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  • rule 18(2) of the Madras General Sales-tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939. Rule 18(2) of the said Rules
  • provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act 1944. Vegetable Oil Product Control Order, 1947,
  • Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (Act No. 38 of 1961) (hereinafter
  • rule 64 of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Market Rules, 1963,
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, Page: 4061955,
  • provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act
  • clause (k) of sub-rule (1) of rule 5
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • rule 18(2) of the Madras General Sales-tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939. Rule 18(2) of the said Rules
  • provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act 1944. Vegetable Oil Product Control Order, 1947,
  • Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (Act No. 38 of 1961) (hereinafter
  • rule 64 of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Market Rules, 1963,
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, Page: 4061955,
  • provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act
  • clause (k) of sub-rule (1) of rule 5
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These are ten connected special appeals under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, arising from a common Single Judge judgment dated 25 August 1978. The learned Single Judge had allowed ten writ petitions filed by the respondents, holding that the respondents were not liable to pay market fees ("Mandi Shulks") on transactions of sale and purchase of "Vanaspati" or hydrogenated oil and that the respondents were entitled to refunds of fees paid or deposited with the Krishi Upaj Mandi.

The appellants challenged that judgment before the Division Bench. The principal factual and statutory context identified by the court includes: section 17 of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (market fees on agricultural produce), the definition of "agricultural produce" in section 2(1)(i) (which incorporates items specified in the Schedule), and section 40 (power to amend the Schedule). The notification history relevant to the dispute was recited: additions to the Schedule (including oils) and regulatory notifications culminating in a Schedule effective from 23 April 1977 that excluded oils. The court treated the relevant operative period as 20 December 1975 to 23 April 1977.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether "Vanaspati" or hydrogenated oil falls within the meaning of the terms used in the Schedule — specifically whether they are covered by the terms "Vanaspati oil" or "groundnut oil" for the purposes of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961.
  2. Whether market fees (Mandi Shulks) were leviable on transactions in Vanaspati during the relevant period (20 December 1975 to 23 April 1977), given the Schedule and notifications in force for that period.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Single Judge erred in holding that Vanaspati or hydrogenated oil did not fall within the meaning of "Vanaspati oil" or "groundnut oil" in the Schedule.
  • Hydrogenated groundnut oil is simply hardened groundnut oil commonly called "Vanaspati"; thus, inclusion of "groundnut oil" or "Vanaspati oil" in the Schedule covers the product at issue.
  • Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Tungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Commercial Taxes Officer (Kurnool) as authority that hydrogenated oil remains groundnut oil in its essential nature.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Single Judge concluded that respondents were not liable for market fees on Vanaspati; respondents relied on that conclusion and on interpretations of statutory/regulatory terms to support their position.
  • The respondents relied on definitions and distinctions found in other statutory instruments and rules (for example, Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules and Central Excise-related orders) and on the Explanation to rule 64 of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Market Rules, 1963, to argue that processed but non-manufactured agricultural produce should be treated differently.
  • Learned counsel for respondents also urged that the term "Vanaspati" should be given its meaning in common parlance, citing authority (Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Commercial Taxes Officer, Kurnool Whether hydrogenated groundnut oil (Vanaspati) remains "groundnut oil" in its essential nature despite hydrogenation; chemical/functional continuity of the oil. The court treated this as the direct and controlling authority for the proposition that hydrogenated oil remains groundnut oil; relied on Tungabhadra's chemical and functional analysis to conclude Vanaspati is included in the Schedule term.
R.M. Krishnaswamy Naidu & Sons v. State of Madras Support for the view (following Tungabhadra) that Vanaspati is groundnut oil in a more stable form. Used as corroborative authority (it relied on Tungabhadra) to support the conclusion that Vanaspati is not a different commodity in essential nature.
Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. Whether production of Vanaspati from oils amounts to "manufacture" for central excise purposes (principle that 'manufacture' can mean bringing into existence a new substance). The court distinguished this case as addressing the issue of manufacture (excise liability) rather than identity; it held Delhi Cloth does not decide whether Vanaspati is different from hydrogenated oil for Schedule inclusion.
Raunaq Ram Tara Chand v. State of Punjab Commodities listed in the Schedule are statutorily "agricultural produce" under section 2(1)(i); court should not import meanings from other statutes to reinterpret the Schedule. Applied to reject the respondents' attempt to import definitions from other statutes or rules when determining whether an item in the Schedule is agricultural produce.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Indore v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh Use of common parlance or ordinary meaning for terms in taxation contexts. The court noted this authority in discussing whether "Vanaspati" should be given its common-market meaning and observed that Vanaspati is commonly understood to be hydrogenated oil.
Amritsar Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. U.S. Naurath Conversion of oil into vegetable ghee amounts to manufacture (based on Delhi Cloth & General Mills). The court regarded this decision as addressing manufacturing liability (and derived from Delhi Cloth) and found it not directly bearing on the identity question in the present case.
Ganesh Trading Co. Kamal v. State of Haryana Example where a raw commodity (paddy) changed identity after processing (rice) for sales-tax purposes. The court distinguished that example as commodity-specific and reiterated that whether processing changes identity depends on the particular commodities; it concluded Vanaspati did not change identity from groundnut oil.
State of Gujarat v. Sakarwala Brothers Processing of sugar into products (patasa, harda, alchidana) did not change essential characteristics; identity continued. Relied upon to support the proposition that processing does not necessarily alter the essential identity of an agricultural product; applied analogously to Vanaspati.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by reference to the statute and the notification history, and then addressed competing authorities and arguments about identity and manufacture. The key steps of the court's analysis (as expressed in the opinion) are:

  1. Statutory framework and temporal scope: The court noted section 17 (power to collect market fees on agricultural produce), section 2(1)(i) (definition of "agricultural produce" by reference to the Schedule), and section 40 (power to amend the Schedule). By analysing the sequence of notifications, the court determined the relevant operative period for the dispute was 20 December 1975 to 23 April 1977.
  2. Direct authority on identity: The court placed decisive weight on the Supreme Court decision in Tungabhadra Industries Ltd., which concluded that hydrogenated oil remains, in its essential nature, an oil (a glyceride of fatty acids) even after hydrogenation; the chemical changes do not alter its essential character and its uses and nutritional value remain the same. The Division Bench read Tungabhadra as leaving no room for arguing that hydrogenated oil is not groundnut oil.
  3. Distinguishing authorities about manufacture: The court considered Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills (and cases following it) which held that producing Vanaspati may involve a process of manufacture for excise law purposes. The Bench distinguished those decisions as relating to whether a manufacturing process exists (for excise liability), not whether the processed product loses its identity as groundnut oil for the purposes of the Schedule. Thus, findings about manufacture did not determine the identity issue under the Markets Act.
  4. Treatment of other statutory definitions and rules: The court rejected the approach of importing definitions or classifications from other statutes (for example, Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules or Central Excise orders) into the Markets Act when deciding if an item in the Schedule is an "agricultural produce." It relied on Raunaq Ram Tara Chand to support the proposition that Schedule items are statutorily agricultural produce and that judicial scrutiny to relabel or redefine them by reference to other statutes is inappropriate.
  5. Common parlance and market usage: The court accepted that in market practice "Vanaspati" and hydrogenated oil are treated as the same product, noting that some may call it "Vanaspati", "Vanaspati Ghee" or "Vanaspati Tel", but it is the same product. The court found that the chemical identity and market usage both supported inclusion.
  6. Analogical support and limits of contrary examples: The court considered decisions where processing produced a different commodity in ordinary parlance (e.g., paddy to rice) and held that whether processing changes identity depends on the commodity; it concluded that for Vanaspati the processing did not change essential identity. It also cited State of Gujarat v. Sakarwala Brothers to show processing may not change essential characteristics.
  7. Conclusion of law applied to facts: On the basis of the statutory text, notification timeline, authoritative precedent (Tungabhadra and related decisions), and market usage, the court concluded that hydrogenated oil (Vanaspati) is included within the term "Vanaspati oil" used in the Schedule and therefore the market committee could collect market fees on transactions in Vanaspati during the relevant period.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Division Bench rendered the following dispositive orders:

