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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent was sought to be committed for contempt of court for breaching an undertaking given to this Court. The background of the dispute involves a petition filed by the petitioners before the Rent Control Court in 1961 seeking eviction of the respondent from a building. The Rent Control Court dismissed the petition, but on appeal, the eviction was ordered. The respondent challenged this through successive revisions and appeals, resulting in this Court ultimately ordering eviction. The respondent was granted time to vacate the premises until 5th May 1971 based on an undertaking given by his counsel before the Court. Subsequently, the respondent filed a suit and obtained ex parte interim injunctions restraining eviction, which were later vacated. The petitioners initiated contempt proceedings alleging breach of the unconditional undertaking given to the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the undertaking given by the respondent's counsel was an undertaking to the Court or merely to the opposing party.
  2. Whether breach of such an undertaking constitutes contempt of court.
  3. The appropriate approach and principles governing committal for contempt based on breach of undertakings given in court.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The undertaking given by the counsel was not an undertaking to the Court but only to the other side.
  • Therefore, breach of such an undertaking would not amount to contempt of court.

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The undertaking was given to the Court and was unconditional.
  • The respondent breached this undertaking by filing suit and obtaining injunctions to delay eviction.
  • Such breach constitutes contempt of court requiring committal of the respondent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nisha Kan Roy Chowdhury v. Smt. Saro ji Bashini Ooho (AIR 1948 Cal. 294) Distinction between undertakings given to the court and to the opposite party; not every undertaking is to the court. Supported the principle that the nature of the undertaking depends on facts and language; court must interpret carefully.
Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka v. Kapurchand Ltd. (AIR 1950 Bom. 338) Once a compromise is accepted by the court and a decree passed, the undertaking becomes an undertaking to the court; breach may amount to contempt. Rejected the view that undertakings are only to parties; court emphasized the binding nature of undertakings incorporated in court orders.
Sukumar Mitra v. Tarasankar Ghosh (AIR 1952 Cal. 591) If consequences for breach are provided in the compromise decree, contempt proceedings should not be initiated; breach is dealt with as per decree. Guided court to consider whether breach should be punished by contempt or by decree consequences.
Em. Lajuklata v. Mrlshingha Prasad (AIR 1952 Cal. 669) Court should not be vindictive in contempt cases but litigants must not break undertakings with impunity. Supported the principle that breach of undertaking to court is serious and may aggravate contempt.
Suretennessa Bibi v. Chintaharan Das (AIR 1955 Cal. 182) Importance of whether undertaking is unconditional and whether consequences for breach exist; such factors determine contempt proceedings. Instructed court to assess the nature and terms of the undertaking before proceeding for contempt.
Chhay Debi v. Lahoriram Prashar (67 C.W.N 819) Committal for contempt should be used sparingly and only with great reluctance; undertakings must be construed naturally. Emphasized cautious approach to contempt and careful interpretation of undertakings.
Lal Shayam Sundar v. Lal Baij Nath Prasad (68 C.W.N 148) Breach of undertaking given to court sanctioning particular conduct amounts to misconduct and contempt. Reinforced that breach of court undertakings can justify contempt proceedings.
Bukhtiparpur Bihar Light Rly Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (AIR 1951 Patna 231) Unintentional or technical contempts should not be punished; strict interpretation of court orders is necessary. Warned against overreach in contempt proceedings and emphasized clarity in court orders.
Badri Das v. Labhu Mal (AIR 1959 Punjab 322) If the court merely accepts a compromise made outside court, breach of such undertaking is not contempt. Supported distinction between undertakings made in court and those made privately between parties.
Ram Juwan v. Devendra Nath Gupta (AIR 1960 M.P. 280) Disagreed with views that all undertakings are to court; distinguished between undertakings to court and between parties. Supported careful analysis of undertakings and their legal effect.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the nature of the undertaking given by the respondent’s counsel, emphasizing the distinction between undertakings given to the Court and those given only to the opposite party. It held that whether an undertaking is to the Court depends on the facts, circumstances, and language used. The undertaking in this case was given in open court during a hearing on an extension of time, with both parties present and agreeing, and was therefore an undertaking to the Court.

The Court noted that the respondent’s subsequent actions—filing suit and obtaining interim injunctions to restrain eviction—contradicted the unconditional undertaking to surrender possession by the stipulated date. This conduct demonstrated an intention not to honor the undertaking. The Court also surveyed relevant precedents, which collectively establish that breach of an unqualified undertaking given to the Court constitutes contempt unless the compromise decree provides specific consequences for breach, and that contempt powers should be exercised sparingly but firmly to uphold the authority of the Court.

