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  • provisions of Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C. 6. Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C
  • Section 37(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 37
  • Rule 29 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Sections 37 and 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Rule 26 (1) of Order 21, C.P.C.
  • Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C.
  • Rule 28 of Order 21. C.P.C.
  • Rule 29 of Order 21, C.P.C.
  • Rule 29 Order XXI C.P.C.
  • Order 21, Rule 29 C.P.C.
  • Order 21, Rule 29
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • provisions of Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C. 6. Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C
  • Section 37(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 37
  • Rule 29 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Sections 37 and 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Rule 26 (1) of Order 21, C.P.C.
  • Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C.
  • Rule 28 of Order 21. C.P.C.
  • Rule 29 of Order 21, C.P.C.
  • Rule 29 Order XXI C.P.C.
  • Order 21, Rule 29 C.P.C.
  • Order 21, Rule 29
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner-plaintiff filed this revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging an order dated 28 April 1958 of the Munsiff-Magistrate of Raichur (Case No.11/2 of 1958). The respondent-defendant had earlier obtained an ex parte money decree against the petitioner on 10 July 1957 in O.S. No.237 of 1956 from the District Munsiff Court of Kavali (Andhra Pradesh). Because the petitioner resided within the Raichur Court's jurisdiction, the decree-holder caused the decree to be transferred to the Raichur Court and commenced execution proceedings by a petition dated 11 April 1958.

The petitioner, on 12 April 1958, filed Suit No.11/2 of 1958 in the Munsiff-Magistrate's Court at Raichur seeking a declaration that the ex parte decree was null and void and not executable as it had been obtained by fraud. He also applied for a stay of execution pending determination of that suit; at argument it was clarified that the stay application was made under Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C. The decree-holder objected, contending that the transferee Court (Raichur) was not competent to stay execution under Rule 29, and the learned Munsiff-Magistrate dismissed the stay application. The present revision petition challenges that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the transferee Court (the Court to which a decree has been sent for execution) has jurisdiction under Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C. to stay the execution of a decree that has been transferred to it when the judgment-debtor institutes a suit in the transferee Court challenging the validity of that decree.
  2. Whether Sections 37 and 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure, read together, permit the transferee Court to be regarded as "such Court" (or otherwise empower it) for the purposes of staying execution under Rule 29.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Judgment-debtor's) Arguments (as presented)

  • The transferee Court (Raichur Court) has jurisdiction under Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C. to stay the execution of the decree when the judgment-debtor has instituted a suit in that transferee Court challenging the decree.
  • In support, counsel relied on Sections 37 and 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure to contend that the transferor Court's powers are, in effect, available to the transferee Court (i.e., the transferee Court shall have the same powers as the transferor under S.42 and, because the transferor Court has "ceased to have jurisdiction" for execution under S.37(b) once it transfers, the transferee should be treated as the Court for the purposes of Rule 29).
  • Petitioner's counsel also relied on the decision in Saradakripa Lala v. Comilla Union Bank, Ltd. (AIR 1934 Cal 4), which was held to support the view that the transferee Court could stay execution under Order XXI, Rule 29, based on Sections 37 and 42.

Respondent's (Decree-holder's) Arguments (as presented)

