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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition was filed by the learned Advocate-General under the Madras Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, 1949 (the "Act"), seeking an order under Section 2 of the Act against the respondent, Sri T.A. Rajendran. The Advocate-General alleged that the respondent habitually instituted vexatious civil and criminal proceedings, had no fixed means of livelihood or abode, earned his livelihood by blackmailing, and falsely styled himself as an editor without actually publishing a paper. The petition referenced a number of proceedings initiated by the respondent in this Court and in subordinate courts: multiple writ petitions in 1984, 1985 and 1986, and two criminal matters in the Magistrate Court (one carried to the High Court).

The High Court reviewed the pleadings and the respondent’s litigation history (numerous writ petitions and other matters listed in the petition). The Court examined the statutory provision invoked (Section 2 of the Act), the objects and reasons behind the Act, and precedent and materials (including English experience and Indian case law) before assessing whether the respondent should be declared a vexatious litigant and subjected to the disabilities in the Act. The petition was ultimately dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent, Sri T.A. Rajendran, has "habitually and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious proceedings" such that an order under Section 2 of the Madras Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, 1949 should be made restraining him from instituting proceedings without leave.
  2. Whether the statutory scheme (including Section 2 and the role of leave by the High Court or the District and Sessions Judge) should be applied in the respondent's case having regard to (a) the nature of his past petitions, (b) the possibility of legitimate public interest litigation, and (c) the safeguards available under Article 226 and other statutory provisions.
  3. Whether the Court should treat allegations of improper motive (e.g., blackmail, receipt of hush money) as established in the absence of supporting evidence, and whether such allegations suffice to characterise the respondent as a vexatious litigant.

Arguments of the Parties

Advocate-General's Arguments (as presented in the petition)

  • The respondent habitually instituted frivolous and vexatious civil and criminal proceedings in various courts.
  • The respondent had no ostensible means of livelihood or fixed abode and earned his livelihood by blackmailing; he only styled himself as an editor though no publication was actually circulated.
  • Reference to a high number of writ petitions (11 in 1984, 5 in 1985 and 1 in 1986) and criminal actions suggested a pattern of vexatious litigation.
  • The respondent had become a menace to society and the public; if permitted to continue, his actions would disturb the peace of respectable persons and permit harassment by launching prosecutions and legal proceedings against innocent people.

The opinion does not contain a separate, detailed transcript of formal legal submissions or a point‑by‑point reply from the respondent. The Court's narrative, however, records the respondent's litigation history and certain outcomes of those matters, and notes instances in which some petitions raised matters of public importance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P. Mawle v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1965 (II) S.C.A 649 Consideration of the Constitutional validity and scope of vexatious litigant legislation; Act prevents habitual vexatious litigants approaching courts without sanction; does not deprive right to access courts but imposes a check; serves public good; not unconstitutional under Articles 19 or 14. The Court relied on Mawle for background and sweep of the legislation, and to emphasise that the Act creates a limited check (not an absolute bar) designed to prevent abuse while allowing genuine claims to be pursued.
Re Chaffers (reported in L.T. 1897) An early English instance where a litigant (Chaffers) brought numerous actions against high functionaries; first order under the English Vexatious Actions Act (1896). Used as an illustrative historical example of the type of repetitive litigation the English legislation sought to curb; assisted the Court in interpreting the Indian Act by reference to English experience.
Re Jones, (1902) 18 T.L.R 476 English authority cited among decisions applying vexatious litigation laws; demonstrates that even comparatively small numbers of actions may warrant an order in exceptional circumstances. Cited to show that number of actions alone is not determinative and that exceptional circumstances may justify orders under similar legislation.
Re Bernard Boaler, 1915-1 K.B. 21 Example of a litigant supporting or causing numerous distinct proceedings (46) against a single opponent; used to illustrate the statute's purpose. Illustrative: emphasised that a staggering number of litigations may indicate vexatious litigation warranting restriction.
Re Hutchinson, 1929 Weekly Notes 102 Tenant who brought multiple actions (ten actions in ten years) which were dismissed as frivolous and vexatious; application under the Act was allowed. Illustrative precedent of sustained repetitive litigation about the same or similar subject matter; used to inform assessment of what constitutes habitual vexatious proceedings.
Re Vernazza, 1959-2 All E.R. 200 Litigant with obsession or delusion bringing more than twenty actions on same subject matter. Used as an example of obsessive repetition that warranted restriction under vexatious litigation provisions.
Re Langton, 1966-3 All E.R. 576 Example of repeated litigation (ten actions in eight years) concerning the same matters; used in English jurisprudence on vexatious litigants. Used to demonstrate the English practice and to guide interpretation of the Indian Act.
State of H.P. v. Umed Ram Sharma, (1986) 2 SCC 68 Illustration that public interest litigation—often pursued by poor or unemployed persons—should not be equated with vexatious litigation; public interest litigation can yield substantial public good even if not always successful. The Court invoked this authority to caution that poverty, public‑spirited motives or unsuccessful but bona fide public interest litigation are not necessarily indicia of vexatious conduct.
Rajendran … v. Home Secretary …, 1982 K.L.T 474 (W.A No. 244/1982) Reported decision involving the respondent’s early litigation in this Court (used to trace the respondent's litigative debut in the High Court). Adduced as part of the respondent's litigation history; the Court referenced it to show that several of the respondent’s matters were reported and thereby had some legal significance.
T.A. Rajendran v. State of Kerala, 1984 KLT 113 (Crl. R.P No. 428/1983) Reported matter involving the respondent (part of his litigation record). Used by the Court to support the observation that some of respondent’s actions were of legal interest and reported in journals.
Rajendran v. Vakkom Purushothaman, 1985 KLT 40 (O.P No. 10229/1984‑P) Reported decision involving the respondent (part of his litigation record). Referred to as evidence that certain of the respondent’s petitions addressed matters of public or legal importance.
Rajendran v. Ayyappan, 1985 KLT 307 (O.P No. 1640/1985‑H) Another reported matter involving the respondent. Included among cases demonstrating that some of the respondent’s litigation was substantial enough to be reported and to contribute to legal discourse.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner:

