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  • Regulation I, section 3, and Regulation VIII, section 4).
  • Bengal Regulation I, section 8, clause 4,
  • Regulation I, section 8, clause 4,
  • provisions of Act VI of 1870
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • Regulation I, section 3, and Regulation VIII, section 4).
  • Bengal Regulation I, section 8, clause 4,
  • Regulation I, section 8, clause 4,
  • provisions of Act VI of 1870
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a consolidated appeal from decrees of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, arising from twenty separate suits that raised substantially the same questions of law. In each suit the plaintiff was the putnidar or dar-putnidar of a village; the defendant-appellant was the registered proprietor (zamindar) of extensive zamindaris in Birbhum. The suits sought recovery of possession of chaukidari chakran lands which had been recently resumed by Government and transferred to the appellant under the provisions of Act VI of 1870 of the Bengal Council. In suits where the dar-putnidar was plaintiff, the putnidar was made a defendant but did not take part in argument. The decrees in the courts below were in favour of the plaintiffs and against the appellant, and the appellant appealed.

Before the Board two principal points were argued: (1) whether a proprietor with a zamindari settlement obtained or retained any interest in chaukidari chakran lands capable of being made the subject of a putni lease; and (2) whether, even if such an interest existed, the effect of Act VI of 1870 was to confer on the proprietor (or transferee) a new title not affected by any putni lease previously granted by him or his predecessors-in-title.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the zamindar (proprietor settled under the Bengal Permanent Settlement) obtained or retained in chaukidari chakran lands an interest capable of being made the subject of a putni lease.
  2. Whether the resumption and transfer of chaukidari chakran lands under Act VI of 1870 conferred on the zamindar a new title that was not affected by any putni or dar-putni leases previously granted.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that the zamindar did not obtain or retain any interest in the chaukidari chakran lands capable of being the subject of a putni lease.
  • Alternatively, the appellant contended that even if the zamindar had such an interest, the effect of Act VI of 1870 was to confer on him a new title not affected by any prior putni leases.
  • In support of the latter contention the appellant's counsel relied on certain expressions used by Mr. Ameer Ali in the Privy Council reasons in Secretary of State v. Kirtibas Bhupati Harichandan (1914), arguing those expressions supported the appellant's position.

The opinion does not set out a detailed, itemized statement of the respondents' (plaintiffs') legal arguments beyond pursuing recovery of possession on the basis of putni or dar-putni rights and the factual finding that the plaintiffs' leases vested in them an interest prior to resumption.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Joykishen Mookerjee v. Collector of East Burdwan (1864) (P.C.) Leading authority that the Permanent Settlement divides chakran lands into (i) tannahdari chakran lands (resumable by Government) and (ii) all other chakran lands; it clarifies the zemindar's prima facie title and the treatment of chaukidari rights and services. The Board treated Joykishen as the controlling precedent: it relied on Lord Kingsdown's exposition to conclude that the zemindar's interest in chaukidari chakran lands is a proprietary interest susceptible of being made the subject of a putni grant, subject to public duties.
Raja Sahib Perhlad Sein v. Doorgapersaud Tewaree (1869) (P.C.) Support for the proposition that, since the Permanent Settlement, zemindars have at least a prima facie title to lands for which they pay revenue (malguzari lands). The Board cited this case to reinforce the view that the settlement recognises the zemindar's prima facie proprietorship over malguzari lands, a foundation for treating chakran lands as falling within the zemindar's recognised interests subject to statutory rules.
Secretary of State v. Kirtibas Bhupati Harichandan (1914) (P.C.) The appellant relied on certain expressions in Mr. Ameer Ali's reasons in this case as suggesting a different view on resumption under Act VI of 1870. The Board held that the Kirtibas decision had little or no bearing on the present controversy; it judged that Mr. Ameer Ali did not intend to depart from the rule in Joykishen and therefore expressions relied on were of little weight.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Board's legal analysis proceeded in a systematic sequence grounded in statutory text and prior decisions:

