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Case Number

F.A.O 183-D of 1964.

Attorney(S)

— — Mr. R.L Tandon, Advocate.
— — Mr. Madan Bhatia, Advocate.

Judges

Mr. Justice B.C. Misra

Acts

Sec. 39 (1) (b) of the Indian Arbitration Act, 10 of 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
Arbitration Act as disclosed from sections 8, 10, 12, 19, 20 (5) and 25
section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
sections 5 and 11 of Arbitration Act
clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 30
Section 39 (1) (vi)
section 35;(c)

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Smart Summary

Opinion Summary: B.C. Misra, J. (Oral)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arose from a contract (No. CWE/D-17 of 1955-56) between the parties in which the Union of India (appellant) claimed damages from the respondent for breach of contract and the respondent counter-claimed. The dispute was referred to arbitration under an arbitration clause. The arbitrator (Lt. Col. R.N. Kapur) made an award dated 23rd October 1958 directing the contractor to pay amounts to the appellant.

The appellant sought to file the award and make it a rule of court. The respondent objected and, on pleadings, several issues were framed. By an order dated 29th April 1960, Sub-Judge O.P. Aggarwal found that, notwithstanding that there was no mistake apparent on the face of the record, the arbitrator had committed judicial misconduct (failing to properly record evidence, destroying pencil notes, not proving inspection of the spot, etc.). He set aside the award and remitted the matter back to the arbitrator to decide afresh, allowing the parties a reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence. The court fixed time till 31st August 1960 for the arbitrator to make the award; a successor judge extended that time to 12th September 1960. It is common ground there was no further court order extending the time.

The arbitrator conducted further proceedings and made a fresh award dated 26th May 1962 (the impugned award). Notice was given and objections to that award were filed by the respondent on 9th October 1962. The respondent's objections included (1) that the award was made beyond the prescribed time and was therefore void, and (2) that the remittal order under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (made by Mr. O.P. Aggarwal) was void and without jurisdiction, so the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to make the fresh award.

The Sub-Judge (first instance) by order dated 29th May 1964 held the objections were within time but set aside the 26th May 1962 award on the ground that the court had no power to extend the time fixed under Section 16(2) of the Act after the award had been made. The Union of India appealed under Section 39(1)(b) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Ansari, J. allowed that appeal by order dated 23rd August 1972, relying on a Calcutta High Court decision (Ganpatrai and Sons v. Ramgopal Nanda Kishore). A review application by K.L. Bhalla (respondent in the appeal) was partly allowed by Ansari, J. — limited to permitting further arguments on certain grounds — and the appeal was repeatedly adjourned until the matter was placed before B.C. Misra, J., who ultimately heard and decided the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a court that has set aside an award on the ground of arbitrator's misconduct (clause (a) of Section 30 of the Act) has jurisdiction to remit the award to the same arbitrator under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
Whether the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Act (permitting extension of time by subsequent order of the court) permits the court to extend the time for making an award after the award has been made, and whether that question may be re-opened in this appeal (noting earlier decision by Ansari, J.).
Whether the respondent is estopped from challenging the validity of the remittal order because he did not file an appeal or revision against the remitting order in the period immediately following that order, or whether the respondent may raise the jurisdictional objection at the stage of objection to the fresh award.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion records specific submissions made by counsel and procedural contentions. The following summarises the arguments as they appear in the text; counsel-side affiliations are recorded only as they appear in the opinion and no inference is made beyond the record.

Arguments by Mr. Bhatia (as recorded)

Contended (in the review context) that Ansari, J. could not allow a review and then confine it to part of the earlier order — i.e., he argued against the limited scope of the review order.
Submitted that the learned Judge (Ansari, J.) was bound by his review order and that the question whether the court could extend time under Section 16(2) after the award had been made had been decided in favour of the appellant by Ansari, J., so the point could not be re-opened before the present court.

Arguments by Mr. Tanden / Mr. Tandon (as recorded)

Argued that the respondent had acquiesced in the arbitrator's proceedings and had not raised objections at appropriate earlier stages, so was estopped from raising the jurisdictional objection later.
Later attempted to argue that the earlier order of Mr. O.P. Aggarwal could be construed as an order setting aside the award and remitting the dispute for re-determination without superseding the arbitration agreement — relying on Prabhat Kumar v. Jagdish Chandra Narang (Patna) — but the court noted this had not been raised below and that there was insufficient material to treat the case as analogous to that Patna decision.