  1. Statutory framework: The Court reproduced Section 2 of the Madras Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, 1949 in full and considered the objects and reasons of the Bill to understand the purpose of the Act — namely, to prevent habitual institution of frivolous and vexatious proceedings and to relieve courts of time‑wasting litigation.
  2. Precedential and comparative context: The Court relied on P. Mawle v. State of Andhra Pradesh to interpret the Act's constitutional contours and emphasised that the Act imposes a check rather than an absolute bar. The Court also reviewed the century-long English experience (citing the Vexatious Indictments Act 1859, Vexatious Actions Act 1896 and the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 and several English decisions) to draw guidance on what constitutes habitual or obsessive repetition of litigation.
  3. Sifting the factual matrix: The Court examined the respondent's litigation record year by year, recounting multiple writ petitions (1984–1986), criminal proceedings, and other actions. The Court looked at the subject matter and outcomes of those petitions—many were dismissed, some were disposed after apologies, some found lacking by reason of standing or prematurity, others touched on public interest or legal principle.
  4. Assessment of allegations of character and motive: The Court found certain allegations (for example, that the respondent acted as a blackmailer or received hush money) were not supported by prima facie evidence and could not be assumed without satisfactory materials. The Court declined to make adverse findings on those unproven allegations.
  5. Consideration of public interest litigation and poverty: The Court acknowledged that public interest litigation has become a recognized feature of Indian constitutional practice, and that poverty or lack of regular employment is not an attribute of vexatious litigation. It relied on State of H.P. v. Umed Ram Sharma to caution against equating unsuccessful public‑spirited litigation with vexatious conduct.
  6. Focus on the nature of repetition and concentration of litigation: The Court observed that the respondent had not concentrated his actions on a single opponent or a single cause of action (though there was notable persistence against the Chief Minister), and that the litigations covered a wide array of persons and topics. Some petitions, even if dismissed, had raised matters of legal principle and had been reported.
  7. Procedural safeguards and practical effect of an order under the Act: The Court noted that an order under the Act operates to require leave of the District Judge (or the High Court in Presidency-town) to institute proceedings, but in the respondent's case the venue was mostly the High Court where threshold scrutiny (for writs under Article 226 and proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act) would already filter out unmeritorious petitions. Thus, insisting on District Judge clearance for matters that must be initially scrutinised by the High Court would be superfluous and inconsistent with the scheme of the Act.
  8. Balancing liberty and extraordinary power: The Court emphasised the extraordinary nature of the Act's power to restrict a citizen's right to litigate and reiterated the presumption against interfering with legal rights; any restriction must be the least interference necessary. The Court found the rigorous requirements for invoking the Act were not met on the material before it.
  9. Conclusion from factual and legal assessment: Taking all materials collectively, the Court concluded that the respondent's activity did not reach the threshold of "habitually and without reasonable ground" instituting vexatious proceedings as contemplated by Section 2. The petition therefore failed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: DISMISSED.