  1. Factual premise: the courts below found (and the finding was not disputed before the Board) that any interest the appellant or predecessors had in the subject lands had, prior to resumption and transfer under Act VI of 1870, been transferred and become vested in the plaintiff putnidar or dar-putnidar by virtue of the lease or sub-lease under which the plaintiffs held their villages. The Board accepted these factual findings.
  2. Nature of chaukidari chakran lands: the Board reviewed the historical background and the Permanent Settlement (1793), explaining that chakran lands are lands held by service tenure (including tannahdars and chaukidars). It noted that traditionally tannahdari and chaukidari allocations had often been left out of account when fixing the jumma (revenue).
  3. Effect of the Permanent Settlement and relevant Regulations: the Board analyzed the Regulations (Regulation I and Regulation VIII, particularly sections 36–41). It concluded that the settlement proceeded on the footing that the zemindars were prima facie proprietors of the land for which they undertake to pay revenue (malguzari lands), and that sections 37–41 treated certain private and chakran lands as annexed to malguzari lands for assessment purposes.
  4. Classification from Joykishen: relying on Joykishen Mookerjee v. Collector of East Burdwan, the Board accepted the division of chakran lands into two classes: (a) tannahdari chakran lands resumable by Government under Regulation I, section 8, clause 4, and (b) all other chakran lands governed by Regulation VIII, section 41. The Board emphasized that while tannahdari lands could be resumed by Government, other chakran lands were treated differently and the zemindar's prima facie title was recognised.
  5. Chaukidari lands and putni grants: the Board examined the particular status of chaukidari chakran lands, recognizing that because chaukidars owed both public duties and personal duties to the zemindar, their lands were partly appropriated for public purposes but the zemindar retained ownership and the right to enjoy personal services and fill vacancies. On this basis and consistent with Joykishen, the Board concluded that the zemindar's interest in chaukidari lands could reasonably be made the subject of a putni grant.
  6. Response to the appellant's reliance on Kirtibas: the Board found the reliance on isolated expressions from Mr. Ameer Ali in Secretary of State v. Kirtibas Bhupati Harichandan to be of little weight. It held that the Kirtibas decision did not intend to depart from Joykishen and had little bearing on the present issues.
  7. Effect of Act VI of 1870: the Board examined the Act's provisions (including definitions of chaukidari chakran lands and sections 49–51). It noted that the Act fixes assessment on resumed lands at one-half the annual value (section 49), allows the zemindar to contest assessments (section 50), and directs the Collector to transfer land to the zemindar subject to assessment (scheduled form) with section 51 containing the proviso preserving "all contracts theretofore made" by which third-party rights might exist.
  8. Conclusion on the Act's effect: the Board interpreted section 51's preservation clause as wide enough to include the rights of a putnidar under putni grants and dar-putnidar under dar-putni grants. Therefore the transfer under the Act was a confirmation and continuance of the zemindar's existing estate and preserved third-party contractual rights affecting that estate.

The Board therefore applied the statutory scheme and authoritative precedent to determine that (a) the zemindar's interest in chaukidari chakran lands was capable of being the subject of putni leases, (b) the Act did not extinguish or supersede existing putni or dar-putni rights but preserved them through its transfer mechanism and proviso, and (c) the factual finding that the plaintiffs' leases vested interests prior to resumption meant the plaintiffs' rights survived the Act's operation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. (Appeal dismissed; their Lordships will advise His Majesty accordingly.)

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The decrees in the courts below, which were in favour of the plaintiffs (putnidars / dar-putnidars) and against the appellant, stand as affirmed by the Board.
  • Costs: the appellant is ordered to pay the respondents who have appeared one set of costs between them; having regard to the terms on which leave to appeal was granted, those costs are to be assessed as between solicitor and client.

Broader implications: The Court applied established principles (notably Joykishen) to hold that chaukidari chakran lands can be the subject of putni grants and that Act VI of 1870 transfers estates to the zemindar in confirmation and continuance of existing estates while expressly preserving rights of third parties under prior contracts. The opinion notes that this view "is that hitherto almost universally adopted in the Indian Courts." The decision therefore confirms and applies settled authorities rather than announcing a novel precedent.


This summary is strictly confined to and derived from the facts, issues, reasoning and dispositions stated in the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion's text has been introduced or inferred.

    Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur v. Sm. Kali Dasi Debi And Others

    Lord Parker:

    This is a consolidated appeal from decrees of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William, in Bengal, made in twenty suits, each of which, though relating to a distinct subject-matter, raised substantially the same questions of Law. Each suit was in substance a suit to recover possession from the appellant, who is the registered proprietor of extensive zamindaris in the Birbhum district of Bengal, of chaukidari chakran lands recently resumed by Government and transferred to him under the provisions of Act VI of 1870 of the Bengal Council. The plaintiff in each suit was the putnidar or dar-putnidar of the village within the boundaries of which the lands the subject of the suit were situate. In those suits in which the dar-putnidar was the plaintiff, the Putnidar was made a defendant, but took no part in the argument. The decree in each suit was in favour of the plaintiff and against the appellant.