APPEALS ALLOWED; SINGLE JUDGE JUDGMENT SET ASIDE; ALL TEN WRIT PETITIONS DISMISSED.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The court held that hydrogenated oil ("Vanaspati") is included in the term "Vanaspati oil" used in the Schedule to the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 for the relevant period (20 December 1975 to 23 April 1977).
  • Market fees (Mandi Shulks) were leviable on transactions of sale and purchase of Vanaspati in the market area during that period; therefore the respondents are not entitled to the relief granted by the Single Judge (including refunds ordered by the Single Judge).
  • The appeals were allowed and the writ petitions dismissed; the court made no order as to costs.
  • The opinion relies on pre-existing Supreme Court authority (in particular Tungabhadra). The judgment does not state that it establishes a novel legal principle beyond its application of those authorities to the facts; the effect described above is the direct consequence for the parties in these appeals.

    Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Jodhpur v. Ashok Kumar

    C.M Lodha, C.J:— These are ten connected special appeals under sec. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. 1949, against a common judgment dated August 25, 1978, by a learned Single Judge whereby the learned Judge allowed 10% writ petitions filed by the respondents in these appeals in the matter of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (Act No. 38 of 1961) (hereinafter to be referred to as “the Act.”). The learned Judge held that the petitioner respondents (hereinafter to be referred to as “the respondents”), were not liable to pay market fees i.e, “Mandi Shulks”, on the transactions of sale and purchase of ‘Vanaspati’ or ‘hydrogenated oil’. He further held that the respondents shall be entitled to get the refund of the market-fees paid or deposited by them with the Krishi Upaj Mandi.

    2. The facts are not in disputs and the short point on which Shri A K. Mathur, learned counsel for the appellants, has directed his attack is that the learned Judge erred in holding that “Vanaspati” or hydrogenated oil do not fall within the meaning of the tera “Vanaspati oil” or “groundnut oil”. Section 17 of the Act provides that the market committee shall collect market fees from the licencees in the prescribed manner on agricultural Produce bought or sold by them in the market area at such rate as may be specified by the State government by notification in official gazette subject 10 a maximum of Rs. 1/- per hundred rupees worth of agricultural produce.

    3. Section 2(1)(i) of the Act defines “agricultural produce” as follows,—

    “2.(1)(i). ‘Agricultural produce’ includes all produce whether of agriculture horticulture, animal husbandary or otherwise as specified in the Schedule.”

    4. Section 40 of the Act gives power to the State Government to add to, amend or cancel any of the items of agricultural produce specified in the Schedule.

    5. By Notification dated June 23, 1975, published in the Rajasthan Rajpatra dated June 25, 1975, against item No. 4 of the Schedule, under the head “oil seeds and oil” “groundnut oil”, “Vanaspati oil” were included in the Schedule. Thereafter, by a notification dated August 19, 1975, issued under sec. 3 of the Act, the State Government declared its intention of regulating the purchase and sale of commodities specified in the said notification, which, however, did not include “ground-nut oil” and “Vanaspati tel” although some other kinds of vegetable oils were included under the general heading “oil seeds and oils”. However, by a subsequent Notification dated December 20, 1975, issued under section 3 of the Act, the items “Vegetable oil” was included in the notification as a commodity, the sale and purchase of which may be regulated by the State Government. Later on by another Notification dated April 23, 1977, issued under section 40 of the Act, the old Schedule was replaced by an entirely new Schedule and this time the item vegetable oil was altogether excluded from the Schedule. Thus, all oils have been exclulded from the list of commodities included in the Schedule which came into force by Notification dated April 23, 1977. Hence, we are concerned only with the period commencing from December 20, 1975 to April 23, 1977. It appears that there has been a slip in the judgment of the learned Single Judge when he observed that the relevant period is from June 23, 1975 to April 23, 1977. In fact, it should be from December 20, 1975 to April 23, 1977.

    6. Learned counsel for the appellants has urged that hydrogenated groundnut oil is commonly called “Vanaspati” and therefore, while making mention of “groundnut oil”, “Vanaspati tel” has been mentioned only by way Page: 404of abundent caution. It is submitted that hydrogenated groundnut oil is nothing but hardened ground-nut oil which is commonly called “Vanaspati”. “Vanaspati oil”, argues Shri Mathur, is nothing but “Vanaspati”. In support of his contention, Shri Mathur has placed reliance on Tungabhadra Industries Ltd. Kumool v. Commercial Taxes Officer, Kurnool (1) The question for consideration before the Supreme Court in that case was whether hydrogenated groundnut oil is groundnut oil within the meaning of rule 18(2) of the Madras General Sales-tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939. Rule 18(2) of the said Rules was as follows,—

    “Every such registered manufacturer of ground-nut oil will be entitled to deduction under clause (k) of sub-rule (1) of rule 5 equal Ito the value of the groundnut and/or kernel purchased by him and convert into the oil and cakes if he has paid the tax to the State on such purchases.”

    7. We are not concerned with the provisos and the Explanation to the said rule and therefore, they have not been reproduced.

    8. The Tribunal as well as the High Court decided against the allowance of the deduction in respect of the sales of hydrogenated oil while upholding the appellant's case as regards refined oil. In this connection, their Lordships observed as follows in paragraph 9,—

    “But in the case of hydrogenated oil which is prepared from refined oil by the process of passing hydrogen into heated oil in the presence of a catalyst (usually finely powdered nickel), two atoms of hydrogen are absorbed. A portion of the oleic acid which formed a good part of the content of groundnut oil in its raw state is converted, by the absorption of the hydrogen atoms, into stearic acid and it is this which gives the characteristic appearance as well as the semisolid condition which it attains. In the language of the chemist, an intermolecular or configurational chemical change takes place which results in the hardening of the oil. Though it continues to be the same edible fat that it was before the hardening and its nutritional properties continue to be the same, it has acquired new properties in that the tendency to rancidity is greatly removed, is easier to keep and to transport. Both the Tribunal as well as the learned Judges of the High Court held that the hydrogenated oil (or Vanaspati) ceased to be groundnut oil by reason of the chemical changes which took place which resulted in the acquisition of new properties including the loss of its fluidity. In other words, they hold that Vanaspati or hydrogenated oil was not ‘groundnut oil’ but a product of groundnut oil, manufactured out of groundnut oil and therefore not entitled to the benefit of the deduction under R. 18(2).”

    9. Thus, the short question, which arose for the decision of the Supreme Court was whether hydrogenated oil (Vanaspati) continues to be oil even after hydrogenation. This question has been answered by their Lordships in the affirmative. It was observed that,—

    “……………Oil is a chemical compound of glycerine with fatty acids, or rather a glyceride of a mixture of fatty acids principally oleic, linoleic, stearic and palmitis, the proportion of the particular fat varying in the case of the oil from different oil-seeds and it remains a glyceride of fatty acids even after the hardaning process, though the relative proportion of the different types of fatty acids undergoes a slight change.”

    10. Consequently, it was held that in its essential nature therefore no change has occurred and it remains an oil-glyceride of fatty acids-that it was when it issued out of the press. Ot was also pointed out that hydrogenated oil serves the same purpose as a cooking medium and has identical food value as refined groundnut oil. There is no use to which the groundnut oilcan be put for which the hydrogenated oil cannot be used, nor is there any use to which the hydrogenated oil Page: 405could be put for which the raw oil could not be used. In the result, their Lordships held that hydrogenated oil still continues to be “groundnut oil” notwithstanding the processing which is merely for the purpose of rendering the oil more stable thus improving its keeping qualities for those who desire to consume groundnut oil. The decision of their Lordships in that case, therefore, leaves no room for argument that hydrogenated oil is not groundnut oil. In other words, hydrogenated oil or what is commonly known as “Vanaspati” is groundnut oil. In R.M Krishnaswamy Naidu & Sons v. State of Madras (2) relying upon Tungbhadra Industries Ltd.'s case (supra), learned Judges of the Madras High Court observed that Vanaspati is nothing other than groundnut oil in a more suitable and stable form, the process of manufacture only endowing it with qualities which would resist natural decay and deterioration.

    11. At this stage, we may refer to another Supreme Court case relied upon by the learned Single Judge i.e, Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. (3). The point for decision in that case was whether or not in producing Vanaspati from groundnut oil, a process of manufacture is involved. A question arose before their Lordships whether under the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act No. 1 of 1944 when the raw groundnut oil is refined and purified and a product known as refined oil comes into existence at an intermediate stage is in the processor manufacture of Vanaspati excise duty could be levied on the product of the refined oil. In that case, the petitioners challenged the legality of imposition of excise duty on what was called by the Taxing authorities as manufacture of refined oil from raw oil. The contention of the manufacturers was that the groundnut oil and Til oil purchased by them from the open market were subjected to different processes in order to turn them into Vanaspati. It was claimed that only the vegetable product of Vanaspati was liable to excise duty and that they did not at any staee produce any new product which could be defined as a vegetable non-assential oil upon which excise duty could be levied, that is to say, since the refined oil was produced in the course of the manufacture of vanaspati the State's attempt to levy excise duty on that refined oil was illegal. Their Lordships pointed out that excise duty is leviable on the manufacture of goods and not on their sale and the circumstance that the substance produced at an intermediate stage was not marketed, would not make any difference to liability to excise duty. They observed that numerous processes, necessary to turn the raw groundnut oil or the Til oil into the vegetable product, had to be undertaken. It was observed,—

    “The word ‘manufacture’ used as a verb is generally understood to mean as ‘bringing into existance a new substance’ and does not mean merely ‘to produce some change in a substance however minor in consequence the change may be.”

    12. Several observations made by their Lordships clearly indicate that in producing Vanaspati from a mixture of groundnut oil and Til oil as had been done by the petitioners in those cases, a process of manufacture was indeed involved. Thus the point involved in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. (3) (supra) was not whether Vanaspati is different from groundnut oil but the point for their Lordships' consideration was whether the process of manufacture was involved in producing Vanaspati and it was held that it did involve a process of manufacture. That case, in our humble opinion, does not deal with the point whether Vanaspati is different from Vanaspati oil or hydrogenated oil. The case, which has direct bearing on the point, is Tungbhadra Industries Ltd. Case (1) (supra), which we have referred to above.

    13. In this connection, it is pertinent to point out that in the market, “Vanaspati” is in fact identified with groundnut oil. The learned Single Judge lias also placed reliance on item A.17.15, “Refined Vegetable Oil” and Item No. A. 19, “Vanaspati, occurring in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, Page: 4061955, in support of his conclusion. “Refined Vegetable Oil” has been defined as any edible vegetable oil which is obtained by expression, neutralised with alkali bleached with absorbent earth and/or activated carbon and deodorised with steam, whereas under item No. A.19 “Vanaspati” has been defined to mean any refined edible vegetable oil or oils, subjected to a process of hydrogenation in any from. Merely because “refined vegetable oil” and “Vanaspati” have been put in different items in order to prescribe the standard of their purity, it cannot be said that they are different items and cannot be identified with each other. Besides that, Vanaspati is hydrogenated oil. In support of his view, the learned Judge has further referred to the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act 1944. Vegetable Oil Product Control Order, 1947, and Vegetable Oil Product (Standard of Quality) Order, 1972, to show that in the aforesaid laws, the Legislature has made a distinction between vegetable oils, refined vegetable oils and hydrogenated vegetable oils. However, in face of the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Tungbhadra's case (1) (supra), we are unable to accept the view taken by the learned Judge. Moreover, it would not be permissible to refer to other statutes to find out whether a particular commodity mentioned in the Schedule is an agricultural produce or not. As observed by their Lordships in Raunaq Ram Tara Chand v. State of Punjab (4), the commodities mentioned in the Schedule are statutorily agricultural produce under section 2(1)(i) of the Act and it is not possible to entertain the argument that the Court should undertake a judicial scrutiny of these items in order to come to a conclusion whether these are agricultural produce or not. In view of the definition, such an enquiry is out of place. It follows as a necessary corollary that we cannot import the definition or the meaning of a term in one Act into the another, but must interpret it in the light of the definition given in that statute itself. This also disposes of the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents based on Explanation to rule 64 of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Market Rules, 1963, that for the purpose of this rule, processed agriculture produce shall include all the notified agricultural produce processed in the market but not manufactured produce.

    14. Learned counsel for the respondents has also urged that the term “Vanaspati” must be given the meaning ascribed to it in common parlance. In support of this contention, he has relied on Commissioner of Sales Tax Madhya Pradesh, Indore v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh (5). This argument should not detain us inasmuch as we are of the opinion that hydrogenated oil is commonly called Vanaspati in the market. Some people call it “Vanaspati” while others call it “Vanaspati Ghee” or “Vanaspati Tel”, but it is in fact the same product.

    15. Learned counsel also relied upon Amritsar Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. U.S Naurath (6) wherein it has been held that the conversion of oil into vegetable Ghee amounts to manufacture of vegetable Ghee and for that reason the purchase of groundnut oil for the manufacture of vegetable Ghee is acquisition of goods for use in the manufacture of goods for sale. This case is based on Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd.'s case (3) (Supra). As we have already observed that conversion of oil into Vegetable Ghee or Vegetable oil amounts to manufacture but that has no bearing on the point involved in the case. In Ganesh Trading Co. Kamal v. State of Haryana (7), it was held that the appellants, who carried on business of buying paddy and after getting it dehusked sold the rice to the registered dealers, are not entitled to exclude the turnover relating to the paddy purchased from the total turnover in computing the assessable turnover for sales tax after sale of rice. It was observed by their Lordships that rice was produced out of paddy, but it is not true to say that paddy continued to be paddy even after dehusking. It had changed its identity inasmuch as rice is not known as paddy. Their Lordships went on to observe Page: 407that it is a misnomer to call rice as paddy as they are two different things in ordinary parlance. In our opinion, it depends upon particular commodities under consideration whether they are two different things in ordinary parlance or are one and the same known by different names. In the present case, we have come to the conclusion that Vanaspati oil and “Vanaspati” are the same and not two different things. In support of our view, we may refer to another Supreme Court decision State of Gujarat v. Sakarwala Brothers (8) wherein the question was whether “patasa”, “harda” and “alchidana” could be considered as ‘sugar’. The Supreme Court held that when sugar was processed into “patasa”, “harda” and “Alchidana”, it did not change its essential characteristics and its identity continued to be the same.

    16. The net result of the foregoing discussion is that hydrogenated oil or “Vanaspati” are included in the term “Vanaspati oil” used in the Schedule and market fees was leviable on the transactions of sale and purchase of ‘Vanaspati’ in the market area during the relevant period. Consequently, we allow these appeals, set aside the judgment by the learned Single Judge and dismiss all the 10 writ petitions, but make no order as to costs.

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    Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Jodhpur v. Ashok Kumar
    (Dec 5, 1979)