Implications (direct effect and observations contained in the judgment):

  • The Advocate-General's petition under Section 2 of the Madras Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, 1949 was dismissed; no order was made declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant under the Act.
  • As a direct consequence, the respondent retains the ability to institute proceedings subject to existing statutory and constitutional safeguards (for example, the High Court's threshold scrutiny of writ petitions under Article 226 and proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act).
  • The Court emphasised that the Act confers an extraordinary power which must be used sparingly and only upon clear demonstration of habitual and unreasonable vexatious litigation; the present material did not justify imposing that extraordinary restriction.
  • The judgment does not purport to lay down a new precedent extending or narrowing the scope of the Act beyond applying existing authorities (notably P. Mawle and English experience) to the facts of this case; it resolves the petition on the record before the Court by declining to exercise the Act's extraordinary power in this instance.
  • The Court expressed the expectation (but did not make an order to that effect) that the respondent would moderate future conduct and exercise better judgment in espousing causes, noting that some of his actions had drawn public attention to matters of public importance.

This summary is limited to the information contained in the provided opinion. No facts, arguments, findings, precedents or implications have been added beyond what appears in the judgment text.

Show full summary ...

    Advocate General v. T.A Rajendran

    JUDGMENT

    1. This petition is one filed by the learned Advocate General, under a rarely invoked statute, the Madras Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The prayer is to pass an order under S. 2 of the Act against the respondent Sri. T.A Rajendran. The essence of the averments in the petition is that the respondent is indulging in vexatious litigation. It is alleged that the respondent has no ostensible means of livelihood or a fixed place of abode, and earns his livelihood by blackmailing; though the respondent styles himself as an Editor, no publication of any paper is really made by him. Reference has been made to the litigations unsuccessfully initiated by him, 11 writ petitions in 1984, 5 in 1985 and 1 in 1986—all in the High Court; two criminal cases in the Magistrate Court, one of which was carried to the High Court. It is asserted that the respondent has become a menace to the society and the public.

    2. The petition states:

    “If the respondent is allowed to indulge in launching prosecutions and other legal proceedings against innocent and respectable people, nobody could pursue his life peacefully…….”

    (Buckley L.J said:

    “The expression “to institute a prosecution” is, I think, an accurate one. Colloquially “to start or to launch a prosecution” might be used, but I should not expect to find those expressions in an Act of Parliament.”

    3. The idea sought to be conveyed by the Advocate-General is, however, fairly clear).

    4. Some of the allegations, particularly in relation to the character and conduct of the respondent, have not been established by any evidence or material, even on a prima facie basis. It is, therefore, difficult to enter a specific finding in relation to those allegations. In as much as many of the allegations made by the Advocate-General in his petition are based on the judgments of, and proceedings in, this Court, they could be obtained from the records of this Court and scrutinised.

    5. Before entering into the assessment of the assertion made by the Advocate-General in relation to the respondent, it is desirable that the section which has been invoked is read in full:

    “2. Leave of court necessary for vexatious litigant to institute proceedings:—(1) If, on an application made by the Advocate-General, the High Court is satisfied that any person has habitually and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious proceedings, civil or criminal, in any Court or Courts, the High Court may, after giving that person an opportunity of being heard, order that no proceedings, civil or criminal, shall be instituted by him in any Court—

    (i) in the Presidency-town, without the leave of the High Court; and

    (ii) elsewhere, without the leave of the District and Sessions Judge.

    (2) If it appears to the High Court that the person against whom an application is made under sub-section (1), is unable, on account of poverty, to engage a pleader, the High Court may engage a pleader to appear for him.

    Explanation:—For the purpose of this section ‘pleader’ has the same meaning as in S. 2, clause (15) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”

    6. The objects and reasons as set out in the Bill leading to the Act states:

    “There is no statutory provision at present to prevent the institution in Courts of frivolous and vexatious proceedings by habitual litigants. The Bill is intended to prevent the institution of such proceedings and thereby relieve the Courts and judicial officers of the annoyance caused by such proceedings and the waste of time involved in dealing with them.

