B.K Mehta, A.C.J:— By our order of May 3, 1985, we have allowed the petition and issued the writs and directions as specified in the said order the reasons for which we have reserved for being pronounced subsequently. Accordingly, we pronounce the reasons in support of the said order.
2. What is the extent of the power of judicial review of the administrative action in the matter of pre-qualification of the prospective bidders of the Controlling Authority constituted under the Award of Inter-State River Dispute Tribunal, and the consequent decision, of such authority disqualifying the petitioners for being entitled to receive tender documents are the two moot questions arising in this petition. The questions arise on the facts and in the circumstances briefly narrated as under:
In response to the separate invitations issued by the State Government in April 1983 to pre-qualify the prospective bidders for (1) construction of concrete dam across Narmada river, and (2) excavation and tunneling and other civil works for the Underground River Bed Power House and appurtenant works for the Sardar Sarovar (Narmada) Project in Gujarat (hereinafter briefly referred to as “the dam construction” and “the power house construction”, respectively), the first and second petitioner Companies submitted their pre-qualification information and documents for the aforesaid two works on August 12, 1983 and October 31, 1983, respectively, as agreed by and between them in their joint venture agreement of August 2, 1983. Admittedly, the joint venture consortia applicant was entitled to make application for pre-qualification for these works. The eligibility criteria for the pre-qualification of the prospective bidders for dam construction was, inter alia, that the applicant must be well-established contractor with experience and capability in dam and similar construction and must have placed 25000 cubic meters cement concrete per month and must have had in any one year during last five years turn over of the value of Rs. 400 million in construction Similarly, the eligibility criteria prescribed for the power house construction was that the applicant must be an established contractor with experience in underground excavation and general civil engineering works and must have done underground excavation of at least 10000 cubic meters per month in rock mass and annual turnover of the value of Rs. 50 million in any one year during the last five years. The information was to be furnished by the prospective bidders in different pro formas as appended to the pre-qualification information Form “A” required particulars of the organisational structure of the applicant. Form “B” pertained to the financial details of the applicant. Form “C” pertained to the particulars of joint venture. Form “D” related to the details of personnel resources. Form “E” related to the details of equipment of plant and machinery with the applicant Form “F” related to experience while Form “G” was for additional information which a particular applicant might desire to furnish.
3. According to the petitioners, the first petitioner Company is a professionally managed company with stable financial resources and having highly skilled engineering manpower and modern equipments with a large experience as a prime and subcontractors in India in course of their construction activity over a period of last 25 years. Besides India, the first Petitioner Company has executed prestigious and difficult works in Iraq, Nepal and Sri Lanka. It has executed major harbour projects which are more difficult than construction of dams and tunnels and have specialised itself in foundation for dams, rock blasting etc. and have executed other types of civil engineering jobs. The first Petitioner Company has made four major bridges in Iraq over the river Euphrates which included launching of prestressed girders each weighing 240 tonnes. The first Petitioner Company has, during five years from 1978 to 1982, alone completed 10 major works in India and abroad involving concrete work ranging from 5000 cubic meters to 25000 cubic meters. In 1982-1983, the first Petitioner Company poured concrete of more than 2,20,000 cubic meters of grade M 250. It has also achieved distinction of executing any type of civil engineering work of construction of highly demanding standards within the time schedule of the tender, and accordingly has confidence to complete the aforesaid two works within the time that may be stipulated under the tender notice. It has also executed specialised foundation work relating to dams such as diaphragm wells, drilling grouting relief wells etc. though they had not direct experience in the construction of dam as such. The first Petitioner Company had executed a soft ground tunnel in Calcutta as also a vertical shaft in the sea at Kalpakkam though they did not have any direct experience in ordinary tunnel and dam construction as such.
4. The second Petitioner Company has more than 37 years of civil engineering and architectural work experience. It is considered to be one of the leading contractors in Dam construction in Japan, and by their efforts and experience have developed, technical, administrative and financial capability and have thus acquired a strong reputation, especially in the construction of dam and power houses. In fact, the second Petitioner Company is a top most dam builders in Japan, and have performed contracts worth more than Rs. 3400 millions in the aggregate for construction of dams, tunnels etc. The second Petitioner Company has recently completed in Indonesia the Singuragura Intake dam and Headrace tunnel for the Asahan Hydro Electric Power Project in North Sumatra. The second Petitioner Company is, therefore, on merits, fully experienced and qualified according to the prescribed qualifications for the aforesaid works to undertake the task of constructing the concrete dam as well as power house.
5. The first and the second Petitioner Companies, therefore, decided to form joint venture with a view to submit their tender for the aforesaid two works, and accordingly executed agreements on August 22, 1983 and November 1, 1983 in that behalf, respectively. The Petitioners, in pursuance of these agreements, submitted necessary information and documents for pre-qualifying them as bidders for the aforesaid two works under the cover of their letters dated August 12, 1983 and October 31, 1983. Since there was no response from the State Government to their applications the first Petitioner Company, on learning that some other parties have been pre-qualified, requested the State Govt. by their telegram of January 14, 1985 and confirmatory letter of even date to advice them by a telex message that the petitioners were also pre-qualified. The first Petitioner Company again sent another telegram seeking advice on their pre-qualification in respect of the power house. The State Government failed to respond to this request with the result that the petitioners have moved this Court for appropriate writs, orders and directions for setting aside the refusal to pre-qualify and enjoining the State Government to grant pre-qualification and also to furnish them with tender documents.
6. After the petitioners filed the petition in this Court on January 23, 1985, they received on January 29, 1985 a letter dated January 24, 1985 from the State Government advising the petitioners that it had not been possible for the State Government to pre-qualify them for the power house construction. A similar letter of January 23, 1985 was received by the petitioners On January 28, 1985 in respect of the dam construction. The Petitioners claim that their joint venture consortia was fully qualified according to the prescribed criteria of the State Government Since they were to execute the work jointly under the joint venture agreements between them, they have been dis-qualified on the grounds which were irrelevant and extraneous and without considering the relevant information furnished, or, in any case, without calling for further particulars in that behalf and the decision of the State Government refusing to pre-qualify them was arbitrary and vitiated by legal mala fides and, therefore, bad in law and void.
7. The State Government resisted the petition on the ground that the impugned decision was by the Sardar Sarovar. Construction Advisory Committee (hereinafter referred to as “the Advisory Committee”) which was a high power committee set up according to the directions under the award of the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal by the Government of India vide its Resolution of September 4, 1980 after detailed scrutiny and evaluation of 29 applications for dam and 39 application for power house construction in strict conformity with the guidelines issued by the World Bank which has agreed to finance the Narmada Project in the matter of pre-qualification of the prospective bidders likely to respond to the invitation of the global tender for the execution of the Project and which decision was considered by the World Bank and, therefore, the Petitioners are not entitled to challenge purely administrative decision unless they can establish that the decision is highly arbitrary and, therefore, perverse since no factual mala fides are attributed to the Committee or to the Narmada Controlling Authority.
8. It is in this backdrop that we have to consider as to whether the petitioners are entitled to any or all of the reliefs.
9. Three principal questions arise. Firstly, what is the extent of the power of judicial scrutiny of such a purely administrative action, particularly in the context of the execution of such a huge project involving a staggering cost of about Rs. 4700 crores and the execution of which is fraught with highly complicated technical and engineering questions the failure of providing adequate solutions of which may result into a very serious and unmanageable disaster having far-reaching repercussions not only on the economy of the State but also on the safety of the people in the vicinity and command of the dam area. The second question which consequently arises is: whether the recommendation of the Advisory Committee as approved by the World Bank, and the consequent decision of the State Government refusing to pre-qualify the petitioners is bad in law, void and, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside. Thirdly, I whether this Court, would be justified in granting a writ of mandamus enjoining the State Government to furnish the petitioners with the tender documents and, if so, in what terms.
10. Before we take up these questions for our consideration, it is necessary to set out briefly as to the different authorities which have been set up under the award of the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal appointed by the Central Government in this behalf, and their powers and duties, and also to recapitulate the procedure of pre-qualifying the prospective bidders as laid down by these authorities, and the grounds for refusing to pre-qualify the petitioners for the aforesaid two works.
