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  • sub - section (1) of s. 145.
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  • sub - section (1) of s. 145.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On the motion of the petitioner the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Fort Cochin, initiated proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and on 17 June 1977 issued an order that (a) directed parties to attend and put in written statements regarding actual possession of the land and building in dispute (13.308 cents in Sy. No. 988/14-16 of Rameswaram village and a house bearing door no. XVI/1188), and (b) declared the matter one of emergency and ordered that the subject of dispute be attached and taken into court custody until further orders, appointing the village officer as receiver.

The first respondent was served with a copy of that order and filed Criminal Revision Petition No. 57 of 1977 before the Court of Session, Ernakulam. The 3rd Additional Sessions Judge overruled the objection that the revision petition was barred by Section 397(2) CrPC, held that a composite order invoking powers under Section 145(1) was unsustainable in law, and concluded that a case of emergency had not been made out on the facts. The petitioner challenged those conclusions in the present revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order dated 17 June 1977, which combined a preliminary order under Section 145(1) CrPC and an attachment under Section 146(1) CrPC, was an interlocutory order barred from revision by Section 397(2) CrPC or a final order amenable to revision.
  2. Whether the Additional Sessions Judge acted beyond his powers in setting aside the order of attachment and appointment of receiver by concluding that there were insufficient reasons to treat the matter as an emergency under Section 146(1) CrPC.
  3. Whether a magistrate may, in the same order, both make the preliminary order under Section 145(1) and simultaneously attach the property under Section 146(1), or whether attachment must follow after the order under Section 145(1) has been made and signed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that neither the preliminary order under Section 145(1) nor the order of attachment under Section 146(1) finally disposed of the proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate; therefore, the order dated 17 June 1977 was interlocutory and barred from revision by Section 397(2) CrPC.
  • The petitioner further argued that the Additional Sessions Judge exceeded his powers by holding that there were not sufficient reasons for the order of attachment and appointment of receiver, since under Section 146(1) CrPC the magistrate's subjective satisfaction that the case is one of emergency confers jurisdiction to attach the property and that such discretionary satisfaction should not lightly be interfered with on revision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Rahman v. Cassim & Sons (1933 P.C. 58) Finality must be a finality in relation to the suit; if after the order the suit remains live, no appeal lies against it under the relevant provision. Cited to explain that finality is contextual and must be assessed with reference to whether rights remain to be determined; used to frame the inquiry into whether the magistrate's order was final or interlocutory.
Mohanlal v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1968 S.C. 733) No single general test for finality; identified that an order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another and recorded four practical tests for finality (set out in the opinion). Relied on for guidance in determining whether the magistrate's order determined the principal matter or was merely interlocutory; the four tests were extracted and applied by reference to the instant order.
Bozson v. Altrincham Urban Council (1908 1 K.B. 547) An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. Approved as a dictum illustrating that interlocutory/finality analysis can be granular; informed the court's approach when assessing whether the attachment order was conclusive of a substantive right.
Parmeshwari Devi v. State and Another ((1977) 1 SCC 169) Clarified the meaning of "interlocutory order" under Section 397(2) CrPC and held that where an order is directed against a person who is not a party to the inquiry or trial and he has no opportunity to challenge it later, such an order may not be interlocutory for purposes of excluding revision. Applied to show that whether an order is interlocutory depends on the person against whom it is made; used to support the conclusion that the revisional forum could entertain the petition in respect of the attachment order.
Pathu v. State of Kerala (1975 KLT 696) Referenced in context with Section 397(2) CrPC jurisprudence. Referenced by the court as a related decision; cited parenthetically to support broader jurisprudence on finality/interlocutory issues.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main analytical stages: first assessing the maintainability of the revision under Section 397(2) CrPC (i.e., whether the magistrate's order was interlocutory), and second addressing the challenge to the propriety of the attachment and appointment of a receiver.

1. On maintainability: The court reviewed authorities that explain that "final" and "interlocutory" are context-dependent concepts. It invoked the Privy Council decision in Abdul Rahman v. Cassim & Sons and the Supreme Court decision in Mohanlal v. State of Gujarat, which set out that no single test exists for finality and suggested four practical tests. The court also cited Bozson for the proposition that interlocutory orders can be conclusive as to subordinate matters.

2. Applying these principles to the present order, the court observed that the magistrate's order of 17 June 1977 was composite: it initiated proceedings under Section 145(1) CrPC and simultaneously ordered attachment under Section 146(1) CrPC. The court emphasized that an order under Section 146(1), once made, causes the attachment to continue until a competent court determines the parties' rights or until the magistrate withdraws the attachment; thus such an attachment "puts an end to the proceedings so far as it relates to the enquiry by the magistrate as to who was in possession" and is final in that respect. Consequently, the revision petition before the sessions judge was not barred by Section 397(2) CrPC and the Additional Sessions Judge was correct to overrule the maintainability objection.