    It is provided in the Bill that if the High Court is satisfied on the application of the Advocate-General that any person has habitually instituted vexatious proceedings, civil or criminal, in any court or courts, the High Court may order that no proceedings, civil or criminal, shall be instituted by such person in any Court within the presidency-town without the leave of the High Court and elsewhere without the leave of the District and Sessions Judge. The High Court is required to give the person concerned an opportunity of being heard before making the above order and also to engage a pleader for him if on account of poverty be is unable to engage one. Provision is also made for the publication of the orders issued by the High Court.

    The Bill mainly follows the provisions contained in S. 51 of the Supreme Court on Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, in Englannd.”

    7. In P. Mawle v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1965 (II) S.C.A 649, the Supreme Court considered the Constitutional validity of the Act. The opinion expressed by the Court furnishes the background and sweep of the legislation. It reads:

    “………the litigants who are to be prevented from approaching the court, without the sanction of the High Court etc., are in a class by themselves. They are described in the Act as persons who ‘habitually’ and without ‘reasonable cause’ file vexatious actions, civil or criminal. The Act is not intended to deprive such a person of his right to go to a court. It only creates a check so that the court may examine the bona fides of any claim before the opposite party is harassed. Such an Act passed in England, has been applied in several cases to prevent an abuse of the process of court. In its object the Act promotes public good because it cannot be claimed that it is an inviolable right of any citizen to bring vexatious actions without control, either legislative or administrative. The Act subserves public interest and the restraint that it creates is designed to promote public good. The Act does not prevent a person declared to be habitual litigant from bringing genuine and bona fide actions. It only seeks to cut short attempt to be vexatious. In our judgment, the Act cannot be described as unconstitutional or offending either Art. 19 or Art. 14.”

    8. The experience in the working of similar legislation in England, for about a century—the Vexatious Indictments Act, 1859, the Vexatious Actions Act, 1896, and the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925—will be of guidance in the interpretation of the Act. The broad features relating to the working of this enactment in England have been dealt with by Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Pages 19-20, Para 29. Chaffers, Jones, Boaler, Hutchinson, Vernazza and Langton are the contributors to the case law on the point. (See In Re Chaffers, 1897-1876 L.T 351, Re Jones (1902) 18 T.L.R 476., Re Bernard Boaler 1915-1 K.B 21, Re Hutchinson, 1929 Weekly Notes 102, Re Vemazza, 1959-2 All E.R 200 and Re Langton 1966-3 All E.R 576.)

    9. Chaffers had brought forty-seven civil actions, against the Speaker, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Lord Chancellor and numerous other high functionaries, without success and without payment of costs. The first order under the 1896 enactment in England was made against Chaffers in January, 1897.

    10. In Hutchinson's case, a tenant under Lord Saville got compensation for disturbance of her agricultural holding and yet commenced ten different actions in the ten years 1918-28, in various Courts claiming very large sums as compensation for ‘tenant right’ etc. All the actions were dismissed, some of them as frivolous and vexatious. She had not paid the costs. The application under the Act was allowed. Vernazza had an obsession or delusion regarding his claim; and in respect of the same sums, he brought more than twenty actions. Langton's case was also one where litigation was repeated in respect of the same subject matter, ten actions in eight years.

    11. Some of the important aspects about the Act would appear to be the following: The Act indubitably is one which deprives a citizen of his rights which would but for the enactment be his rights as a free citizen. At the same time, it would be a grave matter if a person so conducts himself as to expose himself to an order under the enactment; he should not then be allowed to continue his litigious insistence undisturbed. The Act is one giving extraordinary power under extraordinary circumstances. The occasion for invocation of the power under the Act is when a person has habitually and persistently instituted vexatious legal proceedings. The whole history, the general character of the proceedings and the results, are all matters to be looked into in that connection. The staggering number of litigations initiated by a person may give an indication about the vexatious character of the legal proceedings in his hands, as was the case with Boaler, who supported or caused 46 separate and distinct legal proceedings in connection with a single opponent. Though the number of actions is comparatively small, exceptional circumstances would warrant an order under the Act (1902) 18 TLR 476 supra. The presumption against interference with the legal rights and liberties of the subject entitles, even compels, the court to limit its action so as to effect the least interference with those rights.