11. The Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal was appointed in October, 1969 by the Central Government under the Inter-State Water Disputes Act 1956 which submitted its final report to the Government of India in December, 1979. The Tribunal, in its final order, has, inter alia, directed setting up of an Inter-State Administrative Authority to be called “the Narmada Control Authority” for the purposes of securing compliance with and implementation of the decision of the Tribunal The Tribunal had also directed to set up a Review Committee which, on application by any party/State, may review any decision of, the authority. Since four States viz. Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan have financial commitments in respect of Unit 1 Dam and appurtenant works of Sardar Sarovar Project, and three of them, except Rajasthan, have such commitments in respect of Unit 3 Power Complex of the Project, the Tribunal had thought it desirable and necessary that a Construction Advisory Committee should be constituted for enjoining efficient, economic and earlier execution of the said Units 1 and 3 of the Project Accordingly, the Advisory Committee was appointed consisting of: (Vide: Resolution of Govt. of India of 4th Sept., 80)
1. Secretary in Irrigation Department to the Government of India;
2. Chairman or a representative of the Central Water Commission;
3. Chairman or representative of the Central Electricity Authority;
4. Chairman or representative of the Narmada Control Authority;
5. Joint Secretary, Finance & Irrigation, Ministry;
6. Finance Secretaries of the four State Governments;
7. Irrigation Secretaries of Gujarat and Rajasthan;
8. Secretaries in Power Department of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat;
9. Revenue Secretaries of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat;
10. Chief Engineers of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan with Project;
11. Chairman, State Electricity Board of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat;
12. Financial Advisor of the Project; and
13. One Secretary, to be appointed by the Government of India.
12. Similarly by another notification of 10th Sept., 1980, the Governmerit of India appointed Narmada Control Authority and specified the status and constitution of the said Authority. The Advisory Committee has been empowered by a resolution of 4th Sept., 1980 to frame rules regarding procedure and delegation of powers for purposes of carrying on its business. In exercise of this power, the Advisory Committee framed rules known as “Conduct of Business and Procedure Rules, 1981”. By Rule 12 of the said Rules, the Advisory Committee is authorised at its discretion to set up one or more subcommittees for dealing with specific issues, and such committees may be empowered as the Advisory Committee may think fit and proper. Since the World Bank was to finance the Project if held several discussions with the officers of the Government of India and the State Governments concerned. Several appraisal missions visited the site of the Project before agreeing to finance and/or to give loans to meet part of the cost of Project one of the conditions on which such grants could be sanctioned was that the State Government would follow the procedure prescribed and the guidelines issued by the World Bank for the grant of contracts to carry out the work of the Project. The guidelines prescribed international competitive bidding for each such work costing more than Rs. 7 crores. The following three conditions generally guide the Bank's requirements:
1. Need for economy and efficiency in execution of the project and procurement of the goods.
2. All eligible bidders from developing and developed countries must have an opportunity to compete for the execution of the works or supply of goods.
3. Encouragement and development of local contractors and manufacturers in borrowing materials.
13. The World Bank, therefore, insisted that these three conditions could be best secured by the international competitive bidding The State Government was, therefore, required to adopt international competitive bidding and afforded all eligible prospective bidders the necessary information in respect of the works and the expectation of the authorities executing the Project the need of qualified bidders. The guidelines of the World Bank, therefore, required pre-qualification for large and complex works so as to ensure in advance of bidding that invitations to bid are extended only to those who are capable. The borrower is thus required to inform the Bank, in detail the procedure followed for pre-qualification, and if the Bank suggests any modification, to accept the same. The borrower has to forward the list of parties seeking pre-qualification together with the statement of their qualifications and the reasons for exclusion of any applicant for the comment of the Bank before the applicants are notified of the borrower's decision which is subject to any addition, deletion or modification of the list as the Bank may suggest. The World Bank has also suggested to the State Government to frame rules for evaluating pre-qualification, and also to establish a Committee to analyse the pre-qualification applications promptly and well before the pre-qualification period terminates. Accordingly, the State Government has formulated rules as approved by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Sept. 10, 1983. According to rule 12 of the Conduct of Business and Procedure Rules, 1981, the Advisory Committee constituted a sub-group known as “Permanent Standing Committee” (hereinafter referred to as “the Standing Committee”) and delegated certain functions to the said Committee which included, inter alia, the examination of and recommendation to the Advisory Committee on tenders for Project works costing more than Rs. 20 crores each. The Standing Committee consists of:
1. Chairman of the Control Authority;
2. Member (Planning and Project) Central Water Commission;
3. Member (Hydro) Central Electrical Authority;
4. Financial Adviser of the Project; and
5. Secretary of the Advisory Committee.
14. The applications of the parties together with the information and documents furnished by them in respect of pre-qualification are screened and evaluated by the Standing Committee, and its report, on detailed evaluation of the applications who fulfil the prescribed criteria and whose applications are responsive and names of those who failed to pre-qualify and the reasons for refusing to pre-qualify, is submitted before the Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee is to scrutinise the report of the Standing Committee and examine the particulars and documents furnished by each of the applicants, and to decide as to whether the report of the Standing Committee should or should not be accepted. The Advisory Committee in its turn forwards its recommendation about the acceptance of the report of the Standing Committee to the World Bank for no objection. After the World Bank intimates to the Government of India that it has no objection to the recommendation, the latter in its turn communicates decision of the World Bank to the State Government.
15. The Government of Guajarat invited applications in the prescribed form for pre-qualification by the Narmada Project Authority by International Competitive Bidding Pre-qualification Notice No. 1/83 from intending bidders for the dam construction. This notice was published in the various dairy newspapers, in the periodical known as World Bank Development Forum and International Trade Magazines. It was also furnished to the embassies of foreign countries who are members of the World Bank and of Taiwan and Switzerland. By the said notice, it was intimated to the persons concerned that pre-qualification documents along with the technical note giving brief description of the work to be executed and model tender provisions would be made available from April 20, 1983 onwards from the office specified therein, and the last date for submitting such applications was prescribed as Aug. 22, 1983.
16. In pursuance of the above pre-qualification notice, 29 applications were received from the interested parties by the last date specified, including the petitioners. The opening, of the pre-qualification applications for dam construction was 12th Sept., 1983 before the Standing Committee. The said Committee held as many as eight meetings during the period October, 1983 to February, 1984 at Gandhinagar, New Delhi and Baroda. The applications were scrutinised to verify as to whether the applicants had satisfied the prescribed criteria of placing at least 25 M/3 cement concrete per month on dam or similar works and whether the applicants had in one of the last five years annual turnover of Rs. 400 millions in construction. Besides this twin test, the Standing Committee scrutinised the application by the joint venture consortia as to whether the lead firm had been identified; the consortia had practical and workable arrangements amongst the parties; whether clear arrangement had been made regarding the responsibility of execution and financial arrangement and whether the respective parties were competent to discharge the responsibilities so assigned, and whether the lead firm had the necessary skill and capacity to lead. After detailed scrutiny, it was ascertained that 14 applicants would pre-qualify whose names were specified in the report of the Committee. So far as the petitioners were concerned, the conclusion of the Standing Committee for not pre-qualifying them was to the effect that the application was not responsive and the first Petitioner Company had admittedly no experience on dam construction. This report of the Standing Committee was placed before the Advisory Committee on April 10, 1984. The report was scrutinised and the original documents examined, and it was decided to accept the recommendation of the Standing Committee pre-qualifying 14 applicants out of 29. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee required the members to scrutinise the applications of the parties who were not recommended for pre-qualification by referring to their original documents and on review and detailed deliberation, the Advisory Committee unanimously approved the recommendation of the Standing Committee not to pre-qualify 15 of the applicants. These recommendations of the Advisory Commtitee were forwarded to the World Bank in July, 1984. The officers of the World Bank visited India in September, 1984 and scrutinised the original documents. On December 14, 1984 the World Bank communicated to the Government of India their no objection to the recommendation made by the Advisory Committee on pre-qualification, and the Government of India in turn communicated the said decision of the World Bank to respondent No. 1.
17. Similarly by International Competitive Bidding Pre-qualification Notice No. 2/83, applications were invited for pre qualification from the prospective bidders for Power House Construction. The last date for receipt of the applications was specified as 17th Nov., 1983 which was again extended up to 22nd Dec., 1983. In response to this notice, 39 applications were received by 22nd Dec., 1983. The applications were opened on Jan. 11, 1984 before the Standing Committee which scrutinised the applications in two meetings held on April 11 and April 26, 1984. The Standing Committee found 19 firms as pre-qualified. So far as the petitioners were concerned, their applications were also rejected for power house construction broadly on the ground that their application was not responsive and the first petitioner had no experience of underground work. This report was placed before the Advisory Committee on June 14, 1984 and the Advisory Committee, on scrutiny, accepted the recommendation of the Standing Committee in respect of the 19 applications, and also decided to add one more name to the said list of pre-qualified prospective bidders. These recommendations were forwarded to the World Bank in July 1984. After the personal scrutiny by the officers of the World Bank in September, 1984 as stated above, no objection was communicated by the Bank on Dec. 14, 1984 to the Government of India which in its turn intimated it to the State Government.
18. The main contention urged on behalf of the petitioners was that the decision of the State Government refusing to pre-qualify the petitioners both in respect of the dam as well as power house construction is bad in law and void and, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside. Five subsidiary contentions have been urged in support of this broad contention. Firstly, it was urged that the respondents have failed to apply their mind to the correct criteria to be adopted in deciding the question of pre-qualification. Secondly, it was urged that the Advisory Committee in so far as it accepted that the petitioners were rightly refused pre-qualification it acted beyond the prescribed criteria of pre-qualification in spite of clear directions of the World Bank otherwise and, therefore, the decision of the State Government in accepting the same is vitiated Thirdly, it was contended that the respondents have failed to appreciate in correct legal perspective, the responsibility of the partners in a joint venture which was recognised as a legal entity to make an application under the information and instruction to the application seeking pre-qualification. Fourthly the decision refusing to pre-qualify the petitioners was based on grounds which are neither legal nor valid and, therefore, was one which no reasonable person could have reached on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. Fifthly, the decision of the respondents refusing to pre-qualify the petitioners was contrary to public interest.
19. On behalf of the respondents, these contentions were sought to be repelled by urging that the Advisory Committee was only a recommending body and the final approval was by the World Bank and inasmuch as the applications have been screened and subjected to scrutiny by the Committee consisting of highly qualified technical experts and the senior secretaries of the union and the State Governments, and also re-examined by the Advisory Committee and reviewed by the World Bank, it cannot be successfully urged that the decision was arbitrary and illegal and if, after detailed scrutiny at three different levels, the petitioners were found to be not pre-qualified inasmuch as their applications were not responsive and one of the two partners of the joint venture consortia was admittedly without requisite experience for the dam construction or the underground power house, this Court should not interfere with such a decision, particularly because the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere in such purely administrative decision is peripheral in the sense that it can subject it to judicial scrutiny only when it finds that the decision is so perverse that no reasonable person could have reached it. On these contentions, broadly, three questions arise:
Firstly what is the extent of the power of judicial scrutiny of a purely executive decision in the matter of pre-qualification of the prospective bidders who may respond to the invitation to tender their offers for entering into engineering contracts particularly where the State Government has an absolute discretion to reject the applications for pre-qualifications without assigning any reason. Secondly, whether the State Government has, in reaching the impugned decision, erred on the matter of principle so as to warrant the interference by this Court Thirdly, what would be the appropriate relief that should be granted, if the impugned decision was so vitiated.
20-21. It is well established on principle and authority in the administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged and it must scrupulously observe these standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them see: Ramana v. International Airport Authority, AIR 1979 SC: 1628; A.S Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 984 and Sukhdev v. Bhagatram, AIR 1975 SC 1331. This rule does not rest merely on Art. 14 of the Constitution though it can be said to be an adjunct of it. It is clear, however, that the rule has an independent existence apart from Art. 14 and it has been evolved judicially to check the exercise of arbitrary power by the executive authority. The Supreme Court in International Airport Authority's case (supra), speaking through Bhagwati, J., observed that there is no logic in hesitating to adopt this rule as a part of ever expanding administrative law in the country, particularly because of the tremendous expansion of welfare and social service and powers and functions of the State even in the field of commercial activities. The Supreme Court approved the following observation of Mathew, J. in V. Punnen Thomas,… v. State Of Kerala,…., AIR 1969 Ker 81, which was a Full Bench decision where the Court made the following pertinent observation:
“The Government is not and should not be as free as an individual in selecting the recipients for its largess. Whatever its activity, the Government is still the Government and will be subject to restraints, inherent in its position in a democratic society. A democratic Government cannot lay down arbitrary and capricious standards for the choice of persons with whom alone it will deal.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Supreme Court referred approvingly to its earlier decision in Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 266, where the Court in the context of black-listing of a party without giving him an opportunity to be heard ruled, speaking through Ray, C.J (as he then was) that the Government is not like a private individual who can pick and choose the person with whom it will deal, and it cannot without adequate reason exclude any person from dealing with it when it was to enter into commercial contracts. It was clarified in that decision that the State need not enter into any contract with any one, but if it is so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure. Bhagwati, J., thereafter summed up the legal position in the following terms:
“12…… It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving, jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licenses or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largess including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licenses etc. must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory.”
(Emphasis supplied)
22. It is axiomatic to say that Art. 14 strikes at the arbitrariness in State action, and fairness and equality of treatment is implicit in the rule of law. The rule postulates that the State action must not be arbitrary and founded on some rational and relevant principle which should not be discriminatory. The State should not allow itself to be guided by extraneous or irrelevant consideration since that would itself amount to denial of equality. The Supreme Court ruled in International Airport Authority's case (supra) that the principle of reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as philosophically an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness is projected by Article 14 and it must characterise every State action, whether it be under authority of law or in exercise of executive power without making of law. The State cannot, therefore, act arbitrarily in entering into relationship, contractual or otherwise with a third party, but its action must conform to some standard or norm which is rational and non-discriminatory. (See also Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd.'s case) (supra).
23. What is the standard of reasonableness to which the State action must conform is a moot question. The principle that State must exercise its powers reasonably has to be reconciled with no less an important doctrine than that the Court must not usurp the discretion invested in the public authority. A public authority invested with the discretion to take decision, has “genuinely free discretion within the bounds of legal reasonableness. The courts should shun the temptation to delineate these boundaries too rigidly. The approach of the Court must be to adopt and apply an objective standard which may leave to the “deciding authority the full range of choices” which the Legislature is presumed to have intended. The decision cannot be capricious or according to the humour of the authority and if it confines itself within the bounds of legal reasonableness the Court is precluded from looking further into the merits of such decision. Broadly expressed, “the decision is unlawful if it is one to which no reasonable authority could have come” (See: Wade on Administrative Law, Fifth Edition, pages 362-363). The classical formula adopted by Lord Greene. M.R which has become known as ‘Wednesbury’ principle in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1948) 1 KB 223, is illustrative, which is in the following terms:
“It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology used in relation to exercise of statutory discretion often use the word ‘unreasonable’ in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must be done. For instance, a person entrusted, with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting ‘unreasonably’. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. Warrington L.J in Short v. Pools Corporation, (1926) Ch 66 gave the example of the red-haired teacher, dismissed because she had red hair. This is unreasonable in one sense. In another it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith; and, in fact, all these things run into one another.”
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Wade in his Administrative Law, Fifth Edition at p. 365 observes as under:
“The expression ‘arbitrary and capricious’ is sometimes used as a synonym for ‘unreasonable’; and in one case this has been transmuted into ‘frivolous or vexatious’ and ‘capricious and vexatious’. But the meaning of all such expressions is necessarily the same, since the true question must always be whether the statutory power has been exceeded.”.
25. At page 364 the principle has been digested as under:
“…. Unreasonableness is a generalised rubric covering not only sheer absurdity or caprice, but also illegitimate motives and purposes, a wide category of errors commonly described as ‘irrelevant considerations’, and mistakes and misunderstandings which can be classed as self-misdirection, or addressing oneself to the wrong question…….”
26. At page 355 in the same treatise of Administrative Law, it has been observed that the notion of absolute or unfettered discretion is rejected since in a system based on rule of law, unfettered governmental discretion is a contradiction in terms. Unfettered discretion is wholly inappropriate to a public authority which possesses power for the public good. Unreviewable administrative action is just as much a contradiction in terms as is unfettered discretion, at any rate in the case of statutory powers. Lord Danning M.R in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971) 2 Q.B 175, observed as under:
“The discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered. It is a discretion which is to be exercised according to law. That means at least this: the statutory body must be guided by relevant considerations and not by irrelevant. If its decision is influenced by extraneous considerations which it ought not to have taken into account, then the decision cannot stand. No matter that the statutory body may have acted in good faith nevertheless the decision will be set aside. That is established by Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food which is a landmark in modern administrative law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
27. We do not think that it can be urged successfully that these principles hold good only qua statutory discretionary powers. The following observation of Wade on Administrative Law, 5th Edition at page 360: clearly fortifies the above view:
“……It shows that statutory implication is not the indispensable basis of the principle that the discretion of public authorities is never unfettered. Its real basis is that nothing else is compatible with a proper system of administrative law.”
28. A faint attempt was made on behalf of the State Government to urge that the principles governing the power of judicial review of statutory discretionary decision cannot be extended wholly while examining the question of alleged abuse of wide discretionary power vested in the executive body. We do not think that the executive discretionary powers are legally absolute and totally immuned from judicial review. The following observation from De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edition at p. 289 is very instructive:
“…. The absence of a statutory power should not in itself be a conclusive reason for a refusal by the courts to entertain proceedings in which it was alleged, for example, that a contractor had been removed without a hearing from a list of approved government contractors because the Minister believed that the contractor had breached the terms of the Government's incomes policy, or that companies were excluded from submitting tenders on the basis of manifestly arbitrary considerations.”
(Emphasis supplied)
29. We do not think that the above contention urged by the learned Advocate General on behalf of the State can be sustained particularly in view of the clear exposition of law by the Supreme Court in International Airport Authority's case (AIR 1979 SC 1628) (supra) that the principle of reasonableness and rationality must characterise every State action whether it be under authority of law or in exercise of the executive power without making of law.
30. In Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa, AIR 1975 SC 2226, the Supreme Court, after referring to the earlier relevant decisions in this connection and also the decision of the House of Lords in Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 1968 AC 997 summed up the legal position as under in para 13 at page 2234:
“13. The Executive have to reach their decisions by taking into account relevant considerations. They should not refuse to consider relevant matter nor should take into account wholly irrelevant or extraneous consideration. They should not mis-direct themselves on a point of law. Only such a decision will be lawful. The courts have power to see that the Executive acts lawfully. It is no answer to the exercise of that power to say that the Executive acted bona fide nor that they have bestowed painstaking consideration. They cannot avoid scrutiny by courts by failing to give reasons. If they give reasons and they are not good reasons, the Court can direct them to reconsider the matter in the light of relevant matters, though the propriety, adequacy or satisfactory character of those reasons may not be open to Judicial scrutiny. Even if the Executive considers it inexpedient to exercise their powers they should state their reasons and there must be material to show that they have considered all the relevant facts.”
30A. In CIT, Bombay v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 1182, the Supreme Court in the context of the validity of the order of the Central Government accepting the recommendation of the specified authority refusing to issue declaration under S. 72A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to the respondent-Company, speaking through Tulzapurkar J., summed up the legal position about the power of the judicial scrutiny of such a decision in the following terms in paragraph 11:
“By now, the parameters of the Court's power of judicial review of administrative or executive action or decision and the grounds on which the Court can interfere with the same are well settled and it would be redundant to recapitulate the whole catena of decisions of this Court commencing from Barium Chemicals 1966 Supp SCR 311 : (AIR 1967 SC 295 case on the point. Indisputably, it is a settled position that if the action or decision is perverse or is such that no reasonable body of persons, properly informed, could come to or has been arrived at by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong approach or has been, influenced by irrelevant or extraneous matters, the Court would be justified in interfering with the same. This Court in one of its later decisions in Smt. Shalini Soni v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCR 962 : AIR 1981 SC 431 has observed thus:” It is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote”. Suffice it to say that the following passage appearing at pages 285-86 in Prof, de Smith's treatise ‘Judicial Review of Administrative Action’ (4th Edn) succinctly summarises the several principles formulated by the Courts in that behalf thus:
“The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it: it must not act under the dictation of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the latter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Nor where a judgment must be made that certain facts exist can a discretion be validly exercised on the basis of an erroneous assumption about those facts. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: failure to exercise a discretion, and excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account; and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. Nor, is it possible to differentiate with precision the grounds of invalidly contained within each category.”
(Emphasis supplied)
31. The principles enunciated in International Airport Authority's case (AIR 1979 SC 1628) (supra) were again reiterated by the Supreme Court in Kasturi Lal v. State of J & K, AIR 1980 SC 1992. The Supreme Court, however, indicated the basic principle which must guide the court in adjudicating upon the validity of a discretionary executive order. The Supreme Court raised a caution that there may be an infinite variety of considerations which may have to be taken into account by the Government in formulating its policies and it is on a total evaluation of various considerations which have weighed-with the Government in taking a particular action. While determining as to whether the governmental action is reasonable and in public interest, the first principle which the Court has to bear in mind is that there is always a presumption that the governmental action is reasonable and in public interest and the heavy burden to prove lies on a party challenging such decision for rebutting the presumption by producing proper and adequate material. The second principle which has been emphasised is that the Court must not lightly assume that the impugned action is unreasonable or without public interest. However, when it is satisfied that the impugned decision is unreasonable or against public interest, the courts are duty bound under the Constitution to invalidate such action and this duty is the bed-rock of rule of law. The third principle which has been indicated is that this ground of the action being unreasonable or without public interest is different from that of mala fides.
32. It is in the backdrop of this settled legal position that we have to decide as to whether the impugned decision, of the State Government has been vitiated and, if so, on what grounds. We will shortly remind ourselves of the five subsidiary contentions urged in support of the attack on the validity of the impugned decision. The question of pre-qualification is determined on a totally irrelevant consideration and after ignoring the relevant material. The concept of joint venture and the rights and liabilities inter se of such venture have not been properly understood and appreciated. The underlying purpose of the guideline issued by the World Bank is ignored and the whole question has been determined on grounds which were neither legal nor valid with the result that the impugned decision was unreasonable and against the public interest.
33. It should be noted at the outset that the basic purpose which generally guides the World Bank's requirements when it extends its financial assistance is that of eligible bidders from all developing and developed countries must have an opportunity to compete so that the execution of the project may be efficient and economic, and the local contractors may be encouraged. The World Bank, therefore, required that the agencies obtaining loans from the Bank must frame rules to prescribe procedure for evaluation of the pre-qualification of the applicants before their applications are opened and taken into, consideration. Accordingly, the rules were framed by the authorities and approved by the Advisory Committee on Sept. 10, 1983 before the relevant applications were opened on Sept. 12, 1983. The procedure envisages a setting up of a committee to analyse the pre-qualification documents. Accordingly a Permanent Standing Committee was appointed and entrusted with the task of the scrutiny of the applications in accordance with the procedure for evaluation. The Standing Committee held about eight meetings during the period October 1983 to February 1984 and examined and evaluated the applications of about 29 firms which sought the pre-qualification for Dam construction. The applications of about four firms which submitted pre-qualification information and documents after the last date were not taken into consideration. One of the very important points which we have to emphasize is that it is an admitted position that the Standing Committee did not find it necessary to ask for clarification and further related information from the applicants but made its evaluation on the basis of the information supplied in various documents furnished along with the applications. The method of evaluation as approved by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee consists of procedure and rules contained in Parts I and II as detailed in Enclosure to the report of the scrutiny for pre-qualification for dam construction. Shortly stated, the procedure prescribed is as under:
1. Any applicant capable of undertaking and completing the whole work within the stipulated time to the satisfaction, of the Standing Committee is entitled to pre-qualify.
2. An applicant can either be an individual or a proprietary firm, a firm in partnership, a limited company, or a limited Corporation, or group of firms known as joint venture.
3. (a) In case of joint venture, the sponsoring firm has to submit complete information and identify the lead firm.
(b) It has to establish to the satisfaction of the Committee that practicable, workable and legally enforceable arrangement is made amongst the parties and there is a clear assignment of the responsibilities regarding the execution and financial arrangement, and that individual parties to whom such responsibilities are assigned are capable in their individual capacity to discharge them competently and satisfactorily, and that the lead firm has necessary skill and capacity to lead during the entire period of execution for purposes of the responsibility and the involvement as well as control and directions on the resources of the entire joint venture.
4. A system of awarding points for capability under various heads so as to judge the over all capability and fitness be evolved.
5. The Committee will have freedom to ask for clarification and further related information from the applicants, check resources and make inspection of the prospective tender work.
34. In order to satisfy this procedure, rules have been framed. Rules 1A, 1B, 4A and 4B are material for our purposes and they are, therefore, set out in extenso:
“Part-II — Rules
1A. No evaluation will be done if the application is non-responsive or if the ‘applicant’ does not fulfil the twin criteria of—
(a) must have placed at least 25000 cubic metre cement concrete per month, and
(b) yearly turn-over of Indian Rs. 40 crores or its equivalent in construction in any one of the last 5 years.
1B. If only the applicant is qualified as “A” above, further evaluation will be done as per the norms laid down in Rule 4 below:
1C & 1D XXXX.
2. & 3 XXXX
4A. If the applicant is a Joint Venture, the details of the lead firm which will be —
(a) in charge of the actual execution of the work,
(b) incharge of the organisation, equipment and machinery etc. on site, and
(c) incharge of financial dealings as regards all payments including payments for work done, claims etc.
will be considered for determining the pre-qualification.
4B. Total points:
100
Points will be awarded under the following Heads:
Heads
Total points
I. Technical capability
30
II. Financial capability
10
III. Organisational capability
30
IV. Experience
25
V. Overall Assessment
5
Grand Total
100
Negative points will be awarded to applicants for certain disabilities and failure like those elaborated in 4B VI below:
XXXXXXXX”
35. It is not necessary for us to refer to the result of the evaluation of the applicants who had been according to the Standing Committee, entitled to be pre-qualified. We may refer to the result of scrutiny of those applicants who failed to pre-qualify themselves, for the work of dam. So far as the petitioners are concerned, the result of the scrutiny has been set out at Sr. No. 2 in Annexure “V” to the report of scrutiny for dam. We may set out in extenso the conclusion of the Committee in respect of the petitioners:
Result of scrutiny of applications which do not prequalify (either non-responsive or which do not fulfil the two eligibility criteria, or the requirements regarding Joint Venture).
Sr. No.
Sr. No. of applicant.
Name of applicant.
Conclusion.
1
XX
XX
XX
2.
2/29
AFCONS-MAEDA J.V FOR NARMADA PROJECT.
The joint venture agreement is silent about division of responsibilities as well as about the lead firm. In form C, however, some division of responsibilities has been indicated but the lead firm has not been identified. AFCONS is nominated as sponsoring firm; the application is therefore to that extent non-responsive.
MAEDA have adequate experience in dam construction but AFCONS have admittedly no experience on dam construction. The enclosure 10 on p. 198 of AFCONS' document shows that the work will be executed by them under guidance and supervision of MAEDA.
36. The Standing Committee has recommended for pre-qualifying 14 applicants out of 29. This report of the scrutiny was placed before the Advisory Committee. It was circulated in advance amongst the members before the first committee meeting. The report was discussed by the Advisory Committee with reference to the original documents which were tendered by the different applicant-firms. The Advisory Committee reviewed the report, of the Standing Committee and examined the details of the original documents of 14 applicants who were recommended for pre-qualification by the Standing Committee. As regards the applicants who have failed to prequalify as per the report of the Standing Committee, the Advisory Committee had noted in its 13th meeting held at New Delhi on April 10, 1984, that with regard to the applicants who were not recommended for pre-qualification by the Standing Committee, the Chairman of the Sardar Sarovar Construction Advisory Committee (SSCAC —, in short) suggested that in view of the urgency of completing the task such cases may be further examined by the members during the meeting itself. Accordingly, the members scrutinised all such applications with reference to the original documents. As a result of this review and detailed deliberation, the Committee reached its final conclusion which was unanimously approved. The list of the applicants who were finally pre-qualified by the SSCAC is given in Annexure “II”.
37. Similarly for the work of the power house, the rules and procedure were formulated and approved by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Jan. 4, 1984. The procedure which has been formulated and approved was almost in the same terms as was prescribed for the work of dam construction. The rules framed for implementing this procedure, though similar, are slightly differently worded. Rules 1A and 1B read as under:
“1-A: No evaluation will be done —
i) if the information given in Form C or Annexure A, Sr. No. 9 or Annexure B, Sr. No. 8-A or Form B, Item 5 is incomplete and the application is therefore considered ‘non-responsive’, or
ii) if the applicant does not fulfil the criteria for eligibility laid down in clause 8-04 and 8-05 which are reproduced below:
8.04 The applicant applying for prequalification must provide evidence of having adequate experience in control and modern blasting technique in Under Ground Excavation, rock-bolting, shotcreating and permanent underground support system.
8.05 To qualify the applicant must have done Underground excavation with an output of not less than 10,000 cubic metres per month in rock mass. He must have had at least in one of the last five years an yearly turnover of Indian Rs. 50 million or equivalent in construction.
1-B. If only the applicant is qualified as per “A” above, further evaluation will be done as per the norms laid down in Rule 4 below.
38. Rule 4 comprises of two parts, rule 4A and rule 4B. They are in parimateria with rules 4A and 4B adopted for the work of dam construction as set out above.
39. In all 39 applicants sought prequalification for the Power House Construction. Three parties submitted information and necessary documents after the last date for submission of the applications for pre-qualification, that is, 22nd Dec. 1983 and therefore they were not taken into consideration. Annexure “V” to this report of scrutiny contains appraisal of joint venture proposals. This appraisal is contained in a tabular form which contains 8 columns. The appraisal of the petitioners as contained in this statement is in the following terms:
Name & Firms
Whether there is an agreement
Whether the lead firm is identified
Whether the JV has made practicable, workable & legally enforceable arrangement amongst the parties
Whether the responsibilities regarding execution & financial arrangements have been able clearly laid down & assigned
Whether the individual parties to whom the responsibility regarding execution & financial arrangements are assigned are capable in their individual capacity to discharge them competently & satisfactorily
Whether the lead firm has the necessary skill & capacity to lead & also the responsibility and involvement for the entire period of execution as well as a leading role in control & direction of the resources of the entire joint venture
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
AFCONS & MAEDA
Yes
Not mentioned in JV agreement AFCONS Mentions itself as lead firm in its Form C whereas Maeda mentions AFCONS as sponsor
Yes
Financing, Execution “Jointly & severally” (Clause 6 of J.V)
Individual responsibility not defined
AFCONS who have stated (form-C) they will execute the work, have no experience of U.G works
40. Annexure “VII” to this report of scrutiny for Power House Construction contains list of applicants who are considered non-eligible for further evaluation. The common remarks of the Committee in respect of Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 are given at Sr. No. 5. These remarks are in the following terms:
“Joint venture agreement is defective for the following reasons:
(a) Lead firm not identified in agreement. AFCONS have stated (in their Form-C) that they would be the lead firm and would execute the work. MAEDA in their Form-C mentions AFCONS as sponsoring firm only.
(b) Responsibilities of parties for executing work are not clearly defined.
(c) AFCONS who have stated that they would execute the work have no experience of underground works.”
41. The Standing Committee recommended the names of 20 parties as being qualified while it rejected the cases of about 19 parties on one or the other ground. This report of scrutiny of the Standing Committee was placed before the Advisory Committee in its meeting at New Delhi on 14th June, 1984. The Advisory Committee accepted the report of the scrutiny by the Standing Committee with an addition of the name of one more party as entitled to be pre-qualified.
42. At this stage, it is necessary to refer to two telex messages sent by the World Bank Authorities on July 16, 1984 and August 6, 1984. The first telex message of July 16, 1984 is to be found at Annexure “II” to the affidavit in surrejoinder of Shri I.M Shah, Secretary to the Government of Gujarat in Narmada Development Department dated March 25, 1985. This message contains the approach which was to be adopted for pre-qualification of the applicants for dam as well as Power House Construction. It has been emphasised by the World Bank Authorities that the approach of the Committee should be flexible and the applicants who may be suitable should be invited to submit additional information. It has been also pointed out that in the qualification process it is a standard practice that all applicants who may be qualified, if some questions are answered, be requested to provide clarification, and such question may include the particulars “regarding (a) firm's part in a Joint Venture or any other technicality”. Seeking clarification should not be viewed as giving an undue advantage to one party since it will significantly help to ensure that suitable applicants are not disqualified on the basis of some technicality or misunderstanding. In the opinion of the World Bank Authorities, it is proper and prudent to qualify a Joint Venture applicant that may need some administrative revision with the condition that the applicant would make those revisions and provide the required type of Joint Venture in its standard. The World Bank offered the following comments in light of the above prefatory remarks on the recommendations made by the Advisory Committee in respect of the pre-qualification of the parties in respect of the Dam and Power House Construction. The comments are worth repeating in extenso:
“i) The approach in evaluating the applicants was too rigid.
ii) It is very unusual to find that no clarifications or supplementary information were requested from any of the 68 applicants.
iii) There are questions that should be asked of some applicants.
iv) There is good evidence to indicate that there are more applicants capable of doing the work than appear on your tentative list of recommendation.”
In summary the applicants were treated as if they were tenders and not simply applicants to prequalify to be allowed to tender. Therefore, we strongly advise that clarification now be requested of any applicant on any application on which there exist any doubts about ability to perform work. These clarifications can be obtained in a matter of days. We recommend that the above exercise be conducted expeditiously with a goal of qualifying all applicants who are capable of performing the task under question.”