3. On the contention that the Additional Sessions Judge exceeded his powers in setting aside the attachment: the court acknowledged that Section 146(1) contemplates the magistrate's subjective satisfaction as to an emergency and that ordinarily such a discretionary exercise should not be lightly interfered with on revision. Nevertheless, the court found it unnecessary to decide the propriety of the magistrate's exercise of discretion because the attachment order was unsustainable for a separate, procedural reason.

4. Procedural defect identified: Section 146(1) begins with the phrase "if the magistrate at any time after making the order in sub-section (1) of s. 145...", which indicates that the order under Section 145(1) should be made first and only thereafter, if satisfied, the magistrate may proceed to attach property under Section 146(1). In the instant case the magistrate had effected initiation under Section 145(1) and the attachment under Section 146(1) by the same composite order. The court concluded that Section 146(1) does not contemplate a simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction and that the attachment order therefore failed to comply with the statutory sequence. For that reason the Additional Sessions Judge was right in setting aside the attachment and appointment of receiver.

5. Practical outcome left open to the magistrate: The court observed that since the preliminary order under Section 145(1) was confirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge, the magistrate is at liberty to consider afresh whether an emergency exists and, if so satisfied, to issue a fresh order of attachment followed by appointment of a receiver in proper conformity with Section 146(1).

Holding and Implications

CORE HOLDING: REVISION PETITION DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The court upheld the Additional Sessions Judge's overruling of the maintainability objection under Section 397(2) CrPC, concluding the composite order contained a final element (attachment) and so was amenable to revision.
  • The court endorsed the Additional Sessions Judge's setting aside of the attachment and appointment of receiver because the magistrate's order improperly combined the Section 145(1) preliminary order and the Section 146(1) attachment in a single, simultaneous order contrary to the statutory sequence.
  • The preliminary order under Section 145(1) having been confirmed, the magistrate may, if he is properly satisfied after the Section 145(1) order has been made, issue a fresh order of attachment and appoint a receiver in accordance with Section 146(1).

Broader implications: The opinion focuses on statutory sequence and the interlocutory/finality analysis in the context of Sections 145 and 146 CrPC; it does not purport to lay down a new general precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts. No broader, novel rule of law was announced beyond the application of established principles to the procedural defect identified.

    Lilly Franklin v. Wilson

    1. On the motion of the petitioner the sub - divisional magistrate, Fort cochin initiated proceedings under s. 145 of the code of criminal procedure and on 17th june, 1977 issued the following order: "whereas i am satisfied from the report of the divisional inspector of police, Mattancherry dated 7 61977 duly counter signed by the assistant commissioner (law and order) ernakulam that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace concerning 13. 308 cents of landed properties comprised in sy. No. 988/14 - 16 of rameswaram village of cochin taluk and the house bearing door no. Xvi/1188, Which is situated within the local limits of this court, I do hereby require you to attend my court or by pleader at 11 a. M. On 24 - 6 - 1977 and put in written statement of their respective claim, If any, In regard to the actual possession of the land and building under dispute.

    i am satisfied that the matter is one of emergency, I hereby order that the subject of dispute will be attached and taken into the court custody until further orders. Village officer, Rameswaram village is appointed as receiver for the disputed properties.

    given under my hand and seal of the court this the 17th day of june, 1977.

    sd/ - sub divisional magistrate. "

    2. The 1st respondent was served with a copy of the order. He filed criminal revision petition 57 of 1977 before the court of session, Ernakulam. The 3rd additional sessions judge overruled the objection that the revision petition was barred in view of s 397 (2) of the code of criminal procedure. The learned judge held that a composite order invoking the powers under s. 145 (1) is unsustainable in law. The court further held that a case of emergency was not made out on the tacts and circumstances of the case.

    3. All the above grounds are challenged in this revision petition. I shall first deal with the maintainability of the revision petition before the court of sessions. S. 397 (2) of the code of criminal procedure states that the powers of revision under s. 397 (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order pass d in any appeal, Inquiry, Trial or other proceeding. The contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner is that neither the preliminary order under s. 145 (1) nor the order of attachment under s. 146 (1) finally disposed of the proceedings before the sub divisional magistrate and therefore the order dated 17th june, 1977 is an interlocutory order coming under s. 397 (2) of the code of criminal procedure.

    4. There are innumerable cases dealing with the question when an order can be said to be final and when interlocutory. The question when an order could be said to be 'final order' for purposes of s. 109 (a) of the code of criminal procedure, 1898 came up before the privy council in abdul rahman v. Cassim & sons (1933 p. C. 58). The privy council after referring to some earlier decisions observed:

    "the finality must be a finality in relation to the suit. If, After the order, The suit is still a live suit in which rights of parties have still to be determined, No appeal lies against it under s. 109 (a) of the code"
    .

    5. The question came up before the supreme court in air. 1968 s. C 733 mohanlal v. State of gujarat. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted below:

    "the question as to whether a judgment or an order is final or not has been the subject matter of a number of decisions; yet no single general test for finality has so far been laid down. The reason probably is that a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words "final" and 'interlocutory" has, Therefore, To be considered seperately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. However, Generally speaking, A judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final. It may be final although it directs enquiries or is made on an interlocutory application or reserves liberty to apply. In some of the english decisions where this question arose one or the other of the following four tests was applied.