    12. There are some further aspects which have to be adverted to in the Indian context and in the prevailing situation. Two such aspects are: (1)The enactment in question is a pre-constitutional one. Its interpretation has to be attempted bearing in mind the plenitude of rights, legal and fundamental, which a citizen of this country enjoys under the Constitution. (2) Experience in working of the Constitution has now revealed that public interest litigation has come to stay in the land. Public interest litigation has yielded its results, substantial results, particularly for the needy and oppressed in very many areas. Cases of that kind are part of recent constitutional history. One such case where persons in the lower strata struggling hard with an arduous life in the Himalayan heights got some relief is State of H.P v. Umed Ram Sharma, (1986) 2 SCC 68. Persons who espouse such public causes may be poor or without any specific employment. To be poor in a country which is not very rich or to be unemployed in a country which still struggles with the problem of unemployment, cannot be reckoned as attributes of vexatious litigation. Doubtless, a properly oriented public interest litigation, quite often, serves to serve cause, even when the legal fight is lost. Memphis Park case in America and Silent Valley case in India (O.P Nos.: 2949 & 3025 of 1979) are illustrations of that experience.) Public interest litigation may not always meet with success in Courts of Law, due to obvious legal limitations.

    13. Bearing in mind the above principles the factual materials may now be sifted. The cases mentioned in the petition may briefly be alluded to.

    14. The writ petition, O.P No. 183 of 1984 filed by the respondent herein was against a Malayalam newspaper, “Express”, and a leader of the Communist Party of India. The petition sought action under the Contempt of Courts Act. This Court felt that it was not a fit case to continue the matter suo motu when the petitioner was not present; and accordingly dismissed the petition. The second one was to highlight the existence of extraneous influence in the transfer of an income-tax file relating to Shri. P.N Sankaraoarayanan of Trichur, who was then involved in some sensational issues. The 4th respondent in the case was Chief Minister Sri. K. Karunakaran. This Court observed:

    “A public interest which was attempted to be projected by the writ petition persuaded me to ascertain the facts with reference to the files of the Department”.

    15. The ultimate conclusion was:

    “The facts and materials furnished by the petitioner are not sufficient to establish the existence of any extraneous considerations in the transfer and posting effected in the Department. It cannot be assumed, without more, that any pressure had been exerted by the 4th respondent on the Commissioner of Income-tax to bring about the transfers and postings complained of in the writ petition.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    16. O.P No. 566 of 1984 was one filed by the respondent against the Editor and Publisher of the newspaper ‘Indian Express’, complaining of contempt punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 in the background of a publication “Judges and their salary.” A similar petition was filed by the Advocate-General also for the same relief, O.P No. 656 of 1984. Both were disposed of by this Court by accepting the apology offered by the Editor and expressing the hope that such things would not recur.

    17. The respondent rushed to the court with a petition—O.P No. 911 of 1984—complaining about attempts at appointing a junior member of the Kerala Public Service Commission, as Chairman. This Court held that the relief claimed for could not be granted in the light of Article 361(1) of the Constitution. It was further held:

    “Suffice it to say that on the basis of statements entirely of a Newspaper report, the veracity of which has not even been attempted to be verified by the petitioner, it is difficult to entertain an Original Petition invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

    18. O.P No. 1196 of 1984 in which the Chief Minister figured along with the State of Kerala as respondents, was for a writ of mandamus for taking steps to avoid a threatened strike of the employees of the State. The writ petition was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner was not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    19. The writ petition, O.P No. 1430 of 1984 sought a writ of mandamus against the Governor to give sanction to the petitioner to prosecute the Chief Minister. This Court held that it was not for the Court to give a direction to the Governor to grant or not to grant sanction. A prayer for disposal of the representation was rejected on the ground that it was premature. O.P No. 1568 of 1984 sought a writ of mandamus for the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry against the Chief Minister. The writ petition was dismissed. Sukumaran J. who dealt with the matter observed:

    “A Court of law should not be made a venue for personal aggrandizement. Questions of morality and matters essentially of a propaganda nature are better dealt with in other forum. The extraordinary and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not to be lightly invoked in such situations.”

