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  • Order 9 Rule 13
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  • Order 9 Rule 13
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent against the applicant-defendant in the court of Munsiff, R. S. Pura. The defendant was summoned and appeared on 14-11-1971 with counsel, who sought time to file a written statement. The written statement was not filed on subsequent hearings. On 20-1-1972 the defendant's counsel reported "no instructions", after which the trial court proceeded ex parte. The court adjourned for recording ex parte evidence (first to 9-2-1972, then to 24-2-1972) and ultimately passed an ex parte decree on 3-3-1972.

On 29-3-1972 the defendant filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. to set aside the ex parte decree, alleging that due to an emergency (apparently a wartime emergency in December 1971) he had gone to Punjab, fell ill and was unable to move about for two to three months, and only became aware of the ex parte decree shortly before making the application. The plaintiff opposed the application.

The trial court, after evaluating evidence, found that the defendant was in his village from 16-2-1972 to 12-3-1972 and thereafter working on a Government Drug farm, held the illness allegation to be false and dismissed the application for want of sufficient cause. The Subordinate Judge (C.J.M.), Jammu, dismissed the defendant's appeal by an identical order. The defendant then filed the present revision petition challenging the concurrent judgments refusing to set aside the ex parte decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C., a defendant who appeared initially but was absent on a series of subsequent hearing dates must show sufficient cause for his absence on each of the dates constituting the hearing that culminated in an ex parte decree, or whether it suffices to show sufficient cause only for the first date when ex parte proceedings were taken.
  2. Whether the negligence or absence of instructions to the defendant's counsel (i.e., the defendant's engagement of counsel who fails to act) can amount to a sufficient cause for setting aside an ex parte decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant-Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant contended (in his application under Order 9 Rule 13) that he was prevented from appearing because he had gone to Punjab due to the emergency and had been taken ill, being unable to move about for two to three months; he only learned of the ex parte decree a few days before filing the application.
  • The defendant's learned counsel argued before the revisional court that, under Order 9 Rule 13, it is sufficient for a defendant seeking to set aside an ex parte decree to establish sufficient cause for non-appearance only on the date when ex parte proceedings were first taken. Counsel relied on a decision of the Lahore High Court—Krishan Lal Malhotra v. Madan Lal (as cited in the opinion)—to support this contention.
  • As an auxiliary contention, counsel suggested that because the petitioner had engaged counsel and had reason to believe the counsel would look after the case in his absence, this justified his non-attendance and could be a ground to set aside the decree.

Respondent-Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff contested the application to set aside the ex parte decree. (The opinion does not set out detailed, separate enumerated arguments of the plaintiff beyond the fact of contesting the application.)

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishan Lal Malhotra V. Madan Lal (A. I. R J950 Lahore, 43) Relied upon by the petitioner's counsel to support the proposition that a defendant need only show sufficient cause for non-appearance on the date when ex parte proceedings were first taken. The court examined the case, explained its facts, and distinguished it: the Lahore High Court's decision turned on the failure to give notice after the administrative transfer of the case (a requirement of that High Court's rules), not on a general rule allowing reopening upon showing cause only for the initial ex parte date. The revising court treated the Lahore decision as not supporting the narrower interpretation urged by the petitioner and stated that if that decision were read to mean only the initial date need be explained, the court would respectfully dissent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by quoting the language of Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. and focusing on the phrase "when the suit was called on for hearing". It interpreted "hearing" to mean the hearing that actually takes place in the absence of the defendant and which leads up to the passing of the ex parte decree. That hearing, the court observed, may be concluded in one day or may be spread over several days by adjournments.

From the language of the rule the court concluded that where the hearing is spread over a number of days, the defendant must explain his absence to the satisfaction of the court for all those days before he can claim relief under Order 9 Rule 13. To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would contradict the language of the rule and produce absurd or unjust outcomes: for example, a defendant who was legitimately absent on a single day could, after watching proceedings from a distance for years, seek to reopen the decree by relying only on that initial justifiable absence, thereby encouraging delay and unfairness to the plaintiff.