  • The Raichur transferee Court was not competent to stay execution under Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C.; consequently, the application for stay should be dismissed.
  • The decree-holder inter alia objected to the stay and urged that Rule 29 did not confer jurisdiction upon the transferee Court in the circumstances of this case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Maharaja of Bobbili v. Narsaraj, 43 Ind App 238 : AIR 1916 PC 16 Considered on whether transfer of a decree to a Munsiff meant the original Court ceased to have jurisdiction for execution (Privy Council decision referenced by other courts). The opinion notes this Privy Council decision gave rise to differing High Court views; the Calcutta High Court read it to mean the original Court ceased to have jurisdiction after transfer. The present Court reviews that interpretation and disagrees with the Calcutta reading.
Saradakripa Lala v. Comilla Union Bank, Ltd., AIR 1934 Cal 4 Held that under Sections 37 and 42 the transferee Court has power to stay execution under Order XXI, Rule 29. The opinion acknowledges this decision supports petitioner's contention but rejects its reasoning, finding that the Calcutta High Court misread the Privy Council decision and did not take sufficient account of Rule 26(1) and Rule 28 of Order XXI.
Messrs Khemchand Rajmal v. Rambabu Johrimal, AIR 1958 Madh Pra 131 Interpreted Order XXI, Rule 29 in its plain meaning and held transferee Court could not invoke Rule 29; Sections 37 and 42 do not alter that position. The Court expressly endorses and follows this decision as being similar in facts and preferable in reasoning to the Calcutta decision, citing it as supporting the view that Rule 29 cannot be invoked by the transferee Court in such circumstances.
Inayat Beg v. Umrao Beg, AIR 1930 All 121 (1) Earlier Allahabad High Court decision taking the view that Rule 29 does not empower the transferee Court to stay execution. The opinion cites this case as one of the precedents in favour of the view adopted by the Court and aligns with it on the question of interpretation of Rule 29.
M.P. L. Chettyar Firm v. Venappa Chettyar, AIR 1936 Bang.184 Authority cited in the context of the scope of transferor and transferee Court powers after transfer of a decree. Referred to among authorities supporting the Court's view; cited in the context of preferring the view that the transferor Court does not divest itself of powers upon transfer.
AIR 1936 Rang.184 (Rangoon High Court decision) Held that Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C. does not empower the transferee Court to stay execution of the decree. The opinion notes this Rangoon decision dissents from the Calcutta view and the present Court agrees with the Rangoon High Court's conclusion.
(General reference) Decisions of Madhya Pradesh, Rangoon and Allahabad High Courts Cited as authorities dissenting from the Calcutta High Court view and supporting the proposition that transferee Court cannot stay under Rule 29. The Court relies on these contrary decisions (explicitly naming Madhya Pradesh, Rangoon, and Allahabad) and expressly prefers their view over the Calcutta High Court's ruling.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first examining the text of Order XXI, Rule 29 which provides: "Where a suit is pending in any Court against the holder of a decree of such Court, on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may... stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided." The pivotal phrase identified was "such Court."

The petitioner's counsel accepted that "such Court" prima facie refers to "the Court to which the decree has been transferred for execution" (the transferee Court) but argued that, when Sections 37 and 42 C.P.C. are read together, the transferee Court should be treated as possessing the same attributes as the transferor Court and thus be able to act under Rule 29. The Court examined this submission in detail.

On Section 37(b) and Section 42: the petitioner relied on Section 37(b)'s deeming provisions and Section 42's rule that "The Court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself." The petitioner argued that because the transferor Court had "ceased to have jurisdiction to execute" the decree, the transferee Court became the Court for all purposes (including for Rule 29). The Court rejected this construction, holding that a transfer of a decree for execution does not mean the Court which passed the decree wholly ceases to have jurisdiction or divests itself of powers.

To support that conclusion, the Court listed illustrations (drawn from practice and the Code) where the transferor Court retains or can exercise powers notwithstanding transfer: withdrawing the execution by calling back the decree; ordering simultaneous execution by another Court; ordering ratable distribution; deciding limitation objections referred back by the transferee Court; dealing with an assignee's application after transfer; and ordering execution against legal representatives under Section 50 where the judgment-debtor dies after transfer. These examples were used to show that Sections 37 and 42 did not operate to vest exclusive power in the transferee Court such as to allow it to invoke Rule 29 in the manner contended for by the petitioner.

The Court then considered the Calcutta High Court decision in Saradakripa Lala v. Comilla Union Bank (AIR 1934 Cal 4) which had found that Sections 37 and 42 permitted the transferee Court to stay execution under Rule 29. The present Court concluded that the Calcutta Court had read the Privy Council decision too broadly and had not given due attention to Rule 26(1) of Order XXI.

Rule 26(1) was examined (and quoted) to show that the transferee Court is empowered to stay execution only "for a reasonable time" to enable the judgment-debtor to apply to the transferor Court (or an appellate Court) for an order to stay execution. From Rule 26(1), the Court deduced that the Legislature clearly contemplated only a temporary stay by the transferee Court to enable pursuit of remedies in the transferor Court, which implies the transferor Court is not divested of jurisdiction. Rule 28 was also cited to show that any order of the Court which passed the decree is binding on the transferee Court, further indicating the transferor Court retains operative authority.