    20. O.P No. 2224 of 1984 was against the Police Officials of Cochin, seeking a writ of Habeas Corpns. This Court found that the petitioners were not under illegal custody and accordingly dismissed the petition. A similar petition against the Police Officials of Vythiri, complaining about the illegal custody of one Razack, was dismissed, when the Government Pleader submitted that Razack had been admitted to Bala Mandir. O.P No. 10028 of 1984 was one seeking a writ of mandamus for the appointment of the Chairman of the Public Service Commission. The writ petition was dismissed when counsel for the Public Service Commission submitted that the senior-most member was authorised to discharge the functions of the Chairman. The last one of the year 1984, O.P No. 10439 of 1984, was directed against the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. It sought initiation of proceedings under Contempt of Courts Act, against the Speaker, for the remarks made by him at a press conference, that it was not mandatory to resign the speakership to contest an election. This Court held that the petitioner had not the requisite standing to maintain the petition; and that the statements attributed to the Speaker would not tend to interfere with the course of justice.

    21. The litigations of the year 1985 were against a leader and minister of the Muslim League, and against the Advocate—General. Prosecution of Sri. Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait was sought under O.P No. 1 of 1985. A petition Ext. P1 filed by him before the Governor, it was complained, had not been disposed of. This Court directed the disposal of that petition within a period of four months. O.P No. 6234 of 1985 was against the Deputy Chief Minister, for initiating action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 for the statements made by him in relation to a judgment of the Supreme Court of India. The Division Bench made a factual finding that the reported speech did not evidence any intention to disobey the authority of the Court or undermine the prestige of the judiciary. Based on the above decision of Division Bench, the writ petition O.P No. 5825 of 1985 seeking a writ of Quo-warranto aimed at the removal of the Deputy Chief Minister was dismissed. O.P No. 388 of 1985 sought to initiate contempt proceedings against the Advocate-General. As the petition was based on hearsay information that petition was dismissed. The conduct of the Advocate-General in appearing in M.C No. 127 of 1985 on behalf of the Chief Minister of the Kerala State, Shri. K. Karunakaran, was challenged in the writ petition O.P No. 1640 of 1985. This Court dismissed the petition, in the light of the Government order, G.O (MS) No. 26/85.Law dated 11-2-1885, whereby the Governor had specially authorised the Advocate-General to appear in that case.

    22. The one writ petition filed in 1986 O.P No. 1621 of 1986, was for a writ of mandamus directing the District Collector, Alleppey to proceed against the then Minister of Excise and another for alleged violation of the provisions of the Kerala Stamp Act. This Court dismissed the petition, but observed:

    “Whatever be the petitioner's motivation the case espoused by him is one involving a principle; and more than that the conservation of public revenue. It is desirable that the inquiry is not unduly delayed……If the writ petition protects the authorities to devise effective measures for a meaningful implementation of S. 45-A, a would have served a larger purpose than what would have been perhaps intended by the petitioner.”

    23. Criminal M.P No. 180 of 1984 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Trivandrum was dismissed on the ground of lack of evidence. He was, however, successful in persuading the same Court to take on to file another complaint on same set of facts (C.C 18 of 1985.) That action was quashed by this Court in Crl. M.C 137 of 1985. Those actions cannot be treated as constituting vexatious actions under the Act.

    24. Records of this Court would reveal that the respondent had attempted to intervene in the case, Achutha Menon v. State of Kerala. O.P No. 11011 of 1983), relating to an unauthorised construction of a building in Trichur town. It was unnecessary for him to be active in that public interest litigation in which this Court had to conduct a detailed enquiry even otherwise.

    25. The decision of this Court in Crl. M.C No. 227/86 would indicate his so far successful attempts at making out a prima facie case of an offence under the Child Marriage Act as against a Minister in the State Cabinet. The newspaper reports would reveal that he had challenged in the Delhi High Court, (unsuccessfully though) the constitutional correctness in the appointment of two Additional Judges of this Court. The decision in Rajendran… v. Home Secretary…., (1982 K.L.T 474) gives the clue to his debut into the litigative field in this Court when he filed O.P No. 3555 of 1982, seeking a writ for constituting an enquiry under the Commission of Enquiry Act, 1952 against the Chief Minister and others in relation to their rule in the ‘Navab Photostat’ case. The writ petition was dismissed; so was the writ appeal.