The court further reasoned by reference to the legal effect of setting aside an ex parte decree: setting the decree aside reins in the parties to the stage at which the case stood when the defendant absented himself. Because intermediate proceedings become "tied up" by ex parte orders and the final ex parte decree, the defendant must show sufficient cause for absence covering the entire period from the stage when he first absented himself up to the passing of the decree in order to "break the whole chain."

Addressing the authority relied upon by the petitioner (Krishan Lal v. Madan Lal), the court recited its facts and emphasis: the Lahore High Court set aside proceedings not on the ground that a defendant need only show cause for the intermediary stage, but because there was a specific rule requiring notice on transfer which had not been complied with. The revising court observed that the Lahore decision, properly read, recognizes that a defendant cannot insist on reopening the proceedings after a decree unless sufficient cause is shown for the date when ex parte proceedings were first taken, but stressed that read in context the decision did not establish the narrow rule urged by the petitioner. The revising court explicitly stated that if the Lahore decision were to be construed as allowing proof of sufficient cause only for the initial ex parte date (and not for the subsequent dates), the revising judge would dissent from that construction.

Finally, on the contention that the defendant's engagement of counsel and reliance on him amounted to sufficient cause, the court rejected the argument. It held that by engaging counsel a party is not relieved of his duties; the negligence of counsel is attributable to the party (applying the principle that a principal is responsible for the acts of his agent), and thus such negligence does not constitute sufficient cause to set aside an ex parte decree vis-à-vis the other party.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition is dismissed; the court found no merit in the petition and affirmed the concurrent orders below refusing to set aside the ex parte decree. The court directed that parties will bear their own costs in this court and in the courts below.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the trial court's and the Subordinate Judge's orders dismissing the defendant's application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. are affirmed and the ex parte decree stands.
  • The court reaffirmed the principle (described as the general rule) that when ex parte proceedings and the ensuing hearing are spread over a number of days, a defendant seeking to set aside an ex parte decree must establish sufficient cause for his non-appearance not only on the day when ex parte proceedings were first taken but also for his absence on the subsequent dates up to the passing of the ex parte decree.
  • The court held that the negligence or failure of instructions to counsel is attributable to the party and does not itself furnish a sufficient cause to set aside an ex parte decree against the other party.
  • No novel precedent was established; the opinion interprets and applies Order 9 Rule 13 to the facts and distinguishes the authority cited by the petitioner.

S/d Hon'ble Judge.

    Shanker Dass v. Hans Raj

    (1) This revision is directed against a con­current judgment of the courts below refusing to set aside an ex-parte decree.

    (2) The facts are these :- The respondent-plaintiff brought a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent against the applicant-defendant in the court of Munsiff, R. S. Pura. The defendant was summoned and appeared in the court on 14-11-1&71 accompanied by his counsel who took time to file the written statement. The written was not, however filed on several subsequent hearings upto 20-1-1972 when the counsel for the defendant reported "no instructions". As such as the court took ex-parte proceedings against the defendant. Thereafter the case was adjourned for recording ex-parte evidence, first to 9-2-1972 and then to 24-2J972 and even­tually an ex-parte decree was passed against the defendant on 3-3-1972. On 29-3-1972 the defen­dant filed an application under O. 9 R. 13 C. P. C, for setting aside the ex-parte decree alleging that on account of the declaration of emergency-refer­ence apparently being to the emergency declared in December, 197 due to the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan, he had gone to the Punjab Stare where he was taken ill and could not move about for 2/3 months, he could not be pre­sent in the court during the relevant time and could be able to know about the ex-parte decree only a few days before the application when he returned to his village The plaintiff contested the application. On consideration of the evidence the trial court came to the conclusion that the defendant was in his village from 16-2-1972 to 12-3-1972 and even after, working on a Govt. Drug farm and that his allegation about ailment was false and made-up and dismissed the application holding that no sufficient cause was made out for non-appearance by the defendant. The court did not, however, return any clear finding as regards the allegation that defendant had gone over to Punjab earlier. By an indentical prescrip­tion the learned Subordinate Judge (C J. M) Jammu dismissed the appeal filed before him. Hence this revision.

    Order 9 Rule 13 reads :

    "In any case in which a decree is passed ex-parte against a defendant, he may apply to the Court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside, and if he satisfies the Court that the sum­mons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for herring the court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment into court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit :

    Provided that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other defendants also "

    (3) The question is whether in case, like the present, where the defendant appears and then absents himself not only on one date but on several successive date?, to which the hearing is adjourned, suiting first in the case being set ex-parte and then an ex-parte decree being passed against him, the requirements of this rule would be satisfied entitling the defendant to an order to set aside the ex parte decree, if he shows sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the date when the ex-parte proceedings were first taken against him and assigns no such cause for his non-appearance on the subsequent dates, to which the hearing was adjourned, until the ex-parte decree was passed. The learned counsel for the petitioner says, 'yes'. In fact that is the sheet-anchor of his arguments in the present case. He has even tried to support this view by a decision of the Lahore High Court in Krishan Lal Malhotra V. Madan Lal (A. I. R J950 Lahore, 43). I will come to this decision later Here it is enough to say that the view advanced by the learned counsel is not a correct view of the law as set out in O. 9 R. 13.

    (4) On the language of O. 9 R. 13 a defen­dant is entitled to an order to set aside an ex-parte decree if he satisfies the court ''that he was pre­vented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing." The expression 'hearing' has reference to the hearing which takes place in the absence of the defendant leading up to the passing of the ex-parte decree. Such hearing may be concluded in one day or be spread over a number of days to which the case is adjourned from time to time by the court to complete the hearing. Where, therefore, the hear­ing is extended over a number of days, to which the case is adjourned from time to time until the ex-parte decree is passed, the defendant must, on the terms of this rule, explain his absence to the satisfaction of the court on all these days before he may be able to claim an order for setting aside the decree, Holding otherwise would be doing violence to the language of the Rule. That apart, it might lead to absurd results Take, for example, a case in which, during its progress, the defendant is unable to appear in the court on a certain date on account of the sudden illness of his son and the case is set ex-parte against him and thereafter fur­ther proceedings are taken, which take, say, two years, during which the defendant had no ap­parent difficulty to put in his appearance, but in order to exhaust the plaintiff or, at any rate, to delay the matter, he watches the proceedings from a distance till the ex-parte decree is passed and then turns round and says that the ex-parte decree should be set aside because he was prevented by a sufficient cause from appearing in the court when the ex-parte proceedings were first taken against him. Would it not be placing a premium on the defendant's own wrong, if the court were to ac­cept this plea and set aside the ex-parte decree ? Would it not be given an edge to the defendant over the plaintiff ? Does it mean unfairness and injustice to the plaintiff ? Does it not make the concept of fair trial, which the rules of procedure are designed to achieve, illusory for the plaintiff ? With these results in view, it is unimaginable that the Legislature should have intended to make the justifiable absence of the defendant on the day, when ex-parte proceedings were first taken against him, alone as a sufficient cause for setting aside the ex-parte decree.

    (5) Again it may be stated that the legal effect of the setting aside of an ex-parte decree is that the parties are relegated to the stage, at which the case stood, when the defendant absented himself. It is, therefore, reasonable to bold that the defendant should explain his absence right from that stage upto the passing of the decree may be set aside-

    (6) It is true that the defendant has right to participate in proceedings, even after ex-parte proceedings are taken against him without the previous proceedings being interfered with, but that is so only so long as the proceedings do not end in an ex-parte decree. Once an ex-parte decree is passed, the inter mediate proceedings get tied up at both ends with ex-parte order at the one end and the ex-parte decree at the other, leaving no room for them to get loosened unless the whole chain is broken a corollary it follows a defendant must be able to break the whole chain or in other words show sufficient cause for his absence from the beginning to the end before he may be entitled to claim that the ex-parte decree be set aside.

    (7) Viewed from any angle, the legal posi­tion therefore is that, in an application under O. 9 R. 13 C. P C the defendant must not only establish sufficient cause for his non appearance on the date, when ex parte proceedings were first taken, but he must also establish such cause for his non appearance on the subsequent dates, to which the case is adjourned for hearing, till the ex-parte decree was passed, before he may be declared entitled to an order to set aside the decree.