Holding and Implications

The Court held the respondent guilty of contempt of court. The respondent was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 250, with default leading to simple imprisonment for two weeks.

The direct effect of this decision is to penalize the respondent for breaching an unconditional undertaking given to the Court, reinforcing the principle that such undertakings carry serious legal obligation. The Court did not set any new precedent but applied established principles to the facts of this case, underscoring the importance of honoring court undertakings and the judicious use of contempt powers.

    Ayissa Bibi Umma Others v. Aboobacker

    Raghavan, C.J:— The respondent is sought to be committed for contempt of court for committing breach of an undertaking given by him to this Court. We issued notice, in the first instance, dispensing with personal appearance, but, after hearing arguments of both sides, directed the respondent to appear in person on 29th November 1971. The respondent failed to appear; and we issued a non-bailable warrant to have him arrested and produced before us today. After knowing about the warrant, the respondent has appeared.

    2. The petitioners filed a petition before the Rent Control Court in 1961 for evicting the respondent from a building. The Rent Control Court dismissed the petition; but, on appeal, the Appellate Authority allowed the petition and ordered eviction. The respondent took up the matter in revision before the District Judge; and the District Judge reversed the decision of the Appellate Authority and restored the decision of the Rent Control Court. Against that, there was a further revision to this Court; and this Court set aside the decision of the District Judge and remanded the matter for fresh disposal. The District Judge once again came to the same conclusion and dismissed the petition for eviction. There was another revision against that order; and the same learned Judge of this Court again set aside the judgment of the District Judge and ordered eviction. The respondent then moved this Court to grant him some time for vacating the premises which the learned Judge granted. And the respondent moved the Supreme Court for a special leave, wherein also he did not succeed. Then he moved the Single Judge of this Court once again for granting him some time more; and when the matter came for hearing, the counsel of the petitioners also agreed for granting time. And the learned Judge granted time for two months, viz till 5th May 1971. Now, the contempt proceedings have been started by the petitioners on the allegation that the undertaking given by the counsel of the respondent was an undertaking to this Court and the respondent committed breach of that undertaking. We may extract hereunder the undertaking:

    “Without any demur or objection the petitioner (the respondent before us) will unconditionally surrender the building to the respondents in this C.M.P (the petitioners before us) on or before May 5th 1971. I have necessary instruction from my party to make this submission.”

    3. The counsel of the respondent signed, and then followed

    “In view of the above undertaking, I agree to the grant of time to the petitioner in this C.M.P to surrender the building till 5th May 1971.”

    4. And the counsel of the petitioners signed. After these endorsements, the learned judge passed the order.

    “Time is granted up to 5th May 1971.”

    5. After obtaining this order, the respondent filed a suit before the Additional Munsiff's Court, Kozhikode on 7th April 1971, just before that court closed for the midsummer recess. The respondent also obtained an ex parte order of interim injunction in an interlocutory application restraining the petitioners from executing the decree and recovering possession of the building. The suit was one for a declaration that the order of eviction passed by the Sub Court and confirmed by this Court was invalid and unexecatable and also for a permanent injunction restraining the petitioners from executing the order. The petitioners when they knew about this, moved the Vacation Judge of this Court; and the learned Judge sent back the proceedings to the Additional Munsiff, Kozhikode directing him to dispose of the petition for injunction on the reopening day, viz., 22nd May 1971. The Additional Munsiff heard the petition on the reopening day, and on 1st June 1971, pronounced orders vacating the interim injunction and dismissing the petition. Immediately thereafter, the respondent filed, another petition before the Principal Munsiff and obtained another ex parte order of interim injunction. Pending the said order, the respondent filed a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal before the District Court against the order of the Additional Munsiff dismissing the injunction petition. And pending the said miscellaneous appeal, the petitioners have come to this Court with the present petition praying that this Court be pleased to issue notice to the respondent and commit him for contempt of court for committing breach of the undertaking he gave to this Court.

    6. The contention of the counsel of the respondent has been that the undertaking given by the counsel was not an undertaking to this Court, but was only an undertaking to the other side, so that committing breach of such an undertaking was not contempt of court.

