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Case Number

Privy Council Appeals Nos. 38 and 39 of 1940

Attorney(S)

Nevill
Barrow Rogers
Harold Shephard
U Sen Gupta
S. Hyam
D.N. Pritt
P.V. Subba Row
Sir Herbert Cunliffe

Judges

Sir George Rankin
Lord Russell Of Killowen
Justice Lord Atkin

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sir George Rankin)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arises within a Sudra family headed by the defendant, the Raja of Venkatagiri, who is the present holder of an impartible family estate. The two plaintiffs are the illegitimate sons of Venugopal, a younger brother of Rajagopala (the defendant's grandfather). The plaintiffs' mother cohabited with Venugopal in a manner the opinion describes as a dasi under the Mitakshara text, a status that the Mitakshara passage confers certain rights upon.

The plaintiffs advanced three distinct claims in a suit instituted on 4 July 1932 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Nellore:

A contractual claim under a deed dated 8 April 1889, asserting an entitlement to an allowance of Rs. 1,000 per month payable by the defendant as holder of the impartible estate.
A claim to maintenance by custom as junior members of the family.
A claim to maintenance under Hindu law out of the impartible estate as junior male members of the family.

The Subordinate Judge (18 March 1936) upheld the plaintiffs' claim under the deed but rejected the custom and Hindu-law maintenance claims. On appeal the High Court of Madras (Leach C.J. and Krishnaswami Ayyangar J.) reversed on the deed and on the custom, but accepted the Hindu-law maintenance claim and fixed maintenance at Rs. 250 per month for each plaintiff (10 February 1939). The present opinion disposes of the appeals arising from those decisions.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the plaintiffs are entitled under the deed dated 8 April 1889 to the allowance of Rs. 1,000 per month after Venugopal's death, that is, whether the phrase "purusha santhathi" in the deed includes the plaintiffs (illegitimate sons).
Whether a family custom exists making maintenance payable to the plaintiffs as junior members of the family.
Whether, apart from the deed and any custom, the plaintiffs have a right under Hindu law to maintenance out of the impartible estate as junior male members of the family.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

They claimed a contractual right under the deed of 8 April 1889 to an allowance of Rs. 1,000 per month, arguing that the deed's meaning of "purusha santhathi" included them.
They asserted a customary right to maintenance as junior members of the family.
They alternatively asserted a right under Hindu law to maintenance out of the impartible estate as junior male members; they relied partially on authorities (notably the Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal) that were said to support a broader right to maintenance for junior male members by virtue of co-ownership interest.

Defendant's Arguments (Raja of Venkatagiri)