Considering Rules 26 and 28 together with Rule 29, the Court held that the transferee Court's power to stay execution is limited to a reasonable temporary stay under Rule 26(1) and that Rule 29's plain wording requires identity between the Court trying the pending suit and the Court which passed the decree under execution. Therefore, the transferee Court could not invoke Rule 29 to stay execution merely because the judgment-debtor instituted a suit in the transferee Court.

The Court surveyed the conflicting authorities, noting that several High Courts (Madhya Pradesh, Rangoon and Allahabad) had taken the view contrary to the Calcutta High Court, and it expressly preferred those decisions (including the recent Madhya Pradesh decision in Khemchand Rajmal v. Rambabu Johrimal) as correctly interpreting Rule 29 in light of Rules 26 and 28 and Sections 37 and 42.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the transferee Court does not have jurisdiction under Order XXI, Rule 29 C.P.C. to stay the execution of a decree in the circumstances of this case (i.e., solely because the judgment-debtor has instituted a suit in the transferee Court challenging the decree). The Court upheld the order of the trial Court refusing the stay.

Disposition: Petition dismissed.

Implications: The direct consequence is that the trial Court's refusal to stay execution was affirmed and the revision petition failed. The opinion aligns with a line of High Court authorities that construe Rule 29 in its plain meaning and treat Rules 26 and 28 as limiting the transferee Court's power to only a reasonable temporary stay to enable recourse to the transferor Court. The opinion does not purport to create or announce any distinct new legal principle beyond preferring the contrary judicial decisions noted in the opinion.

This summary strictly reflects only the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion; no external facts or inferences beyond that text have been added.

    Raghvender Rao v. Botlagunta Laxminarasayya

    Judgement

    The petitioner-plaintiff has presented this petition under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order, dated 28th of April 1958, passed by the Munsiff-Magistrate of Raichur in Case No.11/2 of 1958 on his file.

    2. The facts leading up to this petition may shortly be stated as follows:

    3. The respondent-defendant obtained a money decree against the petitioner-plaintiff on 10th July 1957 in O.S. No.237 of 1956 in the Court of the District Munsiff of Kavali of Andhra Pradesh. Since the petitioner-plaintiff resided within the jurisdiction of the Raichur Court, the decree-holder got the decree transferred to Raichur Court and started execution proceedings by a petition dated 11th April, 1958. The petitioner-plaintiff, then on 12-4-1958, filed a suit No.11/2 of 1958 in the Court of the Munsiff-Magistrate of Raichur for a declaration that the ex parte decree obtained by the respondent-defendant against him was null and void and not executable as the same had been obtained by fraud. Having filed this suit, he applied for stay of execution of the decree until the decision of his suit pending in that Court. Though the plaintiff-petitioner did not specifically mention in the said petition the provision of law under which it was made, it was however made clear during the course of arguments that it had been filed under Rule 29 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    The respondent-decree-holder objected to the stay of execution and contended inter alia that the Raichur Court was not competent to stay the execution of the decree under Rule 29 Order XXI C.P.C. The learned Munsiff-Magistrate of Raichur upheld the objections of the decree-holder and refused to stay the execution of the decree, dismissing the application. It is against this order that the present revision petition has been preferred.

    4. The respondent remained absent and therefore I requested Mr. Kanakasabapathy to assist the Court and I am thankful to him for rendering such assistance as he could in the matter.

    5. On the above facts, the main question which falls to be considered in this petition is whether the transferee Court has jurisdiction under Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C. to stay the execution of the decree transferred to it when the judgment-debtor institutes a suit in the transferee Court challenging the validity of the very decree transferred for execution. Mr. Sundaraswamy who appears for the petitioner has contended that the Court below was wrong in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction by holding that it could not stay the execution proceeding under the provisions of Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C.