Contentions appearing in pleadings / issues

The respondent's objection petition alleged the remittal order was void and without jurisdiction and that the subsequent award was therefore void.
Issues framed in the trial court included whether the award and proceedings were illegal and void (including whether the objections were time-barred and whether the objector was estopped).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ganpatrai and Sons v. Ramgopal Nanda Kishore, AIR 1955 Calcutta 302	Authority relied on by Ansari, J. to hold that the court had power under the proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Section 16 to extend the time to make the award even after the award had been made.	The court (Misra, J.) stated Ansari, J. had relied on this decision and, being bound by Ansari, J.'s review order, declined to re-examine the point on extension of time.
Raja Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar and Chaudhrain Ram Kuar, ILR 13 Allahabad 300	Cited as a contra authority on the point of extension of time corresponding to Section 16(2) — accepted as having been cited before Ansari, J.	The court noted that the decision had been cited to Ansari, J. but that omission to discuss it was not a sufficient ground for review; the court did not re-open the extension issue because it was bound by Ansari, J.'s review order.
Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Patel Brothers, AIR 1944 PC 76	Principle: "When what purports to be the decision of the Arbitrator is a nullity, there is no power to remit it."	The court relied on this dictum to hold that if an award is annulled (nullity), there is nothing to remit and parties are entitled to a fresh hearing; used to support conclusion that remittal after setting aside for misconduct was without jurisdiction.
Sheo Karan v. Kanhaya and others, AIR 1935 Lahore 113	Under the Code of Civil Procedure, if grounds for remitting an award (as specified in the statute) do not exist, an order remitting the award is without jurisdiction.	Used to support the position that section 16 permits remission only on specified grounds; remittal on other grounds is without jurisdiction.
Mehta Teja Singh v. Fertilizer Corporation of India, AIR 1968 Delhi 188	Section 16 should be construed independently; remission contemplated by section 16 does not include setting aside of the award as contemplated by section 30; section 30 is exhaustive for setting aside.	The court adopted this view to hold that since Mr. O.P. Aggarwal set aside the award under section 30(a) (misconduct), he had no jurisdiction to remit under section 16 and that the remittal was legally void.
State of Patiala & East Punjab States Union v. Messrs Puran Chand Rangiram, 1966 PLR 694	Authority quoted in Mehta Teja Singh regarding appealability and remittal orders.	Referenced to support the proposition that an order remitting an award is not necessarily appealable and that remittal must be on grounds specified in section 16.
R.T. Perumal v. John Deavin, AIR 1960 Madras 43	Held there was no right of appeal against an order remitting the award to the arbitrator; court has jurisdiction to remit only on grounds in section 16 and remittal on other grounds is without jurisdiction.	Adopted to show that when a remittal is without jurisdiction, a revised award based on that remittal can be attacked as resulting from an invalid remittal and an appeal from a decree based on the revised award is competent.
Durga Prasad v. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, AIR 1970 SC 769	Section 115 (CPC) and Article 227 are extraordinary and discretionary remedies; absence of appeal does not bar later challenge where remedies are discretionary.	Used to show that failure to take extraordinary discretionary remedies does not estop a party from raising jurisdictional objections later.
Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340	Where proceedings are without jurisdiction, a party is entitled to challenge them at any stage; defect of jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent.	Applied to hold that if remittal was without jurisdiction, respondent could challenge the matter at the stage of objections to the fresh award.
Prabhat Kumar v. Jagdish Chandra Narang, AIR 1968 Patna 399	Illustrative of a case between private parties where a lower court set aside an award and remitted it for redetermination without superseding the reference; discussed in relation to whether the remittal could be treated as setting aside the award while continuing the arbitration agreement.	The court declined to apply it here because the point was not raised below and there was insufficient material to treat the instant case as analogous; therefore the submission based on this authority was rejected.
Juggilal v. General Fibre Dealers Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1123	Observations on the scheme of the Arbitration Act, including that the court has discretion after setting aside an award whether to supersede the reference; if it does not, further arbitration may take place if the arbitration agreement and machinery remain.	Quoted to indicate that whether a reference is superseded or continued is a fact-specific inquiry and the opinion noted there was insufficient material to apply that framework in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in distinct steps, grounded on the text of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and prior authorities cited in the opinion:

Statutory framework: The court set out Section 16 (remission) and Section 30 (grounds for setting aside an award). Section 16 permits the court to remit an award or matter to arbitrators for reconsideration only on the enumerated grounds in Section 16(1) and directs the court to fix the time for submission of the reconsidered decision; the proviso permits subsequent extension of any time fixed. Section 30 provides the exclusive grounds on which an award may be set aside (misconduct, award made after supersession, improperly procured or otherwise invalid).
Distinction between setting aside under Section 30 and remittal under Section 16: The court reasoned that where the only ground found by a judge for annulling an award is misconduct under Section 30(a) — so that the award is effectively set aside — there is no "award" left which can be legitimately remitted under Section 16. It observed that it would be incongruous to remit a matter to the same arbitrator whose award had been set aside for misconduct.
Application of authorities: The court relied on the Privy Council in Shree Meenakshi Mills (AIR 1944 PC 76) which stated that when an arbitrator's decision is a nullity there is no power to remit it. The court also relied on Sheo Karan (Lahore) and Mehta Teja Singh (Delhi) which support the construction that Section 16's remission power is confined to its specified grounds and does not include remission after an award has been set aside under Section 30.
Conclusion on jurisdiction of remittal order: Applying the foregoing, the court held that Mr. O.P. Aggarwal's order — which set aside the award on grounds of arbitrator misconduct and yet remitted the matter to the same arbitrator — was without jurisdiction and legally void. Because the remittal was void, it could not confer any jurisdiction on the arbitrator to make the impugned award dated 26th May 1962.
Estoppel and procedural remedies: The court considered whether the respondent's failure to appeal or take revision or other extraordinary remedies at the time of the remitting order estopped him from later challenging the remittal. The court observed that an order remitting an award is not necessarily appealable under Section 39(1)(vi), and that remedies under Section 115 (CPC) or Article 227 are discretionary. On authority (Mehta Teja Singh, R.T. Perumal, Durga Prasad, Kiran Singh), the court concluded that where an order is not appealable, a party may wait until the matter is finally concluded and then raise jurisdictional objections against the resultant award: a defect of jurisdiction may be challenged at any stage and is not cured by acquiescence. Therefore, the failure to take extraordinary remedies at the remitting stage did not estop the respondent from attacking the remittal when objecting to the fresh award.
Participation before the arbitrator: The court addressed the submission that the respondent's participation before the arbitrator constituted acquiescence or waiver. It noted that the respondent did apply under Sections 5 and 11 for revocation of the arbitrator's authority and raised the remittal objection then; that application was rejected on the basis that revision should have been sought in the High Court. The court found that participation compelled by a non-appealable remittal order does not amount to waiver of the right to later question jurisdiction, and therefore the respondent's participation did not bar his objection.
Declining to re-open the extension-of-time question: The court explicitly declined to examine the first contention (whether the court could extend time under Section 16(2) after the award had been made) because it was bound by Ansari, J.'s earlier order (and review order) which had accepted the appellant's contention on that point. The court therefore did not decide on the extension-of-time point afresh.
Resulting legal effect: Because the remittal was void and could not confer jurisdiction on the arbitrator, the 26th May 1962 award was without jurisdiction; the trial court had correctly set it aside on that basis and the appeal could not succeed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The final order of the court below (setting aside the award dated 26th May 1962) is confirmed. The appellant is ordered to pay the costs of the appeal to the respondent.

Implications

Direct effect: The impugned award of 26th May 1962 is treated as made without jurisdiction because it resulted from a remittal that was void; that award remains set aside and the trial court's order is affirmed. The appellant must pay costs to the respondent in this Court.
Scope on precedent/new law: The court applied existing authorities (including Privy Council and Indian High Court and Supreme Court decisions) to hold that remission under Section 16 is confined to the grounds specified by statute and cannot validly follow an order which in substance set aside the award for misconduct under Section 30. The opinion does not purport to create a novel legal principle beyond the application of these authorities; it also expressly declined to re-open the question whether courts may extend time under the proviso to Section 16(2) because that question had been decided by the earlier order of Ansari, J.

Appeal dismissed.