The deed, properly construed in its context, uses "purusha santhathi" to mean legitimate or adopted male descendants only; illegitimate sons are excluded, so the plaintiffs have no contractual right under the deed.
The evidence to establish a customary right to maintenance was insufficient; the trial and High Court findings on fact were concurrent and should not be disturbed.
On the question of maintenance under Hindu law, the defendant contended that junior male members have no prima facie right to maintenance out of an impartible estate except by established custom; he relied on a line of Privy Council decisions to that effect.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
'90) 18 Cal. 151; 17 IA 128; 5 Sar. 596 (PC) — Jogendra Bhupati Hurro Chandra Mahapatra v. Nityanund Mansingh	Consideration of the Mitakshara passage (chapter 1, s.12, v.2) regarding dasi and inheritance rights of sons born of such unions.	The Board had much considered the Mitakshara passage in this authority; the present opinion notes it but states no disputable matter under that passage arises in the present case.
'31) 18 AIR 1931 PC 294; 134 IC 1084; 55 Mad. 1; 58 IA 402 (PC) — Vellaiyappa Chetty v. Nataranjan	Also a consideration of the Mitakshara passage and related inheritance questions.	Cited as a prior Board consideration of the Mitakshara text; the Court records that nothing contentious under that passage required decision in the present case.
'18) 5 AIR 1918 PC 81; 47 IC 354; 41 Mad. 778; 45 IA 148 (PC) — Venkata Mahipati Gangadara Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur (second Pittapur case)	Part of a line of decisions relied on for the proposition that junior male members have no right to maintenance from an impartible estate save by custom.	Cited by the defendant; the Court treated this case as part of a consistent line of Privy Council authority supporting the defendant's legal position on maintenance rights.
'19) 6 AIR 1919 PC 126; 52 IC 333; 24 CWN 226 (PC) — Maharaja of Jeypore v. Vikarama Deo Garu (the Jeypore case)	One of the authorities relied upon to establish limits on rights of junior males to maintenance from impartible estate (absence of a general prima facie right).	Cited by the defendant; the Court treated it as part of the established line of authority on the point.
'21) 8 AIR 1921 PC 62; 60 IC 534; 43 All. 228; 48 IA 195 (PC) — Baijnath Prasad Singh v. Tej Bali Singh (the Dhalbhum case)	Part of the line of Privy Council cases supporting the defendant's position on maintenance rights.	Relied on by the defendant and regarded by the Court as part of the relevant line of decisions.
'27) 14 AIR 1927 PC 159; 102 IC 599; 54 Cal. 955; 54 IA 289 (PC) — Protap Chandra Deo v. Jagdish Chandra Deo (Shiba Prasad Singh's case)	Another precedent in the same line addressing rights of family members in the context of impartible estates and maintenance.	Cited by the defendant; the Court treated it as part of the historical line of Privy Council authority bearing on the maintenance question.
'32) 19 AIR 1932 PC 216; 138 IC 861; 59 Cal. 1399; 59 IA 331 (PC) — Shiba Prasad Singh v. Prayag Kumari Debi	Also part of the line of authorities on rights and succession in impartible estates relevant to maintenance claims.	Included among the cases relied on by the defendant; considered by the Court as part of the existing body of Privy Council decisions on the topic.
'34) 21 AIR 1934 PC 157; 150 IC 545; 56 All. 468; 61 IA 286 (PC) — Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal (Gorakhpur case)	Held (as plaintiffs contended) to have established that the right to maintenance belongs to all junior male members of the family by virtue of their interest as co-owners.	The plaintiffs relied on this decision to challenge the earlier line; the opinion records this reliance but notes the subsequent development (see Dewan case) in which the relevant question was later determined adversely to the plaintiffs' wider claim.
'41) 28 AIR 1941 PC 120; 196 IC 707 (PC) — Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab, etc. v. Dewan Bahadur Dewan Krishna Kishore	Recent Privy Council determination (4 July 1941) bearing on whether junior male members have a right to maintenance from impartible estate; described in the opinion as decided in a sense unfavourable to the plaintiffs' position.	The Court regarded this Dewan Krishna Kishore decision as dispositive on the broader legal question; plaintiffs' counsel accepted it would not be reasonable to invite the Board to reach a contrary conclusion in the present case, and the Court applied that stance in rejecting the plaintiffs' Hindu-law maintenance claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in ordered steps addressing each ground of claim on the basis of the record and prior authorities cited in the opinion.