(Emphasis supplied)
43. The next telex message sent by the World Bank is of August 6, 1984. It is also annexed to the aforesaid affidavit and marked Annexure “II” collectively The World Bank Authorities did not think it fit to revise or modify their comments contained in the telex message of July 16, 1984 set out above even after the receipt of the detailed evaluation report from the Advisory Committee. It has been explicitly stated in this telex message of August 6, 1984 that even after examining those reports the authorities found no reason to change their recommendation and, therefore, their position remained as outlined in the telex message of July 16, 1984. The Bank Authorities felt concerned at the significant difference between the level of acceptance for the individual firms which was as high as 68% as compared to the applicants of Joint Venture which was only 16%. The following remarks in this message of August 6, 1984 make an interesting reading:
“…..There are some large and capable firms who appear likely to have qualified on their own but were rejected as partners in joint ventures. As is the case for single firms, prequalification of joint ventures should be based only on their ability to perform the required work as indicated by their experience, personnel, equipment, and financial status. If joint venture partners are the lowest evaluated bidders, you must be satisfied that each firm carried appropriate responsibilities and is committed to joint and several responsibility for performance of the contract. For prequalification, purposes, however, it is not necessary and sometimes not even possible to have full details of joint venture proposals. Therefore joint ventures which include one or more firms who are able to perform the work and who indicate they are jointly and severally responsible should be prequalified. We suggest you review all those joint ventures that have not been qualified to see whether they meet these criteria and should therefore be prequalified. If there exist any doubts about the members of the joint venture's ability or commitment, clarifications should be requested. It is permissible to prequalify joint ventures on the condition that they will make needed organizational re-arrangements or legal commitments by the time they bid, in order to strengthen.
…The Evaluation Committee should keep in mind that the capability of the qualified firms will again be subject to their approval when they submit their bids. With respect to both joint ventures and individual applicants, some disqualifications apparently were a result of imprecise answers that should have been clarified if capability was in doubt….. In summary, we suggest that those applicants that were disqualified be re-evaluated to ensure that all applicants who have the ability to perform the work are prequalified to bid. Clarifications should be requested if there exist any doubts about in applicant's ability to perform the work. Pay special attention to the joint ventures in which there are clearly capable firms…..”
(Emphasis supplied)
44. Two telex messages had been received thereafter one on December 16, 1984 and another on December 26, 1984. In between, somewhere in September, 1984, the officers, of the World Bank had come to India and examined the documents and other related information furnished by the authorities seeking the qualification and particularly of those parties who, according t to the recommendations of the Advisory Committee, failed to pre-qualify. The telex message of Dec. 16, 1984 is at Annexure VIII to the affidavit in reply dated 5-2-1984 of said Shri I.M Shah. By the telex message of Dec. 16, 1984, the World Bank Authorities had given no-objection to the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the report of the scrutiny for pre-qualification in respect of the Dam and Power House Construction by the Standing Committee. In other words, the recommendation of the Advisory Committee accepting the report of scrutiny of the Standing Committee disqualifying, inter alia, the petitioner was cleared by the World Bank. The last telex message of Dec. 26, 1984 also makes a very interesting reading since this message had been received from the World Bank after it accorded its no-objection to the recommendations of the Advisory Committee in the matter of pre-qualification. In this last telex message, it was conveyed that the World Bank does not object to the recommendation made by the Advisory Committee to pre-qualify 14 applicants in respect of Dam Construction and 20 applicants in respect of the Power House Construction. However, the next paragraph numbered as “BBB” (Annexure “IV” to the affidavit of Shri I.M Shah dated 25-3-1985) makes an interesting reading:
“BBB. In light of the need we have indicated to you in the past, of a clarification of the definitions of joint venture and domestic preference, we recommend that any notification to prequalified applicants of their eligibility alter them to the forthcoming requirement in the bid document that will (A) require joint and several liability for any partner in a joint venture, and (B) limit eligibility for domestic preference for joint ventures to those with domestic partners carrying out at least fifty per cent of contract value.”
45. We will deal with the first four subsidiary contentions which we have set out above in support of the attack on the impugned decision of the State Government refusing to pre-qualify the petitioners. It should be recalled that in the pre-qualification information and instructions issued to the applicants seeking pre-qualification for Dam as well as. Power House Construction, joint venture consortia were allowed to apply for the same. Similarly, a group of firms was also entitled to seek pre-qualification. In other words, therefore, the authorities envisaged, inter alia, that the group, of firms and joint consortia are two distinct entities which can seek pre-qualification. The eligibility criteria are to be satisfied by the applicants, including a group of firms, or a joint venture consortia, as the case may be. This pre-qualification information makes the position abundantly clear as to what is the requirement when ah applicant is a group of firms. The printed memorandum containing information issued by the Government of Gujarat in Irrigation Department in this behalf is annexed as Annexure “A/1” to the petition. The information and instructions require that all informations requested in the enclosed form should be furnished, and if any particular query is not relevant, it should be stated as non-applicable. The prospective applicants were cautioned that giving incomplete information in the application, or making any change in the prescribed forms may render the application non-responsive. The instructions also indicate the method as regards how to apply under para 2 of the Memorandum. In case of the application by a group of firms; the instructions provide as under:
“2. Method of Applying:
If the application is made by an individual……….
If the application is made by a group of firms the sponsoring firm shall submit complete information with regard to all the information required in the forms pertaining to each firm in the group and state in covering letter attached to the application as to which of the firms shall have the responsibility for applying for Tender, Submission of Tender and for completion of the contract document and furnish evidence admissible in law in respect of the authority assigned to such firm, on behalf of the group of firms for applying for Tender, Submission of Tender and for completion of the contract document. The full information and satisfactory evidence pertaining to the participation and responsibility of each member firm of the gfoup of firms making the application shall be furnished along with the pre-qualification document duly signed by each firm. The lead firm should be clearly identified and the extent of responsibility of lead and other firms should he defined.”
(Emphasis supplied)
46. As regards Joint Venture the instructions read as under:
“Joint venture consortia will be allowed, to apply for prequalification. A pre-qualiirled firm or joint venture consortia may during tender period strengthen its capacity by the subsequent incorporation of pre-qualified firm subject to the approval of Government of Gujarat.”
47. The different forms “A” to “G” which have been referred to in the facts narrated hereinabove containing requisite particulars to be furnished by the applicants seeking prequalification, inter alia, relate to joint venture also. The particulars which are to be furnished in form “C” relating to joint venture consist of (1) name and address of joint venture; (2) name and address of all the partners of joint, venture; (3) the responsibility of the firm leading the joint venture and the responsibility of the other joint venture partners; (4) the name of bankers and (5) the financial participation of each firm in the joint venture. Thus, it is clear that in case of a group of firms, the applicant-has to give, more particulars which have been set out above, namely, which firm will be responsible for applying for and submission of tender and for completion of the contract document, and also the responsibility of the lead firm as well as other member-firms is to be clearly stated. The effect of the conjoint reading of the Memorandum of instructions and information as well as the forms in which the particulars were to be furnished clearly indicates that the authorities had visualized and envisaged the group of firms as well as the joint venture consortia as different entities which could seek pre-qualification. It appears from the particulars which are required to be furnished in form “C” that the authorities envisaged that there may be cases of joint venture consortia where one of the partner-firms may have a leading role to play, and the responsibility of their joint venture partners may not be so leading and important. It is in respect of such cases that the particulars are to be furnished about the responsibility of the firm leading the joint venture, and the responsibility of the other partners thereof. The legal concept of the joint venture is very well recognised, and we do not think that the authorities in these High Powered Committees can be oblivious of this recognised legal concept. If they are, they have completely misdirected themselves. The common law did not recognise the relationship of co-adventures but with the passage of time, the judicial decisions recognised what is known as ‘joint adventure’ of two or more persons undertaking to combine, their property or labour in conduct of particular line of trade or a general business for joint profits. The Courts do not treat a joint adventure as identical with a partnership though it is so similar in nature, and in the contractual relationship created by such adventurers that the rights as between them are governed practically by the same rules that govern the partnership. This relationship has been defined to be a special combination of persons undertaking jointly some specific adventure for profit without any actual partnership. It is also described as a commercial or a maritime enterprise undertaking by several persons jointly; a limited partnership not limited in the statutory sense as to the liabilities of partners but as to its scope and duration. Generally speaking the distinction between a joint adventure and a partnership is that former relates to a single transaction ‘though it may comprehend a business to be continued over several years’ while the later relates to a joint business of a particular kind (see: 48 American Law Reports at p. 1055 under the caption “what amounts to a joint adventure” at pages 1056-57 and 1060). It is generally agreed that in order to constitute a joint venture, there must be community of interest and right to joint control. It is recognised on authority that each of the parties must have an equal voice in the matter of its performance and control over the agencies used therein, though one authority may entrust the performance, to another. There, is also an authority to the effect that a joint venture may exist although the parties have unequal control of operations. The rights, duties and liabilities of joint venturers are similar or analogous to those which govern the corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of the partners. As in the case of partners, joint venturers may be jointly and severally liable to third parties for the debts of the venture (see: American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Vol. 46, para 12 at pages 33-34 and para 57 to p. 76). Joint Venture groups are internationally recognised in form of cooperation in the joint fulfilment of the construction contract obligations. Joint venture groups in the construction, industry come about through agreements for combination of legally independent contractors for the joint rendering of construction services limited in both time and content. Typically they are restricted to a single project in which case the members of the group act jointly at both the tendering and award stages. Joint venture groups are generally unincorporated associations. The legal systems in general have not kept pace with the growing economic means of joint venture groups and there is no special legal form for this type of co-operation which has come to stay in construction industry. However, in Australia and Germany, joint venture groups as also unincorporated civil law partnerships are subjected to law of partnership. In United States also the law of partnership is applied to joint venture consortia. It is only in France that a special legal form has been created in this behalf. The joint venture groups have got, inter alia, the characteristics of joint organisation, joint action through co-operation of all members of all individual persons acting on the instructions of the members, and joint liability for rendition of services to third parties, and the relation between the partners inter se to be governed according to the joint venture group agreements. The economic importance of joint venture consortia on the one hand, and absence of specific legal provisions on the other has raised a host of problems of interpretation in individual cases since a wide variety of model contracts and pre-printed contract forms are adopted to suit the needs and convenience of a particular construction project. These problems have direct effect on the partners inter se and indirect effect on the third parties, such as customers. If several construction enterprises tender jointly and have been jointly awarded the construction contract, they are obliged to perform the contract jointly as joint venture group. One of the difficult problems which is likely to arise when a construction contract is about to be entered into since the customer when concluding the contract with a joint venture is dealing with all the members of the group, who are jointly committed to rendering the services. The contract has, therefore, to be concluded by an authorised representative of all the members of such a group en-bloc for the simple reason that joint venture groups are unincorporated associations. The services to be rendered by the group are to be allocated amongst the members of the same by internal agreement, and consequently the rights and duties of the members inter se are also regulated by the group agreement. These internal agreements are not effective vis-a-vis the third parties, and they operate amongst the members inter se. Thus, all the members are jointly and severally liable for performance of the construction work jointly undertaken irrespective of internal division of the work. If one member of the joint venture group does not fulfil his commitments, the others are under joint and several obligation to carry out such obligations vis-a-vis the customer. Such a situation may arise when a member of a joint venture group drops out prematurely because of the liquidation or insolvency. When a contract is concluded with a joint venture group all members are made jointly and severally liable even if only one is capable of rendering the service in question. The joint and several liabilities of the members of a joint venture group may cover the marginal areas of the contract performance such as late performance, faults, deficiency of goods and services etc. It is, therefore, very necessary while entering into such contracts with joint venture group that the construction contracts are carefully drafted, and the members of such group must also enter into detailed agreements amongst themselves, (see: Article on Joint Venture Groups — Effects of construction Contract: Dr. Manfred Straube, Professor of Commercial Law, Technical University, Vienna in “International Business Lawyer”, March 1985, a monthly published by a Section of Business Law of International Bar Association, London)
48. In India, a person can become a partner with another person in a particular adventure or undertaking (see: S. 8 of the Partnership Act, 1932). This is described as a particular partnership also since it is confined to a particular adventure or undertaking, or it may be one limited even to a particular advantage or undertaking or an isolated transaction in course of trade or business. However, the three elements of partnership, namely, agreement, business and mutual agency must exist as a matter of course. The only difference between such partnership in nature of joint venture and an ordinary partnership is that in joint venture partners incur no responsibility beyond the limits of the particular advanture or business or undertaking and the rights and obligations are, therefore, less extensive than those of partners in ordinary partnership (See: Karmali v. Karimji, 39 ILR Bom 261 : (AIR 1914 PC 132)).
49. Having regard, therefore, to the legal position in general and to the particular position as available in India in respect of joint venture firms, it is really difficult to conceive that in case of a joint venture consortia which seeks pre-qualification for purposes of obtaining tender documents, there would be invariably a lead firm and the several responsibilities assigned to other joint venture partners. It is no doubt true that one of the columns in form “C” pertaining to joint ventures required the particulars regarding the responsibility of the lead firm, and those of joint venture partners. As pointed out in Karmali's case (supra), joint venture is a partnership of a limited character and consequently the liability to be enforced against one partner when there is no document of debt which on its face binds him can only be justified if it was shown that what he did was within the operations natural of the partnership and for the partnership. However, when there is a clear basic agreement between the persons entering into joint venture consortia, it would indicate the nature-of the liability of joint venture partners vis-a-vis the customer. This basic agreement in the present case clearly indicates that all the partners were jointly and severally liable to the State Government for the contract work jointly undertaken by them. It, is, therefore, difficult on principle as well in fact to agree with the view of the State Government that the application of the petitioners for prequalification was non-responsive. The learned Advocate General was at pains to emphasise that in form “C” filed along with the respective applications by the first and the second petitioners, the particulars furnished did not indicate that the work was to be rendered jointly and the liability was joint and several. He invited our attention first to the application of the first petitioner where in form “C” it has been stated that the lead company, namely, AFCONS would execute the work whereas MAEDA would bring their trained selected persons and certain specialised equipments to ensure that the work is done in time to the required quality and standard. Similarly, in the application submitted by the second petitioner in form “C” in column 3 pertaining to the responsibility of lead firm as well those of other joint venture partners, it has been stated as under:
“All partners shall jointly and severally assume responsibilities to the Employer for the execution, completion and maintenance of the works of the project. However
Asia Foundations and Constructions Limited (Sponsoring firm) has responsibility to provide to the J.V with his knowledge pertaining to the construction works in India including procedure of customs, immigration, transportation, taxations and other matters peculiar to India.
MAEDA Construction Co. Ltd. has responsibility to provide to the J.V with its knowledge especially about Dam Construction and also responsible to arrange the dispatch of personnel, plant and materials from Japan.”
50. The learned Advocate General also invited, our attention to the additional information furnished by the first petitioner in form “C” which is annexed as Enclosure 10 to their application for pre-qualification where the first petitioner have inter alia stated that so far as the present contract was concerned, they were proposing to have an association with the second petitioner Company which is one of the largest civil engineering firms from Japan, and have executed a number of dam projects as would be evident from enclosures to their application. The particular statement on which the learned Advocate General relied reads as under:
“It is planned that the work will be executed by us under the strict guidance and supervision of MAEDA Construction Co. Ltd. As regards equipment, this will be either taken from our existing stock or purchased by us from foreign countries or will be brought by MAEDA Construction for execution of this work on temporary import basis….. You will thus observe that there is a complete transfer of technology from the foreign country to ours when the work is executed by AFCONS. We, therefore, request you to please take, this into consideration while scrutinising the pre-qualification documents and we hope that you will give us an opportunity to submit our offer for this project.”
51. On the basis of the above statement, it was urged by the learned Advocate General that the first and the second petitioners have thought fit to furnish the particulars in form “C” column 3 pertaining to responsibilities of the lead firm and those of other joint venture partners. The combined reading of form “C”, column 3 in both these applications together with the statement extracted as above from the additional information in form “G” clearly indicates that the contract work was to be executed by the first petitioner under the guidance and supervision of the second petitioner Company, though in form “C” furnished by the second petitioner, it has been stated that the responsibility of the execution of the work is joint and several. If, therefore, in submission of the learned Advocate General, having regard to the admitted fact that the first petitioner had no experience whatsoever in respect of the dam construction and power house construction, and if the responsibilities of the first petitioner, which is described as a lead firm, and those of the second petitioner, which is Joint Venture partner, are not clearly domarcated and accordingly stated in the relevant forms, no exception can be taken to the decision of the State Government which has rejected the applications of the petitioners for pre-qualification on the recommendation of the Standing Committee as accepted by the Advisory Committee and cleared by the World Bank on the ground that the applications of the petitioners were non-responsive and they did not specify the eligibility criteria prescribed for granting the pre-qualification. Thus submission of the learned Advocate General apparently appears to be attractive but on close scrutiny, we are unable to sustain it for the obvious reason that the Standing Committee as well as the Advisory Committee have failed to consider the most relevant document in the nature of the basic joint venture agreement which has been furnished by both the petitioner Companies. It is this basic agreement which is the most relevant information supplied by the petitioners which has been completely ignored from consideration. Art. 1, which provides for the purpose of the joint venture is so unequivocal and apparent that it could not have been ignored by the authorities concerned. Article 1 reads as under:
“Article 1 Purpose of the J.V
A. Applying for pre-qualification for the tender for the project.
B. The parties hereto shall prepare and submit the tender for the project in accordance with the tender documents as a joint venture.