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Union Of India v. K.L Bhalla

B.C Misra, J. (Oral):— This first appeal from order has been filed under Sec. 39 (1) (b) of the Indian Arbitration Act, 10 of 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the order of Mr. D.R Khanna, then Sub-Judge, I Class, dated 29th May, 1964, by which he set aside the award of the Arbitrator dated 26th May, 1962, mainly on the ground that it had been made beyond the time allowed by the court under section 16 of the Act and was, therefore, void.

2. The appeal came up for hearing before my learned brother, Ansari J., who by order dated 23rd August, 1972 was pleased to allow the appeal and purporting to follow the decision of the High Court of Calcutta in Ganpatrai and Sons v. Ramgopal Nanda Kishore, AIR 1955 Calcutta 302, (1) held that the court had power under the proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Section 16 of the Act to extend the time to make the award even after the award had been made. Having recorded that finding the learned Judge allowed the appeal. Thereafter, K.L Bhalla, respondent in the appeal, filed an application for review of the order. In the application, it was contended that the learned Judge had failed to notice the decision of the Judicial Committee reported as Raja Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar And Chaudhrain Ram Kuar Allahabad I.L.R 13 Allahabad 300 (2), on the point that time under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure corresponding to Section 16 (2) of the Act could not be extended and that the same had been cited before the learned Judge. The other ground submitted was that the arguments were confined by the appellant to the question which had been decided against the appellant by the court of first instance but that the arguments of the respondent on the merits of the case and the other grounds of objection to the award which had been raised before the trial court and repelled by it had not been heard and the counsel wanted to address arguments further.

3. This review application came up for disposal before my learned brother, Ansari J, who by order dated 8th December, 1972 held that so far as the first contention was concerned, it was true that the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council had been cited before him at the time of arguments as was also admitted by the counsel for the opposite side. But the mere emission to refer to or discuss the judgments cited by the counsel would not be a valid ground for review of the judgment and so the first ground for review was rejected. The second ground of review prevailed with the court and his lordship allowed the review application, but the review was limited to the extent of the second contention, viz. addressing arguments on the grounds which had been decided against the respondent by the court of first instance. The appeal was directed to be heard in the first week of January, 1973. Thereafter, the appeal came up for hearing before my Lord Ansari J. on a number of dates, but it could not be disposed of for one reason or the other and finally on 16th January, 1976 his Lordship was pleased to adjourn it to 23rd January, 1976. His Lordship is no longer a Judge of this court and has been appointed Chief Justice of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and this appeal has hence been placed for hearing before me.

4. The material facts of the case are these: There was a contract between the parties (No. CWE/D-17 of 1955-56). The Union of India, appellant, claimed damages from the respondent for breach of contract. The respondent also claimed some amount from the appellant. In this way, disputes arose between the parties, which were referred to the arbitration of Lt. Col. R.N Kapur in terms of the arbitration clause. He made an award dated 23rd October, 1958 by which he directed the contractor to make some payments to the appellant. The appellant thereupon moved the court for an order for filing the award and making it a rule of the court. Objections against the award were raised by the present respondent. On the pleadings of the parties, a number of issues were framed, including an issue whether the award was bad for the reasons detailed in the objection petition and whether there was any error apparent on the face of the record. The award was claimed to be bad. The matter was decided by Mr. O.P Aggarwal, Sub-Judge, I Class, by order dated 29th April, 1960. The issues on merits were decided by the court together and in paragraph 8 of the order, it observed that there was no error apparent on the face of the record; however, the arbitrator had been guilty of judicial misconduct in not properly recording the evidence of the parties, destroying the pencil notes of evidence and not properly recording the admissions of the objector petitioner and because there was no proof that he inspected the spot after notice to the objector. The Sub-Judge repelled the other objections of the respondent before me, but in answer to issue No. 2 he held that award was liable to be set aside on account of misconduct of the arbitrator. Finally, in paragraph 11, he set aside the award and the remitted the proceedings back to the arbitrator for deciding the matter in dispute a fresh after taking into consideration and allowing the parties reasonable opportunity to adduce whatever evidence they thought proper and necessary in support of their respective assertions. The parties were left to bear their respective costs. By this order, he fixed time till 31st August, 1960 for making of the award which time was letter on, extended by his successor, to 12th September, 1960. It is common ground that there was no order of the court extending the time further.

5. After remission of the award, the arbitrator conducted some proceedings and finally made a fresh award dated 26th May, 1962, which is the subject matter of this appeal. By this award, he again ordered the party, respondent before me, to pay some amount to the appellant. Notice of the filing of the award was given to the parties and the respondent filed objections on 9th October, 1962. There are a number of objections raised against the award which have been noticed in the order of the court of first instance; they included two main objections, which have been reiterated before me, viz. (1) the award had been made beyond the prescribed time and was therefore, void and (2), the remittance of the award under section 16 of the Act by the previous order was void and without jurisdiction, hence, the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction to make the award, which is consequently void. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed: —

“1. Whether the award, the reference and the proceedings of the arbitrator are illegal, void and liable to be set aside as per objections in para 8 of the objection petition ? OPA (Note: This issue will include whether the allegations in para of the objection petition are correct in fact).

2. Whether the objector is estopped from raising objections against the appointment of the arbitrator as per submission in corresponding para of the written reply ? OPR.

3. Whether the objections are time barred ? OPR

4. Relief.

6. The court of first instance by the impugned order dated 29th May; 1964, answered issue No. 3 in the negative and held that the objections were within time. In answer to issue No. 1, it held that the legality and validity of the order of remission could not be challenged before it at that stage and the parties ought to have taken steps to have that order set aside and since the order had become final, it could not be challenged. It also held that the respondent had not raised this question when he moved the application for revoking the authority of the Arbitrator. It, therefore, rejected this contention. But the objection that the court had no power to extend the time fixed under section 16 (2) of the Act. After making of the award was upheld and the award was set aside. Hence this appeal.

7. The question of law decided by the trial court on the extension of time has been decided by my learned brother, Ansari J. by his order dated 23rd August, 1972. He has relied upon the decision of the High Court of Calcutta reported as Ganpatrai and Sons v. Ramgopal Nand Kishore, AIR 1955 Calcutta 302 (1) and he has not taken into consideration the decision of the Privy Council in Raja Har Narain v. Chandhrain Bhagwan (2) ILR (13) Allahabad 300, which had, as is admitted in the order of review, been cited before his Lordship. His Lordship by the review order has not allowed the review of that part of the order, by which he had accepted the contention of the appellant on the question of extension of time and the review has been confined to the limited extent of the other grounds. This order is binding on me and I am, therefore, unable to allow the Counsel to argue as to whether or not in a case remitted under section 16 of the Act, the power to extend the time under section 28 of the Act after making of the award, is in view of the express provision contained in the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 16 of the Act, available. This point has been decided in favour of the appellant by my learned brother, Ansari J. Mr. Bhatia has further submitted that the learned Judge while allowing the review petition could not allow the review and then confine it only to a part. This submission can again not be allowed to be raised since I am respectfully bound by the terms of the order of review passed by my Lord Ansari, J. I shall therefore, decline to examine the 1st contention.

8. The second contention of Mr. Bhatia has force. Section 16 of the Act reads as follows: —

“16. (1) The court may from time to time remit the award or any matter referred to arbitration to arbitrators or umpire for reconsideration upon such terms as it thinks fit —

(a) where the award has left undetermined any of the matters referred to arbitration, or where it determines any matter not referred to arbitration and such matter cannot be separated without affecting the determination of the matters referred; or

(b) where the award is so indefinite as to be incapable of execution; or

(c) where an objection to the legality of the award is apparent upon the face of it.

(2) Where an award is remitted under sub-section (1) the court shall fix the time within which the arbitrator or umpire shall submit his decision to the Court. Provided that any time so fixed may be extended by subsequent order of the Court.

(3) An award remitted under sub-section (1) shall become void on the failure of the arbitrator or umpire to reconsider it and submit his decision within the time fixed.”

Reference may also be made to section 30 of the Act which is quoted below:

“30. An award shall not be set aside except on one of the following grounds, namely: —

(a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings;

(b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under section 35;

(c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid.”

