P.K Balasubramanyan, J.:— The tenant is the petitioner in this petition filed under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. The landlord filed an application for eviction under sub-ss. 2, 3, 4(ii) and 4(v) of S. 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act The Rent Controller, the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority found that the rent was in arrears certainly from the year 1982 onwards and possibly even earlier and that possibility depending upon the decree in O.S 799 of 1983. Before the revisional court it was argued that the decree in O.S 799 of 1983 was reversed in appeal and that suit was dismissed. The Revisional Authority took note of that argument and found that even if the period covered by that suit were to be excluded, this was a case where the rent was clearly in arrears. I see no jurisdictional error committed by any of the authorities in coming to the conclusion that the landlord was entitled to an order for eviction under S. 11(2) of the Act No interference is called for with that order in this proceeding under Art. 227 of the Constitution.
2. The claim for eviction under S. 11(4)(v) of the Act was made by the landlord on the ground that the tenant had ceased to occupy the building for well over a period of one year prior to the date of the application. The tenant disputed that. On an appreciation of evidence in the case the Rent Controller held that there was no user of the premises by the tenant as contended by the landlord. On appeal by the tenant, the appellate authority confirmed that finding. On a revision filed by the tenant the revisional court also agreed with the conclusions of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority. The case of the tenant was that he was doing business in hospital equipments which admittedly required the possession of a licence. The authorities found as a fact that the tenant had even failed to apply for renewal of the licence, that he was not carrying on any business in the petition schedule building for the requisite period under S. 11(4)(v) of the Act It appears that before the appellate authority when the appeal was pending, the tenant produced certain documents and filed an interlocutory application for accepting those documents in evidence. It is seen that this petition for acceptance of additional evidence was not even moved on behalf of the tenant with the result that the appellate authority did not have occasion to deal with these documents.
3. In fact the District Court on a scrutiny found that there was not even an order obtained on the application for permission to adduce additional evidence before the appellate authority. But still the Revisional Authority took up those documents produced in the appeal and on a scrutiny of the same came to the conclusion that the said documents did not establish that the finding of Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority that the tenant had ceased to occupy the building for well over a period of one year prior to the date of the application for eviction was in any manner erroneous. The revisional authority on the other hand was inclined to the view that these documents substantiated the case of the landlord that the tenant had ceased to use the building as claimed by the landlord. On an anxious consideration of the relevant materials referred to in the orders of the authorities below in the light of the elaborate arguments raised before me by counsel for the parties. I am satisfied that no error warranting exercise of jurisdiction by this court under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India has been made by the revisional authority when it confirmed the order of the appellate authority for eviction under S. 11(4)(v) of the Act.
4. The claim for eviction under S. 11(3) of the Act has been rejected by all the authorities and the landlord has not pursued that claim before this court. That claim therefore, does not arise.
5. The other ground on which eviction was granted by the Rent Controller was under S. 11(4)(ii) of the Act on the ground that the tenant had used the building in such a manner as to reduce its value or utility. The case of the landlord was that certain furniture hired out to the tenant alongwith the premises have disappeared or have been misappropriated by the tenant and this would amount to a user of the building which would reduce the value or utility of the building so as to attract S. 11(4)(ii) of the Act. While the Rent Controller accepted this plea, the Appellate Authority did not accept this plea apparently on the ground that the landlord has not shown that any damage or ill-user of the building namely the structure let out has been established. The District Court taking note of sub-s. (b) of S. 2(1), the inclusive part of the definition of ‘building’ took the view that the disappearance of the furniture let out to the tenant alongwith the building would also invite an order for eviction under S. 11(4)(ii) of the Act. This is challenged by the tenant before me.
6. It is true that the definition of the building as contained in S. 2(1)(b) of the Act would show that any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in the building let out would also be included in the definition of ‘building’. It is also true that any fittings or machinery belonging to the landlord affixed to or installed in the building would also be included in the definition of building. But it appears to me that what S. 11(4)(ii) contemplates is the user of the building by the tenant in such a manner as to destroy or reduce its value or utility materially and permanently. Electric light or a fan fixed in the premises may become not useful by constant user. Similarly, even furniture hired out to the tenant may become useless in course of time even by careful user. But unless there is a positive act of waste established by the tenant, S. 11(4)(ii) of the Act may not be attracted. The fact that the tenant did not care to protect the furniture in the building or permitted it to be removed by some unauthorised person or he himself removed it would not enable the landlord to complain that the building had been used in such a manner as to destroy or reduce its value or utility. But on the other hand, if the landlord were able to prove that the tenant had pulled out the lights that were fixed in the room or had removed the fan fixed in the room or had deliberately destroyed or removed any other fixture in the property or an almirah or cupboard that was fixed, the provision in S. 11(4)(i) may be attracted. If the decision in this case were to depend solely on the claim for eviction under S. 11(4)(ii) of the Act, I might have been inclined to direct a reconsideration of that question at least by the appellate authority. But in view of the fact that the order for eviction passed by the District Court under S. 11(2) and 11(4)(v) of the Act is not being interfered with by me, I am not satisfied that there is any need to exercise my jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the order for eviction under S. 11(4)(ii) of the Act passed in this case. It therefore, decline to exercise my jurisdiction to interfere with the order under S. 11(4)(ii) of the Act though I am inclined to see considerable force in the argument of counsel for the tenant on some of the aspects of that provision. Under such circumstances, I find no reason to interfere with the order of the District Court.
7. I dismiss this Original Petition. I make no order as to costs.