    Their Lordships consider it unnecessary to deal at further length with the history of the litigation. It is abundantly clear from the facts found in the Courts below, and not disputed before their Lordships' Board, that any interest which the appellant or his predecessors-in-title, originally had in the lands the subject of each suit had, prior to the resumption and transfer of such lands under the Act of 1870, been transferred to and become vested in the plaintiff putnidar or dar-putnidar by virtue of the lease or sub-lease under which he held the villages in which these lands were situate. Two points only were argued before their Lordships. It was contended, first, that the proprietor with whom a zamindari was settled under the Bengal Permanent Settlement, did not obtain or retain, in the chaukidari chakran lands situate within the territorial boundaries of a village comprised in his zamindari any interest capable of being made the subject of a putni lease; and secondly, that even if he obtained or retained any such interest, the effect of the Act of 1870 was to confer on him a new title not in any way affected by any putni lease there-to-fore granted by him or his predecessors-in-title. In order to arrive at a conclusion on these questions, it is necessary to consider (1) the nature of chaukidari chakran lands, (ii) the provisions of the Bengal Permanent Settlement, and (iii) the true meaning and effect of the Act.

    At the time of the English occupation a zamindar was responsible not only for the payment of the revenue but for the preservation of peace and order within his district. For the latter purpose he maintained tannahdars, or police officials, and chaukidars, or village watchmen. Both had from time immemorial been remunerated by allotments of lands to be held in consideration of the services they rendered to the zemindar, either rent-free or at a low rent, but whereas the police official rendered police service only, the chaukidar not only assisted the police, but rendered acts of service personal to the zemindar. Chakran lands are lands held by service tenure. Generally the term includes all lands so held, whether by police officials, chaukidars, or persons whose only duties are personal to the zemindar. The expression "tannahdari lands or tannahdari chakran lands" means lands held on service tenure by tannahdara or police officials. The expression "chaukidari chakran lands" means lands held on service-tenure by chaukidars, or village watchmen. As one would naturally expect, it had long been customary, in fixing the revenue or jumma payable for the zemindari, to leave tannnhdari and chaukidari chakran lands out of account.

    Passing to the settlement of 1793, it appears to their Lordships to be beyond controversy that whatever doubts be entertained as to whether before the English occupation the zemindars had any proprietary interest in the lands comprised within their respective districts the settlement itself recognises and proceeds on the footing that they are the actual proprietors of the land for which they undertake to pay the Government revenue. The settlement is expressly made with the "zemindars, independent talukdars and other actual proprietors of the soil" (see Regulation I, section 3, and Regulation VIII, section 4). It is clear that since the settlement the zemindars have had at least a prima facie title to all lands for which they pay revenue, such lands being commonly referred to as malguzari lands (see case of Raja Sahib Perhlad Sein v. Doorgapersaud Tewaree (1869) 12 M. I. A. 286, 292 = 2 Suther 225 = 12 W. R. 6 = 2 B. L. R. 111 = 2 Sar 429, 430 (P. C.)

    Bearing this in mind, their Lordships will proceed to consider the Regulations of the Permanent Settlement, so far as they deal with chakran lands. The leading authority on this subject is Joykishen Mookerjee v. Collector of East Burdwan (1864) 10 M. I. A. 16 = 1 W. R. 26 = 2 Sar. 54 = 1 Suther 542 (P. C.). To use Lord Kingsdown's expression in that case, the effect of the settlement is to divide chakran lands into two classes, namely, (i) Tannahdari chakran lands that is, lands held on service tenure by police officials, and (ii) all other chakran lands. As to chakran lands of the former class, they were by Bengal Regulation I, section 8, clause 4, made resumable by Government, the Government relieving the zemindar from the duty of maintaining a police establishment. These tannahdari chakran lands were, in fact, shortly afterwards resumed and became Government lands, the title of the zemindar being extinguished by such resumption. As to all other chakran lands, whether held by public officers or private servants in lieu of wages, they are dealt with by bengal regulation viii, section 41.

    In order to understand the 41st section of the last mentioned Regulation, it is necessary to refer to some of the preceding sections. By virtue of the 36th section the assessment is to be fixed exclusive and independent of all existing lakhiraj lands, that is lands exempted from the public revenue. Such lands are therefore in effect withdrawn from the settlement, and the zemindar, though these lands might be locally situate within his district, could claim no title therein by virtue of the settlement.

    Sections 37 to 40 deal with certain lands referred to as "private lands" of the zemindars. By section 37 these are not to be included in the lakhiraj lands referred to in section 36, and special directions with regard to them are given in sections 38, 39, and 40. Speaking generally, such lands are not excluded from, but on the contrary included in, the settlement. Then comes the 41st section dealing with chakran lands; these, whether held by public officers or private servants in lieu of wages are also not to be included in the lakhiraj lands referred to in section 36. They are to be annexed to the malguzari lands and declared responsible for the public revenue assessed on the zemindaris in which they are included in common with all other malguzari lands therein.

    Sections 37 to 41 inclusive appear to their Lordships to suggest that neither the "private lands" of the zemindars nor chakran lands had theretofore been taken into account in fixing the revenue for which the zemindar was responsible to Government. Otherwise there would be no point in excluding them from the lakhiraj lands dealt with by section 36. However this may be with regard to the private lands of the zemindar or with regard to chakran lands, the services for which were purely personal to the zemindar, it is quite clear that tannahdari and chaukidari chakran lands, the services for which involved the performance of duties in which the public was interested, had not, as a rule, been taken into account for the purpose of increasing the jumma.