    7. A few decisions have been brought to our notice by the counsel on both sides. The first decision is the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nisha Kan Roy Chowdhury v. Smt. Saro ji Bashini Ooho (AIR. 1948 Cal. 294). Harries C.J who spoke for the Division Bench observed that the promise or undertaking in each case should be interpreted on its particular facts and upon the precise words used in the compromise and every undertaking made before the court should not be construed as an undertaking made before the court. In that case, the owner of certain premises brought a suit on the Original Side of the High Court for ejectment against another on the ground that the latter had installed the images of Kali and Siva on the premises without the former's consent. The suit was compromised; and under the compromise, the tenant undertook to remove the images before giving up possession or at any time prior thereto on demand by the landlord. The said compromise was presented to the Court; and the Court passed a decree in terms of the compromise. The tenant failed to remove the images, when the landlord moved the High Court alleging that such failure on the part of the tenant was a breach of the undertaking he gave to the Court so that he committed contempt of court. Harries C.J held that, in the particular circumstances of the case the undertaking given by the tenant was an undertaking to the landlord and not an undertaking to the Court. Gentle J., who heard the matter on the Original Side, held that the undertaking given by the party was an undertaking to the Court; but Harries C.J (in appeal) observed that the word ‘undertakes’ did not mean undertakes to Court’

    8. The next decision is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka v. Kapurchand Ltd. (AIR. 1950 Bom. 338). Chagla C.J and Gajendragadkar J. constituted the Division Bench; and the learned Chief Justice who spoke for the Bench held that, although the court might be bound to record a compromise, still, when the court passed a decree it put is imprimatur upon the terms of the compromise and made the terms a rule of the court; and that if such an undertaking was later on not acted upon by the party who gave the undertaking, the party was liable to be committed for contempt of court Chagla C.J did not agree with the view expressed by Harries C.J The Bombay Chief Justice was of the opinion that, once the compromise was accepted by the court and a decree passed in terr as thereof, the undertaking which was the basis of the compromise became an undertaking to the court. It was also pointed out by Chagla C.J that, on the Original Side of the High Court, whenever the expression ‘a party undertakes’ had been used, it had always borne the meaning that undertaking was to the Court.

    9. The next decision is again of the Calcutta High Court—the decision in Sukumar Mitra v. Tarasankar Ghosh (AIR. 1952 Cal. 591). A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held in this case that, if in the compromise decree, the consequences for breaking the undertaking were provided, the court should not, in such a case, exercise the discretionary powers to order committal for contempt of court and the party who committed breach of the undertaking should be visited only with such consequences as provided in the decree. It was also held in this case that, if there was any reasonable doubt whether the undertaking was an unqualified one or not, then also the court should be reluctant to take proceedings for contempt.

    10. The next decision cited is also of the Calcutta High Court viz., Em. Lajuklata v. Mrlshingha Prasad (AIR. 1952 Cal. 669), where a Division Bench laid down that, in cases of contempt of court, though the court should not be vindictive, still a litigant should understand that he would not be permitted to break with impunity the undertaking he gave to the court. In that cause as in the present case, there was an attempt to move a lower court (the Small Cause Court) to get an order of stay of execution against the decree of the High Court. And the Calcutta High Court pointed out that attempt made the position much worse.

    11. The next decision too is of the Calcutta High Court in Suretennessa Bibi v. Chintaharan Das (AIR. 1955 Cal. 182). The Division Bench which heard the case laid stress on the fact that the court should consider whether the undertaking was an unconditional undertaking or only a qualified one, and whether the consequences of default were provided for either in the undertaking or in the order that followed.

    12. The next decision is again of the Calcutta High Court, the decision in Chhay Debi v. Lahoriram Prashar (67 C.W.N 819). A Division Bench observed that the remedy by committal for contempt of court should be jealously and carefully watched and should be awarded only with great reluctance. The Division Bench also warned that any doctrinaire approach might have its own pitfalls and that the word “undertaking” should be construed in a natural sense. This was a decision in which the learned judges considered several decisions in considerable detail. However, it is not necessary for us to go into all the aspects considered in this decision. Still another decision cited is the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Lal Shayam Sundar v. Lal Baij Nath Prasad (68 C.W.N 148), wherein it was held that the breach of an undertaking given to the court on the faith of which the court sanctioned a particular course of action or inaction was misconduct amounting to contempt.

    13. Next we come to the decision of the Patna High Court in Bukhtiparpur Bihar Light Rly Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (AIR. 1951 Patna 231). This decision pointed out that unintentional and technical contempts should not be punished. The learned Judges also pointed out that the mere fact that there was an attempt to overreach the court should not make the guilty party liable to proceedings for contempt. Again, it was pointed out that the order of the court which a party was bound to follow to the letter should be strictly interpreted and the interpretation should not be open to any doubt or difference of opinion.