Interpretation of the deed (claim under 8 April 1889):
- The Court examined the operative clause of the deed which provided that after Venugopal's life his "purusha santhathi" should in perpetuity be paid the allowance (with further provisions for division among males and for extinction if there were no "purusha santhathi").
- Both learned Judges of the High Court had held that in the context of the deed a man is said to die "without purusha santhathi" if he dies leaving neither a legitimate nor an adopted son. The Board agreed with that construction.
- The opinion explains that an "aurasa" son (i.e., a son begotten by the man on his lawful wife) does not include illegitimate sons; the word "aurasa" and the deed's language guided the Court to conclude that "purusha santhathi" in the deed likewise excluded illegitimate sons. Consequently, Venugopal's branch became extinct on his death for purposes of the deed and the plaintiffs could not claim under it.
Customary claim:
- Both the trial Court and the High Court held that the evidence to prove the alleged custom was insufficient. The Board observed the concurrent findings on this factual matter and noted that no contention was made that the evidence was strong enough to invite disagreement with the Indian Courts' findings. Therefore the custom claim was rejected.
Hindu-law claim to maintenance out of the impartible estate:
- The central legal point was whether junior male members of a Sudra impartible family have a prima facie right at law to maintenance from the impartible family estate, regardless of legitimacy, or whether such a right exists only by virtue of custom.
- The defendant relied on a line of Privy Council authorities that the Court summarizes as supporting the proposition that junior male members have no such general right except by custom.
- The plaintiffs countered by invoking the Gorakhpur decision, which they said established a right to maintenance for all junior male members by reason of their co-ownership interest; but the Board observed that the more recent Dewan Krishna Kishore (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Dewan Krishna Kishore) decision, delivered on 4 July 1941, had resolved the issue in a sense unfavourable to the plaintiffs.
- The plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged that it would not be reasonable or useful to ask the Board to reach a contrary conclusion in the present case. The Board therefore agreed with the Subordinate Judge in rejecting the Hindu-law maintenance claim.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Board advised that the defendant's appeal should be allowed and the plaintiffs' appeals dismissed; the decrees of the Indian Courts were set aside and the suit dismissed.

Consequences and costs:

The plaintiffs' claims under the deed and for maintenance (both by custom and under Hindu law) were all rejected by the Board.
Costs were ordered as follows: the plaintiffs must pay the defendant's costs of both Courts in India and of these appeals, except that the defendant must pay to the plaintiffs their costs in the trial Court on the issue numbered 5 (relating to the paternity of the plaintiffs), subject to a set-off in India in respect of these costs.

Broader implications: The opinion records and applies the recent Privy Council decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Dewan Krishna Kishore as dispositive of the broader legal question on maintenance rights, and the Board declined to depart from that decision. The opinion does not announce a new principle of law beyond the application of the authorities cited; its direct effect is the disposition of the parties' claims in this suit.

Order: Appeal of the defendant allowed; appeal of the plaintiffs dismissed; decrees of the Indian Courts set aside; suit dismissed.

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Raja Velugoti Sarvagna Kumara Krishna Yachendra Bahadur Varu v. Raja Rajeswara Rao And Another

Sir George Rankin:-

The questions in this case arise within a Sudra family of which the defendant, the Raja of Venkatagiri, is the head. He is the present holder of the impartible estate which goes by that name, having succeeded to his father in 1937 while the present suit was pending in appeal before the High Court of Madras. The estate is admittedly joint family property though impartible. The two plaintiffs are the illegitimate sons of one Venugopal, younger brother of Rajagopala, the defendant's grandfather, who was a previous holder of the impartible estate. The plaintiffs' mother, though not married to Venugopal, cohabited with him in a manner exclusive and continuous so as to be a dasi within the meaning of the text of the Mitakshara (chapter 1, section 12, verse 2) which confers certain rights of inheritance upon the sons of Sudras if born of such a union. The meaning and effect of this passage in the Mitakshara were much considered by the Board in ('90) 18 Cal. 151 : 17 IA 128 : 5 Sar. 596 (PC), Jogendra Bhupati Hurro Chandra Mahapatra v. Nityanund Mansingh and ('31) 18 AIR 1931 PC 294 : 134 IC 1084: 55 Mad. 1: 58 IA 402 (PC), Vellaiyappa Chetty v. Nataranjan but no disputable matter has to be decided thereunder in the present case. The claim of the plaintiffs is threefold. First, they say that by the terms of a deed dated 8th April 1889, they are entitled between them to an allowance of Rs. 1000 per month payable by the defendant as holder of the impartible estate. As their second string, they claim that by custom maintenance is payable to them as junior members of the family. Thirdly, they say that apart from the deed and apart from any custom they have the right to be paid maintenance out of the impartible estate as a matter of Hindu law. They brought their suit on 4th July 1932, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Nellore who found in their favour as regards their claim under the deed but rejected their other grounds of claim (18th March, 1936). On appeal the High Court of Madras (Leach C. J. and Krishnaswami Ayyangar J.) held against them on the deed and on the custom, but decided that they had a good claim by the Hindu law to maintenance out of the impartible estate and fixed the amount at Rs. 250 per month for each plaintiff (10th February 1939).

The evidence adduced to prove the alleged custom was held by both Courts to be insufficient; even if the question be any longer open before the Board, it was not contended that the evidence is of such strength as to make it reasonable that their Lordships should be invited to disagree with the concurrent findings of the Courts in India. Hence custom as a ground of claim goes out of the case. The claim under the deed of 1889 depends upon the question whether the plaintiffs are within the words purusha santhathi (male descendants) as they occur in a clause which provides that on the death of Venugopal his male descendants shall in perpetuity be paid the amount of the allowance of Rs. 1000 which had by the deed been made payable to him for life.

It is unnecessary to set out the deed at length or to describe in detail the circumstances in which it came to be entered into; just as it is unnecessary that their Lordships' should endeavour to set forth the various considerations which may bear more or less effectively upon the problem whether-apart from any cases of adoption-words meaning "son", "family", "descendants" and so forth are to be taken as restricted to persons of legitimate birth. At the time of the deed Raja Kumara Yachama was alive and Venugopal was a minor. It appears that the Raja had in 1878 made over the estate and much other property to his eldest son, Rajagopala; but that in 1889 the younger sons, Muttu and Venkata, had been minded to claim that the estate was partible, and had been persuaded by their father to recognise the impartibility of the estate on being given certain money and jewellery and on a proper allowance being provided in perpetuity for each of the three junior branches. The Raja of Bobbili having acted as mediator and fixed the amount of the allowance to each branch at Rs. 1000 per month, the deed of 8th April 1889, gives the sum of Rs. 1000 per month to each of the three younger brothers for life and then sets forth in detail the persons who are to become entitled to the allowances thereafter. The operative clause so far as regards Venugopal's branch, when stripped of certain verbiage and of a clause with reference to widows, is as follows :

After the life of the said Sri Venugopala Krishna Yachendrulu, his purusha santhathi, shall, in perpetuity, be paid the same allowance amount, that is, at the rate of Rupees one thousand (Rupees 1000) per month, in the aforesaid manner. But, if, at any time, in any one of the branches of the said Sri Muttukrishna Yachendrulu, Sri Venkatakrishna Yachendrulu and Sri Venugopala Krishna Yachendrulu there be more than one male member, such males, and their purusha santhathi shall take the said allowance amount of Rupees one thousand in proportion to their respective shares, in the same manner as they would respectively take their other properties separately by way of inheritance according to the Hindu law. Moreover, if in any of the aforesaid three branches of our family . . . any male should die without purusha santhathi, either by way of aurasa or by way of adoption, the allowance amount that was being received by the person who bo died without purusha santhathi shall go to the gnatis (agnates) who are nearest to him in his own branch according to Hindu law ... Further, should any of the said three branches of our family become extinct by the total absence of purusha santhathi either by way of aurasa or by way of adoption, the allowance being paid to that branch shall be stopped.

Both of the learned Judges of the High Court have held that if the clause to which the plaintiffs make their appeal is considered in the light of its immediate context it becomes clear that as words are used in this deed a man is said to die " without purusha santhathi" if he die leaving neither a legitimate nor an adopted son. Their Lordships are in agreement with this view which makes an end of the plaintiffs' claim upon the deed. That an illegitimate son is not an aurasa son as that word is used in Hindu law seems to their Lordships to be elementary. The learned Judges of the High Court both say that this was not disputed before them, and their Lordships do not find that the learned trial Judge had been of any different opinion. The Court translator appended to his version of the deed a glossary of terms which is to the same effect. No weight can be attributed to any suggestion that in a Telugu deed of 1889 regulating the legal rights of a Hindu family in respect of an impartible raj in Madras the word "aurasa" includes natural sons because the etymology of the Sanskrit word "aurasa" shows its original root meaning as ''produced from the breast." Aurasa has always been used to import the highest class of son - the son begotten by the man himself on his lawful wife : of lower kinds once recognized several were not sons in any physical sense, e. g., the putrika putra or son of an appointed daughter (Mayne: Hindu Law and Usage, Edn. 6, 1900, S.67-68, pp. 79, 80). Their Lordships think that the deed of 1889 provides its own guide to the meaning of the words " purusha santhathi " and that in the language of the deed Venugopal's branch became extinct on his death.

The interesting question which remains is whether the plaintiffs are entitled to maintenance from the impartible estate on the ground that it is the prima facie right at law of all junior male members of the family to be maintained out of impartible estate which is family and not separate property. The answer made by the defendant to this claim is that junior male members have no such right save by custom and that, apart altogether from any question of legitimacy, the plaintiffs not being sons or brothers of any holder of the impartible estate can succeed only by proving a special custom, which they have failed to do. For this view of the law the defendant relies upon a line of decisions of the board - the second Pittapur case, ('18) 5 AIR 1918 PC 81 : 47 IC 354 : 41 , Mad. 778 : 45 IA 148 (PC), Venkata Mahipati Gangadara Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur the Jeypore case, ('19) 6 AIR 1919 PC 126 : 52 IC 333 : 24 CWN 226 (PC), Maharaja of Jeypore v. Vikarama Deo Garu g Baijnath's case, ('21) 8 AIR 1921 PC 62 : 60 IC 534 : 43 All. 228 : 48 IA 195 (PC), Baijnath Prasad Singh v. Tej Bali Singh the Dhalbhum case, ('27) 14 AIR 1927 PC 159 : 102 IC 599 : 54 Cal. 955 : 54 IA 289 (PC), Protap Chandra Deo v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Shiba Prasad Singh's Case, ('32) 19 AIR 1932 PC 216: 138 IC 861 : 59 Cal. 1399 : 59 IA 331 (PC), Shiba Prasad Singh v. Prayag Kumari Debi The plaintiffs' reply is that this line of decision was abandoned or deflected by the judgment of the board in the Gorakhpur case, ('34) 21 AIR 1934 PC 157 : 150 IC 545 : 56 All. 468 : 61 IA 286 (PC), Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal which, as he contends, established the right to maintenance as belonging to all junior male members of the family by virtue of their interest as co-owners. This interesting and difficult question has recently (4th July 1941) been determined by the board in another case (Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab, etc. v. Dewan Bahadur Dewan Krishna Kishore) Reported in ('41) 28 AIR 1941 PC 120 : 196 IC 707 (PC) in a sense unfavourable to the plaintiffs, whose learned counsel recognized that it would be neither reasonable nor useful to ask the board to give a contrary decision in the present case. Their Lordships on this part of the case agree with the learned Subordinate Judge who negatived this ground of claim. Their Lordships have read the Subordinate Judge's judgment and both judgments in the High Court with high appreciation and have been struck by the skill and care with which the various questions have been elucidated and by the ability with which they have been discussed. But the plaintiffs' suit must fail. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal of the defendant should be allowed, the appeal of the plaintiffs dismissed, the decrees of the Indian Courts set aside, and the suit dismissed. The plaintiffs must pay the defendant's costs of both Courts in India and of these appeals save that the defendant must pay to the plaintiffs their costs in the trial Court of the issue numbered 5 which relates to the paternity of the plaintiffs, with a set-off in India in respect of these costs.

Order accordingly.

Raja Velugoti Sarvagna Kumara Krishna Yachendra Bahadur Varu v. Raja Rajeswara Rao And Another

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sir George Rankin)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

Defendant's Arguments (Raja of Venkatagiri)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Raja Velugoti Sarvagna Kumara Krishna Yachendra Bahadur Varu v. Raja Rajeswara Rao And Another

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