    6. Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C is as follows: Where a suit is pending in any Court against the holder of a decree of such Court, on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided". The important words in this rule are "such Court". If we read the rule, it is plain that the words "such Courts" must mean "a transferee Court". Mr. Sundaraswamy has conceded that the words "such Court" must mean the Court to which the decree has been transferred for execution. Yet he contends that the transferor Court also must be deemed to be "such Court if we read Sections 37 and 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure together.

    7. Firstly he relies upon Section 37(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 37 reads as follows:

    The expression Court which passed a decree, or words to that effect, shall, in relation to the execution of decrees, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, be deemed to include -

    X X X X X X

    (b) where the Court of first instance has ceased to exist or to have jurisdiction to execute it, the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree was passed was instituted at the time of making the application for the execution of the decree, would have jurisdiction to try such suit". He next relied upon S.42 C.P.C. which reads:

    "The Court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself. x x x"
    He, therefore, contends that under S.42, the transferee Court shall have the same powers as the transferor Court and argues that under S.37 (b) the transferor Court i.e. the Court of first instance has ceased to have jurisdiction to execute it having transferred the decree to the Raichur Court for execution. If that is so, he then contends that it is the Raichur Court which would have all the powers of the transferor Court. I am unable to accede to this argument. This is not a case where the Court of first instance had ceased to exist. It cannot be said that because the Court which passed the decree has transferred it for execution to another Court, it ceased to have jurisdiction. The transferor Court does not altogether surrender its control.

    The Privy Council Case reported in Maharaja of Bobbili v. Narsaraj, 43 Ind App 238 : (AIR 1916 PC 16) gave rise to some extent to a difference of opinion among some of the High Courts, a few holding that after transferring a decree to another Court for execution, the Court which passed that decree cannot itself execute it on an application for execution made to it after the transfer and before the certificate of no satisfaction under S.41 has been returned. The other view is that there is no justification for holding that the transferor Court cannot execute the decree after it is transferred to another Court and that when the transferor Court transfers a decree, it does not divest itself of its powers but only vests the transferee Court with powers which it would not otherwise have. The difference is only with regard to whether when the decree has been transferred to another Court for execution, the transferor Court could execute the decree. But the consensus of judicial opinion now is that the transferor Court does not divest itself of its powers; e.g. when the decree has been transferred to another Court for execution, it may withdraw the execution by calling back the decree or it may even make an order for simultaneous execution by another Court or it may make an order for ratable distribution. Likewise, it has jurisdiction to decide an objection as to the limitation if referred to it by the transferee Court. If the decree is assigned after transfer, the assignee must apply for execution to the original Court. If the judgment-debtor dies after the decree has been transferred for execution, the Court which passed the decree is by reason of S.50 of the Code of Civil Procedure the proper Court to order that execution should proceed against the legal representative. These instances illustrate the fact that the transferor Court does not divest itself of its powers though the decree made by it has been transferred for execution to another Court. Thus, in my view, the contention of Mr. Sundaraswamy based on S.37 (b) read with S.42 C.P.C must fail.

    8. However, he relies upon a decision reported in Saradakripa Lala v. Comilla Union Bank, Ltd., AIR 1934 Cal 4. No doubt, this decision entirely supports the contention put forward by Mr. Sundaraswamy. The facts in that case are somewhat similar to the facts of the present case and, therefore, Mr. Sundaraswamy pressed into service this ruling in support of his contention. It has been held in that case that under the provisions of sections 37 and 42, the Court to which the decree has been transferred has power to stay execution of the decree under Order 21, Rule 29 C.P.C. Their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court relied upon the decision to which I have already referred viz. AIR 1916 PC 16 : 43 Ind App 238. It was held in the Privy Council decision that when a decree of a District Court was sent to the Court of a Munsiff for execution, the proper Court in which to apply "for execution or to take some step-in-aid of execution" of the decree is the Court of the Munsiff, the original Court having ceased to have jurisdiction. In that view of the case, according to their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court, the words "such Court" under S.37 C.P.C will include the Court to which the decree was transferred. Then their Lordships referred to S.42 C.P.C and stated that the Chittagong Court had powers to stay the execution of the decree which was transferred to it under Order 21, Rule 29.