    14. The next decision of the Punjab High Court in Badri Das… v. Labhu Mal…. (AIR. 1959 Punjab 322). This is a decision of a Single Judge, and it is a very short decision, wherein the learned Judge observed that if there was a compromise or an understanding between the parties, previously and the court merely accepted such compromise, then a breach of such undertaking would not be comtempt of court.

    15. And the last decision we would refer to is the decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Ram Juwan v. Devendra Nath Gupta (AIR. 1960 M.P 280). This is again by a Single Judge; and the learned Judge disagreed with the views expressed by Chagla C.J in the Bombay decision and the views expressed in the Calcutta decision in Suretennessa Bibi v. Chintaharan Das. (AIR. 1955 Cal. 182). The learned Judge referred to Oswald on Contempt of Court and observed that an undertaking given to the court was different from what the parties agreed between themselves.

    16. From the several decisions cited above, we have been able to gather the main principles in a case like this; and we may just enunciate them.

    17. Every undertaking given by a party to a litigation is not an undertaking to the court: there is difference between an undertaking given to the other party and an undertaking given to the court. The breach of an undertaking given to the other party will not constitute contempt of court: only the breach of an undertaking given to the court will constitute contempt of court. Whether a particular undertaking is an undertaking to the court or to the Opposite party must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the language used. Normally, if the parties agreed to a compromise outside court and reported the same to the court and the court passed a decree in terms of the compromise, then the undertaking given by a party to the compromise is not an undertaking given to the court unless the order passed by the court in pursuance of the compromise indicates that the court treated the undertaking as one given to it: a compromise come to in the presence of the court may not stand on the same footing. Similarly, if, in pursuance of an undertaking, a compromise decree was passed and provision was also made in the decree that if a breach of the undertaking was committed a particular consequence would follow. In such a case also even if the undertaking was to the court, the court should not treat it as a matter for contempt of court but should leave the party who committed the breach to suffer the consequence mentioned in the decree. And the undertaking should be an unqualified undertaking: and if there is any reasonable doubt regarding its meaning as to whether it is unqualified or not, then the court should be reluctant to take proceedings for contempt. The court should exercise the power to commit for contempt only sparingly, but should never fail to guard it jealously. And the court should not be vindictive or over-sensitive: and if there is reasonable scope for doubt or difference of opinion as to whether a particular undertaking was an undertaking to the opposite party or to the court or whether it was an unqualified undertaking or not, the court should treat the undertaking as an undertaking given to the party and only a qualified undertaking. Still, the court should not allow a party to treat the court lightly or to commit breach of an undertaking given to the court with impunity; none should be allowed to have such a feeling. Bearing these principles in mind, if we analyse the position in this case, what follows is that the undertaking given by the counsel of the respondent was in fact an undertaking given to the court. The respondent filed a petition for extension of time; and when the matter was being heard, during the discussion at the bar, the respondent agreed that be would unconditionally surrender the premises on or before a particular day and the petitioners also agreed to give time till that day. This agreement was in the presence of the Court; and it was not an agreement come to by the parties outside Court and reported to the Court. It is therefore not correct to treat the undertaking given by the respondent before the Court only as an undertaking given to the other side. Subsequent to his undertaking, the respondent filed a suit before the Additional Munsif, Kozhikoda for a declaration that the order of eviction passed by the High Court was invalid and unexecutable. And be also obtained an interim ex parte order of injunction restraining the petitioners from executing the order of eviction. And when that order was vacated by the Additional Munsif, the respondent went before the Principal Munsif and obtained another similar order; and it was pending that order that he filed a civil miscellaneous appeal against the dismissal of his petition for injunction by the Additional Munsif. All this he did after he took time from this Court undertaking to surrender “unconditionally” and without “any demur or objection”: it is therefore fairly apparent that the respondent had no intention to honour the undertaking even when he gave the undertaking: and this is clear from his subsequent conduct in approaching the Additional Munsif first with his suit and interlocutory application and the Principal Munsif next with are similar interlocutory application.

    18. The respondent is thus guilty of contempt of court. We therefore convict him and sentence him to pay a fine of Rs. 250/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two weeks.

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    Ayissa Bibi Umma Others v. Aboobacker
    (Dec 6, 1971)