    26. After considering the cases individually and collectively, I am of the view that the respondent's activity could not be termed as a condemnable exercise coming under the Act. He had not concentrated one one individual or one cause of action, in his litigations. They cover persons in power and persons in opposition; political leaders and newspaper editors; Chief Minister and Ministers; and even Speaker and Judges. At least on certain occasions, they have really served to bring to publice attention some matters of public importance. Having regard to the rigorous requirements of law, legal actions may not succeed in given situations. That would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the activities were frivolous or vexatious. Even in cases, where petitions have been dismissed, the decisions have been found to be important enough from the point of view of legal principles laid down therein. That is implicit in the decisions being reported in legal journals. (See Rajendran… v. Home Secretary…., 1982 KLT 474 (W.A No. 244/1982), T.A Rajendran v. State Of Kerala, 1984 KLT 113 (Crl. R.P No. 428/1983), Rajendran v. Vakkom Purushothaman, 1985 KLT 40 (O.P No. 10229/1984-P) and Rajendran v. Ayyappan, 1985 KLT 307 (O.P No. 1640/1985-H). No doubt, it may not be accidental, that there has been a persistent attack on one individual, the Chief Minister of Kerala. A personal motivation is perhaps inferable. However, even in such actions, it could not be said that there was such total lack of substance or such dominance of malice, as to condemn the petitioner as a vexatious litigant and subject him to the disabilities under the Act.

    27. The learned Advocate-General was emphatic in his submission about the petition filed by the respondent against the Chief Minister under the Lunacy Act. I do not comment on that petition in view of its pendency before a subordinate Court. I shall assume that it was a totally irresponsible and unnecessary action. Even then, that circumstance by itself, would not be sufficient to characterise the respondent as a vexatious litigant: a single swallow does not make a summer.

    28. The learned Advocate-General particularly referred to the situation arising out of publicity given in the media of the presentation of such a petition. The criticism in that regard, however, can only be against the media, and as to whether the media had shown the requisite degree of responsibility in publishing that news item. That has no direct effect or impact on the consideration of the conduct of the respondent.

    29. Some of the allegations against the respondent, such as his being a regular black-mailer or about his receipt of hush money are not supported by any materials. This Court would not be justified in making any assumptions in relation to those assertions without sufficient and satisfactory materials.

    30. The effect of an order under the Act is to enable District Judge to scrutinise whether there is a prima facie case to be fought in a court of law, before the action is actually brought by a vexatious litigant declared as such (See S. 3 of the Act). Such scrutiny does not appear to be necessary in the case of the respondent for an added reason also. The venue of the respondent's action has been mostly the High Court. The proceedings he had initiated were mostly cases where initial scrutiny had to be done by this Court. That will be the case both in relation to the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and in relation to the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. That safeguard itself is sufficient, to stem the flow of vexatious litigation, if the petitioner resorts to the same. The High Court, will have to examine at the threshold the prima facie case, in all such matters. That is so even when the District Judge gives him clearance. The scrutiny by the District Judge would, in such circumstances, be meaningless superfluity. It is inconsistent with the scheme and spirit of the Act to insist on the petitioner obtaining the sanction of the District Judge to move a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    31. The litigations of the respondent, understandably, constitute irritants to the victims. Such inconveniences are inevitable in any large institution, however, careful be the managers thereof. The richest city has its cockroach nuisance; but then, you do not hurl a napalm bomb to exterminate cockroach menace.

    32. The respondent would appear to feel that he is having a crusading mission, and possibly under an obsession. But, unlike in Vernazza's case (supra), it is not in relation to one matter and one defendant. Some obsessions which may at first sight appear to be an abnormal activity to the outside world, may sometimes prove productive; as was the case with the multimillionaire who launched continuous planting activity for decades, which ultimately transformed an Alpine waste to a contiguous greenery, formed a perennial stream, and founded a sizable settlement of people.

    33. In Maule's case (supra), Shah J. was disinclined to ‘impose the blanket restriction’ under the Act, though the person concerned had ‘filed dozens of cases and had flooded the Courts with litigation often by way of repeated petitions in the same matter’. The Court placed on record that ‘Mawle expressed his willingness to be restrained in his litigation’, hoped that he would make amends for his past conduct, and expected him to behave properly in future. It is only to be hoped that this petition would help the respondent to modulate his future conduct, and would impress upon him the necessity for the exercise of a better judgment for the espousal of causes. In the light of the above discussion, the petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed.

    34. Dismissed.

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    Advocate General v. T.A Rajendran
    (Jun 2, 1986)