C. Upon award of the contract for the Project by the Employer to the J.V to the parties hereto shall execute, complete and maintain the works jointly in accordance with the conditions of contract.”
(Emphasis supplied)
According to Art. 2, the name of the Joint Venture is AFCONS-MAEDA Joint Venture for Narmada Project. Art. 6 which is again a very important clause pertains to the responsibilities of the parties. It reads as under:
“Art. 6. Responsibilities of the parties
The parties hereto shall co-operate themselves with one another, shall faithfully perform and observe all the terms and conditions of the contract, and shall jointly and severally assume responsibilities to the employer.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 7 provides that AFCONS would be the sponsoring firm of the Joint Venture who would be authorised to apply for the tender, to submit the tender, to complete the contract documents and to do all other matters relating thereto including signing the documents on Behalf of the Joint Venture in connection with the project.
52. It is really difficult for us to agree with the learned Advocate General that in view of this unequivocal arrangement incorporated in the basic document, it can be ever concluded by the authorities as they did that the first Petitioner Company was to execute the works, and that since it was described as a lead firm, and the responsibilities of the other joint venture partners having not been clearly assigned, the application was non-responsive. As we have noted above while discussing the true concept of the joint venture groups in context of construction contracts, the following observation in the Article which we have profusely referred to while setting out the correct connotation of joint venture groups, is instructive on the point:
“When concluding a contract with a joint venture group, the customer is dealing with all the members of the group, who are jointly committed to rendering the service.
Since joint-venture groups are unincorporated associations, the contract is concluded by an authorised representative of all members enb-loc. The services to be rendered are allotted among the members of the joint-venture group by internal agreement Similarly, the rights and duties of the members inter se are generally regulated by the provisions of the joint-venture group agreement.
Internal agreements between members of the joint-venture group are not generally effective vis-a-vis third parties, but merely constitute the basis for mutual services and entitlements within the joint-venture group. Thus, all members are jointly and severally liable for the performance of the construction work jointly undertaken irrespective of the internal division of the work. If a member of a joint-venture group does not meet his commitments, the other members are under a joint and several obligation to provide the missing services for the customer……….
…..When a contract is concluded with a joint-venture group, all members are made jointly and severally liable even if only one is capable of rendering the service in question…..”
53. In our opinion, therefore, the authorities did not consider the most relevant information contained in the basic document and proceeded merely on some inaccurate and imprecise statements made in form “C” enclosed to the application of the petitioners. In any case, if these imprecise statements in form “C” of the two petitioners as well as the additional information in form “C” furnished by the first petitioner give rise to some doubt in the matter of the responsibilities of joint venture partners, the Standing Committee or the Advisory Committee could have sought for clarification, and further related information from the applicants as may be necessary so as to confirm the first impression I gathered on perusal of these applications. It is an admitted position that neither the Standing Committee nor the Advisory Committee thought it necessary to ask for clarification and further related information and made its scrutiny on the basis of the information supplied in various documents furnished along with the respective applications. As a matter of fact, this approach stuck the World Bank Authorities as slightly unusual. We entirely agree with the view of the World Bank Authorities that this was not the usual and proper course for this high power committee to make the scrutiny and decide merely on the basis of the information supplied in these applications, particularly when the information given in the prescribed pro forma was not in consonance with not only the recognized legal concepts of joint venture firms but also with the basic agreement of joint venture which was unequivocal in its terms and in conformity with the recognized legal rights and liabilities of the partners of joint venture inter se as well vis-a-vis the customer. The Standing Committee, in order to decide as to whether the joint venture consortia seeking pre-qualification were eligible or not, examined the cases from the angle whether the lead firm had been identified, and whether the (workable and practicable arrangement has been made amongst the parties, and whether the individual parties to whom the responsibilities regarding execution and financial arrangements were assigned were capable in their individual capacity to discharge them completely and satisfactorily. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners was, therefore, perfectly justified in urging that the Standing Committee as well as the Advisory Committee, and for that matter the State Government, have failed to apply their mind to the correct criteria to be adopted in deciding the question of pre-qualification in case of joint venture consortia applicants. The reasons, as stated above, are obvious. Firstly, the committees failed to consider the most relevant information contained in the basic agreement document, and proceeded on some imprecise information given in the pro formas without caring to call for the clarification and necessary related information in that behalf. Consequently, in our opinion, therefore, they proceeded on the grounds which can hardly be said to be germane and relevant to the inquiry. Secondly, the Committees have treated the joint venture consortia as a group of firms for all intents and purposes. They failed to realise that joint venture consortia is a distinct and separate category of applicants. This is manifestly clear from the information and instructions to the applicants seeking prequalification. It is in the case of the applicants who apply as a group of firms that the sponsoring firm had to submit complete information pertaining to each firm in the group and to state in the covering letter as to which firm shall have the responsibility for applying for and submission of tenders, and for completion of the contract documents and give satisfactory evidence and full information regarding participation and responsibility of each member firm of the group of firms. It is in the case of this category of the applicants that there is an obligation to clearly identify the lead firm and define the extent of the responsibility of the lead and other firms. This obligation could not have been prescribed in the category of the applicants who are applying as joint venture consortia. The very fact that in case of joint venture consortia applicants they have been permitted during the tender period to strengthen their capacity by subsequent incorporation of pre-qualified firm with the approval of the State Government is an indication that they can re-enforce their capability by including a pre-qualified firm during the tender period. Thirdly, the I Standing Committee as well as the Advisory Committee overlooked the clear direction of the World Bank in adopting the procedure and prescribed rules for pre-qualification of the joint venture applicants for the dam construction as well as power house construction. The Committees failed to appreciate the direction which the World Bank issued particularly in the telex message of August 6, 1984 since the authorities failed to adopt the correct criteria and prescribed entirely irrational criteria for them as if there is no difference between the joint venture firms and group of firms. The authorities of the World Bank were at pains to point out that if the joint venture partners are the lowest evaluated bidders, the authorities must be satisfied that each firm carried appropriate responsibilities and is committed to joint and several responsibilities for performance of the contract. The Bank Authorities further pointed out that for pre-qualification purposes it was not necessary, and sometimes even not possible, to have full details of joint venture proposals and, therefore, joint ventures which include one or more firms which are able to perform the work and who indicate their joint and several responsibilities should be pre-qualified. The Bank Authorities, therefore, suggested to review all those joint venture cases that have not been qualified and to see whether they meet those criteria, and if there existed any doubt about the members of the joint venture authority, or commitment, clarification should be requested. The authorities further suggested that it would be permissible to pre-qualify the joint ventures on condition that they would make the needed organizational rearrangements or legal commitments by the time they bid in order to strengthen themselves. In the last telex message of December 26, 1984, the World Bank Authorities, even after agreeing to clear the recommendation of the Standing Committee as accepted by the Advisory Committee that in light of the need which had been indicated by the Bank in the past about the clarification of the definition of joint venture, it was recommended that the pre-qualified applicants should be alerted to the requirements in the bid documents that will require joint and several liability for any partner in a joint venture. It is thus clear that the Bank Authorities were of opinion that the Committees were not unequivocal in their approach in cases of joint venture applicants, and if the joint ventures include one or more firms who are capable to perform the work and who indicate that they are jointly and severally responsible they should be pre-qualified. In our opinion, the Committees have clearly overlooked the aforesaid relevant criteria as indicated by the World Bank which are in consonance with the recognized legal connotations of joint venture concepts in context of the construction contracts. Fourthly, the ultimate decision of the State Government on the basis of the recommendation of the Advisory Committee, though cleared by the World Bank, is contrary to the public interest, inasmuch as the basic objective incorporated in the guideline of the World Bank that all eligible bidders from developing as well as developed countries must have an opportunity to compete for the execution of the work is deflated by the procedure and rules adopted by the Committee which not only applied wrong criteria and misdirected itself but also failed to consider relevant material and decided the question in a manner as no reasonable person would do it. The committees treated the applicants as if they were tenderers and not simply applicants to pre-qualify to be allowed to tender with the result that the decision is contrary to public interest. In that view of the matter, therefore, the impugned decision rejecting the applications of the petitioners for pre-qualification for the dam construction as well as power house construction is vitiated, bad in law and, therefore, liable to be set aside.
54. For the reasons aforesaid, therefore, we allowed this petition and issued a writ of certiorari in the terms in which we have made the Rule absolute vide our order of May 3, 1985, with no order as to costs.
Petition allowed.