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citation codes
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  • SECTION 109 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Madras Estates Land Act, 1908,
  • section 109, sub-section (c),
  • section 52, sub-section 3,
  • Rule 3 of Order 45
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 109 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Madras Estates Land Act, 1908,
  • section 109, sub-section (c),
  • section 52, sub-section 3,
  • Rule 3 of Order 45
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion delivered by Lord Buckmaster

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an appeal in which the respondent raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was incompetent because no proper certificate of appeal had been granted. The court examined the requirements for certificates under the Civil Procedure Code and related rules, considered whether the existing certificate was sufficient, and addressed the appellants' request for special leave to appeal on a question said to be of public importance under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. The appellants' request for special leave was refused and the appeal was dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the certificate of appeal produced on behalf of the appellants was a proper certificate under the governing provisions (including section 109, sub-section (c), section 110, and Rule 3 of Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Code), or whether its alleged ambiguity rendered the appeal incompetent.
  2. Whether special leave to appeal should be granted despite the subject-matter being below the statutory monetary threshold, on the basis that a substantial and novel question of law under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 (specifically section 52, sub-section 3) was raised—namely, whether the word "decreed" in that provision means decreed under that Act so as to exclude the operation of any former decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • Counsel for the respondent objected to the competency of the appeal on the ground that no proper certificate of appeal had been granted (i.e., the certificate did not satisfy the statutory or procedural requirements), making the appeal incompetent.

Appellant's Arguments

  • Counsel for the appellants conceded that the value in dispute was beneath the proper appealable amount but sought special leave to appeal on the ground that an important question of law affecting the whole community arose under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908.
  • The specific contention advanced on behalf of the appellants was that the phrase "decreed" in section 52, sub-section 3 of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, should be read to mean "decreed under that Act," implying that a former decree would have no operation under that provision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Banarsi Pershad v. Kashi Krishna Narain (1901) 23 All. 227 (= 28 I.A. 11) (P.C.) Establishes the conditions regulating the granting of certificates for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council (principle that petitioners must show subject-matter of suit reaches required monetary threshold and, in certain cases, that a substantial question of law exists). The court relied on the principle as settled law and treated it as the foundational rule governing when a certificate should be granted; used it to evaluate whether the certificate in the present case met those requirements.
Radha Krishn Das v. Rai Krishn Chand (1901) 23 All. 415 (= 23 I.A. 182) (P.C.) Also cited for the clear statement of conditions for granting certificates to appeal to His Majesty in Council (same principle as above). The court referred to the case as confirming the plain principle and used it to support the view that certificates must clearly state on which statutory ground they are granted; this supported the court's finding that the present certificate was ambiguous.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by accepting and reciting the settled principle from the precedents cited: as an initial condition to appeal to His Majesty in Council, petitioners must satisfy the Court that the subject-matter of the suit amounts to Rs. 10,000, and in certain cases there must, in addition, be a substantial question of law. The court observed that some disputes cannot be valued in money and that section 109 sub-section (c) and Rule 3 of Order 45 provide for such situations by allowing petitions to seek certification that the case is otherwise a fit one for appeal.

The court then turned to the certificate in the present case and quoted its wording. The court found the certificate ambiguous because it did not indicate whether the certificate was granted on the basis of the monetary/value requirement or on the basis of section 109(c) (i.e., that the case was otherwise a fit one for appeal), nor did it state the nature of the question said to be involved. Because the certificate did not show on its face which ground was relied upon, the court concluded the discretion under section 109(c) did not appear to have been invoked or exercised in a way that the certificate made clear.

The court emphasized the practical importance of clarity in such certificates, noting that they "seriously affect the rights of litigant parties" and should be drafted so their meaning is unambiguous on their face. The court then considered the appellants' submission for special leave based on the asserted novel question under section 52(3) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 (whether "decreed" means decreed under that Act and therefore excludes former decrees). After consideration, Lord Buckmaster stated that this contention was not of sufficient weight to justify granting special leave to appeal.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Direct consequences:

  • The appeal was dismissed and the appellants' request for special leave to appeal was refused.
  • The court found the certificate of appeal to be ambiguous on its face and not to demonstrate clearly that the discretion under section 109(c) had been invoked or exercised.

Broader implications noted by the court:

  • The court called attention to the importance of drafting certificates of appeal with clarity so that they plainly show the ground on which they are granted, because such certificates significantly affect litigants' rights.
  • The opinion applied established precedents concerning the conditions for leave to appeal but did not purport to establish a novel legal rule beyond enforcing the requirement of clear certificates; the court did not grant special leave and did not set a new precedent on the substantive interpretation of section 52(3) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908.

Source material for this summary: Opinion of Lord Buckmaster as provided. Statutory provisions and case citations are referenced exactly as they appear in the opinion.

    Radhakrishna Aiyar And Another v. Swaminatha Aiyar

    Lord Buckmaster:-

    In this case a preliminary objection is taken to the appeal on behalf of the responded based upon the ground that no proper certificate of appeal has bean granted, and that the appeal is consequently incompetent.

    The conditions that regulate the granting of certificates for leave to appeal, have been clearly stated in the cases referred to by Counsel for the respondent, reported in Banarsi Pershad v. Kashi Krishna Narain (1)and Radha Krishn Das v. Rai Krishn Chand (2). It is not necessary to examine them again, for the principle which they establish is plain and cannot be questioned. That principle is this; that as an initial condition to appeal to His Majesty in Council, it is essential that the petitioners should satisfy the Court that the subject-matter of the suit is Rs. 10,000, and in addition that in certain cases there should be added some substantial question of law. This does not cover the whole grounds of appeal, because it is plain that there may be certain cases in which it is impossible to define in money value the exact character of the dispute; there are questions, as for example, those relating to religious rites and ceremonies, to caste and family rights, or such matters as the reduction of the capital of Companies as well as questions of wide public importance in which the subject-matter in dispute cannot be reduced in to actual terms of money. Sub-section (c) of section 109 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplates that such a state of things exists and Rule 3 of Order 45 regulates the procedure. It is there provided, that the petition for appeal should state the grounds of appeal, and pray for a certificate that either as regards amount or value and nature, the case fulfils the requirements of section 110, or that it is otherwise, i.e., under section 109, sub-section (c), a fit case for appeal to His Majesty in Council. When any certificate is granted under that Order, it is, in their Lordships' opinion of the utmost importance that the certificate should show clearly upon which ground it is based, and they regret so find that the certificate in this case is at least ambiguous. It runs in these terms :

    "It is hereby certified that, as regards the value of the subject-matter and the nature of the question involved, the case fulfils the requirements of sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the case is a fit one for appeal of His Majesty in Council."

    (1) (1901) 23 All. 227 = 28 I.A. 11 = 5 C.W.N. 193 = 11 M.L.J. 56 = 3 Bom. L. R. 154 = 7 Sar. 825 (P. C.)

    (2) (1901) 23 All. 415 = 23 I.A. 182 = 5 C.W.N. 689 (P.C.).

    There is no indication in the certificate of what nature the question is that it is thought was involved in the hearing of this appeal, nor is there anything to show that the discretion conferred by section 109 (c) was invoked or was exercised. Their Lordships think it should be brought to the attention of the Indian Courts that these certificates are of great consequence, that they seriously affect the rights of litigant parties and that they ought be be given in such a form that it is impossible to mistake their meaning upon their face.

    Counsel for the appellants has asked that even though the amount in value in this suit is beneath the proper appealable amount, as it undoubtedly is, his clients should be granted special leave to appeal upon the ground that an important question of law affecting the whole community is raised under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, a question which has not hitherto been the subject of judicial interpretation. That question was this; section 52, sub-section 3, provides that: puttahs and muchalkas accepted, exchanged or decreed for any revenue year shall remain in force until the commencement of the revenue year for which fresh puttahs or muchalkas are accepted, exchanged or decreed; provided that where a puttah or muchalka has continued in force for more revenue years than one, no fresh puttah or muchalka for the same holding shall take effect until the commencement of the revenue year next succeeding that in which it is tendered, accepted, exahanged or decreed." He desires to contend on behalf of the appellants that "decreed" in that section means decreed under that Act, and that no former decree could have any operation. Their Lordships have considered this contention but they do not think it of sufficient weight to justify granting special leave to appeal with costs as incompetent, and that special leave to appeal should not be granted.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Radhakrishna Aiyar And Another v. Swaminatha Aiyar
    (Dec 3, 1920)