1. The short question which falls for determination in this appeal is: Whether a person who has sustained bodily injuries in a motor vehicle accident can claim compensation for property damaged in the accident which is not owned by him?
2. The appellant was driving a tempo, which according to him, was owned by another person, when he met with an accident caused by respondent No. 1, who was driving a bus belonging to the Government Transport Undertaking, resulting in injuries not only to his person but also damage to the tempo. He, however, made an application under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter the Act) claiming compensation not only for the injuries suffered by him, but also for the damage caused to the tempo driven by him.
3. An objection was taken on behalf of the respondents that the appellant not being the owner of the vehicle had no right to claim compensation for the damage caused to the tempo under section 110 read with section 110-A of the Act. This objection weighed with the Tribunal which upheld the same while relying upon two decisions viz: Om Prakash v. N.F & G. Insurance Co. . A.I.R 1962 M.P 19. and Farsubhai Altapbhai Saiyed v. Dullabhbhai . 1973 A.C.J 149.. Hence the appeal.
4. Answer to the question involved turns upon the interpretation of sections 110 & 110-A. Section 110(1) before it came to be amended vide Act No. 56 of 1969 read as under:
“110. Claims Tribunal.—(1) A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as Claims Tribunals) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles.”
5. There was conflict of opinion among different High Courts as to whether compensation under this section could be claimed for the property damaged in the accident. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Dr. Om Prakash Mishra's case had taken the view that claim for compensation in respect of property damaged in an accident lay before the tribunal alone even if section 110(1) did not specifically say so, and that such inference was reinforced by the provisions of section 110-F of the Act which excluded the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in such matters. The Court took various factors into consideration to support this view, e.g apprehension of conflict of adjudication on the same point in case two different forums for compensation i.e, one for injury to person and other for damage to property were to be assumed, need to avoid absurdity arising out of literal interpretation of a provision in a statute where it was possible to give it its ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning to carry out the object of the statute; need to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and applicability of the principle that where the claim was a composite one, only a part of which was triable by the tribunal, it would have jurisdiction to try even that part of the claim which was triable by an ordinary civil court, as a matter incidental thereto, in order to give relief to the claimant. A similar view was taken by Gujarat High Court in Joshi Ratansi Gopaji v. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation . 1968 A.C.J 338.. In its view the expression “involving death of or bodily injury to” was limitative of the accident but not of the various claims for compensation for death of or injury to the person or damage to the property involved in it which arose out of the accident. The High Court of Madras in R. Selvaraj v. Jagannathan . 1969 A.C.J 1., however, took a contrary view and held that compensation for damage to property could be recovered only by filing a suit in a competent civil court and that section 110 did not apply to such a case. A similar view was taken by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in B.S Nat v. Bachan Singh . 1971 A.C.J 37.. According to it, the words “involving death of or bodily injury” had to be read not disjunctively from, but conjunctively with the words “adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents” immediately preceding the same to bring out the true meaning of sub-section (1) of section 110, and in case they were read together the inference would be crystal clear that sub-section (1) related to claims for compensation arising out of death of or bodily injury to the person involved in the accident alone. To resolve this conflict, the legislature amended sub-section (1) of section 110 by Act No. 56 of 1969, as already pointed out, and included in its ambit claim for compensation in respect of property as well. Sub-section (1) after its amendment read as under:—
“110. Claims Tribunals.—(1) A State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as Claims Tribunals) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising or both:
Provided that where such claim includes a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property exceeding rupees two thousand, the claimant may, at his option, refer the claim to a civil court for adjudication, and where a reference is so made, the Claims Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim.”