    The effect of section 41 appears to be this : The question whether any of the chakran lands therein referred to ought to be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the jumma, is left to be determined by the custom which had hitherto prevailed or any special directions contained in the Regulations. But whether or not so taken into account, all chakran lands are to be considered malguzari for the purpose of ascertaining the lands in respect of which the jumma is paid and upon which it is secured. The prima facie title of the zemindar to chakran lands within his district is thus recognised by the settlement. Tannahdari chakran lands may be resumed under Regulation I, section 8, clause 4, but with regard to all other chakran lands if resumable at all, they can be resumed by the zemindar alone. In the case, however, of chaukidari chakran lands, not even the zemindar may be entitled to resume them, for chaukidars have public duties to perform and the lands which they hold on service; tenure as remuneration for the performance of such duties, are to that extent appropriated or assigned for public purposes. Subject, nevertheless, to the requirements of the public interest, the zemindar is the owner and as such is entitled to the enjoyment of any personal services which the chaukidars ought to render and when vacancies occur to appoint others in their place. All this follows from what was said by Lord Kings down in Joykishen Mookerjee v. Collector of East Burdwan (2).

    Such, then, being the zemindar's interest in chaukidari chakran lands within his district, it is difficult to see why this interest should not be made the subject of a putni grant. That it could be so made appears to have been admitted in the last-mentioned case, and the whole of Lord Kingsdown's judgment proceeds on that footing. In their Lordships' opinion, there can be no reasonable doubt on this matter. Indeed, the only argument to the contrary advanced by the appellant's counsel was based on certain expressions used by Mr. Ameer Ali in giving the reasons of the Board in the recent case of Secretary of State v. Kirtibas Bhupati Harichandan (1914) 42 Cal. 710 = 26 I. C. 676 = 42 I. A. 30 (P.C.). In that case, which has little if any, bearing on the questions now in controversy the point for decision was whether the power of resumption conferred by Act VI of 1870 extended to certain chakran lands which the Government had affected to resume thereunder. Here it is admitted by everyone that the powers of the Act were applicable. Moreover, it is abundantly clear that Mr. Ameer Ali, whatever expressions he used, did not intend to depart in the smallest degree from what had been laid down by Lord Kingsdown in Joykishen v. Collector of East Burdwan (2). Under these circumstances, any argument based on a meticulous examination of insolated expressions used by him can, in their Lordships' opinion, have little weight.

    It remains to consider the effect of a resumption by the Government of chaukidari chakran lands under the provisions of Act VI of 1870 of the Bengal Council.

    It should be observed that the definition of chaukidari chakran lands contained in the Act refers not only to the public duties of chaukidars, but also to their personal duties to the zemindar. It is apparently for this reason that the revenue assessment on the lands resumed is, by section 49, fixed at only one-half of the annual value of such lands. If the zemindar had no interest, the effect of this provision would be to make him a free gift of half of the value of the lands resumed. It appears to be for the same reason that the zemindar is, under section 50, entitled to contest the correctness of any assessment which is made. After the assessment is complete the Collector is under section 50, by order in the Scheduled form to transfer the land to the zemindar subject to the assessment. By the 51st. section such order operated to transfer the land to the zemindar subject to such assessment and

    "subject to all contracts theretofore made in respect of, under or by virtue of which any person other than the zemindar may have any right to any land, portion of his estate, or tenure in the place in which such land may be situate."
    The latter words may not be very happily chosen, but their obvious intention is to preserve the rights of third parties. They contemplate a case in which the village in which the resumed lands are situate has been made the subject of a contract by the zemindar, of those through whom he claims and that under this contract some third parly may have an interest in the lands resumed. They are wide enough to include, and in their Lordships' opinion do include, the rights of a putnidar under a putni grant by virtue of which the putnidar is lessee of the zemindar's interest in the lands resumed, and also the rights of a dar-putnidar under a dar-putni grant. In their Lordships' opinion, therefore, not only does the Act recognise the existing title of the zemindar to the lands resumed, but the estate taken by the zemindar under the order of transfer is in confirmation and by way of continuance of his existing estate, and when the zemindar or those through whom he claims has or have entered into contracts affecting his existing estate the rights of third parties under these contracts are preserved. It is a satisfaction to their Lordships to find that the view above expressed is that hitherto almost universally adopted in the Indian Courts.

    The result is that the appeal fails and should be dismissed and their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. With regard to costs the appellant should pay to the respondents who have appeared one set of costs between them, but these should having regard to the terms on which leave to appeal was granted, be as between solicitor and client

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur v. Sm. Kali Dasi Debi And Others
    (Jan 24, 1917)