The power to set aside an award arise only on the ground mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 30 which provide that the award shall not be set aside except on the aforesaid grounds. The power to remit the award to the arbitrator is expressly conferred by section 16 of the Act and its exercise is confined to the grounds mentioned therein. Should the court set aside the award on the ground of misconduct of the arbitrator, there is obviously no award left to operate upon and nothing can be referred to the arbitrator. It would also look incongruous to refer the matter again to the same arbitrator, who has been found guilty of misconduct. The order of Mr. O.P Aggarwala, setting aside the award on the ground of misconduct and then remitting it to the same arbitrator for reconsideration is obviously without jurisdiction. It may be further emphasised that in answer to the other issues raised before Mr. Aggarwal he expressly found that there was no mistake apparent on the face of the record, which could attract section 16 of the Act. The only ground he found was the misconduct of the arbitrator mentioned in clause (a) of section 30 and thereupon he set aside the award. As such on the findings arrived at by him he did not have any jurisdiction to remit the award under section 16 of the Act.

9. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Patel Brothers, AIR 1944 PC 76 (3), observed in page 78 as follows: —

“When what purports to be the decision of the Arbitrator is a nullity, there is no power to remit it. Nor is there need for any such power, since there is nothing to remit, and since it necessarily follows from the fact that the decision is annulled that the parties are entitled to a new and effective hearing and determination.”

In Sheo Karan v. Kanhaya and others, AIR 1935 Lahore 113, (4) although the decision was given under the Code of Civil Procedure, it was held, if none of the grounds mentioned in the appropriate provision existed for remitting the ward, the order of the court remitting the award would be without jurisdiction. In Mehta Teja Singh v. Fertilizer Corporation of India, AIR 1968 Delhi 188 at 190 (5), I.D Dua, C.J (as his Lordship then was), observed that section 16 of the Act dealing with the power of the court to remit the award, should be construed independently and the remission of the award or any matter contemplated by this section was not intended to include within its fold setting aside of the award or part of it as contemplated by section 30, which was apparently an exhaustive provision specifically dealing with setting aside of awards. I have, therefore, no doubt that the order of Mr. O.P Aggarwala remitting the award to the arbitrator was legally void and without jurisdiction. As such, it could not confer any jurisdiction on the arbitrator to make the impugned award.

10. The question now arises for consideration is whether the failure of the respondent to file an appeal or revision against the order of Mr. Aggarwala, estops him from agitating the question at the present stage. The order of the court remitting the award to the arbitrator under section 16 of the Act does not amount to setting aside or refusing to set aside the whole of the award as provided by clause (vi) of Section 39 (1) of the Act, since operative part of the order is to remit the award and as such the same would not be appealable. In the decision of Mehta Teja Singh's case (supra), this question also came up for consideration. His Lordship held that section 30 seemed to suggest that it was exhaustive of the grounds on which an award was to be set aside and it did not contemplate setting aside or refusing to set aside a part of an award. Section 39 (1) (vi) would also seem to contemplate an appeal from an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an award as a whole and an order remitting a part of an award and affirming a part did not necessarily amount to an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an award within the contemplation of Section 39 (1) (vi) of the Act and it would thus be not appealable. Consequently, when the case does not fall under this clause, no appeal lies against an order remitting the award. In laying down this rule of law, his Lordship quoted with approval a decision of the High Court of Punjab, reported as State of Patiala and East Punjab States Union v. Messrs Puran Chand Rangiram, 1966 PLR 694 (6) and a decision of the High Court of Madras, R.T Perumal v. John Deavin, AIR 1960 Madras 43 (7). In the Madras decision, it was clearly held in paragraph 7 that there was no right of appeal against the order of the court remitting the award to the arbitrator and the court had jurisdiction to remit an award only on one or more of the grounds specified in section 16 and under no other ground. Where the court remitted an award on any ground other than those specified in section 16 such an award would be without jurisdiction and in such a case one of the grounds on which a revised award could be sought to be set aside was that it was the result of an invalid order of remittal and on this view, an appeal from the decree based on the revised award was competent.

11. Since the appeal was not available to the party against the order, it cannot be estopped from challenging the same at a subsequent stage of the proceedings. It is true that it was open to the party to file a revision petition in the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, but those remedies are extraordinary and discretionary (see Durga Prasad v. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, AIR 1970 SC 769 (8). Since no party has a right to apply under those provisions and the court is not bound to grant relief and the failure of the party to go up to the High Court in revision at that stage cannot stand in its way to agitate the point at a subsequent stage. Had the order been appealable, certainly in the absence of the appeal, the order could be treated as final and binding, but if no appeal is provided, the party is entitled to wait until the matter is finally concluded and then raise the point as a ground of attack. Moreover, as held in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 (9), if the proceedings are without jurisdiction, the party is entitled to challenge the same at any stage of the proceedings. In this decision, the Supreme Court also observed that a defect of jurisdiction, could not be cured even by consent of parties.