6. By adding the words “or damages to any property of a third party so arising or both”, as well as the proviso to sub-section (1), the legislature left no room for doubt that compensation claimed in respect of the property damaged in a motor vehicle accident would also lie before a tribunal. The proviso, however, gave an option to the claimant to prefer a claim in respect of damage to property whether in the tribunal or in a civil court where such claim exceeded Rs. 2,000/-, but in no case could such a claim lie in a civil court where the amount claimed was only Rs. 2,000/-, or even less, and in case it exceeded Pis. 2,000/- and the claimant had opted to refer it to a civil court, the tribunal would cease to have jurisdiction to entertain the same. In a way, therefore, the legislature gave effect to the view taken by the High Courts of Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat by introducing the aforesaid amendment in section 110 so as to bring it in conformity with the view expressed by these Courts. The position may now be taken as well settled that one or more than one tribunal may be appointed by a State Government under section 110, either to adjudicate upon the claims for compensation arising out of accidents resulting in death of or bodily injury to a person, or to adjudicate upon claims for compensation on account of damage caused to the property, as a result of such accident, or both, where the accident has taken place due to the use of a motor vehicle. Furthermore, it is the option of the claimant to prefer such a claim in respect of the property damaged, either in a civil court or before the tribunal itself, where the amount claimed exceeds Rs. 2,000/- but in no case shall a civil court have jurisdiction to entertain such a claim where the amount claimed is either Rs. 2,000/-, or less. If the claimant prefers a claim exceeding a sum of Rs. 2,000/- in a Civil Court by filing a suit in it, the tribunal shall cease to have jurisdiction in the matter and section 110-F shall be no bar to such a suit. A claimant may, therefore, make a composite prayer in a petition preferred before the tribunal for compensation for death of another person or bodily injury to him, as the case may be, as well as for the property damaged in the accident, provided the tribunal has been invested with powers not only to adjudicate upon the claims for compensation in respect of death of or bodily injury to a person, but is also invested with the powers to adjudicate upon the claims for compensation in respect of the property damaged in the accident. It may be pointed out at this juncture that the State of Jammu and Kashmir has, vide SRO 383 dated 28-8-1971 invested the tribunal with powers to adjudicate upon both types of the claims. This SRO may be reproduced as below:
“SRO 383.—Whereas the State Government considers it necessary to constitute a single Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for the whole of the State for the purpose of adjudication upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both; and
Whereas the State Government thinks it fit that the said Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal may consist of one member only.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939) and in supersession of Notification SRO 336 dated 14th July, 1970 the State Government hereby constitute the Jammu and Kashmir State Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for the whole State and appoint Shri Hari Singh Hardesh, State Transport Appellate Tribunal to be the single member of the said Tribunal.”
7. This brings me to the question precisely involved in the appeal. Whereas section-110 deals with the types of claims which a tribunal may be empowered to adjudicate upon, section 110-A deals with the person or persons who may bring such claims before a tribunal. section 110-F contains bar of jurisdiction of civil courts, and lays down that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Tribunal. Conversly, a civil court shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a claim, if either it is not the one mentioned in section 110, or if it is so, it has not been preferred by a person competent to make it under section 110-A. In case the conditions laid down in section 110 and 110-A are fulfilled in respect of a particular claim, then section 110-F will operate as a total bar to its enforcement by filing a suit in a civil court. Section 110-A(1) reads as under:
“110-A. Application for compensation.—(1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 110 may be made—
(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or
(b) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or
(c) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be:
Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application.”
