Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act corresponds to sec. 22 of the Central General Clauses Act. Sec. 22 of the Central General Clauses Act
  • provisions in the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act and the Rajasthan Zamindari and Biswedari Abolition Act
  • Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land (Government) Rules, 1963. Sec. 30-E
  • Act No. 4 of 1960) amending the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Act No. 3 of 1955)
  • Constitution Amendment Act of 1964. By the Amending Act some 24 Acts
  • Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land (Government) Rules, 1963,
  • Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act (58 of 1961)
  • provisions of sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act,
  • sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act.15.
  • sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act
  • sec. 37 of the English Interpretation Act,
  • Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1960 (Act
  • sub-sec. (1) of sec. 30-E of the Tenancy Act,
  • Tenancy Act by the Amending Act (i.e Act
  • sec. 23, 24, 25 and 26 of the Tenancy Act.
  • Kerala Agrarian Relations Act of 1961
  • CONSTITUTION 17TH AMENDMENT ACT 1964
  • Sub-sec. (1) enacts the general Rule
  • Constitution Amendment Act, 1964
  • Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act corresponds to sec. 22 of the Central General Clauses Act. Sec. 22 of the Central General Clauses Act
  • provisions in the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act and the Rajasthan Zamindari and Biswedari Abolition Act
  • Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land (Government) Rules, 1963. Sec. 30-E
  • Act No. 4 of 1960) amending the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Act No. 3 of 1955)
  • Constitution Amendment Act of 1964. By the Amending Act some 24 Acts
  • Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land (Government) Rules, 1963,
  • Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act (58 of 1961)
  • provisions of sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act,
  • sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act.15.
  • sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act
  • sec. 37 of the English Interpretation Act,
  • Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1960 (Act
  • sub-sec. (1) of sec. 30-E of the Tenancy Act,
  • Tenancy Act by the Amending Act (i.e Act
  • sec. 23, 24, 25 and 26 of the Tenancy Act.
  • Kerala Agrarian Relations Act of 1961
  • CONSTITUTION 17TH AMENDMENT ACT 1964
  • Sub-sec. (1) enacts the general Rule
  • Constitution Amendment Act, 1964
  • Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act
Smart Summary

Court Opinion Summary — Chhangani, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

A total of 542 writ applications were filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging the vires of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1960 (Act No. 4 of 1960) (which amended the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Act No. 3 of 1955)), and challenging Rules and Notifications issued under that Act. The petitioners sought writs (mandamus, prohibition or certiorari) restraining the State from giving effect to or acting under the impugned Act, Rules and Notifications.

Material dates and steps recorded in the opinion:

  • The Amendment Act received the President's assent on 12-3-1960.
  • On 9-4-1963 the Government published a draft of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land (Government) Rules, 1963, and invited objections prior to consideration from 15-7-1963.
  • On 26-11-1963 three notifications were issued: (i) fixing 15-12-1963 as the date the Act shall come into force; (ii) notifying 15-12-1963 for sec. 30-E for holdings of 150 ordinary acres and above (except Rajasthan Canal Project areas); and (iii) making the Ceiling Rules, 1963 under sec. 257 of the Tenancy Act.
  • Sec. 30-E (as inserted) required persons in possession of land in excess of ceiling to report and surrender excess land within prescribed periods; R.9 required filing declarations in prescribed forms.

During the pendency of these petitions, Parliament enacted the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, adding many State enactments (including the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and its amendment) to the Ninth Schedule. The Supreme Court in Sajjan Singh v. The State of Rajasthan upheld the validity of the Seventeenth Amendment and the Acts added to the Ninth Schedule, thereby affecting the petitioners' initial reliance on earlier Supreme Court decisions that had struck down comparable State enactments.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1960 (Act No.4 of 1960) is vires — specifically, whether it is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature (colourable legislation / Entry of List competence).
  2. Whether the Act is colourable in substance because it results in deprivation of land holders by payment of inadequate compensation (and the State making a profit by reallocation).
  3. Whether the Act suffers from excessive delegation (particularly under sec. 30-G(4) which delegates apportionment of compensation to rules).
  4. Whether the Act, although purporting to impose a ceiling on land, actually imposes a ceiling on agricultural income.
  5. Whether Notification No. F. 6(120) Rev. B/60(iii) dated 26-11-1963 (fixing 15-12-1963 for holdings of 150 ordinary acres and above) was valid — including questions whether the State could fix dates under sec. 30-E prior to the Act's commencement and whether "different areas" can be defined by size of holdings.
  6. Whether the Ceiling Rules, 1963 (made under sec. 257) were invalid because they were framed before the amending Act came into force.
  7. Whether specific factual claimants (e.g., Mahant Shreyonath managing land for a religious math without a family) fall outside the reach of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Amending Act was violative of fundamental rights (Arts. 14, 39 and 31) — an initial principal attack which was largely not pressed in view of subsequent developments.
  • The State Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact the law (should fall under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List or be treated as acquisition/requisition rather than subjects under Entry 18 of the State List), and the Act was a colourable piece of legislation.
  • The Act was colourable because it would pay inadequate compensation to persons losing land and benefit by reallocating land at higher prices.
  • The Act exhibited excessive delegation — sec. 30-G(4) delegates apportionment of compensation without adequate guiding principles.
  • The Act purportedly created a ceiling on agricultural income rather than land holdings.
  • The State lacked jurisdiction to fix dates under sec. 30-E before the Act came into force; sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act could not be invoked to validate such pre-commencement action in this context.
  • The phrase "different areas of the State" in the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 30-E must mean different geographical regions and not categories based on the size of holdings; thus the notification fixing 15-12-1963 for holdings of 150 ordinary acres and above exceeded the Act's power.
  • That certain rules were inconsistent with or went beyond the provisions of the Act (though petitioners acknowledged a lack of necessary averments/materials to fully prosecute this point in the present petitions).
  • In Writ No. 337/1964 (Mahant Shreyonath) it was argued the petitioner managed land for a religious 'math' whose head and chelas are celibates and therefore have no 'family' within the Act's definition, so the Act should not apply to such holdings.

State / Respondent Arguments (as represented in the opinion)

  • The Amending Act is a valid exercise of State legislative power — the legislation concerns land and entries under the State List (Entry 18) apply; alternatively if it falls under the Concurrent List the State still retains competence and, in any event, Presidential assent protects the legislation from inconsistency with a central law.
  • The doctrine of colourable legislation does not apply; adequacy of compensation could not be questioned in view of Art. 31(2) and relevant Supreme Court authority (Karimbil Kunhikonan).
  • The delegation in sec. 30-G(4) is not excessive because rules will be guided by the compensation principles in secs. 23–26 of the Tenancy Act which provide legislative policy and sufficient direction to the rule-making authority.
  • The Act's object is to impose ceilings on land holdings; there is nothing in the Act to indicate an intent to impose ceilings on agricultural income.
  • The State relied on sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act (corresponding to sec. 22 Central General Clauses Act) to justify pre-commencement notifications and rules that are preparatory and relate to the time/manner for performing acts under the Act.
  • On interpreting "different areas" the Advocate General explained administrative convenience and the rationale for selecting a measurable standard (150 ordinary acres) to phase implementation; such categorisation was argued to be permissible under the proviso to sec. 30-E.
  • The Ceiling Rules, 1963 were framed under sec. 257 of the Tenancy Act which was already in force when the rules were framed, and thus the rules could not be invalidated on the ground that they were made before the amending Act came into force.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Karimbil Kunhikonan (In Petition v. No. 114 Of 61) Supreme Court had struck down the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act of 1961; considered adequacy of compensation in relation to claims of colourable legislation. The court relied on this decision to show that a contention of State making profits by differential compensation had previously been rejected; used to refuse the petitioners' colourable-legislation/compensation argument.
A.P. Krishnaswami Naidu v. The State of Madras Decision in which the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act was struck down. Referenced as one of the earlier Supreme Court decisions on which petitioners sought to rely; the court noted such earlier decisions lost practical effect after later constitutional amendment and Supreme Court ruling upholding the 17th Amendment.
K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa Principle on colourable legislation: courts must examine whether legislation in substance transgresses legislative competence; motive is irrelevant. The court quoted and applied this principle to reject the petitioners' claim that the Act was a colourable exercise of power.
Venkateswaraloo v. Supdt. Central Jail, Hyderabad State Interpretation of sec. 22 Central General Clauses Act (corresponding to sec. 24 Rajasthan General Clauses Act): enabling provision validating rules/orders made after passing an Act but before commencement, where such measures are preparatory and relate to time/manner of doing things under the Act. The court relied on this authority to hold that the State Government could validly issue the notification fixing commencement-related dates under sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, because the notification related to the time when acts under the Act were to be done.
Sajjan Singh v. The State of Rajasthan Supreme Court decision upholding the validity of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 and the Acts added to the Ninth Schedule. The court observed that this decision affirmed the validity of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and the Amending Act No. 4 of 1960, thereby neutralising many of the petitioners' initial constitutional attacks based on earlier Supreme Court decisions.
Adarsh Bhandar v. State Tax Officer, Aligarh Cited authority (facts and legal reasoning considered case-specific). The court stated it was unnecessary to examine this decision in detail because its facts and circumstances differed and it could not assist petitioners on the present factual matrix.
Rajender (Rajendra) Kumar Chandarmal v. Government of State of M.P (two citations in the opinion) Cited authority (facts and legal reasoning considered case-specific); referenced in relation to pre-commencement validity and earlier similar observations. The court observed the decisions had been reached on their specific facts and said they did not render assistance in the present case; earlier observations relied upon by petitioners were held inapplicable to the present facts.
A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkatachalam Potti Some observations were relied upon by petitioners concerning commencement and pre-commencement acts. The court held those observations were made in different facts and circumstances and had no bearing on the present controversy.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the challenges in a structured manner and applied statutory interpretation, principles of legislative competence, doctrines concerning colourable legislation and delegation, and rules of interpretation for pre-commencement executive action.

On the validity of the Act (general):

  1. Legislative competence: The court found the legislation concerned land and subjects falling within Entry 18 of the State List. Even if the subject were treated as within Entry 42 of the Concurrent List, the State would still have competence to legislate. No conflict with central law was shown; and, in any event, Presidential assent protects the legislation. The branch of argument asserting want of legislative competence was rejected.
  2. Colourable legislation and compensation adequacy: Applying the principle from K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo, the court emphasized that assessment of colourable legislation depends on whether the legislature in substance transgressed its powers, not on motive. The court relied on Karimbil Kunhikonan and the position under Art. 31(2) to hold that the petitioners' contention — that the State would pay less compensation and thus the Act was colourable — was insufficient to invalidate the legislation.
  3. Excessive delegation: The court examined sec. 30-G(4), which apportions compensation "in the manner laid down in rules made by the State Government." The court concluded that guidance exists in secs. 23–26 of the Tenancy Act on principles for determining compensation and that these provisions provide sufficient legislative policy and guidance to the rule-making authority. Therefore the delegation was not excessive.
  4. Claim that the Act imposed a ceiling on income rather than land: The court rejected this, finding the Act's scheme clearly aimed at ceilings on agricultural holdings; nothing indicated an intent to impose income ceilings.

On the validity of Notification F. 6(120) Rev. B/60(iii) dated 26-11-1963:

  1. Whether the State could fix dates under sec. 30-E before the Act came into force: The petitioners argued that the relevant amending provisions only became part of the Tenancy Act on 15-12-1963 when the Act came into force and thus the State lacked jurisdiction earlier. The court disagreed, holding that sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act (analogous to sec. 22 of the Central General Clauses Act) is an enabling provision validating preparatory orders made after passage of an Act and before its commencement to facilitate implementation; the court quoted Venkateswaraloo v. Supdt. Central Jail to the effect that such provisions validate orders related to the time or manner for doing things under the Act. The court held the notification related to the time when acts under the Act were to be done and therefore could properly be issued under sec. 24.
  2. Alternate contention that the Act came into force on publication so sec. 24 could not apply: The court found these authorities fact-specific and inapplicable; the position here was that the Act had been passed but fixed to commence later, and sec. 24 applied to validate the preparatory notification.
  3. Meaning of "different areas of the State": Petitioners argued it must mean geographic regions. The court construed the proviso purposively — the phrase could include differentiation by geographic divisions or by categories such as size of holdings. The court accepted the State's administrative convenience rationale (as advanced by the Advocate General) for selecting a measurable threshold (150 ordinary acres) as a reasonable basis for phased implementation.
  4. The court concluded the notification did not violate sec. 30-E in letter or spirit and refused to invalidate it.

On the Rules (Ceiling Rules, 1963):

  1. The court noted the rules were framed under sec. 257 of the Tenancy Act, which was in force when the rules were made; therefore the petitioners' contention that the State had no authority to enact the rules because the amending Act had not yet come into force was unfounded.
  2. The court observed that even if rules were regarded as framed under powers conferred by the amending Act, the reasoning applied to notifications and sec. 24 would similarly support their validity as preparatory instruments. However, challenges alleging specific inconsistencies or that particular rules went beyond the Act were not accompanied by adequate averments, materials or affidavits in the petitions.
  3. Because of inadequate materials and absence of a State reply on the alleged inconsistencies, the court declined to express a final opinion on the validity of the rules and granted the petitioners liberty to file fresh writs with proper pleadings and evidence.

On the specific petition of Mahant Shreyonath:

The petitioner argued the holdings were for a religious 'math' whose head and chelas are celibates and have no family, so the Act could not apply. The court held this contention untenable: sec. 30-E applies to any person in possession exceeding ceiling limits; the legislature had not exempted religious or charitable institutions and the absence of a family in the petitioner's circumstances did not remove him from the statute's operation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: All writ applications, in so far as they raised the common grounds described in the opinion, were dismissed and the validity of the Amending Act and the contested notification were affirmed. The court granted no final decision on the validity of specific Rules where inadequate materials were placed on record, but allowed petitioners liberty to file fresh writs on proper averments.

Implications:

  • The court affirmed the vires of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1960 with respect to the grounds it considered and rejected challenges based on legislative incompetence, colourable legislation, excessive delegation and the claim that the Act created a ceiling on income rather than land.
  • The court upheld the notification fixing 15-12-1963 for holdings of 150 ordinary acres and above, finding sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act applicable to validate preparatory pre-commencement administrative action related to time/manner under the Act.
  • The Ceiling Rules, 1963 were not finally invalidated by this decision; the court found they were framed under sec. 257 of the Tenancy Act which existed at the time; but the court expressed no final view on alleged inconsistencies of individual rules because petitioners had not provided sufficient pleadings or materials — petitioners were granted leave to renew specific challenges with fuller material.
  • The petition by Mahant Shreyonath claiming exemption for a religious institution was dismissed and no special exemption was found in the Act for such institutions.
  • No broader new precedent was articulated beyond the court's application of existing principles and the Supreme Court authorities cited; the decision had the direct effect of dismissing the petitions and leaving parties to bear their own costs.

Costs: Considering the petitioners had initial support from earlier Supreme Court decisions but failed in view of subsequent developments, the court ordered that parties bear their own costs.

    Prithvi Raj v. State Of Rajasthan

    Chhangani, J.:— This is a bunch of 542 writ applications presented under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, challenging the vires of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1960 (Act No. 4 of 1960) (which shall hereafter be referred to as the Act No. 4 of 1960) amending the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Act No. 3 of 1955) (which shall hereafter be referred to as the Tenancy Act), and the validity of the Rules and Notifications issued under the Act, and praying for writs in the nature of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, restraining the opposite party from giving effect to or acting in any manner by virtue of or under the said Act or Notifications.

    2. To state the facts, the State of Rajasthan passed the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act No. 4 of 1960 for the purpose of imposing ceilings on agricultural holdings in Rajasthan. By means of this Act, the Legislature inserted new Chapters III-B and III-C. Chapter III-B which is relevant for our purposes, introduces secs. 30-B to 30-J in the original Tenancy Act. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 1 of the Act provided that the Act shall come into force on such date as the State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint. This Act received the assent of the President on 12-3-1960. After the enactment of Act No. 4 of 1960, the Rajasthan Government by notification No. F. 6(120) Rev./B/60 dated 9th April, 1963, published a draft of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land (Government) Rules, 1963, as required by sec. 259 of the Tenancy Act, for the information of all persons likely to be affected thereby, and further giving notice that the said draft rules shall be taken into consideration on or after the 15th day of July, 1963, along with any objections or suggestions which may be received by the Government from any person with respect to the said draft rules before that day. It may be pointed out that during the course of arguments no reference was made whether any of the petitioners made any objections or suggestions in response to the notice given by the Government. We then come to 26th of November, 1963. On this date, the three important notifications were promulgated. Firstly, by notification No. 6(12) Rev,/B/60 passed in the exercise of powers conferred by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 1 of the Act No. 4 of 1960, the State Government appointed 15th day of December, 1963 as the day on which the said Act shall come into force. By another notification No. F. 6(120) Rev. B./60(iii) of the even date passed in the exercise of powers conferred by sub-sec. (1) of sec. 30-E of the Tenancy Act, the State Government notified 15th day of December, 1963 as the day for the purpose of said section in respect of all holdings of 150 ordinary acres and above situated in all areas other than the areas covered by the Rajasthan Canal Project. Lastly, by Notification No. 6(120) Rev. B/60(ii) dated 26-11-1963 in the exercise of powers conferred by sec. 257 of the Tenancy Act, the State Government made and published “The Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land (Government) Rules, 1963.” Sec. 30-E as inserted by the Act No. 4 of 1960 requires a person in possession of land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him or a person who subsequently comes into possession of excess area by acquisition to make a report of such possession or acquisition and to surrender such excess land to the State Government within six months of such date or within three months of such acquisition. R. 9 of the Ceiling Rules requires persons to file declarations in the prescribed forms. The petitioners, who are holders of agricultural holdings having become liable to take action under sec. 30-E of the Act No. 4 of 1960 and R. 9 of the Ceiling Rules, Page: 508filed the present writ applications challenging the Act, the Notifications and the Rules. The main attack of the petitioners against the Act was based on the Act being violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners by Arts. 14, 39 and 31 of the Constitution. It may be incidentally mentioned that at the time when these writ petitions were filed, the decision of the Supreme Court in 1. Karimbil Kunhikonan (In Petition v. No. 114 Of 61) (1) striking down the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act of 1961 held the field. There was another pronouncement of the Supreme Court in A.P Krishnaswami Naidu v. The State of Madras (2) whereby Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act (58 of 1961) was struck down. The petitioners claimed to have very powerful weapons of attack in these two decisions of the Supreme Court.

    3. At this stage, we ought to mention some subsequent developments which took place during the pendency of the writ applications. The Central Government and most of the State Governmtnts appeared very keen to implement what is called by them a “programme of agrarian reforms”. After abolition of the Zamindari, Biswedari and other measures of agrarian reforms, the Government took in hand the second step by imposing the ceiling on agricultural holdings. Some States passed enactments for that purpose. These enactments were challenged before the judiciary and some of the Acts were struck down. The Central Government thereupon moved the Parliament and got enacted the 17th Constitution Amendment Act of 1964. By the Amending Act some 24 Acts of the various State Legislatures including the Rajasthan Tenancy Act as also some of the Acts which were struck down were added to the list in the Ninth Schedule so as to place them beyond challenge on the ground of violation of fundamental rights. The validity of the Seventeenth Constitution Amendment Act, 1964 was challenged in the Supreme Court. Some persons feeling aggrieved by one or other of the Acts added to the Ninth Schedule by the impugned Act challenged the validity of the Seventeenth Amendment Act and the validity of the various Acts added in the list. The Supreme Court by its decision in Sajjan Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, (Writ Petitions Nos. 31, 50, 52, 54, 81 and 82 of 1964, decided on 30th October, 1964) upheld the validity of the Constitution (17th Amendment) Act, 1964 as also of the various Acts added to the list in the Ninth Schedule. In this manner, the validity of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act as also of the Amendment Act No. 4 of 1960 was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Although in view of these developments the so called powerful weapons in the armoury of the petitioners became more or less ineffective still the learned counsel for the petitioners did not abandon their attack against the Act and Mr. Chand Mai, Mr. Agarwal, Mr. Sharma and Mr. Joshi, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, addressed lengthy arguments while attacking the vires of the Act, the validity of the notifications and the validity of the rules. We propose to refer to these arguments while dealing with each head of attack.

    4. We first take up the attack against the Act itself. The counsel for the petitioners were faced atonce with Constitution (17th Amendment) Act and the decision of the Supreme Court and they felt that it was not possible for them to challenge the vires of the Act on the ground of the Act being violative of the fundamental rights and they, therefore, did not press most of the grounds which were taken in the writ applications. However, the learned counsel for the petitioners made a three-fold attack on the Act and contended that the Supreme Court having not expressed any opinion with regard to these grounds of attack, it is open to this Court still to consider the validity of the impugned Act on an examination of the grounds submitted by them.

    5. In the first instance, it was submitted that the Act suffers from the infirmity of want of legislative competence. The State Legislature, it is contended, had no legislative competence to enact the impugned Act and it is a colourable piece of legislation. The argument in this behalf were two pronged. In the first instance, it was contended that although the legislature has purported to pass this legislation under Entry No. 18 of the State List, in fact, it is a legislation which should appropriately be considered as relating to acquisition and requisition of land and that it Page: 509should appropriately fall under Entry No. 42 of the Concurrent List. This submission as regards the want of legislative competence on the part of the State Legislature has absolutely no force. In the first place, the legislation is mainly concerned with the land and the various subjects mentioned in Entry 18. Even if the legislation be treated as falling under Entry No. 42 of the Concurrent List, still the competence of the State Legislature to enact the law cannot be doubted, because the subject, if treated as falling within the Concurrent List, the State Legislature has competence to enact such a law. It has not been suggested that the law is in conflict with any Central law on the subject and even if there be such a conflict, the legislation stands protected because the legislation has been assented to by the President. This branch of argument relating to want of legislative competence is absolutely without force and deserves summary rejection.

    6. The next branch of argument is that although the Act purports to rationalise the distribution of agricultural lands, in fact that Act seeks to deprive the holders of agricultural lands of their holdings by payment of inadequate compensation and by making profits by selling the holdings to other persons at comparatively higher prices. Now, the principle as to what is a colourable legislation stands well settled. As observed by the Supreme Court in K.C Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa (1), “the question whether a law was a colourable legislation and as such void did not depend on the motive or bona fides of the legislature in passing the law but upon the competency of the legislature to pass that particular law, and what the courts have to determine in such cases is whether though the legislature has purported to act within the limits of its powers, it has in substance and reality transgressed those powers, the transgression being veiled by what appears, on proper examination to be a mere pretence or disguise. The whole doctrine of colourable legislation is based upon the maxim that you cannot do indirectly what you cannot do directly.”

    7. A question similar to the one which has been raised before us was raised before the Supreme Court in 1. Karimbil Kunhikonan (In Petition v. No. 114 Of 61) (1). In the case before the Supreme Court, the person to whom the land was to be assigned after acquisition, was required to pay 55% of the market value of the land while the person from the excess land was taken was not to be paid always 50% of the market value and in some cases was to receive only 25% of the market value. On these facts, it was contended before the Supreme Court that the State wanted to make profits and that the Act was a colourable legislation. The contention was over-ruled. It was observed that the adequacy of the compensation could not be questioned in view of Art. 31(2). In the present case the challenge to the vires of the Act on the ground of inadequacy of the compensation or on the ground of the Act being violative of the fundamental rights, cannot at all be entertained. In these circumstances, on this ground that the State is paying less to the land holders in the form of compensation and will be receiving higher amounts of money from the persons to whom the lands will be allotted, cannot be considered sufficient to hold that the State had no legislative competence to enact the law and that the law is a colourable one. The contention of the petitioners based on want of legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact the law on this ground also fails and stands rejected.

    8. Next, it was contended that the Act suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. Our attention in this connection was invited to sub-sec. (4) of sec. 30-G. Sec. 30-G sub-sec. (4) reads as follows—

    “The amount of compensation so determined shall be apportioned among the person surrendering his land under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 30-E or ejected therefrom under sub-sec. (4) of that section, and his tenants, if any, in the manner laid down in rules made by the State Government in this behalf.”

    9. The argument is that the Act does not lay down any guiding principle for the rulemaking authority as to the manner in which the compensation should be apportioned between the land holder and his tenant. A perusal of the Act No. 4 of 1960 shows that the compensation payable to the land holder is to be determined in accordance with the principle laid down in sec. 23, 24, 25 and 26 of the Tenancy Act. The principles as to how compensation should be determined, are available in the Tenancy Act itself and these provisions, in our opinion, do indicate the legislative policy and provide sufficient guidance to the rule-making authority to frame necessary rules in this behalf. In enacting sub-sec. (4), we do not think that the legislature has in Page: 510any manner abdicated its legislative function. There are sufficient guiding principles under which the State Government can frame the necessary rules. The challenge to the attack on the ground of excessive delegation has no merits and must therefore fail.

    10. Thirdly, it was contended that the Act, although it purports to create ceilings on land, in fact creates a ceiling of agricultural income. We have not been impressed by this contention. The entire scheme of the Act clearly shows that the main purport of the Act is to impose ceiling on agricultural holdings. There is nothing in the Act to indicate that the legislature intended to impose ceilings of agricultural incomes. The attack on this ground also fails and merits no serious consideration.

    11. Thus, the various grounds of the attack on the Act fail and we have no hesitation in affirming the validity of the Act.

    12. The next attack of the petitioners is on the validity of the notification No. F. 6(120) Rev. B/60(iii) dated 26th November, 1963 appointing 15th day of December, 1963, as the date for the purposes of sec. 30-E in respect of all holdings of 150 ordinary acres and above situated in all areas other than areas covered by the Rajasthan Canal Project. The attack against the notification may be discussed under three different heads.

    13. Firstly, it was contended that the various provisions which were sought to be inserted in the original Tenancy Act by the Amending Act (i.e Act No. 4 of 1960) became incorporated in the Tenancy Act only on 15th day of December, 1963, the date on which the Act came into force. Before that date they had not been incorporated in the Act. Consequently, the State Government had no jurisdiction to exercise the powers conferred on it by sec. 30-E and to fix a date in terms of sec. 30-E. Being faced with the provisions of sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, it was contended that sec. 24 cannot be made applicable to the present case. It was contended that the State Government while fixing the date was acting sub-stantively as a functionary under the Act and was not discharging any delegated functions. sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act corresponds to sec. 22 of the Central General Clauses Act. Sec. 22 of the Central General Clauses Act came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court in Venkateswaraloo v. Supdt. Central Jail, Hyderabad State (2). After referring to corresponding sec. 37 of the English Interpretation Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the law in the following terms:

    “It is an enabling provision, its intent and purpose being to facilitate the making of rules, bye-laws and orders before the date of the commencement of an enactment in anticipation of its coming into force. In other words, it validates rules, bye-laws and orders made before the enactment comes into force provided they are made after the passing of the Act and as preparatory to the Act coming into force. It does not authorize or empower the State Government to pass substantive orders against any person in exercise of the authority conferred by any particular section of the new Act. The words of the section “with respect to” prescribe the limit and the scope of the power given by the section. Orders can only be issued with respect to the time when or the manner in which anything is to be done under the Act.”

    14. The last two sentences are very relevant for the purposes of determining the present controversy. Their Lordships clearly say that orders can be issued with respect to the time when or the manner in which anything is to be done under the Act. Now, in the present case the order which has been passed by the State Government relates to the time when a particular act is to be done under the Act. The present is not the case where the State Government acts as a functionary to exercise some powers conferred upon it by the Act. As we understand the principle laid down by the Supreme Court, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the notification issued by the State Government can be properly passed in terms of sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act.

    15. The learned counsel also relied upon Adarsh Bhandar v. State Tax Officer, Aligarh (3) and Rajender Kumar Chandarmal v. Government of State of M.P (4). It is unnecessary to notice these cases in detail in view of the discussions of the law in the Supreme Court case. It will be sufficient to observe that the decisions have been arrived at on a consideration of the facts and the circumstances of these cases and they cannot render any assistance to the petitioners in the facts and the circumstances of the present case.

    16. Alternatively, it was also urged that the Act came into force as soon as it was published and that sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act is confined to the period between the promulgation of the Act and the commencement of the Act. Reliance was placed in this connection upon some observations in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkatachalam Potti (5) and Rajendra Kumar Chandanmal v. Government of State of M.P (6). These observations have been made in different facts and different circumstances and, in our opinion, have no bearing on the controversy calling for determination in the present case. The position before us is very clear. The Act had been passed by the State Legislature but it was to come into operation at a later date. Between these two dates the State exercising powers under sec. 30-E of the Act No. 4 of 1960 passed an order fixing the date as required by that section. We do not see how sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act cannot be invoked in these circumstances. The contention in this behalf thus has no force.

    17. Next, it was contended that under proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 30-E, the State Government can notify different dates for the purposes of sub-sec. (1) for different areas of the State. It was contended that different areas of the State in the context must mean different geographical regions. Consequently it is argued that the State went beyond the provisions of the Act in categorising areas on the basis of the sizes of the holdings and fixing the date with respect to hold wigs measuring 150 ordinary acres and above. In support of their contention, reference was made to similar provisions in the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act and the Rajasthan Zamindari and Biswedari Abolition Act where it was provided that different dates can be prescribed for different classes or categories of Jagirs or Biswedari or Jamindari. We have given our very careful consideration to the argument advanced in this behalf. It appears that the legislature had in view the administrative convenience of the State Govt. while providing in the proviso that different dates may be notified for different areas in the State. The legislature might have thought that it was hardly possible for the State to take action in respect of the entire land in the State at one stage and thought it proper to enable the State Government to carry out the reform in various stages. This could only be the main consideration in enacting this provision. Now, in taking steps in stages the State Government could differentiate areas both on consideration of geographical regions as also on a consideration of the sizes of the holdings. In considering the State's convenience the legislature could have no intention to insist that the different phases should be related to different geographical regions. It is in this back ground that the proviso has to be properly understood and given meaning to. It may also be incidentally pointed out that in giving meaning to a particular provision of law the entire context and the setting in which the provision happens to be enacted must be considered and that unnecessary emphasis should not be given on a mere literal interpretation. As we look at the matter, the expression “different area of the State” is capable of being interpreted in two different ways. Firstly, “different area of the State” can be interpreted as meaning different areas within different geographical divisions. Secondly, the areas may be differentiated on the basis of sizes of the agricultural holdings and in that sense agricultural holdings of different sizes may be treated different areas of the State. We may also in this connection notice the position placed before me by the Advocate General in this behalf. He submitted that sec. 30-E of the Act No. 4 of 1960 imposes a substantial burden upon the land holders in the matter of submitting reports and surrendering lands in their possession in excess of the ceiling limits and also in making certain declarations. Consequenly, it was considered necessary step in the proper working of the Act that some measurable standard which may proximate to the ceiling area, be adopted. The State Government, therefore, thought it proper to fix 150 ordinary acres as it was reasonably expected that the holders of that size or above are very likely to have lands beyond ceiling limits. This also, in our opinion, is a very relevant consideration in interpreting and giving the matter our very careful and earnest consideration, we feel inclined to take the view that under the terms of the proviso it was open to the State to categories lands on the basis of areas and sizes and to adopt different dates with reference to such categories.

    18. In our opinion, the notification does not violate the letter or the spirit of Page: 512the provisions of sec. 30-E and we do not see adequate reason to invalidate the notification on this ground.

    19. Lastly, it was argued that the State Government by fixing 15th December for holdings of 15 ordinary acres and above has acted inconsistently with sub-sec. (1) of the Act No. 4 of 1960. We do not find any inconsistency. Sub-sec. (1) enacts the general Rule and empowers the State Government to fix a day in terms of sec. 30-E. The proviso enables the State to fix different dates for different areas or categories of holdings. When a particular date is notified for certain categories of, holdings sub-sec. (I) cannot apply to holdings other than those referred to in the notification. The two provisions have to be interpreted according to the rule of harmonious construction. There is no force in this ground cither.

    20. The notification attacked by the petitioners suffers from no invalidity and we reject the contention of the petitioners in this behalf.

    21. Lastly, we come to the attack against the Rules. We need only consider the general attack against the rules. The argument is that the Act No. 4 of 1960 having not come into force till 15th day of December, 1963, the State had no authority to enact the rules. The answer to this contention is that the rules have not been framed under any powers conferred upon the State Government by the amending law. The rules have been framed under sec. 257 of the Tenancy Act which was in force when the rules were framed. No objection, therefore, can be taken to the rules on this point. Of course, objection can be taken about the validity of the rules on the ground that the rules are not consistent and go beyond the provisions of the Act itself including the amending provisions. Even if the rules be treated to have been of framed under the amending Act still the reasoning which has been advanced in connection with the notification applies to rules also and the validity of the rules cannot be questioned in view of the provisions of sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act. During the course of arguments, attempts were made without giving necessary information to challenge the validity of some of the rules on the ground that the rules are inconsistent and go beyond the provisions of the Act, but counsel for the petitioners and the Advocate General both, however, agreed that the petitions were mainly directed against the vires of the Act and the rules were challenged indirectly along with the provisions of the Act and therefore, proper averments and materials for declaring the rules as invalid being inconsistent with and beyond the provisions of the Act, were not made and placed on record. We have gone through some of the writ petitions and the position taken by counsel for both sides appears to be correct. It is further agreed by the petitioners' counsel as well as the learned Advocate General that on the basis of inadequate materials in the writ applications and the absence of reply by the State, no decision can be properly taken on the validity of the rules at this stage. The petitioners, therefore, did not press their contentions at this stage but desired to reserve liberty to file fresh writ applications to challenge the validity of the rules on proper averments, materials and affidavits. We do not see any harm in granting this liberty to the petitioners. In the circumstances, we express no opinion at this stage on the validity of the rules, on the ground that the writ applications do not make necessary averments to enable us to form a correct opinion.

    22. All the writ applications, therefore, fail so far as the common grounds are concerned.

    23. In writ No. 337 of 1964 Mahant Shreyonath v. State of Rajasthan, Mr. Chandmal contended that the petitioner is a Mahant, who manages the holding for the benefit of a ‘math’. It was also pointed out that the head of the ‘math’ as well as the ‘chelas’ are celibates and do not marry nor have families. The produce of the holding is utilised for the ‘math’ or given in charity and is not the personal property of the petitioners. Accordingly, the petitioner cannot have a family as defined in the Act. On these facts, it is contended that the provisions of the Act cannot be applied to him. We have given due consideration to this argument and have come to the conclusion that the argument is untenable. Sec. 30-E of the Act No. 4 of 1960 is very clear and requires that no person can have in his possession any land exceeding the ceiling limits. The fact that the petitioner cannot have family is not a decisive matter. Page: 513The petitioner is nonetheless a person subject to the provisions of the Act. The legislature has not thought it proper to make any exemption in favour of religious or charitable institutions and on the proper interpretation of the scheme and the provisions of the Act, we do not find any force in the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner.

    24. All the petitions, in the circumstances, fail and are hereby dismissed. Considering the fact that when the writs were instituted the petitioners had some support from the decision of the Supreme Court and that the writ fail on account of subsequent developments, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Prithvi Raj v. State Of Rajasthan
    (Dec 9, 1964)