    (8) Let me now deal with the decision in Krishan Lal V. Madan Lal (A. I. R 1950 Lab. 43) cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The facts of this case were these : On 14th June, 1947, Madan Lal instituted a suit for damages and for the recovery of rent against Krishan Lal and others in the court of Sub-Judge, Lahore. The defendants filed the written statement and the plaintiff was directed to file replication. The case was fixed for this purpose on 8th October, 1947. On that date the defendants were not present in the court nor also their counsel. Ex-parte pro­ceedings were ordered to be taken and the case was adjourned for evidence from time to time until it was transferred under some administrative orders to another court at Lahore. The court, to which the case was transferred, recovered the evidence ex-parte without informing the defen­dant of the transfer and eventually also passed an ex-parte decree on 11-2-1948. On 28-2-1948 the defendant, Krishan Lal, filed an application under O. 9 R. 13 for setting aside the ex-parte decree. The trial court found that the petitioner had no sufficient cause for absence on 8-10-1947 and dis­missed the application On appeal the Lahore High Court set aside the ex-parte decree and the proceedings taken against the defendant since transfer, replying on a Rule of the court which provided for notice regarding transfer being given to the parties, where a case was transferred by an administrative order from one court to another. The ratio decidendi was that no notice was given to the defendant after transfer, as required by the High Court Rules, and not that he had justifiable cause for non-appearance from an intermediary stage, though, as a fact, it was found that there was sufficient cause for the subsequent non-appearance of the defendant. This is what was made clear by the court observing :

    "There is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure to prohibit a defendant against whom a case is proceeding ex-parte, to join at any hearing of the case and start from that stage. This is, however, quite different from saying that after the case is finished and has resulted in a decree, a defendant can insist on the reopening of the proceedings from the intermediary stage for which he had established "suf­ficient cause" for his absence. This would lead to useless complications and a case may never end."

    (9) The court, however, added:

    "Where ex parte proceedings have commen­ced in a proper manner and culminated in an ex parte decree, the defendant must show 'sufficient cause' for his non-appearance on the date when the ex-parte proceedings were first taken."

    and observed at the end that the above was the general rule.

    (10) It is on the latter observations that emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner to support his contention that, in order to entitle a defendant to an order to set aside an ex-parte decree, he need only establish sufficient cause for his absence on the day when ex-parte proceedings were first taken against him. Taken alone, these observations may perhaps convey that sense but they cannot be torn out of their context in the preceding observations, which when read with these observations, unmistakably suggest that the defendant must prove sufficient cause for his absence both at the beginnings when the case was set ex-parte against him, as also at the subsequent stage, when the hearing was completed and an ex-parte decree was passed. This is, as the court put it, the general rule. In any case if the judgment was construed as laying down that the defendant need only show sufficient cause for his non appea­rance on the date, when the ex-parte proceedings were first taken, to entitle him to an order for setting aside the ex-parte decree, I would respect­fully record my dissent from it on the basis of the observations made earlier in this judgment regar­ding the correct position of the law based on O. 9 R. 13 C. P. C.

    (11) In these circumstances, even if it were assumed, as the learned counsel for the petitioner put it, that on the facts found by the lower courts the defendant had established sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the date, when ex-parte proceedings were first taken against him, it cannot be held that he has established sufficient cause for his absence in terms required under O. 9 R. 13 when no such cause was admittedly established by him for his absence at the later stage of the pro­ceedings culminating in the passing of the ex-parte decree.

    (12) Towards the end the learned counsel for the petitioner faintly suggested that the petitioner had engaged a counsel and he had reason to believe that the counsel would look after his case in his absence which prevented him for attending the court and that this was a valid ground on which the ex-parte decree may be set aside. I find it difficult to agree with this contention. By enga­ging counsel a party to a suit, is not relieved of his duties and obligations in the matter. In any case the negligence of a party's counsel cannot be a ground of claim or application against the other party, because, on the principle that the principal is responsible for the acts of his agent as much as for his own, the negligence of the counsel is the negligence of the party himself.

    (13) For the reasons I find no force in this revision petition which is hereby dismissed. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, I would, however, direct that the parties will bear their own costs in this court as also in the courts below.

    S/d Hon'ble Judge.

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    Comments

    Shanker Dass v. Hans Raj
    (Oct 8, 1973)