8. This section, on its plain reading places claimants into three categories, viz: (1) legal representatives of the person who died in the accident, (2) person injured in the accident, and (3) a duly authorised agent of such legal representatives, or the person injured, as the case may be. It does not in terms limit the right to claim compensation for damage done to the property to its owner alone, but confers that right on the person, irrespective of the ownership of the property damaged, who is either legal representative of the person dying in the accident, or is himself the person sustaining bodily injuries in the accident, or is the duly authorised agent of such legal representative or person. The expression “or damages to any property of a third party” used in sub-section (1) of section 110 is too significant to support this inference. The words “third party” in the context in which they have been used, clearly bring out the intention of the legislature to enlarge the scope of section 110 by including in its ambit even the property not belonging to the person who either died or received bodily injuries in the accident. The object of the Act appears to be to provide cheap and speedy remedy to only those who either died or received bodily injuries in the accident, both in respect of their person as well as their own property, or even the property belonging to others, which is damaged due to the accident. Cases are conceivable where a person injured in an accident may be personally liable to compensate the owner of the property which also got damaged in it. The legislature, therefore, advisedly conferred upon such persons right to prefer claims before the tribunal itself, so that they do not have to suffer twice i.e, once due to the accident, and then again by following the lengthy course and costly remedy of a civil suit. The words “or damages, to any property of a third party” could not be intended to limit the scope of section 110 and restrict the claim for compensation in respect of property which belonged to a third party alone, so that no claim could be made under this section, if the property damaged belonged to the person who either died or received bodily injuries due to the accident. Such an interpretation, even though literally warranted would, nevertheless, defeat the very object of the Act and lead to manifest absurdity. The legal representatives of the person who died, or the person who sustained bodily injuries due to the accident in that case, would have to file a separate civil suit for compensation in respect of the property damaged, in case the same belonged to him, but compensation could be recovered for both injuries to his person as well as damage to the property by taking recourse to section 110 and 110-A, if the property damaged did not belong to him. This, surely, could not have been the intention of the legislature. sub-section (1) of section 110 shall have to be interpreted in such a way, that not only the patent absurdity is avoided, but alongwith it effect is also given to the intention of the legislature, even if it is to be done by ignoring its plain meaning, or making a departure from grammatical rules. Maxwell in his Interpretation of Statutes says:
“……when the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended constructions must be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, by altering their collocation, by rejecting them altogether or by interpolating other words, under the influence no doubt of an irresistible conviction that the legislature could not possibly have intended that the words signify and the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true intention. The rules of grammer yield readily in such cases to those of commonsense.”
9. Section 110(1) has, therefore, to be construed in a manner to make it applicable to cases for compensation in respect of property damaged in an accident, which belonged either to a third party, or to the person who died or received bodily injuries due to the accident.
10. It follows that an owner who has not sustained any bodily injury cannot take recourse to sections 110 and 110-A for recovering compensation in respect of his property damaged in the accident. The object of the Act as already observed, is to provide relief to only those who either die or receive bodily injuries due to the accident, and not to others. He cannot be considered injured within the meaning of section 110(A)(1) with the aid of dictionary meaning of the word “injury”. The word “injury” occurring in section 110(1) distinctly refers to a bodily injury and has been used in sub section (1) in contradistinction to the word “damages” occurring in it, which pointedly refers to property. Furthermore, the word “the” preceding the word “injury” occurring in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 110-A qualifies its meaning, and clearly signifies that it refers to “bodily injury” mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 110, and not to any other injury. To determine precisely its ambit and scope, section 110-A(1) has to be read alongwith section 110. Had the intention of the legislature been to enlarge the scope of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 110-A, then surely the word “the” immediately preceding the word “injury” would not have been there. With utmost respect to the learned Judges who constituted the bench in Haryana State v. Pusa Ram, I find myself unable to subscribe to the view taken therein that owner of a vehicle damaged in an accident can bring a claim for compensation under section 110-A, even though he has not himself sustained any bodily injury, because injury to his property, according to dictionary meaning, tantamounts to injury to his person. Section 110-A(1)(a) speaks of only bodily injury, and of no other injury. The Tribunal was, therefore, not right in refusing to entertain the claim of the appellant in respect of tempo driven by him, merely because he was not its owner. The moment it was shown that he belonged to one of the categories mentioned in section 110-A(1), his right to bring the claim petition before the Tribunal stood established. Reliance of the tribunal upon the aforesaid two decisions of the High Courts of Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat was clearly misplaced. In fact the question whether a person who was not owner of the property damaged, but who admittedly had sustained bodily injuries in the accident could claim compensation in respect of the property by making an application under section 110-A, never fell for determination in those cases. It was a sheer coincidence that the persons who had preferred claims in respect of the property damaged in those cases were also its owners.
11. In the result the appeal is allowed and the order of the Tribunal is set aside. The case is sent back to it for its disposal in accordance with law. In the peculiar circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs.