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Equivalent Citations
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Acts
  • General Clauses Act, neither Central Act nor Regulation
  • (1) of R. 40-A of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1922,
  • SECTION 37 ELECTRICITY ACT 1910
  • SECTION 24 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
  • 40-A of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1922.
  • Indian Factories Act, 1911 (12 of 1911).8.
  • Indian Electricity Rules of 1922
  • Indian Electricity Rules, 1922,
  • 48, Electricity Rules, 1937,
  • sub-rule (1) of R. 40-A
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • General Clauses Act, neither Central Act nor Regulation
  • (1) of R. 40-A of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1922,
  • SECTION 37 ELECTRICITY ACT 1910
  • SECTION 24 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
  • 40-A of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1922.
  • Indian Factories Act, 1911 (12 of 1911).8.
  • Indian Electricity Rules of 1922
  • Indian Electricity Rules, 1922,
  • 48, Electricity Rules, 1937,
  • sub-rule (1) of R. 40-A
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary: Broomfield, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from two connected appeals brought by the Government of Bombay against the acquittal, by a Magistrate, of Raghunath Ramchandra Karlekar, licensee and proprietor of an electric supply company at Ilkal in the Bijapur District. The accused was prosecuted for an alleged breach of R. 48 of the Electricity Rules, 1937.

The undisputed facts are: in February and March 1938 the accused carried out small electrical installation works for some half-dozen inhabitants of Ilkal. Each installation consisted of a single light point with switches and cut-outs. Three of these installations formed one case and the other three formed a second case. The works were done at the expense of the supply company, and the light points, switches and related equipment remained the property of the company.

The accused held a certificate of competency issued by the Provincial Government and the works were carried out under his supervision, but he did not hold an electrical contractor's licence. The prosecution alleged an infringement of R. 48 (Electricity Rules, 1937) on that ground.

Procedurally: the Magistrate acquitted the accused, the Government of Bombay appealed, and this opinion disposes of those appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether R. 48 of the Electricity Rules, 1937 applied to the installation works carried out in February and March 1938, given that R. 48 came into force on 22 March 1938.
  2. Whether the corresponding provision R. 40-A of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1922 remained in force at the time the works were carried out (despite the 1937 rules being made applicable on 27 March 1937) or was effectively superseded.
  3. Whether the Bombay Government's notification of 15 November 1934 exempting “All Electric Supply Companies” from sub-rule (1) of R. 40-A “in so far as their own works are concerned” applied to the installation works in question.
  4. Whether, in light of the above, the accused was guilty of a breach of the rule charged.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Government of Bombay) — Main Contentions

  • The charge referred to R. 48 of the 1937 Rules; alternatively the reference could be treated as a slip and the prosecution framed under R. 40-A of the 1922 Rules because the two rules are in precisely the same terms.
  • Although the 1937 Rules were made applicable on 27 March 1937 and R. 48 did not come into force until 22 March 1938, Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (re-enactment continuity provision) means that the old R. 40‑A continued in force so far as it was consistent with re-enacted provisions, and thus the accused could be prosecuted for breach during February–March 1938.
  • The words “their own works” in the 15 November 1934 notification should be read as meaning works connected with the supply of energy as defined in the Act (i.e., the definition of “works” in the Act) and/or should be limited to works carried out on the premises of the exempted bodies.
  • Reliance was also placed on R. 46 of the rules issued on 15 November 1932, which required supply companies to obtain contractor's licences and employ a separate staff of supervisors and wiremen, to argue that the company should not be treated as exempt from the contractor's licence requirement.

Respondent (Accused) — Main Contentions

  • The accused asserted that the reference to R. 48 was a slip and that, even if considered under the 1922 Rules, he was exempted by the Bombay Government notification dated 15 November 1934, which exempted “All Electric Supply Companies” from sub-rule (1) of R. 40‑A “in so far as their own works are concerned.”
  • The accused relied on the words “their own works” and emphasised that the installation works were carried out by the company itself, at the company's expense, and remained the property of the company; accordingly, they were the company’s “own works” and fell within the exemption.
  • The accused also relied on holding a certificate of competency and that the works were carried out under his supervision.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in several steps addressing timing, continuity of the earlier rule, and the scope of the 1934 exemption notification.

  1. Timing and applicability of R. 48:

    The Court noted that R. 48 (1937 Rules) did not come into force until 22 March 1938, while the accused's works were carried out in February and the first part of March 1938. Thus, prima facie R. 48 could not apply to those works.

  2. Continuity of R. 40‑A (1922 Rules) after the 1937 Rules:

    The 1937 Rules were introduced by notification dated 27 March 1937 and the notification expressly stated that the 1937 Rules were in supersession of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1922. The Government argued, invoking Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, that where a central Act or regulation has been repealed and re-enacted the corresponding rules continue in force unless inconsistent. The Court observed two difficulties with this argument:

    • The notification expressly stated that the 1937 Rules superseded the 1922 Rules, making it hard to treat an exception in favour of R. 40‑A.
    • Section 24 of the General Clauses Act operates where a Central Act or Regulation has been repealed and re-enacted; the Court expressed doubt about treating a rule made under an Act as equivalent to the Act or Regulation for the purposes of S.24, referring to the definitions in the General Clauses Act.

    Accordingly, the Court was not satisfied that R. 40‑A necessarily remained in force by virtue of S.24; but it proceeded on the assumption for argument's sake that R. 40‑A could be regarded as in force at the relevant time.

  3. Interpretation of the 15 November 1934 notification (exemption):

    The accused relied on a Bombay Government notification (No. 640/27‑II) dated 15 November 1934 which, exercising the proviso to sub‑r. (1) of R. 40‑A (1922), directed that a list of bodies (including “All Electric Supply Companies”) be exempted from sub‑rule (1) of R. 40‑A “in so far as their own works are concerned.” The question was whether the company's installations fell within “their own works.”

    The Court rejected the Government's contention that the words must be read to mean works carried out on the premises of the bodies. The Court observed that if “their own works” inherently meant works on their own premises, the later proviso (which explicitly mentions works “when carried out on their own premises”) would have been redundant. Thus, implying the additional phrase was unnecessary if the earlier words already carried that meaning.

  4. Meaning of “works” — statutory definition vs. rule context:

    The Government argued that “works” should be interpreted in light of the statutory definition in the Act (encompassing electric supply lines and buildings, machinery or apparatus required to supply energy). The Court acknowledged that it is ordinarily sound to give words in rules the same meaning as in the Act, and was initially impressed by this point.

    However, the Court emphasized that R. 48 and the corresponding R. 40‑A begin by referring specifically to “installation works,” and the descriptive language of the rule plainly covers the kind of small lighting installations at issue. Given the textual context, the Court found it difficult, if not impossible, to ascribe to “works” the broader meaning found in the Act’s definition when the rule itself was describing the much narrower class of electrical installation work (light points, switches, cut-outs, etc.).

  5. Application to the facts:

    On a contextual construction, the words “their own works” naturally mean works carried out by, or belonging to, the exempted bodies of the kind described in the rule (installation works). In the present case the works were carried out by the electric supply company, at its expense, and the fittings remained the company's property. The Court therefore found it impossible to exclude these works from the expression “their own works” in the 1934 notification.

  6. R. 46 (1932 rules) and “electrical contracting work”:

    The Government relied on R. 46 (rules of 15 November 1932) which provided that supply companies must obtain contractor's licences and employ separate staff. The Court observed it was not clear that the works in question amounted to “electrical contracting work” within the meaning of that rule. Even if that rule applied, the existence of the specific exemption would mean the accused could not be convicted for breach of R. 40‑A under the 1934 notification.

  7. Conclusion of reasoning:

    Because the 1934 notification exempted electric supply companies in respect of “their own works,” and the works here were carried out by the supply company and remained its property, the Court concluded the accused was within the exemption and therefore could not be convicted of the charged breach. Accordingly, the Magistrate's acquittal was correct.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court affirmed the Magistrate's acquittal and dismissed the appeals. APPEALS DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties: The accused's acquittal is upheld; the Government of Bombay's appeals against that acquittal are dismissed. The accused cannot be convicted on the charge framed under the rule because the Court held that, on the materials and notifications before it, the company’s installations fell within the 1934 exemption.

Broader implications: The opinion does not purport to lay down a new rule of general application beyond the interpretation applied to the specific statutory rules and the 1934 Bombay notification. The Court's decision rests on statutory and regulatory construction as applied to the facts; no case law precedent was cited and the opinion does not claim to establish a novel precedent beyond its findings on these instruments.

Judge: Broomfield, J. (per the opinion)

    Emperor v. Raghunath Ramchandra Karlekar Accused.

    Broomfield, J.:— These are appeals by the Government of Bombay in two connected cases in which one Raghunath Ramchandra Karlekar, licensee and proprietor of an electric supply company at Ilkal in the Bijapur District, was prosecuted for an alleged breach of R. 48, Electricity Rules, 1937, and was acquitted by the Magistrate. There is no dispute about the facts of the case. In the months of February and March 1938, the accused carried out certain small Installation works on the premises of some half a dozen inhabitants of Ilkal. The installation works consisted of putting in each case one light point with switches and cut-outs. Three of these works were made the subject of one case and three of the other. The work was admittedly done at the expense of the supply company, and the light points, switches etc., remained the property of the company. Rule 48, which is alleged to have been infringed, is as follows:

    Precautions to be adopted by consumers and owners, electrical contractors and electrical workmen— (1) No electrical installation work, including additions, alterations, repairs, and adjustments to existing installations, except such replacement of lamps, fans, fuses, switches and other component parts of the installation as in no way alters its capacity or character, shall be carried out upon the premises or on behalf of any consumer or owner for the purposes of the supply of energy to such consumer or owner, except by an electrical contractor licensed by the Provincial Government in this behalf and under the direct supervision of a person holding a certificate of competency issued by the Provincial Government:

    Provided that the Provincial Government may by notification in the Official Gazette exempt on such conditions as it may impose any such description of work either generally or in the case of any specified class or consumers or owners from so much of this sub-rule as requires such work to be carried out by an electrical contractor licensed by the Provincial Government in this behalf:

    Provided further that this rule shall not apply to any work carried out by or on behalf of the Government of India unless the Government of India so direct.

    (2) This rule shall come into force in any province or part thereof on such date as the Provincial Government may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint.

    2. The accused in this case holds a certificate of competency issued by the Provincial Government, and it is not disputed that the works in question were carried out under his supervision. But the accused has not an electrical contractor's license. It is by reason of the want of this license that the prosecution alleges the rule has been infringed. The first difficulty in the way of the prosecution is that R. 48 under which the accused was charged did not come into force until 22nd March, 1938. That was the date fixed in the notification issued under part (2) of the rule. It is common ground that the installation works in question were carried out by the accused in February and March 1938, before 22nd March, 1938. But under the Indian Electricity Rules of 1922 there was a R. 40-A, which was in precisely the same terms as the present R. 48. It is suggested, therefore, that the reference to R. 48 of the rules of 1937 was a mere slip, that the charge should have been under R. 40-A of the rules of 1922, but that this mistake has not in any way Page: 102prejudiced the accused, the wording of the two rules being precisely the same. That, however, does not get rid of the difficulty. The rules of 1937 were introduced by a notification dated 27th March, 1937, which was as follows:

    In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 37 of the Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910), and in supersession of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1922, the Governor-General in Council is pleased after previous publication to make the following rules applicable to the whole of British India.

    3. Therefore, the old R. 40-A was superseded prima facie when the new rules were made Applicable on 27th March, 1937. As I have paid, the corresponding new R. 48 did not come into force until 22nd March, 1938, and, according to the contention of the learned advocate for the accused, in February and the first part of March 1938, when he carried out these installation works, there was no rule corresponding to the present R. 48 in force. The learned Government Pleader attempts to get over this difficulty by relying on Section 24 of the General Clauses Act 10 of 1897. That provides, so far as is material, that where any Central Act or Regulation is repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any rule made under the repealed Act or Regulation, shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been made under the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any sole made under the provisions so re-enacted. The learned Government Pleader's argument is that the old R. 40-A cannot be considered to have been superseded by the Electricity Rules of 1937 when they were made applicable on 27th March, 1937, and was only superseded when the new R. 48 came into force in consequence of the notification issued under part (2) thereof. However, the notification by which the new rules were introduced expressly stated that they were in supersession of the Electricity Rules, 1922, and it is a little difficult to see how an exception is to be made in the case of R. 48. Another point is that S. 24 only comes into operation where a Central Act or Regulation bias been repealed and re-enacted. According to the definitions in the General Clauses Act, neither Central Act nor Regulation would include a rule made under an Act, unless by some straining of language it is possible to say that the rule can be regarded as part of the Act, because it is provided that it is to have the same effect as though it were part of the Act. Assuming, however, for the sake of argument that the old R. 40-A can be regarded as having been in force at the time when the accused was prosecuted, we are not satisfied that a breach of the rule has in fact occurred. The accused has relied for his defence on the terms of a notification (No. 640/27-II) which was issued by the Bombay Government on 15th November, 1934, (p. 2566, part I). It was as follows:

    In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to sub-r. (1) of R. 40-A of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1922, the Governor in Council is pleased to direct that the following Administrations, Institutions and Bodies shall be exempted from the operation of the said sub-rule (1) of R. 40-A in so far as their own works are concerned, namely:

    1. The Electrical Branch of the Public Works Department, Bombay.

    2. The State Railways.

    3. The Victoria Jubilee Technical Institute, Bombay.

    4. The College of Engineering, Poona.

    5. The N.E.D Civil Engineering College, Karachi.

    6. All Electric Supply Companies.

    7. All factories within the meaning of the Indian Factories Act, 1911 (12 of 1911).

    8. The Royal Indian Navy Dockyard, Bombay.

    9. Railways other than State Railways.

    Provided that in the case of bodies referred to at items 7, 8 and 9 above, a person holding a Certificate of Competency is employed for supervising such works on their own premises.

    4. The accused relies on the words “their own works” in this notification and contends that as the installation works in question were carried out by the company itself, and after being carried out remained the property of the company, they are the company's own works, and therefore the exemption given by this notification in the case of electric supply companies is applicable to him. The case depends therefore on the interpretation of this notification and in particular of the words “their own works.” The learned Government Pleader says that what is meant is works carried out on the premises of the various bodies referred to. There seems to be no very good reason however why the words “on their own premises” should be implied. It would have been very easy to say “works carried out by them on their own premises.” Moreover, at the end of the notification there is a proviso that in the case of certain bodies “such works” (which would naturally mean their own works), when carried out on their own premises, are not exempted unless a person holding a certificate of competency is employed for supervising them. If the words “their own works” in themselves meant works on the premises of the body concerned, the addition of the words “on Page: 103their own premises” in this last proviso would have been unnecessary. This interpretation of the words therefore seems to be unacceptable.

    5. The learned Government Pleader has argued with more force that the word “works” should be interpreted with reference to the definition contained in the Act. According to that definition “works” includes electric supply lines and any buildings, machinery or apparatus required to supply energy and to carry into effect the objects of a license granted under Part II, which deals with the supply of energy. The definition is not exhaustive. Nevertheless, a reference to other provisions in the Act does seem to indicate that when the expression “works” is used it usually means works connected with the supply of energy, and not lighting installations of the kind with which we are concerned which have nothing to do with the supply of energy. It is usually a sound rule of construction to give the same meaning to words used in rules made under an Act as the words have in the Act itself. We were therefore at first somewhat impressed by the argument put forward on behalf of Government in this respect. But when we look at the language of R. 48 or R. 40-A, it becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to suppose that the word ‘works’ in the notification has the meaning ascribed to it in the definition in the Act.

    6. The section begins by referring to “installation works” and the description of the work there given clearly covers the kind of work which was carried out by the accused in this case and in respect of which he has been prosecuted. The work referred to there is quite obviously not work connected merely with the supply of energy. Then the notification goes on to say that the Provincial Government may by notification exempt any such description of work either generally or in the case of any specified class of consumers or owners from the requirement that a licensed electrical contractor must be employed. So that the kind of work referred to in the rule is not work connected with the supply of energy but electrical installation work, and, that being so, when we find the notification issued under the rule stating that certain bodies shall be exempted in so far as their own works are concerned, it seems reasonable to hold that by “works” is meant the kind of works referred to in the rule and not the kind of works referred to in the definition.

    7. The words “their own works” would naturally mean works carried out by the exempted bodies themselves, or perhaps works belonging to them. In the present case, the works were not only carried out by the electric supply company but were carried out at their own expense and remained their own property. Since it seems to be clear that the notification applies to the installation works, we find it impossible to say that the works carried out by the accused in this case are not such as can be fairly included in the expression “their own works” in this notification. If Government intended that the exemption was only to apply in the case of works carried out by the various bodies on their own premises, that intention has not been made sufficiently clear. On behalf of Government reliance was also placed on R. 46 of the rules issued on 15th November, 1932, in connexion with the issue of certificates of competency under R. 40-A of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1922. That rule is as follows:

    Supply companies to obtain contractor's licenses.— No electrical contracting work shall be carried out by any electric supply company unless they have obtained an Electrical Contractor's license and employed a separate staff of supervisors and wiremen, in compliance with these rules.

    8. It is not clear however that the work carried out by the accused in this case can be described as electrical contracting work within the meaning of this rule.

    9. In any case, if he is exempted under the provisions of the notification from the operation of R. 40-A, he could not be convicted of a breach of that rule, and it is a breach of that rule which is the subject of the charge. For these reasons we are of opinion that the learned Magistrate was right in acquitting the accused in this case, and we dismiss the appeals.

    G.N/R.K

    10. Appeals dismissed.

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    Comments

    Emperor v. Raghunath Ramchandra Karlekar Accused.
    (Oct 7, 1940)