12. Mr. Tanden, counsel for the appellant, submits that the respondent before me had acquiesced in the proceedings before the arbitrator and as held by the Court below, he did not raise the objection at the other stages of the proceedings when he could do so. This position is factually not correct. The respondent before me filed an application under sections 5 and 11 of Arbitration Act for revocation of the authority of the arbitrator. In this he raised the ground that the other remitting the matter to the arbitrator was bad and without jurisdiction, this application was rejected by the court on the ground that the party ought to have challenged the order of Mr. O.P Aggarwala by revision in the High Court. This shows that the party did not acquiesce in the order and was challenging the same seriously, but could not do so successfully unless and until the final award had been made. Even, as a matter of law, I am inclined to agree with Mr. Bhatia that if the order of the court remitting the award to the arbitrator is without jurisdiction and the party does not have a right to appeal against the same at that stage, but is obliged to wait till the making of the award, the party will have no option except to appear before the arbitrator and proceed with the case in pursuance of the order of the court. The participation in the proceedings of the arbitrator in such circumstances cannot amount to waiver of his rights or acquiescance in the order. The legal remedy of the party to resuscitate the objection against the order of Mr. O.P Aggarwala lies in raising objections against the award which is finally made in pursuance of the order of remission. This view finds favour in the authorities referred to above and I respectfully agree with them. The objection of Mr. Tandon has no force and is rejected.

13. In the end, Mr. Tandon made a feeble attempt to urge that the previous order of Mr. Aggarwala Sub-Judge, may be construed as an order setting aside the award and remitting the dispute to the arbitrator for re-determinations since the arbitration agreement had not been superseded by exercise of power under section 19 of the Act and he has relied upon Prabhat Kumar v. Jagdish Chandra Narang, AIR 1968 Patna 399 (10). I am unable to accept the submission. Firstly, this had not been raised in the court below; secondly the arbitration agreement is not before the court from which it could be deduced as to whether in an arbitration to which the Government is a party the power of the court to supersede the reference is or is not excluded and whether any machinery is provided for redetermination of the dispute after the setting aside of the award. The case of Prabhat Kumar (supra) was an arbitration between private parties and the High Court found as a fact that the lower appellate court had not superseded the reference, but continued the reference by sending the matter back to the arbitrator after setting aside the award and so the appeal was maintainable. This is not the position in the instant case and there is no doubt about the maintainability of the present appeal. It may be significant to notice that in Patna judgment reference is made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Juggilal v. General Fibre Dealers Ltd, AIR 1962 SC 1123 (11), where the following observations occur:

“The scheme of the Arbitration Act as disclosed from sections 8, 10, 12, 19, 20 (5) and 25 is whether the arbitration is under Chapter II, Chapter III or Chapter IV of the Act, to give discretion to the court to decide whether to supersede the reference or not when it sets aside an award. Where it decides to supersede the reference it has to order that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect with respect to the difference referred; but where it decides not to supersede the reference and the reference and the arbitration agreement subsist and if there is machinery provided in the arbitration agreement for making a further reference or for continuing the same reference further arbitration can take place.”

The said observations only indicate that after the award has been set aside, what are the provisions applicable to the case for supersession of the reference or for proceeding with the arbitration contained in the arbitration agreement and the provisions of law will have to be determined in each case. In the instant case, we do not have any material on the subject. Moreover, even in the Patna case, the High Court observed that it was not desirable to appoint the same arbitrators whose award had been set aside. Under the circumstances I find there is no substance in the contention of Mr. Tandon. I have already held that the appeal against the order of Mr. Aggarwala was not maintainable in this court and so the submission is of no avail.

14. As a result, the appeal is dismissed and the final order of the court below is confirmed. The appellant will pay to the respondent costs of the appeal in this Court.

Appeal dismissed.

Union Of India v. K.L Bhalla

Opinion Summary: B.C. Misra, J. (Oral)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments by Mr. Bhatia (as recorded)

Arguments by Mr. Tanden / Mr. Tandon (as recorded)

Contentions appearing in pleadings / issues

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Implications

Union Of India v. K.L Bhalla

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