    1. Was the order made upon an application such that a decision in favour of either party would determine the main dispute?

    2. Was it made upon an application upon which the main dispute could have been decided?

    3. Does the order as made determine the dispute?

    4. If the order in question is reversed, Would the action have to go on?"

    the supreme court approved the following dictum in bozson v. Altrinchan urban council (1908 - 1kb. 547).

    "an interlocutory order though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals."

    6. S. 397 (2) of the code of criminal procedure itself was the subject matter of decision in parmeshwari devi v. State and another ((1977) 1 scc 169). In that case the appellant was asked under s. 94 of the code of criminal procedure to appear in court and make her denial of possession of the document on oath and be subject to questions by the court. The revision against this order was refused on the ground that it was "interlocutory". The supreme court overruled the contention and observed:

    "the code does not define an interlocutory order, But it obviously is an intermediate order, Made during the preliminary stages of an enquiry or trial. The purpose of sub - s. (2) of s. 397 is to keep such an order outside the purview of the power of revision so that the enquiry or (rial may proceed without delay. This is not likely to prejudice the aggrieved party for it can always challenge it in due course if the final order goes against it. But it does not follow that if the order is directed against a person who is not a party to the enquiry or trial, And he will have no opportunity to challenge it after a final order is made affecting the parties concerned, He cannot apply for its revision even if it is directed against him and adversely affects his rights."

    the court came to the following conclusion:

    "so in so far as the appellant is concerned, The order of the magistrate could not be said to be an interlocutory order and the revisional courts erred in raising the bar of subsection (2) of s. 397 against it."

    (see also pathu v. State of kerala (1975 klt. 696)).

    7. Thus whether a particular order is interlocutory or final will depend on the nature of the order, The person against whom it is made and the proceedings wherein it is passed. In the instant case, The order dated 17th june, 1977 issued by the magistrate takes in not only a preliminary order under s. 145 (1) but also an order of attachment under s. 146 (1). Once an order is passed under s. 146 (1) cr. P. C, The magistrate is not expected to proceed with the enquiry under s. 145 or to decide whether any and which of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute on the date of the preliminary order or whether there has been a dispossession within a period of two months of the preliminary order. The attachment will continue until a competent court determines the rights of parties or until the magistrate withdraws the attachment on being satisfied that there is no longer a likelihood of breach of peace with regard to the subject of dispute. The order of attachment thus puts an end to the proceedings so far as it relates to the enquiry by the magistrate as to who was in possession of the property and viewed in that light, It is a final order. The revision petition before the sessions judge was not, Therefore, Hit by the restriction contained in s, 397 (2) of the code of criminal procedure and the learned additional sessions judge was right in,'overruling these objection regarding its maintainability.

    8. It is then argued that the learned additional sessions judge acted beyond that court's powers when it was held that there were no sufficient reasons for the order of attachment and the subsequent appointment of receiver. The argument is that under s. 146 (1), It is the subjective satisfaction of the magistrate that the case is one of emergency that confers on him the jurisdiction to attach the property in dispute. There is some weight in the contention. From the language of s. 146 (1), It appears that the question whether an emergency exists which justifies the attachment of property is a matter within the discretion of the magistrate and unless there are strong reasons, The exercise of discretion is not expected to be interfered with in revision. At the same time, Since attachment causes interference with the possession of parties, Certain amount of caution is required and the power should not be exercised unless the circumstances of the case warrant such a procedure. However, The propriety of the order of attachment does not arise for consideration in the instant case, Since the said order is otherwise unsustainable for the reason that follow.

    9. The learned additional sessions judge has held that in the instant case, The order of attachment does not conform to the requirements of s. 146 (1) of the code of criminal procedure. The conclusion seems to be well - founded. The order of the magistrate extracted above shows that it is a composite order initiating proceedings under s. 145 (1) and at the same time attaching the subject of dispute on the ground that there is an emergency. In other words, The initiation of proceedings under s. 145 (1) and the attachment of property are seen effected by the same order this is not warranted by the provisions of s. 146 (1). S. 146 (1) begins with the words:

    "if the magistrate at any time after making the order in sub - section (1) of s. 145.

    the expression "after making the order" makes it clear that proceedings under s. 145 (1) should precede the order attaching the property. S. 146 (1) does not contemplate a simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction under s. 145 (1) and s. 146 (1). The order under s. 145 (1) becomes complete only when the magistrate puts his signature therein. It is only thereafter that he is expected to consider whether it is a case of emergency requiring attachment of property. Since the order attaching property in the instant case did not satisfy the above requirements, It was rightly set aside by the additional sessions judge. Now that the preliminary order under s, 145 (1) has been confirmed by the additional sessions judge, It is open to the magistrate to consider whether a case of emergency exists and whether the property should be attached and if he is so satisfied it is upto him to issue fresh order of attachment followed by appointment of receiver.

    the revision petition is dismissed with the above observation.

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    Comments

    Lilly Franklin v. Wilson
    (Oct 5, 1977)