    It appears their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court read the Privy Council case to mean that the original Court totally ceased to have jurisdiction, and having thus read, came to the conclusion that the transferee Court could stay execution of the decree under Order 21, Rule 29, C.P.C. With great respect, I am unable to agree with the view taken by their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court. I have already stated by way of illustration the instances where the transferor Court does not divest itself of its powers. It appears that the attention of their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court was not invited to Rule 26 (1) of Order 21, C.P.C. It reads:

    "The Court to which a decree has been sent for execution shall, upon sufficient cause being shown, stay the execution of such decree for a reasonable time, to enable the judgment-debtor to apply to the Court by which the decree was passed or to any Court having appellate jurisdiction in respect of the decree or the execution thereof, for an order to stay execution, or for any other order relating to the decree or execution which might have been made by such Court of first instance or appellate Court if execution had been issued thereby, or if application for execution had been made thereto"
    .

    It is apparent from this rule that the transferee Court has been given power to stay the execution of the transferred decree for a reasonable time to enable the judgment-debtor to apply to the transferor Court and obtain the necessary orders. If, as has been held by their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court, the transferee Court could stay execution of the decree under Rule 29, then it is rather difficult to understand why the Legislature provided in Rule 26 that the transferee Court shall stay the execution of such decree for a reasonable time. This also indicates that the transferor Court does not divest itself of its powers. If we read together Rules 26 and 29, it appears to me that the transferee Court has been empowered to stay the execution of the decree for a reasonable time only.

    9. Reference may also be made to Rule 28 of Order 21. C.P.C. which states:

    "Any order of the Court by which the decree was passed, or of such Court of appeal as aforesaid, in relation to the execution of such decree, shall be binding upon the Court to which the decree was sent for execution."

    This also indicates that the transferor Court does not divest itself of its powers. The provisions made in Rule 26 empowering the transferee Court to stay the execution of a decree for a reasonable time only, clearly indicates that the transferee Court cannot stay the execution under Rule 29.

    10. The aforesaid decision of the Calcutta High Court has been dissented from by the Madhya Pradesh and Rangoon High Courts. The Allahabad High Court also has taken a view contrary to it.

    11. In Messrs Khemchand Rajmal v. Rambabu Johrimal, AIR 1958 Madh Pra 131, the facts in which are similar to the facts in the present case, it was held:

    "If the words of Order 21, Rule 29 are interpreted in their plain meaning it will be clear that in order to enable the Court to pass suitable orders for stay the identity of the Court passing the decree under execution and the Court trying the pending suit is necessary so that, if the Court which passed the decree under execution is different from the Court in which there is the pending suit with judgment-debtor as the plaintiff, then the power under the rule cannot be invoked. This position is not altered by reason of the provisions of Sections 37 and 42."

    Nevaskar, J. after referring to the decisions in AIR 1916 PC 16, Inayat Beg v. Umrao Beg, AIR 1930 All 121 (1) and M.P. L. Chettyar Firm v. Venappa Chettyar, AIR 1936 Bang.184, held that the view taken by the Allahabad and Rangoon High Courts was preferable to that taken by the Calcutta High Court.

    12. Their Lordships of the Rangoon High Court in AIR 1936 Rang.184, in similar circumstances, found themselves unable to agree with the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court, and held that Rule 29 of Order 21, C.P.C. does not empower the transferee Court to stay the execution of the decree. The Allahabad High Court in the decision reported in AIR 1930 All 121 (1) which is an earlier case, has taken a similar view. Since the facts in the aforesaid cases are practically similar to those in the instant case, I do not think that any detailed examination of the said cases is necessary.

    13. I have already stated in my reasons as to why I find myself unable to agree with the view taken by their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1934 Cal 4. With respect, I agree with the view taken by their Lordships in AIR 1958 Madh Pra 131, AIR 1936 Rang.184 and AIR 1930 All 121 (1). Therefore the contention put forward by Mr. Sundaraswamv that the transferee Court could stay the execution of the decree under Rule 29 of Order 21, C.P.C fails.

    14. Thus, for the reasons stated above, I hold that the order passed by the trial Court is correct and must be upheld. Consequently, this revision petition fails and the same is dismissed.

    Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    Raghvender Rao v. Botlagunta Laxminarasayya
    (Jun 9, 1961)