Dextrose and Glucose are understood as identical substance and for that reason there is no necessity for a fixation of a separate standard for Glucose. Dextrose is therefore Glucose. They are two names for the same chemical compound.

    17. In the present case, Pw. 1 is the Public Analyst employed in the Regional Analytical Laboratory at Calicut. He says “Dextrose is a synonym form of Dextrose D Glucose. Both Dextrose and Glucose have similar structure, chemical properties and reactions. A Glucose molecule containing one non water of hydration is called Dextrose. Dry (an hydrose) Dextrose is Glucose. Both these components are the same except for the presence of water of hydrates”. In cross-examination he stated thus:—

    “The term Dextrose pertains only K.D Glucose. There are D centigurations and L. centigurations of Glucose. L. centigurations of Glucose is Lavlose and D. centiguar-ations of Glucose is Dextrose. Both have the same molecular formula.”

    18. There is nothing brought out in the cross-examination of Pw. 1 to discredit his testimony. The court below was therefore wrong in rejecting the evidence of Pw. 1 and coming to a conclusion that Glucose and Dextrose are two different substances. The court below has acquitted the accused on the only ground that there is no standard fixed for Glucose and thus there was no “adulteration” as defined under the Act when there was no fall in the prescribed standard. This conclusion is untenable for the reason already stated and the acquittal has to be set aside.

    19. The court below has stated ‘there is no case for prosecution that the accused have exhibited for sale misbranded article. This also is challenged in appeal.

    20. Pw. 2, the Food Inspector, has stated that he purchased Glucose from the accused who had kept Glucose C.D for sale. On analysis it is found that there was no Glucose—the test for Glucose being nil.

    21. Under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, ‘adulterated’ is defined thus, for the purpose of this case:—

    “adulterated”—an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated.

    (a) If the article sold by a vendor is not of the nature, substance or quality demanded by the purchaser and is to his prejudice, or is not of the nature, substance or quality which it purports or is represented to be;

    22. In the complaint it was stated thus:

    “Sri. N. Mammed Moyin, Food Inspector, Calicut Corporation purchased six packet of Glucose C.D Glucose from A1 from the stock kept for sale which belongs to A2 company. The purchased articles was divided into 3 equal parts and sampled it as per rules then and there in the presence of Vendor and witnesses as sample No. 452 and the remaining two parts handed over to Local Health Authority. The Public Analyst in his report No. 47 dated 9-7-1979 has certified that the sample does not conform the standard prescribed for Dextrose under P.F.A Rules 1955 and is therefore adulterated.

    Hence the accused mentioned above have committed an offence punishable under the P.F.A Act.”

    23. The facts disclose that though the Food Inspector purchased “Glucose”, he was in fact given a substance which contained no Glucose. As I am sending back the case to the lower court for disposal according to law, the lower court may also consider whether on the facts of the case, the charge itself should not be amended and the accused given an opportunity to answer that charge as well. The facts are already before court and the accused cannot claim acquittal for want of a charge, if the facts warrant a framing of charge in the light of the statutory definition.

    24. Ext. P9, the packet in which the substance was sold, describes or advertises thus:—

    “Delicious Glucose for everybody”

    “Babies get extra energy in a rapidly utilisable form”.

    “Helps speedy recovery during sickness and convalescence”.

    “Pure Glucose for children”

    25. And “Glucose” in bold and white print across the packet stares at everybody.

    26. And still the Analyst reports that there is no Glucose, no trace of Glucose in the sample.

    27. If still the law protects him, of course, he is entitled to acquittal; not acquittal because of some defect committed by court in the framing of charge.

    28. The counsel for the appellant frankly admits that the acquittal of the second accused will have to be maintained on another ground. The copy of the report of the analysis was not given to the second accused and therefore there is violation of the mandatory provision contained in S. 13(2) of the Act. This is fatal for the prosecution and therefore the acquittal of the second accused has to be confirmed on the short ground that so far as he is concerned, S. 13(2) of the Act is not complied with.

    29. In the result, the acquittal of the 1st accused is set aside, and the case is sent back to the lower court for disposal according to law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. The 1st accused can raise all questions available to him in law except those concluded by this judgment. Before parting with this case, it is necessary to make a few observations. We rush for Glucose when somebody is sick. We give Glucose to give the patient “the extra energy” which he badly requires, the food which he can easily assimilate in the system. If then, the Glucose we buy does not contain Glucose at all, it is really a very serious matter. There are several labels of Glucose in the market. It is necessary that the authorities awake to the risks unfolded in the prosecution of this case and take concerted action to test samples of Glucose available in the market and ascertain how far they maintain the standards prescribed under the Act and the Rules and whether something other than Glucose is sold in the market. There is no reason why in cases where adulteration is noticed, the manufacturer should not also be hauled up in court. The Food Inspectors have to be alive to their responsibilities, alert about the duties to the community and the demands of the society. If the food Inspectors can swing into action, show no discrimination, purchase and analyse suspected articles of food from every dealer, whether he is a manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer, prosecute diligently every person who commits the crime against society, the first step in consumer protection is taken. Many of the cases end in acquittal only because the mandatory provisions are ignored. A little more care to comply strictly with the mandatory provisions of the Act and the Rules will also go a long way in the better enforcement of the provisions. Similarly, time and again, the courts have noticed some lacuna in the provision, and suggested the need for amendment in certain cases. It is necessary that the authorities take notice of those decisions and initiate steps to streamline the provisions of the Act and the Rules Let not adulteration of article of food thrive under the mask of the Food Adulteration Act. Let the Act serve its purpose and the society protected under its wings.

    30. Allowed.

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    Food Inspector, Corporation Of Calicut v. Kochunni & Another
    (Aug 24, 1984)